The demographic impact of Partition in the Punjab in 1947

We use data from the 1931, 1941, and 1951 censuses of India and the 1951 census of Pakistan to examine the demographic consequences of Partition in the Punjab in 1947. Had growth rates for the period 1931–41 for the Punjab as a whole continued to 1951, the population of the Punjab would have been 2.9 million larger than that recorded in 1951. Population losses from migration and mortality above age 20 were approximately 2.7 million greater between 1941 and 1951 than would have been predicted by loss rates between 1931 and 1941. We estimate a net Partition-related population movement out of the combined Punjab of about 400,000. We conclude from several lines of analysis that Partition-related population losses in the Punjab, either from deaths or unrecorded migration, were in the range 2.3–3.2 million. Partition was also marked by a dramatic religious homogenization at the district level.     

Estimation of demographic measures for India, 1881-1961, based on census age distributions

Abstract India is one of the very few developing countries which have a relatively long history of population censuses. The first census was taken in 1872, the second in 1881 and since then there has been a census every ten years, the latest in 1971. Yet the registration of births and deaths in India, even at the present time, is too inadequate to be of much help in estimating fertility and mortality conditions in the country. From time to time Indian census actuaries have indirectly constructed life tables by comparing one census age distribution with the preceding one. Official life tables are available for all the decades from 1872-1881 to 1951-1961, except for 1911-1921 and 1931-1941. Kingsley Davis(1) filled in the gap by constructing life tables for the latter two decades. He also estimated the birth and death rates ofIndia for the decades from 1881-1891 to 1931-1941. Estimates of these rates for the following two decades, 1941-1951 and 1951-1961, were made by Indian census actuaries. The birth rates of Davis and the Indian actuaries were obtained basically by the reverse survival method from the age distribution and the computed life table of the population. Coale and Hoover(2), however, estimated the birth and death rates and the life table of the Indian population in 1951 by applying stable population theory. The most recent estimates of the birth rate and death rate for 1963-1964 are based on the results of the National Sample Survey. All these estimates are presented in summary form in Table 1.     

Migration between India and Pakistan, 1951–61

A critical evaluation of the available data on migration between India and Pakistan in the 1951-61 decade leads to the conclusion that there was a substantial net migration of Pakistan-born persons into India, but only a negligible net migration of India-born persons into Pakistan. Annual administrative statistics published by the Indian Government suggest an immigration from Pakistan of the order of 1.16 to 1.32 million. More importantly, birthplace data from the Indian censuses indicate a net intercensal immigration of Pakistan-born persons amounting to 1.19 to 1.34 million, depending on the assumed level of mortality. The Pakistani census data on the India-born show no net influx from India during 1951-61. Intercensal growth rates for the populations of different religious faiths in Pakistan are consistent with the estimates of net immigration into India. The migrants and the survivors of their progeny are estimated to represent a net gain of about 1.68 million by India and to account for no more than 2.2 per cent of the total population growth in India during 1951-61.     

An analysis of net immigration in census coverage evaluation

National surveys monitored growth in the foreign-born population for the 1980s, especially net undocumented migration's continuing role, but the 1990 census portrayed an even larger foreign-born population than these surveys. Undercoverage in 1990 could have been higher than initially presented because preliminary studies may have insufficiently accounted for decadal net immigration. Assumptions intended to maintain a high undocumented undercount performed poorly when census counts of foreign-born residents became known. Any point estimate for net undocumented migration, calculated as a residual, is likely to be biased by assumptions and data gaps for components of calculating net legal immigration, especially in the direction of underestimation. A reasonable statement is that at least 2.1–2.4 million undocumented residents were enumerated in the 1990 census. The number of unenumerated undocumented residents may easily have ranged between 0.5 million and 3.0 million, and a narrower range of 1 million to 2 million is plausible. Despite the importance of undocumented migration measurement for census evaluation and policy purposes, differences among various undocumented estimates are more likely to stem from discrepancies in universe, reference dates, or individual judgment, rather than analytic refinement. Better measurement of the foreignborn population or its census coverage would aid in setting upper limits on net undocumented migration.     

Mortality in England and Wales from 1848 to 1947

This is a survey of the changing causes of death in England and Wales during the past 100 years. Based on the published mortality statistics of the General Register Office the framework of the survey is a series of specially prepared tables of death rates by sex, age and cause of death for the periods 1848–72, 1901–10, 1921, 1931, 1939 and 1947. Adjustments were made wherever necessary to compensate for changes in medical nomenclature and in the statistical classification of disease.

After allowance has been made for the changing age structure of the population, the male death rate at all ages in 1947 was 42% of the rate in 1846–50, and the female rate 35 %. Maximum improvement was among girls aged 5–9 years, whose death rate in 1947 was 9% of the rate 100 years before.

In 1848–72 the group to which were allocated the largest proportion of the deaths at all ages were the infectious diseases with one-third of the total; and these were followed by the respiratory, nervous and digestive diseases. In 1947, on the other hand, diseases of the circulatory system came first with rather more than one-third of the total at all ages, and these were followed by cancer.

Changes in proportionate mortality rates from various causes have been examined at successive ages from infancy to old age. There was a decline in proportionate mortality from the infectious diseases other than tuberculosis, but increased mortality from tuberculosis in the younger age groups and from violence, circulatory diseases and cancer.

The trends of absolute mortality from the various causes were also studied. The reduction in total mortality was such that whereas there were half a million deaths of civilians registered in England and Wales in 1947, the total would have been over a million had the death rates of 1848–72 still prevailed.

The article concludes with a brief review of the factors responsible for the changes that have taken place.     

A new estimate of Ukrainian population losses during the crises of the 1930s and 1940s

Ukraine experienced two very acute demographic crises during the Soviet era: the 1933 famine and the Second World War. While different estimates of total losses have been produced previously, we have tried here to distinguish the specific impact of the crises on mortality from their impact on fertility and migration. Taking into account all existing sources of registered data and estimates, a painstaking reconstruction of annual demographic changes has been produced and complete annual life tables have been computed for the years 1926-59. Life expectancy at birth fell to a level as low as 10 years for females and 7 for males in 1933 and plateaued around 25 for females and 15 for males in the period 1941-44.     

Estimation of interprovincial migration for Canada from place of birth by residence data, 1951–1961

In Canada, unlike many other countries, birth-residence data by age and sex are available in each of the decennial censuses from 1931 to 1961 which permit the estimation of intercensal net migration for the provinces and regions. After a brief discussion of the basic measures of migration from birth-residence data the paper focusses on the problems and procedures in estimating interprovincial net migration, 1951–1961 for Canada using “the place of birth survival ratio method, ” and it evaluates the estimates thus obtained. The evaluation of the estimates, taking into consideration the inherent limitations of the method and its merits compared with period migration estimates by the census survival ratio method and life table survival ratio method, suggests that the net migration estimates for the Canadian born by the place of birth survival ratio method are probably more reliable than those by the other two methods. One striking finding was that the net migration curves by age obtained from the census survival ratio and place of birth survival ratio estimates were smoother than the curve obtained with the use of the more accurate life table survival ratios. Furthermore, whatever the relative accuracy of net migration may be, the birth-residence approach is capable of furnishing more details about the net migration of the native born than by the standard survival-ratio methods. For the population under age 10 intercensal estimates were directly derived from the place of birth and residence distributions by age.     

Effect of census errors on the measurement of net migration

This paper traces the history of the use of vital statistics, survival rates, and ratios in the estimation of net migration from one decade to another. Net migration studies by Hart (1921); Baker (1933) ; Hamilton (1934); Thornthwaite (1934); Lively and Taeuber (1939) ; Henderson (1943); Hamilton and Henderson (1943); Hamilton (1951); Siegel and Hamilton (1952); Lee and Bowles (1954); Price (1955); Lee, Miller, and others (1957); Hamilton (1959); Zachariah (1962); Tarver (1962); Shryock (1964); Eldridge (1965); Hamilton (1965); and the United States Census Bureau are cited as the principal users of various residual methods of estimating net migration. All these demographers have either implicitly or explicitly recognized that errors in census enumeration and in the registration of births and deaths have been reflected in errors of estimated net migration.The underlying characteristic of all the methods used by these demographers has been the estimation of net migration as a residual obtained by subtracting natural increase in an area during a decade from the population change during the same decade. This method has been most generally stated in the classic formula {fx394-1} This formula has been used both with total populations and with aging cohorts. The principal variations of the basic formula have involved the use of life table and census survival ratios as a means of measuring natural increase (B - D), or of estimating "expected" populations assuming no migration. The main points of controversy have involved life table v. censm survival ratios, assumptions regarding the similarity in national and state census enumeration errors, and ways and means of estimating the errors involved in estimates of migration and of migration rates by the various methods.Daniel O. Price (1955) and Zachariah (1962) made important mathematical contributions and attempted to evaluate the errors involved in the me of census survival rates. Eldridge (1965) discovered that, in the United States between 1950 and 1960, the use of the census survival rate method usually gave much lower estimates of net migration than did the classic vital statistic method. Hamilton (1965), using some suggestions by Hope T. Eldridge, developed a mathematical theory or explanation of not only why the CSR estimates were usually lower than the VS estimates but also why the CSR estimates would usually give closer estimates on the true net migration than would the EVS method, which itself is subject to errors of census enumeration and of underregistration of births and deaths. The author also discusses the effect of improvement in census enumeration between 1950 and 1960 on estimates of net migration and derives a generalized formula which takes the timing of migration into consideration.The author acknowledges with sincere appreciation important constructive suggestions made by Dr. Hope T. Eldridge, Population Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania, and the authors of the many papers used as original material. This paper is a revision of a paper read before the annual meeting ot the Population Association of America, Hotel Roosevelt, New York, New York, April 29-30, 1966. Contribution from the Departments of Sociology and Experimental Statistics, North Carolina Agricultural Experiment Station, North Carolina State University. Published with the approval of the Director of Research as Paper No. 2227 of the Journal series.     

The effect of long-term migration dynamics on population structure in England & Wales and Scotland

We investigated the effect of migration on population dynamics in England & Wales and Scotland from the mid-nineteenth century to the present by comparing actual population size and structure with estimates based on zero net migration from a range of starting dates. In this period, Scotland had the largest net outflow among countries in Europe for which detailed information is available, whereas overall net migration in England & Wales was close to zero. In the absence of migration, population would have been over twice as large in Scotland in 2013 as the actual value, but similar to its actual value in England & Wales. Levels and pace of population ageing have been broadly similar in both countries, so the major impact of differential migration has been on population size rather than structure. We discuss these findings in relation to the debate on migration policy between political parties supporting and opposing independence in the 2014 Scottish referendum.     

Emigration and fertility decline: The case of Barbados

This paper examines the role of emigration in the recent fertility declines which have occurred on the island of Barbados. Barbados with a history of over two centuries of out-migration has experienced in the period 1951–1970 very significant migration loss. In the period 1960–1970 and up to the present fertility has been declining. An important question is what part has this net migration loss of 32,600 had on the reduction of the crude birth rate from 33.6 in 1960 or from 31.5 in 1956 to 20.5 in 1970? Using officially published net migration loss figures and supplementing them with data on Barbadians living overseas, we calculated the crude birth rates which would have occurred had there been no migration loss. We also calculated the numbers of births to be expected if certain age-specific fertility rates were maintained and compared these with the births to residents plus the calculated births to Barbadians overseas. We conclude that in both cases emigration is a very significant contributor to the fertility declines which have occurred and are still underway.     

India's population: second and growing

Attention in this discussion of the population of India is directed to the following: international comparisons, population pressures, trends in population growth (interstate variations), sex ratio and literacy, urban-rural distribution, migration (interstate migration, international migration), fertility and mortality levels, fertility trends (birth rate decline, interstate fertility differentials, rural-urban fertility decline, fertility differentials by education and religion, marriage and fertility), mortality trends (mortality differentials, health care services), population pressures on socioeconomic development (per capita income and poverty, unemployment and employment, increasing foodgrain production, school enrollment shortfalls), the family planning program, implementing population policy statements, what actions would be effective, and goals and prospects for the future. India's population, a total of 684 million persons as of March 1, 1981, is 2nd only to the population of China. The 1981 population was up by 136 million persons, or 24.75%, over the 548 million enumerated in the 1971 census. For 1978, India's birth and death rates were estimated at 33.3 and 14.2/1000 population, down from about 41.1 and 18.9 during the mid-1960s. India's current 5-year plan has set a goal of a birth rate of 30/1000 population by 1985 and "replacement-level" fertility--about 2.3 births per woman--by 1996. The acceleration in India's population growth has come mainly in the past 3 decades and is due primarily to a decline in mortality that has markedly outstripped the fertility decline. The Janata Party which assumed government leadership in March 1977 did not dismantle the family planning program, but emphasis was shifted to promote family planning "without any compulsion, coercion or pressures of any sort." The policy statement stressed that efforts were to be directed towards those currently underserved, mainly in rural areas. Hard targets were rejected. Over the 1978-1981 period the family planning program slowly recovered. By March 1981, 33.4 million sterilizations had been performed since 1956 when statistics were 1st compiled. Another 3 million couples were estimated to be using IUDs and conventional contraceptives.     

A reconstruction of the size and composition of Jewish Holocaust survivors in the Netherlands, 1945

Compared to other countries that have suffered from the Nazioccupation, the destructive impact of the Holocaust on theJewish population has been particularly strong in the Netherlands. This paper gives a demographicreconstruction of the Jewish population in the Netherlands by the end of the war (1945),disaggregated by age and sex. The reconstruction is based on two approaches: a forwardprojection 1941–1945, starting from registration data supplemented by information onHolocaust losses; and a backward projection 1966–1945, starting from an enumerationof Halachic Jews carried out in 1966. The two approaches yieldtwo estimates that are comfortingly similar.     

Demographic Trends in Ukraine: Past,Present, and Future

Ukraine, during the first half of the twentieth century, underwent a series of man‐made demographic catastrophes—World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, the 1932/33 famine linked to land collectivization, the massive deportations and executions of Stalin's Great Terror, and World War II. This article assembles estimates of the demographic impact of these deadly events. In their absence, it is estimated that Ukraine's hypothetical population would have been 87 million on the eve of independence in 1991, instead of its actual 52 million. Pre‐independence demographic losses were episodic and driven by external forces. By contrast, since independence in 1991, Ukraine has experienced a sustained demographic crisis of its own making. Ukraine's population declined from 52 million in 1990 to 45 million by 2013. Fertility, while it has recovered from its lowest point, remains at a TFR of about 1.5—far below replacement. Emigration, although the greatest hemorrhage of young people in the 1990s is over, is still of concern. The loss of Crimea and the unsettled state of affairs in Southeastern Ukraine give further cause for concern.     

Understanding the demographic implications of climate change: estimates of localized population predictions under future scenarios of sea-level rise

Significant advances have been made to understand the interrelationship between humans and the environment in recent years, yet research has not produced useful localized estimates that link population forecasts to environmental change. Coarse, static population estimates that have little information on projected growth or spatial variability mask substantial impacts of environmental change on especially vulnerable populations. We estimate that 20 million people in the United States will be affected by sea-level rise by 2030 in selected regions that represent a range of sociodemographic characteristics and corresponding risks of vulnerability. Our results show that the impact of sea-level rise extends beyond the directly impacted counties due to migration networks that link inland and coastal areas and their populations. Substantial rates of population growth and migration are serious considerations for developing mitigation, adaptation, and planning strategies, and for future research on the social, demographic, and political dimensions of climate change.     

A survey of population in the ESCAP region

In 1983, the ESCAP region added 44 million people, bringing its total population to 2600 million, which is 56% of the world population. The annual rate of population growth was 1.7% in 1983 compared to 2.4% in 1970-75. The urban population rose from 23.4% in 1970 to 26.4% in 1983, indicative of the drift from rural areas to large cities. In 1980, 12 of the world's 25 largest cities were in the ESCAP region, and there is concern about the deterioration of living conditions in these metropoles. In general, however, increasing urbanization in the developing countries of the ESCAP region has not been directly linked to increasing industrialization, possibly because of the success of rural development programs. With the exception of a few low fertility countries, a large proportion of the region's population is concentrated in the younger age groups; 50% of the population was under 22 years of age in 1983 and over 1/3 was under 15 years. In 1983, there were 69 dependents for every 100 persons of working age, although declines in the dependency ratio are projected. The region's labor force grew from 1100 million in 1970 to 1600 million in 1983; this growth has exceeded the capacity of country economies to generate adequate employment. The region is characterized by large variations in life expectancy at birth, largely reflecting differences in infant mortality rates. Whereas there are less than 10 infant deaths/1000 live births in Japan, the corresponding rates in Afghanistan and India are 203 and 121, respectively. Maternal-child health care programs are expected to reduce infant mortality in the years ahead. Finally, fertility declines have been noted in almost every country in the ESCAP region and have been most dramatic in East Asia, where 1983's total fertility rate was 40% lower than that in 1970-75. Key factors behind this decline include more aggressive government policies aimed at limiting population growth, developments in the fields of education and primary health care, and greater availability of contraception through family planning programs.     

Construction of nuptiality tables for the single population in India: 1901–1931

In this paper abridged nuptiality tables for the single population of India have been constructed for the three consecutive decades 1901–1911, 1911–1921 and 1921–1931. No significant time trend has been observed in the nuptiality rates among the single population of India. The rates are initially small, but increase rapidly until they reach a maximum at ages 25–30 for bachelors and 15–20 for spinsters, following which they gradually decline. During 1901–1931, unlike Western countries, India had not experienced any revolution in marriage habits encompassing traditional child marriages. The distinctive marks of the Indian age patterns of marriage are higher age-specific marriage rates combined with lower ages at marriage and lower proportions of people who never marry with relative stability of marriage habits during the early part of the twentieth century.     

Population estimates for Bangladesh: The use of a specific transitional population model

Summary The development of population in Bangladesh was affected by a succession of man-made and natural calamities, such as the Bengal Famine of 1943, refugee movements following the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, devastating floods and cyclones around 1970, and the military action during the war of liberation. Though there had been a tradition of census taking and vital registration in Bangladesh, as part of the Indian sub-continent, extending for over a century, vital registration was so deficient as to be almost valueless, and there were gross misstatements of age and under-enumeration in the censuses. In the census of 1941, on the other hand, political manoeuvring led to a substantial overcount of the population. In this paper, Bangladesh population trends are studied within the broader framework of the subcontinent, taking account of plausible differentials. A considerable element of uncertainty was introduced into growth trends as a result of variations in the completeness of census-taking and of unrecorded refugee and labour movements across open land borders. In this connection the substantial inflationary bias associated with techniques of population estimation using the dual record system is discussed. The application of stable population models is even less justified in Bangladesh with its history of declining mortality. A transitional age structure model was constructed on the basis of the information available on declining mortality and accelerating growth and the model was made even more specific by modifications which took care of the impact of recent calamities and of unrecorded migration. The population base of the census of 1961 was adjusted in accordance with this model. The local mortality age pattern was used in projecting the population by sex and age groups to the date at which the census was originally due to be taken in 1971, and to the date when it was actually taken in March 1974. The post-1970 calamities and their effect on mortality were ignored. The aggregate estimate of population of 72.9 million in March 1974 is slightly in excess of the census count (by about two per cent) reported provisionally as 71.3 million. The excess in our estimate could be accounted for by the losses due to cyclone and military action.     

2006年度中国十大杰出母亲——回族妇女马志英

马志英,女,41岁,回族,宁夏中卫市海原县海城镇南居委会居民。她先后两次下岗待业,在四次大手术和经济贫困的重压下,以赢弱的身体和慈母般的爱心坚持救助了185名贫困和残疾儿童,其中76名考入区内外各大中专院校。目前,仍有65名儿童生活在这个温暖的大家庭。     

The Preliminary Demography of the 2001 Census of India

This note presents and comments on the provisional results of the 2001 census of India. For the first time since Independence in 1947 there is clear evidence that the country's intercensal rate of population growth has fallen significantly—from an average annual rate of 2.14 percent between 1981 and 1991 to a rate of 1.93 percent between 1991 and 2001. At the state level there has been little change in the rates of population growth in Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan, but there are signs of—often quite considerable—reductions in growth rates for most of the remaining states. The provisional census results suggest that there has been a decline in India's population masculinity compared to 1991. But the note contends that this decline is probably largely spurious because females were less fully enumerated in 1991 than they were in 2001. Indeed the sex ratios of the states of Punjab, Haryana, Maharashtra, and Gujarat have become noticeably more masculine, which may partly reflect the influence of sex‐selective abortion.     

Unintended consequences of US immigration policy: explaining the post-1965 surge from Latin America

Immigration reforms in the United States initiated in the 1960s are widely thought to have opened the door to mass immigration from Asia and Latin America by eliminating past discriminatory policies. While this may be true for Asians, it is not the case for Latin Americans, who faced more restrictions to legal migration after 1965 than before. The boom in Latin American migration occurred in spite of rather than because of changes in US immigration law. In this article we describe how restrictions placed on the legal entry of Latin Americans, and especially Mexicans, set off a chain of events that in the ensuing decades had the paradoxical effect of producing more rather than fewer Latino immigrants. We offer an explanation for how and why Latinos in the United States, in just 40 years, increased from 9.6 million people and 5 percent of the population to 51 million people and 16 percent of the population, and why so many are now present without authorization.