考虑信用销售的改良品联合采购决策

信用销售能够提升生产企业竞争力、扩大经营规模,帮助销售企业缓解资金压力,对供应链的运作效率有较大影响,成为供应链管理研究的重要课题之一。考虑在单一供应商和多个零售商组成的二级改良品供应链中,供应商提供延迟支付作为信用销售手段,分别建立零售商独立采购和联合采购的最小单位时间总成本函数,通过比较最小单位时间总成本函数得到联合采购优于独立采购的条件。将改良品联合采购的成本分配问题构造为改良品联合采购博弈,给出博弈具有的基本性质,并设计一种基于博弈核心的成本分配方法。通过数值算例和敏感性分析验证了文中所构建模型的正确性。     

考虑订货协调成本与数量折扣的改良品供应链水平协调

在单个供应商与多个销售商构成的二级改良品供应链中，销售商们采用联合补货方式不仅可以分摊订货成本，而且由于订货批量的增加从而更易获得供应商提供的数量折扣合同。建立多个销售商在独立补货与联合补货中的利润水平函数，推导联合补货优于独立补货的充要条件。将销售商之间的联合补货行为转化成多人合作博弈问题，证明博弈具有的基本性质，设计基于博弈核心的利润分配方法。通过数值算例和敏感性分析验证了文中所构建模型的正确性。     

改良技术共享下改良品联合采购联盟的竞合博弈研究

改良技术共享与联合采购在一定程度上能够降低改良品采购联盟的运作成本。但是，是否选择进行改良技术创新，改良率提高到什么程度，是否进行改良技术共享，形成改良技术共享与联合采购联盟之后如何进行运作成本分摊可以保持其稳定性，是零售商进行改良技术共享后改良品联合采购联盟所需要解决的关键问题。本文基于经典的EOQ模型，建立了改良技术共享下改良品联合采购联盟成员间既有竞争又有合作的竞合博弈模型。首先，当零售商各自进行改良技术创新并在联盟内共享改良技术时，确定了改良技术共享下改良品联合采购联盟的运作策略与总成本；随后，给出了一种分配方案证明改良技术共享下改良品联合采购合作博弈的核是非空的；最后，指出平均分配方案所得到的改良率将低于集中化决策时零售商的最优改良率，并指出在该合作博弈核的极点的成本分摊规则下，此联合采购联盟的总成本是最低的。本文的研究表明，采用平均分摊成本的方案将不能达到系统最优，而采用核的极点的成本分摊方案将可以使成本降低至系统集中化决策时的水平。     

联合订货区间值EOQ模型及变权Shapley值成本分摊方法

研究多个销售商企业组成联盟向一个供应商订购同种商品的联合订货问题。考虑到实际问题中很难预测到精确的需求，本文用区间表示单位时间需求量，研究允许缺货的销售商企业联合订货区间值EOQ模型，其中缺货完全回补。以联合订货平均成本最小为目标，结合连续有序加权集结算子求解出联合订货的周期、区间值订货量和区间值平均成本。定义变权Shapley值，给出区间值合作博弈的区间值变权Shapley值的求解方法，得出区间值变权Shapley值的表达式可直接利用相关联盟值的左、右端点计算得到。考虑联盟和局中人的相对重要性，结合需求率确定合成权重，提出基于区间值变权Shapley值的联合订货成本分摊方法。利用数值算例验证模型和方法的有效性。本文可为解决联合订货成本分摊问题提供决策参考。     

基于Stackelberg博弈的变质物品分销网络设计模型

研究了一类短销售期的变质物品的分销网络设计问题.假定零售商的缺货成本依赖于分配给为其提供服务的分销中心的库存成本,供应商在销售期末给零售商提供第二次订货机会,供应商根据零售商的订货决策确定分销中心的最优选址和确定每个分销中心为哪些零售商提供服务,从而最小化总的运作成本(选址成本,运输成本,库存成本和变质成本),其中分销中心的运输成本和库存成本依赖于零售商确定的订货数量;而零售商则根据供应商的决策确定自身的最优订货决策,利用Stackelberg博弈分析的方法,建立了一类变质物品的分销网络设计模型,并使用拉格朗日松弛算法求解,最后通过数值算例分析了模型最优解对于参数的敏感性.     

联合经济批量模型中的损失补贴与利益分配问题研究

针对单供应商和单采购商构成的供应链系统,分采购商占主导地位和供应商占主导地位两种情形,讨论了采购商的最优订货决策与供应商的最优生产决策,以及它们合作情形下的系统最优决策,给出了采购商和供应商各自独立决策与联合决策下,它们各自的成本函数以及供应链系统的总成本函数.最后,通过比较独立决策与联合决策下采购商和供应商的成本函数,分析了联合经济批量模型中的损失补贴与利益分配问题.     

碳交易机制下零售商合作的费用分配研究

在一个由单供应商和多个零售商组成的二阶供应链中，研究碳交易机制下多零售商合作的订货决策问题。对完全信息下零售商合作的费用分配问题，应用合作博弈理论建立了费用分配的博弈模型，证明了博弈为子模博弈且设计了属于核心的费用分配方案，该方案不仅可通过总体单调分配机制实现而且可使大联盟长远稳定。对不完全信息下零售商合作的费用分配问题，证明了纯策略纳什均衡的存在性。研究结果表明，零售商的合作不仅能降低总费用，而且能降低碳排放量；各零售商在不完全信息下分担的费用大于完全信息下分担的费用。     

不同权力结构下TPL服务增值的供应链决策与效率评价

在供应商批发价格内生、TPL服务增值情形下,研究由供应商、TPL和零售商组成的三级供应链决策与效率评价。基于不同权力结构,构建了TPL和供应商主导的序贯非合作博弈模型,证明了博弈均衡解均存在且唯一。研究表明：两种权力结构下系统利润均出现损失,TPL主导下零售商的订购量、TPL的物流服务水平及二者比值均低于供应商主导的情形,故TPL主导致使供应链运作效率更低。为提高系统运作效率,以TPL的利润结构为出发点,在两种权力结构下均分别引入TPL物流服务费用及成本分摊策略,发现：费用分摊策略下,供应商通过操控批发价格抑制了费用分摊的影响,从而造成策略失效;而成本分摊策略下,当分摊系数满足特定条件时,能够提高两种权力结构下的系统效率以及实现系统帕累托改进。最优的分摊系数仅取决于各权力结构下,无分摊策略时TPL和系统的期望利润。     

两级供应链订货批量联合决策

本文针对单供应商和单零售商的两级非一体化供应链，分析了供需双方的订货批量、生产批量优化问题，比较分析了分散决策和联合决策过程，证明了联合决策能降低供应商和整个供应链的成本，但是会增加零售商的成本。     

复杂产品主制造商-供应商协同合作最优成本分担激励研究

当前,“主制造商-供应商”的协同合作模式成为复杂产品的主流生产模式,与传统的制造商供应商合作激励相比,该合作模式更关注供应商的努力水平和长期战略合作,其努力程度决定了复杂产品的生产质量与效率。为激励供应商的努力合作,本文设计努力程度参数,提出了主制造商分摊供应商努力成本的激励策略,建立了基于努力程度的最优成本分摊模型,研究了Nash均衡和Stackelberg均衡两种结构下的激励模式,给出该激励模式下的主制造商分摊供应商研制成本的最优比例、最优努力水平和最优收益。研究结果表明,当供应商的努力程度大于等于努力阀值时,主制造商需分担供应商的努力成本,成本分担大小与供应商努力程度的平方成正比,且受单位收益系数和努力程度收益影响系数的影响。同时,研究表明,在主制造商供应商的协同合作机制中,主从关系的 Stackelberg博弈收益优于Nash均衡收益,应用分析进一步表明,主制造商通过分担供应商努力成本的激励措施可以有效地激励供应商的努力程度,实现在主制造商供应商利益均增长的情况下,达到帕累托改进。本文系统地揭示了主制造商激励供应商的最优成本分担问题,为复杂产品主制造商供应商的长期战略合作激励策略制定提供决策依据。     

Coalition Formation and Cost Allocation for Joint Replenishment Systems

This paper focuses on the issues of coalition formation and cost allocation in a joint replenishment system involving a set of independent and freely interacting retailers purchasing an item from one supplier to meet a deterministic demand. The papers dealing with this problem are mainly focused on supperadditive games, where the cost savings associated with a coalition increase with the number of players in the coalition. The most relevant question addressed then is how to allocate the savings to the players. In this paper, we propose to go further by dealing with a non‐supperadditive game, where a set of independent retailers have the common understanding to share the cost savings according to the cost‐based proportional rule. In this setting, the global cost optimization is no longer a relevant approach to identify appealing coalitions for any retailer. Here, we provide an iterative procedure to form the so‐called efficient coalition structure and we show that this coalition structure has the nice properties of being (i) weakly stable in the sense of the coalition structure core and (ii) strongly stable under a given assumption. An exact fractional programming based solution is also given to generate such efficient coalitions.     

Duality Approaches to Economic Lot‐Sizing Games

Sharing common production, resources, and services to reduce cost are important for not for profit operations due to limited and mission‐oriented budget and effective cost allocation mechanisms are essential for encouraging effective collaborations. In this study, we illustrate how rigorous methodologies can be developed to derive effective cost allocations to facilitate sustainable collaborations in not for profit operations by modeling the cost allocation problem arising from an economic lot‐sizing (ELS) setting as a cooperative game. Specifically, we consider the economic lot‐sizing (ELS) game with general concave ordering cost. In this cooperative game, multiple retailers form a coalition by placing joint orders to a single supplier in order to reduce ordering cost. When both the inventory holding cost and backlogging cost are linear functions, it can be shown that the core of this game is non‐empty. The main contribution of this study is to show that a core allocation can be computed in polynomial time under the assumption that all retailers have the same cost parameters. Our approach is based on linear programming (LP) duality. More specifically, we study an integer programming formulation for the ELS problem and show that its LP relaxation admits zero integrality gap, which makes it possible to analyze the ELS game by using LP duality. We show that there exists an optimal dual solution that defines an allocation in the core. An interesting feature of our approach is that it is not necessarily true that every optimal dual solution defines a core allocation. This is in contrast to the duality approach for other known cooperative games in the literature.     

产品组合竞争下远视互补品供应商联盟的稳定结构

考虑由4个远视供应商与1个零售商所组成的两层供应链系统,基于最大一致集的概念,探讨部分供应商可替代时互补品联合销售联盟的远视稳定结构。研究发现:当供应商的成本相差较小时,如果两类产品组合的零售竞争强度较小,则远视供应商会偏好各自独立销售给下游零售商;如果两类产品组合的零售竞争强度较大,则远视供应商会偏好形成一个由3个供应商联合销售的大联盟。当供应商的成本相差较大时,远视供应商会偏好形成联合销售的大联盟,或者偏好各自独立销售给下游零售商。但是,两个供应商形成的联合销售联盟不是远视稳定的。     

Replenishment Strategies for Micro‐Retailers in Developing Countries

When formal distribution channels are absent in developing countries, micro‐retailers travel a long distance to replenish their stocks directly from suppliers. This “informal” replenishment strategy is inefficient due to high imputed travel costs involved in the replenishment process. To improve efficiency, one “hybrid” replenishment strategy has emerged under which one of the micro‐retailers in a neighborhood, while continuing its own retail business, also operates as a wholesaler to serve other micro‐retailers in the neighborhood. A major obstacle for the transition from the informal strategy to the hybrid strategy is that the micro‐retailers are reluctant to source from a wholesaler who also competes with them in the retail market. Thus, it is not clear when the micro‐retailers adopt the hybrid strategy instead of the informal strategy. Meanwhile, the micro‐retailers may prefer the “formal” strategy: a traditional replenishment strategy under which one of the micro‐retailers relinquishes its retail business and operates purely as a wholesaler. We examine a situation when competing micro‐retailers contemplate with the three potential aforementioned replenishment strategies. Our equilibrium analysis of the two‐store model reveals that the dominant strategy is: (a) the hybrid strategy when the travel cost is high; (b) the formal strategy when the travel cost is medium; and (c) the informal strategy when the travel cost is low. This key insight is shown continue to hold when we extend the two‐store model to incorporate other issues including: quantity discounts from the supplier, variable operating costs, price competition, local monopolies, and different decision sequences. One additional finding is that the transition from the informal strategy to the hybrid strategy could benefit consumers if the micro‐retailers receive quantity discounts from the supplier. Furthermore, when there are more than two stores, we show that the formal strategy is never dominant. Moreover, when the number of stores increases, the hybrid strategy becomes more preferable to the informal strategy.     

不同信息透明度对分销系统及各成员的影响

考虑由一个供应商和多个零售商组成的分销系统。研究高、中、低三种不同信息透明度模式下系统的最优补货及分配策略以及相应的系统和各个零售商的期望成本。证明无论从系统的角度还是从零售商的角度,并非信息透明度越高,期望成本越低。从整个系统的角度来讲,虽然系统的期望成本总在高信息透明度模式下取得最低,但是,中低两种信息透明度模式谁取得第二低的系统期望成本取决于系统内各节点之间的距离以及零售商所面对客户需求的性质。从零售商的角度,高信息透明度并不能降低零售商的期望成本。零售商是否可以从较高的信息透明度水平中获益则取决于零售商在送货路线上所处的位置,系统内各节点之间的距离,以及零售商所面对客户需求的性质。