Inequality aversion,impartiality and utilitarianism

Egalitarianism presents the problem of baseline-dependence: egalitarianism from where? No collective choice can be egalitarian for all choices of a baseline. So the question arises as to whether and how the egalitarian program can be weakened in order to be compatible with baseline-independence. I characterize the set of choices that satisfy a minimal degree of inequality-aversion, embodied in the generalized Lorenz criterion, independently of the choice of a baseline. It turns out that this set coincides with the Lorenz-Utilitarian set, the set of Utilitarian choices which are not Lorenz dominated for any choice of baseline. Either this set is empty or it coincides with the Utilitarian set (when this is a singleton). Moreover, I also characterize the full Utilitarian set by using a standard requirement of impartiality (the Suppes-Sen criterion).     

Segregation,informativeness and Lorenz dominance

It is possible to partially order cities according to the informativeness of neighborhoods about their ethnic groups. It is also possible to partially order cities with two ethnic groups according to the Lorenz criterion. We show that a segregation order satisfies four well-established segregation principles if and only if it is consistent with the informativeness criterion. We then use this result to show that for the two-group case, the Lorenz and the informativeness criteria are equivalent.     

On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games

According to Coleman’s index of collective power, a decision rule that generates a larger number of winning coalitions imparts the collectivity a higher a priori power to act. By the virtue of the monotonicity conditions, a decision rule is totally characterized by the set of minimal winning coalitions. In this paper, we investigate the structure of the families of minimal winning coalitions corresponding to maximal and proper simple voting games (SVG). We show that if the proper and maximal SVG is swap robust and all the minimal winning coalitions are of the same size, then the SVG is a specific (up to an isomorphism) system. We also provide examples of proper SVGs to show that the number of winning coalitions is not monotone with respect to the intuitively appealing system parameters like the number of blockers, number of non-dummies or the size of the minimal blocking set.     

Ecological restoration volunteers: the benefits of participation

There is an international volunteer movement to protect and restore sensitive natural landscapes. In Illinois alone, almost 40,000 acres of rare prairie, oak savanna, wetlands and woodland ecosystems in urban and suburban communities are monitored and managed by volunteers. As natural habitats disappear or become degraded worldwide, it is increasingly important to understand how a personal involvement with nature, in the form of restoration, benefits the individual as well as aiding in species and ecosystem survival. This study examined the satisfactions that volunteers derive from prairie restoration in the Chicago metropolitan area. Questionnaire responses from 263 volunteers indicate that volunteers experience high levels of many different satisfactions. Tenure, frequency and extent of involvement in restoration were used to predict restoration satisfactions, life satisfaction and life functioning. Implications for recruiting and sustaining volunteer involvement in restoration efforts are discussed.     

Uncovering some subtleties of the uncovered set: Social choice theory and distributive politics

 Although the uncovered set has occupied a prominent role in social choice theory, its exact shape has never been determined in a general setting. This paper calculates the uncovered set when actors have pork barrel, or purely distributive, preferences, and shows that in this setting nearly the entire Pareto set is uncovered. The result casts doubt on the usefulness of the uncovered set as a general solution concept and suggests that to predict the distribution of political benefits one must explicitly model the institutions that structure collective choice. Received: 29 April 1993/Accepted: 28 June 1996     

Characterizations of Lorenz curves and income distributions

The purpose of this paper is to propose and justify the use of a few measures of inequality for summarizing the basic information provided by the Lorenz curve. By exploiting the fact that the Lorenz curve can be considered analogous to a cumulative distribution function it is demonstrated that the moments of the Lorenz curve generate a convenient family of inequality measures, called the Lorenz family of inequality measures. In particular, the first few moments, which often capture the essential features of a distribution function, are proposed as the primary quantities for summarizing the information content of the Lorenz curve. Employed together these measures, which include the Gini coefficient, also provide essential information on the shape of the income distribution. Relying on the principle of diminishing transfers it is shown that the Lorenz measures, as opposed to the Atkinson measures, have transfer-sensitivity properties that depend on the shape of the income distribution. Received: 20 July 1998/Accepted: 10 September 1999     

The measurement of opportunity inequality: a cardinality-based approach

We consider the problem of ranking distributions of opportunity sets on the basis of equality. First, conditional on a given ranking of individual opportunity sets, we define the notion of an equalizing transformation. Then, assuming that the opportunity sets are ranked according to the cardinality ordering, we formulate the analogues of the notions of the Lorenz partial ordering, equalizing (Dalton) transfers, and inequality averse social welfare functions – concepts which play a central role in the literature on income inequality. Our main result is a cardinality-based analogue of the fundamental theorem of inequality measurement: one distribution Lorenz dominates another if and only if the former can be obtained from the latter by a finite sequence of rank preserving equalizations, and if and only if the former is ranked higher than the latter by all inequality averse social welfare functions. In addition, we characterize the smallest monotonic and transitive extension of our cardinality-based Lorenz inequality ordering. Received: 2 May 1995 / Accepted: 11 October 1996     

The Lorenz zonotope and multivariate majorizations

 The distribution of d commodities among n individuals is described by an n×d row stochastic matrix. We present a geometric approach to order such matrices. For a row stochastic matrix the Lorenz zonotope is investigated, which is a higher dimensional generalization of the Lorenz curve. The Lorenz zonotope is a convex polytope. The inclusion of Lorenz zonotopes defines an ordering between row stochastic matrices, which is a multivariate majorization. For a cone in nonnegative d-space, a cone extension of the Lorenz zonotope and the respective inclusion ordering are introduced. We study this class of orderings and establish equivalence with known majorizations. It is provided a finite set of inequalities to which the ordering is equivalent. Received: 16 February 1994/Accepted: 22 May 1996     

Multi-profile intergenerational social choice

In an infinite-horizon setting, Ferejohn and Page showed that any social welfare function satisfying Arrow’s axioms and stationarity must be a dictatorship of the first generation. Packel strengthened this result by proving that no collective choice rule generating complete social preferences can satisfy unlimited domain, weak Pareto and stationarity. We prove that this impossibility survives under a domain restriction and without completeness. We propose an alternative stationarity axiom and show that a social welfare function on a specific domain satisfies this modified version and some standard social choice axioms if and only if it is a chronological dictatorship.     

Macro-economics and infant behaviour: a sociological treatment of the free-rider problem

A number of general issues in the social sciences are currently being addressed through consideration of the free-rider problem, also known as the problem of collective action. Many different ways of comparing and evaluating competing social theories can be co-ordinated as discussions of the problem. In attending to its relatively simple structure fundamental issues routinely arise, concerning the basis of social order, the nature of power, and the invariants of human nature itself, if such exist. In this paper I adopt a sociological perspective in defending the plausibility of one kind of solution to the problem, and then explore the general significance of that solution in a frankly speculative way.     

Reported job satisfaction: what does it mean?

We emphasize the major influences of experienced utility gaps or regret, i.e. the difference between what happened and what might have happened, on job satisfaction. The main prediction that we test is that job satisfaction correlates with the wage gaps experienced in the past and present, holding other job-related satisfactions constant, with the possible exception of young workers. We further test that this effect of wage gaps on job satisfaction declines with working experience. We find evidence on a Canadian cross-section that the past matters.     

An extended Gini approach to inequality measurement

It is well-known that, when the Lorenz curves do not cross, the ranking of distributions provided by the Gini index is identical to the one implied by the Lorenz criterion. This does not preclude inequality as measured by the Gini index to increase while the Lorenz curves cross. A suitable modification of the Gini coefficient allows the Lorenz quasi-ordering to coincide with the ranking generated by the application of unanimity over the class of extended Gini indices. Recently the Lorenz quasi-ordering and the underlying principle of transfers have come under attack, while new criteria – the differentials, deprivation and satisfaction quasi-orderings – have been proposed for providing unambiguous rankings of distributions. We suggest to weaken the principle of transfers by imposing additional restrictions on the progressive transfers, which take into account the positions on the income scale of the donors and beneficiaries. We identify the subclasses of extended Gini indices that satisfy these weaker versions of the principle of transfers and we show that the application of unanimity among these classes generate rankings of distributions that coincide with those implied by the differentials, deprivation and satisfaction quasi-orderings.      

Ranking intersecting Lorenz curves

This paper is concerned with the problem of ranking Lorenz curves in situations where the Lorenz curves intersect and no unambiguous ranking can be attained without introducing weaker ranking criteria than first-degree Lorenz dominance. To deal with such situations two alternative sequences of nested dominance criteria between Lorenz curves are introduced. At the limit the systems of dominance criteria appear to depend solely on the income share of either the worst-off or the best-off income recipient. This result suggests two alternative strategies for increasing the number of Lorenz curves that can be strictly ordered; one that places more emphasis on changes that occur in the lower part of the income distribution and the other that places more emphasis on changes that occur in the upper part of the income distribution. Both strategies turn out to depart from the Gini coefficient; one requires higher degree of downside and the other higher degree of upside inequality aversion than what is exhibited by the Gini coefficient. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the sequences of dominance criteria characterize two separate systems of nested subfamilies of inequality measures and thus provide a method for identifying the least restrictive social preferences required to reach an unambiguous ranking of a given set of Lorenz curves. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the introduction of successively more general transfer principles than the Pigou–Dalton principle of transfers forms a helpful basis for judging the normative significance of higher degrees of Lorenz dominance. The dominance results for Lorenz curves do also apply to generalized Lorenz curves and thus provide convenient characterizations of the corresponding social welfare orderings.     

Das Aggregationsproblem bei Mikro-Makro-Erklärungen

The present paper discusses a component of the micro-macro explanatory model (i.e. the individualistic research program): the question is whether and, if so, how collective properties (or, equivalently, macro variables) can be constructed by properties of individuals (i.e. by aggregating micro variables). This is the aggregation problem. After sketching the procedure of micro-macro explanations and its possible problems the state of research in regard to the aggregation problem is described. Then two kinds of aggregation are analyzed in detail: analytical aggregations (i.e. the micro-to-macro relationship is a logical one) and empirical aggregations (i.e. the micro-to-macro relationship is empirical). It is further discussed whether there exist collective properties that cannot be reconstructed individualistically. Many collective properties emerge by the unintended consequences of individual action. It is argued that the structure of micro-macro explanations do not differ if these consequences are intended or unintended. In the final part it is claimed that there are emergent properties but that they do not invalidate methodological individualism. In this context it is argued that “ontological” arguments are not helpful for solving explanatory problems of the social sciences.     

Role Selection: The Influence of Internalized Vocabularies of Motive

The notion of internalized vocabulary of motive is introduced in an analysis of role selection that also incorporates the concepts person, self, identity, and role-taking. The selection process is described as being influenced by the person's attempt to assemble a role pattern which provides an overall source of validation and satisfaction for an internalized vocabulary of motive. The role-choice implications of the balance of satisfactions among what are called operating dominant roles, model dominant roles and ephemeral roles are considered, and a measurement technique is suggested. It is argued that what appears to be conformist role enactment by a person can actually be a creative act of role selection. The role taken “as is” can effectively contribute another component to an idiosyncratically balanced role array assembled and enacted by the individual.     

Averaging Lorenz curves

A large number of functional forms has been suggested in the literature for estimating Lorenz curves that describe the relationship between income and population shares. The traditional way of overcoming functional-form uncertainty when estimating a Lorenz curve is to choose the function that best fits the data in some sense. In this paper we describe an alternative approach for accommodating functional-form uncertainty, namely, how to use Bayesian model averaging to average the alternative functional forms. In this averaging process, the different Lorenz curves are weighted by their posterior probabilities of being correct. Unlike a strategy of picking the best-fitting function, Bayesian model averaging gives posterior standard deviations that reflect the functional-form uncertainty. Building on our earlier work (Chotikapanich and Griffiths, 2002), we construct likelihood functions using the Dirichlet distribution and estimate a number of Lorenz functions for Australian income units. Prior information is formulated in terms of the Gini coefficient and the income shares of the poorest 10% and poorest 90% of the population. Posterior density functions for these quantities are derived for each Lorenz function and are averaged over all the Lorenz functions.     

BLACK ATTITUDES AND THE 1960s BLACK RIOTS:

Nearly all aggregate-level studies of political violence use objective indicators to assess an aggrieved group's dissatisfactions and deprivations. Critics of this research often note that there are no necessary connections between perceived grievances and their objective counterparts. Moreover, even if such correlations do exist, detractors contend there is no inherent relation between felt grievances and participation in—or support of—collective violent protest. The 1968 Kerner Commission's 15-Cities Study provides a unique set of data to test both of these objections. Correlational analyses of aggregated subjective reports of black grievances and their objective counterparts reveal a weak relation; however, such reports do not correlate with riot activity in directions that would be predicted by conventional wisdom or much of current social science theory.     

Determinants of management’s organizational structure in the public sector

A model is developed to identify factors that are important in determining whether a municipality employs a labor relations specialist as chief negotiator and, if not, whether a municipality has a labor relations specialist on its collective bargaining team. Results indicate that municipal organizational structure for collective bargaining is influenced by the economic and legal environments within which collective bargaining occurs, the complexity of municipal collective bargaining, and various other demographic characteristics of the municipality.     

Does acclamation equal agreement? Rethinking collective effervescence through the case of the presidential “tour de France” during the twentieth century

This article discusses the integrative function frequently assigned to festive events by scholars. This function can be summed up in a proposition: experiencing similar emotions during collective gatherings is a powerful element of socialization. The article rejects this oft-developed idea according to which popular fervor could be an efficient tool to measure civic engagement. It raises the following question: what makes enthusiasm “civic”, “patriotic”, “republican” or simply “political”? Based on a study of French presidential tours in France from 1888 to 2007, this article casts a different light on the topic. The enthusiasm of the crowds interacting with the successive French presidents is not civic because an inquiry may find “patriotism” into participants’ minds. It can be called civic simply because the forms and meaning of the festive jubilation, which may be summarized into the formula: “if spectators applaud, it means they support,” necessarily preexist its multiple manifestations.