Judgments of the Carter-Reagan Debate: The Eyes of the Beholders

In line with social-psychological theory and with findings fromprior analyses of the impact of televised campaign debates,the 1980 Carter-Reagan debate seems to have been interpretedlargely in light of preexisting candidate preferences. Knowledgeof whether a viewer intended to vote for Carter or Reagan and,for undecided voters, knowledge of position on the liberal-conservativecontinuum, permit accurate predictions to be made of judgmentsof who won the debate.     

An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories

Do polls simply measure intended voter behavior or can they affect it and, thus, change election outcomes? Do candidate ballot positions or the results of previous elections affect voter behavior? We conduct several series of experimental, three-candidate elections and use the data to provide answers to these questions. In these elections, we pay subjects conditionally on election outcomes to create electorates with publicly known preferences. A majority (but less than two-thirds) of the voters are split in their preferences between two similar candidates, while a minority (but plurality) favor a third, dissimilar candidate. If all voters voted sincerely, the third candidate — a Condorcet loser — would win the elections. We find that pre-election polls significantly reduce the frequency with which the Condorcet loser wins. Further, the winning candidate is usually the majority candidate who is listed first on the poll and election ballots. The evidence also shows that a shared history enables majority voters to coordinate on one of their favored candidates in sequences of identical elections. With polls, majority-preferred candidates often alternate as election winners.     

Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections

This article focuses on voting systems that (i) aim to select the Condorcet candidate in the common case where one exists and (ii) impede manipulation by exploiting voter knowledge of electorate preferences. The systems are relatively simple, both mathematically and for voter understanding, and are fully workable for large-scale elections. Their designated equilibrium strategies, under which voters vote sincerely, involve discerning the top one or two candidates in the preference ordering of the electorate. One set of systems uses its ballot to obtain voters’ preference rankings plus approval votes, and tallies the latter if no Condorcet winner exists. It offers solid advantages vis-à-vis instant-runoff voting, which uses a kindred ballot and has attracted recent reformers. Another set of systems uses only approval voting, which is examined from a new angle.     

Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting

This paper describes the correspondences between the results given by backward induction (BI) and iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) in binary voting agendas with sequential voting. When the voters have strict preferences over all candidates, the strategies that survive IEWDS all select the unique candidate selected by the BI strategy profiles. But if some voters are indifferent, this result no longer holds. However, when there are only two candidates, it is possible to demonstrate strong relationships between the results given by BI and IEWDS, even when some voters have indifferences.     

Media use and political learning: Comparing Trump supporters to celebrity candidate voters

This study examines whether political media use behaviors of voters who supported Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election align with those of “celebrity candidate voters” portrayed in the literature. The study used a national online survey (N = 1,608) conducted during the 2016 primary, and findings reveal that Trump supporters, more than other voters, are driven by entertainment motivations and follow campaign news using entertainment media: specifically, the video-sharing site YouTube. Although Trump voters are interested in the campaign, their level of political knowledge is lower than other voters, and no one media outlet made a significant contribution to their learning. A comparison group of other voters showed significant knowledge gains from news websites and Twitter. Results for Trump voters are consistent with scholars’ characterization of the celebrity candidate audience, particularly in studies suggesting that celebrity politicians may increase citizens’ engagement through entertainment gratifications rather than by a desire to become informed.     

Do Absentee Voters Differ from Polling Place Voters?: New Evidence from California

In the 2003 California gubernatorial recall election 2,775,785absentee ballots were cast, representing about 30 percent ofall voters statewide. Given the number of absentee ballots andthe increasing propensity for voters in California and elsewhereto choose this voting method, we some basic questions: Who areabsentee voters, and are they different from polling place voters?To answer these questions, we fielded a statewide survey ofabsentee voters in the days before the October 7 recall election,asking respondents why they voted absentee, their partisan andideological preferences, demographic characteristics, and otherrelevant questions. We find that absentee voters do not differsignificantly from the overall state electorate in terms oftheir vote preferences, despite being older and better educated.For example, 56 percent of absentee voters in our survey voted"yes" on the recall, compared with 55 percent for the entirestate, according to official returns. Further, absentee votersfavored Arnold Schwarzenegger over Cruz Bustamante by a considerablemargin, similar to the overall election results. We found partyregistration among absentee voters to be nearly identical tostatewide partisan registration.     

ELECTORAL POLITICS AND THE EXECUTIVE VETO: A PREDICTIVE THEORY

We argue that winner-take-all voting in states and the unequal distribution of electoral votes across states in presidential elections makes incumbent presidents rationally place more weight on the preferences of voters in closely contested, larger states when making policy decisions. This hypothesis is tested by examining whether presidential veto decisions are influenced by the floor votes of senators from these electorally crucial states. In a pooled sample of 325 individual bills from 1970 through 1988, we find significant evidence of this behavior by incumbent presidents.     

The Undeserving Rich: “Moral Values” and the White Working Class1

White working‐class citizens who vote for the Republican Party have been fodder for much political discussion and speculation recently, and a debate has arisen about the role that “moral values” played in the political decision making of this segment of voters. In this article, we defend a version of the moral values claim. We show that although the Republicans’ policies are unpopular, they are bundled with an overarching moral framework that is extremely resonant to this set of voters, and we use in‐depth interviews to uncover this framework. A key feature of this framework, on which in the 2004 presidential election George W. Bush scored high and John Kerry scored low, is the appropriate attitude to wealth, which serves as an indicator for a candidate’s general moral philosophy and as a heuristic about whether the candidate will govern with working‐class voters’ interests in mind. National Election Studies data support the argument that this was a key influence on the voting decision in 2004, even controlling for voters’ partisan identification.     

DECEPTION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THEORY AND LABORATORY EVIDENCE

We model two‐candidate elections in which (1) voters are uncertain about candidates' attributes; and (2) candidates can inform voters of their attributes by sending advertisements. We compare between political campaigns with truthful advertising and campaigns in which there is a small chance of deceptive advertising. Our model predicts that voters should vote in‐line with an advertisement's information. We test our model's predictions using laboratory elections. We find, in the presence of even a small probability that an advertisement is deceptive, voters become substantially more likely to elect a “low‐quality” candidate. We discuss implications of this for existing models of voting decisions. (JEL C92, D72, D82)     

Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference

The Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate who would be able to defeat all other candidates in a series of pairwise elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting procedure is the conditional probability that it will elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists. The study considers the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules (WSR's) on three candidates for large electorates when voter indifference between candidates is allowed. It is shown that increasing the proportion of voters who have partial indifference will increase the probability that a Condorcet winner exists, and will also increase the Condorcet efficiency of all WSR's. The same observation is observed when the proportion of voters with complete preferences on candidates is reduced. Borda Rule is shown to be the WSR with maximum Condorcet efficiency over a broad range of assumptions related to voter preferences. The result of forcing voters to completely rank all candidates, by randomly breaking ties on candidates that are viewed as indifferent, leads to a reduction in the probability that a Condorcet winner exists and to a reduction in the Condorcet efficiency of all WSR's. Received: 31 July 1999/Accepted: 11 February 2000     

Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study

We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences, we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics (under two-round voting) or they just vote sincerely (under single transferable vote).     

AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEMS: TRANSPARENCY,DONATIONS, AND POLICY CHOICES

We experimentally study the transparency effect of alternative campaign finance systems on donations, election outcomes, policy choices, and welfare. Three alternatives are considered: one where donors' preferences and donations are unobserved by the candidate and public; one where they are observed by the candidate but not the public; and one where they are observed by all. We label them full anonymity (FA), partial anonymity (PA), and no anonymity (NA), respectively. We find that in NA and PA candidates consistently respond to donations by choosing policies favoring the donors. FA, in contrast, is the most successful in limiting the influence of donations on policy choices. Donors benefit greatly from the possibility of donations whereas social welfare may be harmed in some treatments. To our knowledge, this article is the first to investigate the effect of different campaign finance systems distinguished by their transparency level. (JEL D72)     

Alienation,indifference and the choice of ideological position

In this paper we describe a simple model of individual voting behavior and present its implications for the candidate positioning problem under both vote and plurality maximization. Under our assumptions, some voters at the extremes of the ideological spectrum typically will not vote because they are alienated by the equilibrium location of candidates. There will also be some voters in the middle of the ideological spectrum who will not vote because they are indifferent between the equilibrium locations of the candidates. Both the abstention from alienation and from indifference arise explicitly from utility maximization. Once we allow for alienation and indifference, the two alternative candidate objective functions (vote maximization and plurality maximization) yield different outcomes. In particular, we show that under vote maximization the Median Voter (or Minimum Differentiation) outcome will not arise. On the other hand, under plurality maximization, the Median Voter outcome may or may not hold, depending on the distribution of voter preferences.We should like to thank Jerry Fusselman, Jon Hamilton, Mel Hinich, Charlie Holt and participants at seminars at the University of Virginia, Northwestern University and the 1989 Meetings of the Public Choice Society and the Economic Science Association for their helpful comments.     

Effects of Political Advertising

Relationships between broadcast advertising exposure and variouscognitive and affective orientations were assessed in a surveyof voters during a congressional election campaign. Exposurewas moderately correlated with political knowledge and interest.Highly exposed voters were somewhat more likely to attach higheragenda priorities to issues and candidate attributes emphasizedin the commercials. Personal affect toward each candidate wasmildly associated with advertising exposure frequency.     

STATE LIQUOR LICENSING, IMPLICIT CONTRACTING, AND DRY/WET COUNTIES

Local option liquor laws are generally interpreted as granting voters the right to choose between allowing and prohibiting alcoholic beverage sales. This paper argues that the real choice confronting voters is between legal sales according to state-prescribed rules and illegal sales according to an informal set of locally-determined rules. Given this choice, rational voters will choose the option with the lower relative price. State laws restricting the number of licenses that can be issued in legally wet jurisdictions prove to be more powerful than religious preferences in explaining the pattern of dry counties.     

Genealogy of an Emerging Field: Foundations for the Study of Media and Religion

This study triangulated research methods to analyze how the public debate on a controversial issue was framed, and by whom, as a means of understanding the process and outcome of that debate. Its findings support the idea that public debates are framed by all involved parties, not just the news media. It also considered how the relative power position held by each side in this debate may have affected their interactions with the news media.     

Do Candidates Run as Women and Men or Democrats and Republicans? The Impact of Party and Sex on Issue Campaigns

Previous work on the campaigns of women and men has tried to identify whether these candidates campaign for office by focusing on or downplaying gender-stereotyped issues and personality traits. We continue that investigation with a unique data set that uses all campaign advertisements created by almost 400 candidates for Congress in 2010. In examining whether candidate sex or political party identification are the primary influences on the issues candidates present to voters, we determine that all candidates, women and men, campaign as strategic politicians, crafting campaigns around the issues of the day and adopting partisan perspectives on those issues. We find no evidence that women or men attempt to “play to” gender stereotypes in their advertisements.     

The two-party system under alternative voting procedures

Countries that elect their policy-makers by means of Plurality Voting tend to have a two-party system. This observation can be explained by the strategic behavior of voters. This article derives two broad classes of voting procedures under which strategic voting behavior induces a two-party system under standard assumptions on voter preferences. One class consists of the voting procedures with unique top-score, i.e., under which a voter can cast a top-score vote for only one candidate (e.g., Plurality Voting, Borda Count). The other class consists of the voting procedures that permit truncated ballots, i.e., under which voters do not have to cast all their votes (e.g., Approval Voting). This analysis suggests that the key for strategic voting behavior to induce a two-party system is that voters can always cast a different score for the two candidates they rank first and second on their ballots.     

Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule

In this paper we show in the context of voting games with plurality rule that the “perfect” equilibrium concept does not appear restrictive enough, since, independently of preferences, it can exclude at most the election of only one candidate. Furthermore, some examples show that there are “perfect” equilibria that are not “proper”. However, also some “proper” outcome is eliminated by sophisticated voting, while Mertens' stable set fully satisfies such criterium, for generic plurality games. Moreover, we highlight a weakness of the simple sophisticated voting principle. Finally, we find that, for some games, sophisticated voting (and strategic stability) does not elect the Condorcet winner, neither it respects Duverger's law, even with a large number of voters. Received: 16 March 1999/Accepted: 25 September 1999