竞争博弈下新创企业混合柔性技术战略决策研究

运用博弈论求解不同竞争策略下两企业的最优产能、新创企业的最大生存概率和成熟企业的最大利润,得出了二者的竞争均衡.研究表明,在竞争中,新创企业应选择无柔性技术;当需求波动较大时,成熟企业应选择混合柔性技术;当两种产品市场总需求容量较大时,成熟企业选择混合柔性技术能使其获得更多的收益.     

基于策略性竞争博弈的供应链信息共享策略

在供应链成员的市场信息以及成本非对称的情形下,讨论两个终端企业（一个自产自销,一个从上游批发产品）,在供应链中信息共享策略的方案,包括：信息优势企业如何根据市场需求情况确定是否信息共享（若是,则如何共享）;信息劣势企业如何根据对方透露出的市场信息来决策订货量;上游供应链如何决策批发价,从而控制整个供应链的博弈态势,使下游销售商在竞争中更为主动。经过研究发现,低市场类型时,自产自销商乐于共享信息,使竞争对手摄于低迷的市场状况从而降低订货量;在高市场类型且市场波动较小时自产自销商依然选择共享,在乐观的市场条件下表明自己的竞争优势,从而一定程度上威摄入侵者;而市场波动较大时,由于信息共享的额外收益不足以抵消信息共享需付出的额外成本,从而选择不共享信息。     

航空公司交叉持股对产能共享策略的影响研究

产能共享与交叉持股是航空公司常用的运作与财务策略,两种方式都能在一定条件下起到缓和竞争的作用。本文考虑两家航空公司的两种交叉持股模式,构建了包含顾客忠诚度的价格竞争模型,依据产能是否对称以及是否实施产能共享策略形成八种不同的情形,求解并分析了不同情形下的最优价格决策及对应期望利润。通过对比不同情形下的利润,本文发现,在单向持股模式下,当产能对称时,两家企业始终愿意采用产能共享策略,而当产能不对称时,如果存在产能共享,产能较小的企业将更愿意降低产品价格,导致市场竞争加剧,从而损害产能较大企业的盈利能力。因此,只有当持股比例相对较小时企业才愿意实施共享产能策略。在交叉持股模式下,当产能对称时,企业在交叉持股比例适中时才愿意实施产能共享策略。而当产能不对称时,企业始终不愿意采用产能共享策略。这也表明产能共享和交叉持股策略之间存在一定的相互替代作用,企业应根据不同市场状态协调使用两种策略。     

竞争环境下主导电子零售商的销售模式选择和信息共享策略

考虑由单一供应商、单一电子零售商和单一传统零售商组成的供应链，研究了占主导地位的电子零售商的在线销售模式(转售和代理销售)选择及信息共享策略。首先，针对两种在线销售模式，构建了信息共享和不共享情形下以供应链成员利润最大化为目标的优化模型，并通过求解模型得到了供应链成员的均衡定价和订货策略；然后，比较了不同策略组合下供应链各成员的期望利润，分析了各成员的信息共享策略偏好以及电子零售商的销售模式选择策略。研究表明：1)在转售模式下，当市场需求波动程度较小时，信息共享会增加电子零售商的利润，降低供应商和传统零售商的利润；当波动程度较大时，则相反；当市场需求波动处于中等水平时，电子零售商不共享信息能使供应商、电子零售商和传统零售商达成三赢局面。2)在代理销售模式下，信息共享能增加传统零售商的利润，但不一定能增加供应商和电子零售商的利润。只有佣金费率较低，高市场类型的概率较低且市场需求波动不大时，信息共享才是电子零售商的最优策略。3)主导电子零售商应该选择转售模式。本文的研究可为主导电商企业销售模式选择和信息分享决策提供理论依据;为相关零售企业在不同策略组合下定价和订货决策提供支持。     

企业战略柔性效用机理及其决策模型研究

采用Makadok理性期望模型分析了战略柔性在提供信息、降低运营成本等方面对竞争优势的作用机理,及其与组织资源在创造竞争优势过程中的关系;在此基础上,以不确定性环境下市场需求作为随机变量,构建了企业略柔性水平决策模型.     

需求不确定和纵向约束的链与链竞争固定加价

基于需求不确定和纵向约束的链与链竞争环境,识别固定加价合同选择的绩效改进条件和博弈均衡特征,并进一步分析市场需求波动风险、市场规模、市场份额、价格竞争、零售商预测能力及固定加价比例对合同选择行为的影响。研究发现：当横向价格竞争相对较弱,零售终端的市场份额相对较大时,基于纵向约束的固定加价合同是实现供应链系统绩效改进的贝叶斯占优均衡;若此时固定加价的比例相对适中且市场需求波动风险不是很高,或者固定加价的比例较大但市场需求波动的风险相对适中,则固定加价合同是实现制造商和零售商Pareto绩效均改进的贝叶斯均衡;而若价格竞争非常激烈,则无纵向约束的批发价格合同能形成实现供应链系统绩效Pareto改进的占优贝叶斯均衡。     

基于动态环境构型分析的企业雇佣策略研究

在整合已有研究的基础上,通过构型分析来研究不同性质的环境动态性及其对企业战略性雇佣策略的复合性影响,并构建出基于动态环境的企业雇佣策略选择机制以促进该领域研究的发展.研究认为,环境的动态性是多维的,其中的知识扩散速度会影响企业的知识管理范式和雇佣策略,而竞争环境的波动决定了企业需要具备的人力资源柔性的程度,但对雇佣策略的影响则不明确.研究结果表明,处于知识慢速扩散环境的企业适宜采取长期雇佣,竞争环境的波动程度则会影响企业管理知识员工的方式;当环境中知识快速扩散但竞争环境波动较低时,企业适宜采用短期雇佣;当知识扩散速度和竞争环境波动都较高时,企业适宜采取多元雇佣.     

代工模式下的竞争优先权与企业绩效关系研究

根据对江苏省135家中小工业企业的调研,将代工模式下的竞争优先权划分为成本、质量、交货和柔性,企业绩效划分为财务绩效和非财务绩效,利用因子分析探索了竞争优先权与企业绩效之间的相关关系。结果表明,质量、交货和柔性对财务绩效和非财务绩效都有显著的正向影响,其中交货影响最大,但成本对企业绩效没有影响。这为中小工业企业选择竞争要素提供了决策依据。     

新创企业品牌联合伙伴选择的计算实验研究

品牌联合是新创企业克服其成长劣势的有效策略之一。为提高新创企业选择品牌联合伙伴的成功率，基于复杂适应系统理论构建了新创企业品牌联合企业主体行为活动的基本模型和主体之间、主体与环境之间的交互模型；研究了外部竞争环境、合伙企业的企业类型、品牌资产、关系承诺和联合匹配性等特征对联合形成的影响。结果表明：在外部环境动态变化时，越来越多的新创企业会选择品牌联合策略，而其选择成熟企业还是新创企业作为联合伙伴，并不受外部环境变化的影响。在品牌联合系统中，作为核心的新创企业选择合伙企业时，其自身特征并不影响其是否采取联合策略；不管核心企业自身特征如何，均优先选择成熟企业作为联合伙伴；同时，合伙企业的关系承诺对联合伙伴选择的影响最显著，品牌资产次之，而联合匹配性影响不显著。候选企业在回应核心企业的联合请求时，其接受/拒绝联合的决策主要取决于核心企业对其评价的结果，其次是核心企业的品牌资产。研究结果对新创企业的管理实践具有重要的参考价值。     

在碳交易机制下再制造授权选择以及信息披露研究

本文基于碳交易机制以及制造商无产品专利保护背景,考虑两周期情形下原始制造商(OEM)和第三方独立再制造商(IR)之间由OEM主导的Stackelberg博弈,根据OEM是否授权IR以及IR再制造成本信息是否对称分为四种情形构建理论模型。研究结果表明：当再制造成本较低时(IR受产能约束),双方都愿意接受授权合作;当再制造成本较高时(IR不受产能约束),OEM是否愿意授权取决于新产品生产成本大小;而IR是否愿意接受授权取决于消费者对于授权后再制造产品效用增量的大小。信息不对称在再制造成本较高(较低)时不利于(有利于)IR,这说明IR只有在再制造成本较高时才愿意披露成本信息;而信息不对称对OEM的影响在IR达到最大产能时较为复杂,在未达到最大产能时不利于OEM。信息不对称会降低OEM授权意愿,对IR接受授权意愿的影响还与再制造成本大小有关,并且授权策略以及信息不对称都影响着供应链环境效益。     

Production,Process Investment,and the Survival of Debt‐Financed Startup Firms

Whether to invest in process development that can reduce the unit cost and thereby raise future profits or to conserve cash and reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy is a key trade‐off faced by many startup firms that have taken on debt. We explore this trade‐off by examining the production quantity and cost reducing R&D investment decisions in a two period model wherein a startup firm must make a minimum level of profit at the end of the first period to survive and operate in the second period. We specify a probabilistic survival measure as a function of production and investment decisions to track and manage the risk exposure of the startup depending on three key market factors: technology, demand, and competitor's cost. We develop managerial insights by characterizing how to create operational hedges against the bankruptcy risk: if a startup makes a “conservative” investment decision, then it also selects an optimal quantity that is less than the monopoly level and hence sacrifices some of first period expected profits to increase its survival chances. If it decides to invest “aggressively,” then it produces more than the monopoly level to cover the higher bankruptcy risk. We also illustrate that debt constraint shrinks the decision space, wherein such process investments are viable.     

基于NASH谈判模型的上下游企业R&D合作与协调机制研究

已有研究往往孤立地分析企业横向或纵向R&D合作问题,而现实中,企业有可能同时采用两种合作形式进行技术创新。针对这一现象,建立了上下游企业同时进行横向与纵向R&D合作的博弈模型,并与下游企业只选择横向R&D合作的情形进行了比较。研究发现:(1)与下游企业只进行横向R&D合作的情形相比,同时进行横向与纵向R&D合作将带来更高的均衡产量、R&D投入水平和行业利润;(2)当R&D成本分担比例较低(较高)时,上游企业具有(缺乏)R&D合作动机,该结果与技术溢出水平高低无关;(3)当上游企业R&D成本分担比例较高或技术溢出水平较低时,下游企业必然同时选择与上游企业R&D合作。为保持合作的稳定性,通过构建基于满意度的NASH谈判模型,设计了上下游企业R&D合作的利益协调机制。算例表明,该协调机制能避免传统R&D成本分担法引起的合作冲突。     

The Effect of Competition on the Efficient–Responsive Choice

In determining their operations strategy, a firm chooses whether to be responsive or efficient. For firms competing in a market with uncertain demand and varying intensity of substitutability for the competitor's product, we characterize the responsive or efficient choice in equilibrium. To focus first on the competitive implications, we study a model where a firm can choose to be responsive at no additional fixed or marginal cost. We find that competing firms will choose the same configuration (responsive or efficient), and responsiveness tends to be favorable when demand uncertainty is high or when product competition is not too strong. Intense competition can drive firms to choose to be efficient rather than responsive even when there is no additional cost of being responsive. In such a case, both firms would be better off by choosing to be responsive but cannot credibly commit. We extend the basic model to study the impact of endogenized production timing, multiple productions and product holdback (or, equivalently, postponed production). For all these settings, we find structurally similar results; firms choose the same configuration, and the firms may miss Pareto‐improvements. Furthermore, through extensions to the basic model, we find that greater operational flexibility can make responsiveness look less attractive in the presence of product competition. In contrast to our basic model and other extensions, we find it is possible for one firm to be responsive while the other is efficient when there is either a fixed cost or variable cost premium associated with responsive delivery.     

A Competitive Model of Customization with Lead‐Time Effects

In this article, we study the competitive interactions between a firm producing standard products and a firm producing custom products. Consumers with heterogeneous preferences choose between n standard products, which may not meet their preferences exactly but are available immediately, and a custom product, available only after a certain lead time l. Standard products incur a variety cost that increases with n and custom products incur a lead time cost that is decreasing in the lead time l. We consider a two‐stage game wherein at stage 1, the standard product firm chooses the variety and the custom firm chooses the lead time and then both firms set prices simultaneously. We characterize the subgame‐perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. We find that both firms can coexist in equilibrium, either sharing the market as local monopolists or in a price‐competitive mode. The standard product firm may offer significant or minimal variety depending on the equilibrium outcome. We provide several interesting insights on the variety, lead time, and prices of the products offered and on the impact of problem parameters on the equilibrium outcomes. For instance, we show that the profit margin and price of the custom product are likely to be higher than that of standard products in equilibrium under certain conditions. Also, custom firms are more likely to survive and succeed in product markets with larger potential market sizes. Another interesting insight is that increased consumer sensitivity to product fit may result in lower lead time for the custom product.     

Product Positioning and Pricing Under Production Cost Considerations*

A framework in a competitive environment is proposed that incorporates production cost and economies of scale in the problem of positioning a product for a market segment. The model facilitates the existence of a Nash equilibrium in prices and product positions. As such, firms can simultaneously choose prices and product positions for the segment. This result improves the traditional theory on equilibria points in prices and product positions where firms choose their product positions first and then set their prices. A sensitivity analysis demonstrates the effects of changes in the unit savings derived from economies of scale or the cost of furnishing a product with its attributes by one firm on the product positions, prices, and profits of all competing firms. More important, the paper examines the effect on prices and profits of competing firms when one of the firms repositions its product closer to the segment's ideal point. It is shown that under certain conditions, the profit of a firm may actually decrease as it redesigns its product closer to the segment's ideal point. These conditions assist management to identify the product design beyond which enhancements of the product would lead to lower profits because of increasing production costs. It is also shown that the price of this firm increases. Past research supports the idea that positioning a brand closer to the ideal point, given fixed product positions of competing firms, would lead to greater buyer preferences and eventually higher profits. The price and profits of the competing firm may increase or decrease. Conditions are derived under which a movement towards the segment's ideal point by one firm would lead to higher profits by the competing firm.     

Committed Versus Contingent Pricing Under Competition

Should capacitated firms set prices responsively to uncertain market conditions in a competitive environment? We study a duopoly selling differentiated substitutable products with fixed capacities under demand uncertainty, where firms can either commit to a fixed price ex ante, or elect to price contingently ex post, e.g., to charge high prices in booming markets, and low prices in slack markets. Interestingly, we analytically show that even for completely symmetric model primitives, asymmetric equilibria of strategic pricing decisions may arise, in which one firm commits statically and the other firm prices contingently; in this case, there also exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Such equilibrium behavior tends to emerge, when capacity is ampler, and products are less differentiated or demand uncertainty is lower. With asymmetric fixed capacities, if demand uncertainty is low, a unique asymmetric equilibrium emerges, in which the firm with more capacity chooses committed pricing and the firm with less capacity chooses contingent pricing. We identify two countervailing profit effects of contingent pricing under competition: gains from responsively charging high price under high demand, and losses from intensified price competition under low demand. It is the latter detrimental effect that may prevent both firms from choosing a contingent pricing strategy in equilibrium. We show that the insights remain valid when capacity decisions are endogenized. We caution that responsive price changes under aggressive competition of less differentiated products can result in profit‐killing discounting.     

超竞争环境下企业困境并购定价与时机研究

在超竞争环境下企业面临的竞争环境越来越动荡，企业的竞争优势呈现出短期性与临时性的特点，为了快速发展，越来越多的企业选择并购。本文以超竞争环境为研究背景，运用期权博弈理论，分析并建立了存在竞争对手的企业困境并购定价与时机选择模型，通过模型求解得到并购中主并企业给予目标企业的最优价值以及主并企业的最佳并购时机；此外，通过数值模拟重点分析了三个超竞争特征因子（竞争强度、竞争不确定性、企业价值损失因子）、企业困境因子以及竞争对手的溢价水平对企业困境并购时机的影响。本文研究发现：（1）被并企业得到的价值补偿比例及主并企业最佳并购时机均受到各超竞争特征因子、企业困境因子以及竞争对手溢价水平的综合影响；（2）竞争对手的存在会使目标企业得到的价值补偿比例增加；（3）超竞争环境下企业困境并购中主并企业的最佳并购时机取决于并购双方的相对价值比；（4）随着可能导致双方谈判破裂因素、事件的增多以及企业财务困境程度的增加，主并企业提前进行并购的可能性增加；（5）随着竞争强度、竞争不确定性、竞争对手造成溢价水平的增加，主并企业推迟并购时机的可能性增大。     

产品异质条件下排污权交易市场支配力对系统均衡的影响研究

日趋臻显的行业细分趋势和显著的外向型经济发展特点等在很大程度上决定了我国区域排污权交易系统内不存在显著的产品竞争。鉴于此,在产品异质条件下,通过考虑产成品市场与排污权交易市场之间的关联影响,首先从理论层面分析了社会最优的排污权配置状态;进而,构建了主导企业与从属企业之间的主从博弈模型,通过分析特定排污权市场价格下从属企业的最优行为特征,深入剖析了主导企业的策略性行为及其对系统均衡的影响。结果表明：市场支配力对系统均衡的影响具有多样性与复杂性;特别是,为了获取更大的额外收益,主导企业存在作为卖家时选择"溢价"与作为买家时"抑价"两种排污权价格操纵形式,并不可避免地导致系统均衡与社会最优配置状态的偏离,而从属企业却会蒙受巨大损失;其中,初始排污权禀赋是影响主导企业最优决策的重要因素。最后,通过量化分析对结论进行了验证,并细致展现了主导企业产污系数和治污成本等变动对系统均衡的影响。     

面向价值共创的服务衍生供需决策优化研究

针对制造企业服务衍生时，制造企业与客户间可能存在的"双重边际效应"问题，以制造企业服务衍生特征刻画为基础，构建了服务衍生供需价值创造模型，比较分析了分散和集中两种决策情形下的价值创造，发现集中决策下供需双方能够创造整体更高的价值，但制造企业存在陷入"服务悖论"的风险，由此，设计了有助于协调供需价值分配的收益共享契约。研究表明，收益共享契约能够缓解制造企业与客户间的"双重边际效应"，契约能够激发制造企业以更为积极主动的态度改进服务衍生方案，提升方案的性价比，并由此促进市场需求，实现供需双方的价值共创。     

Integration and Cospecialization of Emerging Complementary Technologies by Startups

We analyze the market entry problem faced by startups that must integrate their service or product with one or more complementary technologies. The problem is especially challenging when the complementary technologies have uncertain cost reduction potentials. The entrepreneurship literature suggests that startups should pursue focused strategies for various reasons, including bounded rationality and budget constraints, but generally overlooks startups entering markets with complementary technologies. The advice for mature firms investing in complementary technologies is often to diversify investment across multiple complements to manage technological uncertainty. Given competing guidance, we seek to extend the entrepreneurship literature by modeling startups' entry decisions for markets in which complementary technologies exhibit strong learning effects. We find that, consistent with the extant entrepreneurship literature, startups generally achieve higher expected returns by channeling their integration investment to only one complementary technology. However, the mechanisms driving our results differ significantly by hinging on nonlinear feedback effects that occur when firms concentrate integration investment in only one complementary technology. Interestingly, this focused strategy often does not yield the highest market share or the lowest likelihood of bankruptcy. We characterize the situations under which each finding holds and describe the implications of these findings for theory, practice, and policy.