The Structure of Wages by Firm Size: A Comparison of Canada and the USA

Cross‐country comparisons of the skill premium between USA and Canada show differences in the returns to higher education between the two countries since the 1980s. This paper analyses whether such differences could be related to differences in skill distribution and worker sorting across firm size between the two countries. Estimation of the wage structure by size for male non‐unionized workers in the private sector reveals that selectivity effects on wages are present and similar in both countries. There are significant and substantial cross‐country differences in the returns to education among large firms, especially for younger workers.     

Acquisition and Disclosure of Operational Information*

We study a firm's strategy for acquisition and disclosure of operational information by establishing linkages among information quality, managerial self‐interest, and production planning. We develop a multistage model in which a manager of a publicly traded firm first receives private information about the product demand and then uses it to make production and disclosure decisions. We consider two prevalent disclosure models employed in the accounting literature: all‐or‐nothing and cheap‐talk models. In the all‐or‐nothing model, it is assumed that any disclosure must be truthful, but the manager can strategically withhold information. We show that the manager commits to acquire the value‐added operational information if (i) the managerial self‐interest in the interim share price is low or (ii) the managerial self‐interest in the interim share price is high, but the fixed disclosure cost is either sufficiently low or sufficiently high. We demonstrate that the firm is better off if the production level is observable to the financial market because multidimensional signaling reduces costs. In the cheap‐talk model, we assume that the manager's disclosure may not be truthful. We show that the manager's incentive to acquire value‐added operational information increases along with the penalty cost for misleading investors. Therefore, a high penalty cost for misleading investors can encourage the manager to obtain more precise information, which in turn improves the firm's cash flow.     

基于控制权私有收益视角的可转债融资的治理效应研究

通过在职消费、过度投资、自由现金流和现金股利支付4个变量间接测度管理者攫取的控制权私有收益,并运用中国A股市场数据实证检验权益、债务和可转债3种不同融资方式下(横向比较)以及可转债发行前后(纵向比较)企业控制权私有收益的差异。研究结果表明,可转债发行将导致在职消费和自由现金流的降低以及现金股利支付的增加;但在抑制管理者过度投资中可转债并未发挥积极作用。研究结果为优化我国企业融资结构,完善内部公司治理提供了理论支持;同时,也将为促进我国资本市场金融创新提供新的证据。     

Forms of Network Resource: Knowledge Access and the Role of Inter‐Firm Networks

The leveraging of inter‐firm networks is increasingly considered to be a strategic resource that can potentially be shaped by managerial action. In recent years, scholars have turned to the concept of social capital to understand how the transfer of knowledge occurs within and across firms. However, this has resulted in an overstretching of the social capital concept. The aim of this paper is to refine and add specificity to the current broad application of the social capital concept. It is argued that although the social capital concept explains investments in networks based on a network logic relating to sociability and socialization, it does not explain investments in networks based on a logic relating to economic expectations. These expectations result in network participation that is more calculative than networks containing social capital. The paper introduces the notion of ‘network capital’ to explain the resources contained within inter‐firm networks that do not necessarily equate with the type of trust and obligations associated with social capital. Network capital is defined as an investment in calculative relations through which firms gain access to knowledge to enhance expected economic returns. It is argued that while network capital can be strategically managed, particularly to influence knowledge flow, the nature of social capital is such that it is very difficult to manage. It is concluded that the network capital–social capital framework opens a number of avenues in terms of future research, especially in relation to the extended resource‐based view of the firm and theories of open innovation.     

Dual-class shares,external financing needs,and firm performance

Whereas the agency theory predicts that dual-class shares decrease firm performance, the stewardship theory predicts that dual-class shares increase firm performance. The cumulative findings on the performance consequences of dual-class shares have been weak and/or inconclusive. Because endogeneity is a constant challenge in empirical corporate governance studies, this study uses a unique law change in Switzerland as a source of exogenous variation in the fraction of firms with dual-class shares. Controlling for firm fixed effects and time-varying confounders, we find that dual-class shares neither harm nor benefit firm performance on average. However, dual-class shares increase firm performance if the firm requires external finance and dual-class shares decrease firm performance if the firm does not require external finance. External financing needs mitigate the agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders and create a context in which dual-class shares facilitate firm-specific investments instead of private perquisites. The study’s results have both managerial and policy implications.     

Government and family Guanxi in Chinese private firms: perceptions and preference

This paper examines the role of family ties in private firms in China. Drawing on social capital theory, we argue that family ties can be valuable assets for running businesses, and should be studied as a separate type of managerial ties. Government ties are then used as a benchmark to demonstrate the difference between family and government ties in four dimensions: face, affection, reciprocity and trust. Taking the resource-based view, we argue that Guanxi network is a dynamic capability that evolves in response to the changing operating environment and a firm’s lifecycle. A survey of 296 private firms in China is utilized to explore antecedents of managers’ perceptions and their preference between government and family ties. We find that a volatile operating environment is the most important factor that is linked to the perceived importance of government and family ties. In addition, we find younger firms are more likely to value family ties highly, while perceived importance of government ties increases with the size of the firm. This study contributes to the literature by adding an extra domain, family ties, to managerial ties and highlights the importance of family ties for fledgling firms. It provides further evidence on the role of managerial ties in mitigating operational uncertainties, and sheds light on the different roles that family and government ties play.     

Dynamic Matching,Two‐Sided Incomplete Information,and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition

Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good. Time is discrete, each period has length δ, and, each unit of time, continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry. Traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter. Within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero, one, or more buyers. Every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and, if trade occurs, both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility. Traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched. We characterize the steady‐state equilibria that are perfect Bayesian. We show that, as δ converges to zero, equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the Walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation. We also show the existence of equilibria for δ sufficiently small, provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation costs.     

收益公布效应的实证研究

股票市场的有效性研究是金融经济学的一个重要基础 .国外对此作了广泛深入的研究 ,其中事件研究方法是一个重要的方法 ,其普遍适应性导致了它的广泛应用 .目前对我国股票市场有效性的实证研究尚处于起步阶段 ,本文试图采用事件研究方法主要针对上海股市进行收益公布的实证研究 .本文研究的经验结果对我国股市的半强式有效性提供了一个重要支持     

长期资产减值信息有用性的实证检验——来自银行借款契约角度

本文实证检验了长期资产减值信息在企业与银行借款契约中的作用.研究发现,长期资产减值反映了企业未来盈利的预期,长期资产减值越多的企业未来业绩越差;长期资产减值信息为银行所接受,长期资产减值越参的企业获得的银行借款总量越少;且银行更倾向用短期借款代替长期借款,以降低风险;所有权性质、地区性质对长期资产减值信息的有用性存在影响,民营企业、东部地区企业长期资产减值信息的有用性更强;借款契约期限的差异、减值信息质量的差异也会影响长期资产减值信息的有用性.     

Culminating events and time working together in top management teams: Insights from private equity

In some managerial contexts, performance is measured by the results of a rare event that is itself the culmination of a long and ongoing process of daily decision making. In the private equity (PE) industry, for example, a firm makes a limited number of investments throughout its life. However, selecting these few investments requires the firm to engage in a large number of decision-making activities to evaluate the much larger array of potential investments. This raises the interesting possibility that the performance of each culminating event is not a function of the number of previously completed tasks, as it has been conceived previously, but is in fact a function of the accumulation of daily decision making that may or may not culminate in actual buyouts. To understand performance drivers in this and similar contexts, we examine and test the performance effect of the time that members of a PE top management team (TMT) spend working together to evaluate potential investments, and untangle this effect from the number of investments the TMT has bought and sold previously. Our data reveal a U-shaped relationship between time working together (TWT) and buyout performance, and a moderation effect of TMT heterogeneity and TMT support staff size. These findings extend our knowledge of executive decision making in PE firms, and in all managerial contexts where rare decision events are the culmination of an extended process of daily decision making.     

The effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency: evidence using Japanese private firms

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency. Public involvement is defined as the actions taken by governments to control firm management, as expressed in regulation and public ownership. We make the following three contributions. First, we show public involvement is an important determinant of the inefficiency of private firms. Although public involvement has been shown to influence firm behavior in public or regulated sectors, existing studies in the private sector tend to ignore its effects. Second, we analyze firm inefficiency rather than firm performance by focusing on cost factors. Previous work tends to use performance measures such as return on assets or return on equity rather than inefficiency measures to judge a firm’s management level. Performance measures are problematic, however, in that they are affected by not only cost factors but also demand factors. Therefore, we must separate these factors when we analyze a firm’s management. Third, we use a stochastic cost frontier model for the estimation. Although this is a suitable approach for estimating firm inefficiency, it is rarely used for private firms. Our results suggest that public ownership increases firm inefficiency while regulation decreases firm inefficiency. It is also clear that the effect of public ownership is not significant in the manufacturing industry, while it is strongly significant in the nonmanufacturing industry. This shows the importance of studying the effect of public involvement in the private sector.     

民营上市公司控制类型、多元化经营与企业绩效

本文将2006年度民营上市公司分为直接上市和间接上市两种类型,考察了所有权与控制权分离程度、多元化经营与企业绩效之间的关系。发现间接上市民营公司所有权与控制权分离程度、多元化经营程度均显著高于直接上市民营公司。多元回归结果表明,直接上市民营公司最终控制人金字塔持股和多元化经营对企业绩效没有显著影响;而间接上市民营公司最终控制人所有权与控制权分离程度和多元化程度越高,企业绩效越低,说明代理问题在此类公司比较突出。所有权与控制权分离程度和多元化指标的交互关系也为此提供了进一步的证据。本文的贡献在于对民营上市公司进行了更为细致的分类,并从动机和行为两方面考察了其所导致的经济后果。研究增进了对我国民营上市公司的认识,对理解民营上市公司控制类型以及多元化经营也提供了新的视角。     

Accounting information for managerial decision-making in shareholder management versus stakeholder management

With global challenges like climate change and, of course, the crisis of capital markets in the recent past stakeholder oriented management receives enhanced attention whereas shareholder value management is increasingly criticized for its undesirable external effects on stakeholders other than owners. Regardless of whether these criticisms are well founded or not, the question arises how accounting-related techniques for supporting managerial decision-making differ in shareholder and stakeholder value management. Accounting information can affect managerial decision-making in two ways: directly as input to decisions or indirectly by influencing the behavior of managers. This article reviews the contributions and limitations of information that prominent accounting-related techniques of shareholder management and stakeholder management provide for managerial decision-making. In a comparative perspective we find that the approaches in shareholder value management are much more advanced. In particular the two roles of information in shareholder value management are manifest in accounting-related techniques which are focused on increasing firm value. The value driver models or residual income-based performance measures may serve as examples. In comparison, accounting-related techniques to support managerial decision-making in stakeholder management are not as well advanced. So far we have approaches which concentrate on selective stakeholder groups and only partially address the multi-dimensionality of stakeholder value creation. From a conceptual perspective our findings indicate that stakeholder value creation requires a more integrated approach for answering the question whether stakeholder value is created or diminished. As a consequence, if stakeholder-orientation is taken seriously, the time has come to pay more attention to related accounting techniques.     

Do CEOs exercise managerial discretion to save their jobs?

Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) wield considerable power and authority. In many industries and contexts, CEO turnover is studied in terms of antecedents, the event itself, and the related consequences. However, the extent to which CEOs exert their power and attempt to prevent their dismissal has not been thoroughly examined. In this study, we examine the role of CEOs exercising managerial discretion in their effort to prevent their own corporate demise. We hypothesize that CEOs cut discretionary expenses such as research and development, advertising, and rent in order to boost earnings and enhance financial performance. A sample of CEO turnover from Standard and Poor’s ExecComp database for the period 1992–1998 in US firms yielded 474 turnover firms and 2,066 control firm-years. We tested the effects of CEO turnover and managerial discretion on firm performance measured by cumulative abnormal stock returns. We also compared the turnover and non-turnover firms in terms of pattern of discretionary spending prior to CEO turnover. The results are consistent with our prediction that CEOs facing termination attempt to post higher earnings by reducing discretionary spending after controlling for firm performance, firm diversification, book to market ratio, and CEO ownership, industry-, and year dummies.     

Identifying Technology Spillovers and Product Market Rivalry

The impact of R&D on growth through spillovers has been a major topic of economic research over the last thirty years. A central problem in the literature is that firm performance is affected by two countervailing “spillovers” : a positive effect from technology (knowledge) spillovers and a negative business stealing effects from product market rivals. We develop a general framework incorporating these two types of spillovers and implement this model using measures of a firm's position in technology space and productmarket space. Using panel data on U.S. firms, we show that technology spillovers quantitatively dominate, so that the gross social returns to R&D are at least twice as high as the private returns. We identify the causal effect of R&D spillovers by using changes in federal and state tax incentives for R&D. We also find that smaller firms generate lower social returns to R&D because they operate more in technological niches. Finally, we detail the desirable properties of an ideal spillover measure and how existing approaches, including our new Mahalanobis measure, compare to these criteria.     

Social Increasing Returns and the Effects of Immigration on the Host Country Economy

In this paper we analyse the impact of both the number of immigrants and their human capital on the welfare of the host economy. We will show that in the presence of ‘social increasing returns’ in human and physical capital accumulation, arising from a labour market characterized by a costly search and by randomness of the matching technology, immigrants’ skill level may influence the investments in human capital of natives as well as the investments in physical capital. We will find that the immigrants’ human capital interacts with social increasing returns making them stronger or weaker according to the level of immigrants’ human capital relative to that of natives. If immigrants have a higher level of human capital, increasing returns are accelerated, while if immigrants’ human capital is lower, increasing returns are weakened if not reversed. The consequence of this behaviour is that in the first case immigration has a positive impact on native welfare and there is a positive interrelation between the skills of natives, the skills of immigrants and the firms’ level of physical capital. In the second case immigration may have a negative impact on the welfare of natives, on the skills of native workers and on the physical capital of firms.     

The Performance Implications of Ownership-driven Governance Reform

This paper explores the performance impact of recent changes in foreign shareholdings and boardroom reforms in Japan. Empirical research on the impact of reform on the Japanese corporate governance system could provide useful lessons for their European counterparts who are themselves facing similar pressures to reform. We found that although participation of outside directors in strategic decision-making was associated with positive stock returns, the increase in the ratio of outside directors, the separation of the board members and executive officers, and the reduction of board size were not related to firm performance.     

A Rational Theory of Mutual Funds' Attention Allocation

The question of whether and how mutual fund managers provide valuable services for their clients motivates one of the largest literatures in finance. One candidate explanation is that funds process information about future asset values and use that information to invest in high‐valued assets. But formal theories are scarce because information choice models with many assets are difficult to solve as well as difficult to test. This paper tackles both problems by developing a new attention allocation model that uses the state of the business cycle to predict information choices, which in turn, predict observable patterns of portfolio investments and returns. The predictions about fund portfolios' covariance with payoff shocks, cross‐fund portfolio and return dispersion, and their excess returns are all supported by the data. These findings offer new evidence that some investment managers have skill and that attention is allocated rationally.     

Forgoing the Flexibility of Real Options: When and Why Firms Commit to Investment Decisions*

Real option investments benefit from the flexibility associated with the possibility of abandonment should investment returns prove insufficient. But a firm also benefits from making commitments that engender reciprocal commitments on the part of employees and partner firms, and that allow the firm to address markets that exhibit increasing returns with the speed and scale required for success. I investigate the conditions under which large firms commit to investments in small firm equity alliances and acquisitions, and find that large firms commit to relationships that they initiate and that are subject to a high degree of rivalry. Uncertainty was not a significant predictor of the choice to commit. My findings point to the discretionary nature of the choice to commit and to firms' willingness to commit to investment decisions, despite high uncertainty, during periods of strong growth.     

董事会非正式层级与高管薪酬契约有效性

董事会治理是影响高管薪酬契约有效性的关键,已有研究主要从董事会结构层面展开,缺乏对董事会内部运作机制与高管薪酬契约有效性关系的具体分析。基于董事权威不平衡性的治理效应视角,系统考察了董事会非正式层级与高管薪酬契约有效性的逻辑关系及其作用机理,得出了一些具有重要价值的结论,主要包括:1.董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬业绩敏感性具有显著的负向调节作用,且主要体现在业绩下滑的样本公司中,表明董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬契约的影响主要体现在公平性和风险匹配性方面。2.只有当最高层级董事身份为独立董事时,董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬业绩敏感性具有显著的负向调节效应。3.董事会非正式层级增强了高管薪酬的行业和地区薪酬敏感性,进一步验证了董事会非正式层级的社会公平效应。论文的研究为从微观运作层面理解董事会治理和高管薪酬契约有效性提供一种新的视角和结论,对于优化董事会治理和提高高管薪酬契约有效性等均具有重要借鉴意义。