Predicting corporate failure— Some results for the UK corporate sector

A large number of authors have developed statistical models, which are based solely on conventional financial ratios constructed from published accounting data, with the aim of predicting corporate failure as evidenced by the event of ‘bankruptcy’. The purpose of this paper is to report some empirical results for a study of the UK corporate sector in which corporate failure is predicted employing a statistical model which incorporates both conventional accounting ratios and a number of new variables which are not derived from profit and loss accounts and balance sheet items, but which are computed from annual company reports and accounts. The empirical results suggesting that our new variables enhance the predictive power of models which employ conventional financial ratios only.     

A future for the corporate planner?

Although not initiated by the event, it seems appropriate that this article is written on the tenth anniversary of the founding of The Society for Long Range Planning. It is entirely coincidental that Ansoff's book ‘Corporate Strategy’, which has evolved into the standard work on corporate planning, also appeared about a decade ago. This fortuitous coincidence has been further emphasized by the recent publication of another book from the same authority which introduces an entirely new factor into the future prospects for corporate planners. An attempt is made here to assess its implications.     

Quo Vadis? Suggestions for future corporate governance research

In this paper I first review the basic tenets of agency theory and theory of managerial capitalism as well as some of the major research in these areas then suggest for areas for future research that go beyond the extant empirical work. First, I suggest that it would be useful to reconsider the basic nature of the agency relationship, taking into account that while equity holders can be considered the principal, the board of directors may be more realistically in need of agent-like controls. Second, the complementary or supplementary nature of the monitoring/incentive alignment relationship has been shown theoretically but the empirical evidence is equivocal and needs future investigation. Third, there has been very limited research on the construct validity of archival measures of the sort used in agency theory. This requires the use of methodologies outside those of the more conventional type used in agency theory (i.e., from economics and finance). Finally, agency theory development would profit greatly by more extensive use of research methods such as laboratory studies and survey methodology and the integration of concepts such as personality and control processes.

Is corporate governance different for the Lebanese banking system?

This paper investigates the effect of board size and its composition on bank’s performance in an emerging context. This study includes 749 firm years of data on the banking industry in Lebanon from 1992 to 2006. The data contains all nationwide banks in operation in any year over the studied period. Since some banks entered and/or exited over the sample period, there is an unbalanced panel data, where an Ordinary Least Squares regression may create problems of interpretation. Within this framework, we use a fixed-effect model which produces unbiased and consistent estimates of the coefficients. This paper reports that bank performance is positively related to board size. It also identifies a quadratic relationship between bank performance and board independence. Both return-on-assets and return-on-equity first decrease and then increase in direct proportion to the increased percentage of outside directors on the board. This paper sheds some light on the differential impact of corporate governance on firm performance across industries and countries. It concentrates on banks in developing countries that are generally known to suffer from high asymmetric information and where concerns about safety and soundness remain. Hence, it contributes to the existing debate on appropriate regulations for an effective and stable financial system in the Arab world. Also, it complements the Basel Committee standards for bank supervision and capital adequacy reinforcement, and offers regulators some evidence on the relationship between board size and bank performance in a developing country such as Lebanon.     

Does the market value corporate response to climate change?

Motivated by the controversial debate on mandatory reductions of greenhouse gases in the U.S., this study explores whether the market values corporate response to tackle carbon dioxide emissions. We measure corporate responses using the measure of media tone based on the positive and negative words in each news article. Our results show that the market reacts favorably to the negative media exposure of corporate response to climate change over the announcement period and the one-year period, which implies that the socially responsible action to tackle climate change is costly. We further find that the positive response is less pronounced for firms from polluting industries and firms with poor environmental performance.     

Women on corporate boards: key influencers or tokens?

This paper investigates how the increasing ratio of women directors on corporate boards is associated with decision-making dynamics, specifically the perceived participation and influence of the women on the board. We test hypotheses using a sample of 458 women on Norwegian corporate boards where the ratio of women directors among board members ranges from 11 to 100%. Overall, we find that women perceive that they have a high level of information sharing, a low level of self-censorship, and a high level of influence across the different ratios of board membership held by women directors. These results support the notion of women directors as significant influencers. However, the results also show that women directors perceive that they do receive more information and engage in more informal social interaction when the ratio increases, and perceived influence does also increase when the ratio increases.     

Is there a distinctive MENA model of corporate governance?

This study explores the diversity of corporate governance practices in the MENA region, with particular emphasis on Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Interviews with senior managers find that the state, foreign investors and large family groups act as monitors of corporations in both countries, whereas the role of institutional investors and other shareholder activist groups is minimal. Ownership was more concentrated in Egypt than in Saudi Arabia, particularly in family firms. However, control is firmly in the hands of dominant shareholders even when ownership concentration is not high enough to merit such control and boards are dominated by majority shareholders. The high levels of concentrated ownership and control, and the low levels of disclosure and transparency, clearly differentiates the corporate governance system in the region from that in Anglo-American countries while the importance of state and family shareholders reflects characteristics of organisation and control found in many developing countries, predominantly those in Asia. However, it remains premature to speak of a unique MENA model of corporate governance.     

Does strategic corporate performance depend on corporate financial architecture? Empirical study of European,Russian and other emerging market’s firms

Performance of the firm depends on its structural dimensions: capital structure, ownership structure and corporate governance. Their interactions are known as corporate financial architecture according to S. Myers. In this paper we analyze financial architecture which is a mix of ownership structure, capital structure, control and board’s composition, and therefore, provides the given framework for improving corporate performance. We contribute to the literature by different attributes of our study. In contrast to most empirical papers on performance, we develop integrated rather than segmented approach combining the intrinsic components of corporate financial design in one research model. We introduce new variable to capture the structure of ownership for the purpose of performance analysis. Our third contribution is based on comparative analysis of the influence of financial architecture over corporate performance in rather different capital market environment: developed European and emerging (developing) capital market’s countries. We start with a classic empirical model of the impact of ownership structure, capital structure and other components of financial architecture on the corporate performance. Further we verify the validity of exogenous nature of key variables of the classic model when applying it to companies in developed and emerging market environment. Our results could have some important policy implications for the firms in normal economic environment as well as in the period of global economic crisis. We found that the higher proportion of related ownership which indicates investors with significant voting power and the board’s composition affect firm performance positively. The related shareholders and independent directors seem to add more value to firms while the impact of government ownership differs depending on the country. The emerging market’s sample versus the one from developed countries proves the stronger influence of corporate financial architecture over performance.     

Social forecasting: An integral part of corporate planning?

The increasing need for business to monitor the social dimensions of its environment and, hopefully make some forecasts of future trends has met with some constructive response from academics and consultants although not as yet on a very liberal scale. The published literature does not indicate to what extent companies in general attemp social forecasting and, where they do, the degree of integration which exists within their corporate planning systems. The authors, therefore, decided to survey a sample of British organizations to see if they could shed some light on these issues and thereby add some information to the excellent accounts of individual cases of social forecasting in, they suspect, the more advanced and atypical companies. The survey suggests a general picture of: awareness of the value of social forecasting; fairly widespread ignorance of the techniques which do exist, primitive though these may largely be; successful integration of social forecasting into the corporate planning systems of a substantial number of organizations but not in the majority.     

The future of U.S. government—corporate relations

The future of government—corporate relations in the United States was studied using the Delphi research methodology. An expert panel estimated the dates of occurrence for 55 events, forming a futures scenario. The events were grouped into the five topic areas of the natural environment, employment, corporate governance, the economy and regulation/planning. The findings from the research indicated that the federal government will play an increasingly active and important role in the regulation of business over the next 20 years. However, there will not be drastic changes in structure or major discontinuities in the institutional relationships.     

Is philanthropy being used by corporate wrongdoers to buy good will?

While an increasing number of philosophers and community activists argue in favor of corporate philanthropy, the practice is not without its critics. A number of firms that have restated suspect earnings also appear on lists of top corporate givers or are ranked among most ethical firms, prompting the suspicion that companies are using philanthropy as a kind of moral window-dressing. This paper explores whether restating firms are (1) using philanthropy to divert public attention away from suspect financial results; or (2) making donations to buy good will or a better reputation after they have been required to restate suspect earnings. Our results paint a mixed picture of the morality of corporate philanthropy. Firms forced to restate suspect earnings do seem to be using philanthropy either to divert attention away from their lackluster earnings or to elicit good will from the large community after such restatements. However, the reverse is not true. Just because a firm is a top giver, it does not follow that it is more likely to be a restater of earnings. Nor did we find evidence that firms ranked as very ethical are more likely to be restaters than non-restaters. Firms engage in philanthropy for a variety of reasons. We should not uncritically praise them for their giving, but neither should we regard with a cynical eye all corporate reputations for goodness or all corporation donations.     

Does one hat fit all? The case of corporate leadership structure

Recent corporate scandals have led to renewed campaigns for governance reforms, including calls for the separation of CEO and chairman positions. This paper argues that this trend ignores the possibility that differences in firm characteristics determine the appropriateness of separating or combining the two positions. I propose and test hypotheses on the determinants of leadership structure using a sample of 1,883 firms. I find that organizational complexity, CEO reputation, and managerial ownership increase the probability of CEO duality. I also find that whether CEO duality benefits or hurts the firm is contingent on firm and CEO characteristics. These results suggest that firms do consider the costs and benefits of alternative leadership structures, and that requiring all firms to separate CEO and chairman duties may be counterproductive.

Can institutional investors fix the corporate governance problem? Some Danish evidence

It has been advocated within corporate governance that institutional investors may discipline management in listed firms and thereby alleviate the free rider problem associated with dispersed ownership. This article tests this hypothesis using a sample of Danish listed firms during 1998–2001 determining, whether ownership by institutional investors impacts performance, measured by Tobin’s q. Using three stage least squares, it is shown that aggregate ownership by institutional investors does not influence firm performance. However, when decomposing the results, it is found that joint ownership by the largest two Danish institutional investors, has a significant negative impact firm performance. Ownership by banks and to a lesser extent insurance companies significantly influences firm performance positively. The results somehow challenge the conventional wisdom, arguing that the black box view of institutional investors should be abandon. Therefore it is suggested that a more careful analysis should be devoted to each institutional investors own legal environment.

Is the German system of corporate governance converging towards the Anglo-American model?

This paper analyses whether the German corporate governance is converging towards Anglo-American practices. We summarise the extant empirical evidence on the various governance mechanisms that economic theory suggests ensure efficiency and describe recent legal developments. We find no clear signs of convergence in form, i.e. the main distinctive features of the German system have remained largely unaltered. However, changes occurred over the last decade (specially in the legal framework) suggest a certain convergence in function, i.e. some governance mechanisms have effectively incorporated aims and/or goals generally associated with the Anglo-American model.

Is corporate governance of private equity targets more effective for risk mitigation?

Journal of Management and Governance - Private equity is a source of finance and a governance device characterised by active monitoring through sponsors that intervene in targets’ corporate...     

How does globalization affect corporate governance and accountability? A perspective from MNEs

This paper addresses how the global activities undertaken by multinational enterprises (MNEs) in international settings impact corporate governance mechanisms and accountability systems. International corporate governance and accountability research, whether from a political science, economics, finance, or accounting perspective, has thus far predominantly focused on the comparison of corporate governance schemes in different countries and on the investigation of institutional parameters that determine these schemes. Straying from this line of inquiry, this article discusses how globalization at the firm level affects governance and accountability systems at parent- and subsidiary-levels. It emphasizes how an MNE's globalization attributes such as globalization scale, foreign adaptation, global competition, and international experience influence the design of governance mechanisms such as board size, board composition, executive compensation, market discipline, interlocking directorate, ownership concentration, duality and inbreeding, as well as the design of accountability systems such as accounting information, auditing standards, and financial and non-financial disclosures. This article bases its conjectures on information processing and agency theories.     

The interaction between stock prices and corporate investment: is Europe different?

I find limited evidence of firm learning from stock prices in Europe and uncover multifaceted complementarities between firm informational and operating environments in determining investment sensitivity to stock prices. Specifically, European firms seemingly do not shift away from their own (peer) stock prices even in instances in which their peers’ (own) stock prices become relatively more informative about firms’ fundamentals. This is consistent with European managers adopting more conservative strategies relative to their U.S.-based peers, and stock prices being less revealing in Europe than in the U.S. Furthermore, while a firm may attach equal weight to both its own stock prices and peer price innovations when peer firms are relatively smaller, investment responds more positively to peers’ price shocks than to that firm’s own stock prices when peers are relatively larger. Interestingly, investment sensitivity to peers’ stock prices decreases in peers’ market share, operating performance, and capital intensity. The decrease is accentuated when peer firms have more informative stock prices and are industry leaders or more capital intensive, thereby signaling perceived reduced growth opportunities. Broadly, these results imply that the specifics of the interaction between stock prices and firm behavior in the U.S. do not necessarily generalize to Europe. More important, these different learning patterns are partly attributable to differences in the amount of internal information, which in turn depends on country-level institutional infrastructures.