Flexibility or Cost Saving? Sourcing Decisions with Two Suppliers

This article studies a decentralized supply chain in which there are two suppliers and a single buyer. One supplier offers the quantity flexibility (QF) contract to the buyer, while the other offers the cheaper price. Under the QF contract, the buyer does not assume full responsibility for the forecast, yet the supplier guarantees the availability of the forecasted quantity with additional buffer inventory. On the other hand, the price‐only contract places full inventory burden on the buyer, but with a cheaper price. We study this problem from the buyer's perspective and solve for the buyer's optimal procurement and forecasting decisions. We identify areas where flexibility and cheaper price have an advantage, one over the other. Our results indicate that the buyer significantly benefits from having multiple sources of supply. We also find that, from the system's standpoint, a multisupplier system may outperform a single‐supplier supply chain under certain conditions. Interestingly, we observe that providing too much flexibility may benefit the low‐price supplier rather than benefiting the QF supplier. We discuss the managerial implications and provide directions for future research opportunities.     

Price and Service Competition in an Outsourced Supply Chain

We consider a buyer who outsources the manufacturing of a product to multiple symmetric make‐to‐stock suppliers who compete on price and service (fill rate). The buyer allocates demand to the suppliers using a score function with an exponential form, which specifies the relative importance of price vs. service, in order to minimize his costs, while the suppliers choose their prices and fill rates to maximize their profits. For the case of dual‐sourcing, we characterize the optimal parameter of the exponential score function, considering the impact of the buyer's decisions on the suppliers, and considering how the suppliers compete against each other to earn a portion of the buyer's demand. We prove the existence of a unique equilibrium and characterize the equilibrium behavior of the system. We then consider a general number of suppliers and show that the equilibrium prices and fill rates, and the buyer's cost, are increasing in the number of suppliers. We compare these results to a model of single‐sourcing, in which the buyer is the Stackelberg leader and extracts all profits from the supplier. We find that the buyer always prefers single‐sourcing to multisourcing. Finally, we study a centralized system and use the results to develop a coordinating contract for the decentralized system.     

Profit Seeking vs. Survival Seeking: An Analytical Study of Supplier's Behavior and Buyer's Subsidy Strategy

Supplier default is common in emerging markets. Suppliers under the threat of default have different objectives from profit‐seeking companies. This paper analytically tests how profit‐seeking or survival‐seeking behavior, single‐period or two‐period consideration, and buyer's subsidy influence the supplier's and buyer's final utilities. The results show that under single‐period consideration, the supplier's survival‐seeking strategy in fact drives more start‐ups or small suppliers out of business when the competition becomes severe; under two‐period consideration, no matter which strategy (profit‐seeking or survival‐seeking) the supplier selects, the second‐period price and profit are always higher than those of the first period. Furthermore, we find that providing subsidy is an effective way for buyer to keep suppliers’ competition at a certain level on the behalf of buyer's interest. By numerically estimating the benefits associated with the cost of subsidy, we provide a basis for understanding the cost–benefit analysis of buyer's subsidy strategy.     

Drivers and Outcomes of Long‐term Orientation in Cooperative Relationships

We argue in this paper that a buyer may deliberately develop long‐term orientation as a governance mechanism to deal with risks arising from exchange hazards, and to reduce the opportunistic behaviour of a supplier. While the exchange hazards of asset specificity pose a safeguarding problem, those of market uncertainty pose an adaptation problem. We test our model on a sample of 221 procurement partnerships. Our results show that satisfactory prior history of a supplier, asset specificity of the buyer and market uncertainty are all positively related to a buyer's long‐term orientation towards a supplier. Consistent with the idea that asset specificity and market uncertainty pose different governance problems, we find that satisfactory prior history reduces the positive relationship between asset specificity and a buyer's long‐term orientation, but enhances the positive relationship between market uncertainty and a buyer's long‐term orientation. We also find that a buyer's long‐term orientation fully mediates the relationship between satisfactory prior history and a supplier's opportunistic behaviour. Finally, implications on the theory and the practices of relationship governance are discussed.     

Requirement or Promise? An Analysis of the First‐Mover Advantage in Quality Contracting

Quality contracting is critical and challenging due to the many unique issues related to quality. In this study, we analyze the first‐mover right in quality contracting by considering two different strategies for the buyer: the quality requirement strategy (QR) where buyer moves first by posting quality requirement to suppliers and quality promise strategy (QP) where buyer voluntarily gives up the first‐mover right to suppliers to ask them to promise quality. We study which strategy (1) better encourages suppliers' quality improvement efforts and (2) leads to a higher expected profit for the buyer. To analyze the drivers behind the buyer's choice between QR and QP, we start with the basic model where buyer faces only one supplier who has the opportunity to make quality improvements. We then gradually add other business features such as information asymmetry and supplier competition, analyzing how each feature adds/changes the driving forces and how they interact in the buyer's decision between QR and QP. We consider both the case where the wholesale price is fixed (when the buyer has the power to dictate price or price is set by the market) and the case where the wholesale price is included as a variable (when price is part of the negotiation). We find that QP always leads to the first‐best quality efforts from the supplier(s) while QR limits their efforts. However, this does not guarantee higher expected profit for the buyer under QP. We provide insightful guidelines in buyer's choice between QP and QR. This research enriches the limited literature on quality contracting with quality improvement opportunity and asymmetric information.     

Managing High‐Tech Capacity Expansion via Reservation Contracts

We study capacity reservation contracts between a high‐tech manufacturer (supplier) and her OEM customer (buyer). The supplier and the buyer are partners who enter a ‘design‐win” agreement to develop the product, and who share the stochastic demand information. To encourage the supplier for more aggressive capacity expansion, the buyer reserves capacity upfront by paying a deductible fee. As capacity expansion demonstrates diseconomy of scale in this context, we assume convex capacity costs. We show that as the buyer's revenue margin decreases, the supplier faces a sequence of four profit scenarios with decreasing desirability. We examine the effects of market size and demand variability to the contract conditions. We propose two channel coordination contracts, and discuss how such contracts can be tailored for situations where the supplier has the option of not complying with the contract, and when the buyer's demand information is only partially updated during the supplier's capacity lead‐time.     

Optimal Quantity Discount Design with Limited Information Sharing*

In this article we address the optimal quantity discount design problem of a supplier in a two‐stage supply chain where the supplier and the buyer share annual demand information only. The supply chain faces a constant deterministic demand that is not price sensitive and operates with fixed setup costs in both stages. We show that the supplier can actually moderate a cost‐minimizing buyer to order in quantities different than the buyer's optimal order quantity in the traditional setting and develop a multi‐breakpoint quantity discount scheme that maximizes supplier's expected net savings. The proposed multi‐breakpoint discount scheme can be easily computed from the available information and, while also maximizing the supplier's net savings, is very effective in achieving high levels of supply chain coordination efficiency in the presence of limited information.     

Push or Pull? Auctioning Supply Contracts

Consider a buyer, facing uncertain demand, who sources from multiple suppliers via online procurement auctions (open descending price‐only auctions). The suppliers have heterogeneous production costs, which are private information, and the winning supplier has to invest in production capacity before the demand uncertainty is resolved. The buyer chooses to offer a push or pull contract, for which the single price and winning supplier are determined via the auction. We show that, with a pull contract, the buyer does not necessarily benefit from a larger number of suppliers participating in the auction, due to the negative effect of supplier competition on the incentive of supplier capacity investment. We thus propose an enhanced pull mechanism that mitigates this effect with a floor price. We then analyze and compare the outcomes of auctions for push and (enhanced) pull contracts, establishing when one form is preferred over the other based on the buyer's profits. We also compare our simple, price‐only push and pull contract auctions to the optimal mechanisms, benchmarking the performance of the simple mechanisms as well as establishing the relative importance of auction design and contract design in procurement auctions.     

Mechanisms to Induce Buyer Forecasting: Do Suppliers Always Benefit from Better Forecasting?

In this study, we consider a supplier's contract offerings to a buyer who may obtain improved forecasts for her demand over time. We investigate how the supplier can take advantage of the buyer's better forecasts and what kind of contracts he should offer to the buyer in order to maximize his profits. We model a natural forecast evolution where the buyer can obtain a more accurate forecast closer to the selling season. We assume there is information asymmetry between the buyer and the supplier at all times in that the buyer understands her demand better than the supplier. Three types of contracts that the supplier can offer are considered: (1) one where a contract is offered before the buyer has a chance to obtain improved forecasts, (2) one where a contract is offered after the buyer has obtained improved forecasts, and (3) a contingent (dynamic) contract which offers an initial contract to the buyer before she obtains improved forecasts, followed by a later contract (contingent on the initial contract) offered after improved forecasts have been obtained. We consider two scenarios: (1) where the supplier is certain that the buyer can obtain more accurate forecasts over time, and (2) where the supplier is uncertain about the buyer's forecasting capability (or forecasting cost). In the first scenario, we show that among the three types of contracts, the contingent contract is always the most profitable for the supplier. Furthermore, using the contingent contract, the supplier always benefits from higher accuracy of the buyer's demand forecasts. In the second scenario, we explicitly model the supplier's level of certainty about the buyer's capability of obtaining better forecasts, and explore how the supplier can design contracts to induce the buyer to obtain better forecasts when she is capable.     

Managing Risk of Supply Disruptions: Incentives for Capacity Restoration

A supplier facing the prospect of disruption has to decide whether or not to invest in restoration capability. With restoration capability, if disruption occurs, additional costly effort can be exerted to rebuild capacity, although its outcome is uncertain. We study how a firm (buyer) can use incentive mechanisms to motivate a supplier's investment in capacity restoration, and compare this approach with the traditional approach of diversifying part of the order to an expensive but reliable supplier. Under a Restoration Enhancement (RE) strategy, the buyer uses price and/or order quantity incentives to encourage the supplier's restoration investment decision. Two different cases are considered—when the incentive is committed to ex ante (prior to disruption) and when it is committed to ex post (after disruption). In contrast, under a Supplier Diversification (SD) strategy, the buyer splits orders between a reliable supplier and an unreliable supplier to hedge against the disruption risk. Here, the buyer does not provide any separate incentive to the unreliable supplier. Our analysis indicates that under the RE strategy, where the buyer offers incentives, both the buyer and the supplier (weakly) prefer the ex ante commitment over the ex post one. Furthermore, the RE strategy is preferred over the SD strategy when the unreliable supplier's restoration outcome is more predictable or when a high restoration outcome is more likely. However, the buyer's preference for the SD strategy increases as market demand increases.     

Transparency in Buyer‐Determined Auctions: Should Quality be Private or Public?

We study buyer‐determined procurement auctions where both price and non‐price characteristics of bidders matter for being awarded a contract. Although, in scoring auctions bidders perfectly know how price and non‐price attributes determine the awarding of the contract, this remains uncertain in buyer‐determined auctions where the buyer is free to choose once all bids have been submitted. We analyze the impact of information bidders have with respect to the buyer's awarding decision. As we show theoretically whether it is in the buyer's interest to conceal the impact of non‐price characteristics depends on how important the quality aspects of the procured good are to the buyer: The more important quality aspects are, the more interesting concealment becomes. In a counterfactual analysis using data from a large European procurement platform, we analyze the reduction of non‐price information available to the bidders. Confirming our hypothesis, for auction categories where bidders’ non‐price characteristics strongly influence buyers’ decisions concealment of non‐price information leads to an increase in buyers’ surplus of up to 15% due to higher competitive pressure and lower bids. Conversely, for categories where bidders’ non‐price characteristics are of little importance concealment of non‐price information leads to a decrease in buyers’ surplus of up to 6%.     

Managing Engineering Design for Competitive Sourcing in Closed‐Loop Supply Chains

We examine the strategic interplay between a buyer's design decision and the ensuing competition between suppliers in a three‐tier closed‐loop supply chain setting with significant recycling considerations. The nature of the engineering design decision in our research entails choice of integral versus modular design that has direct implications for the input raw material waste and ensuing competition between suppliers (i.e., incumbent and new). Whereas the integral design requires a large blank and generates excessive material scrap, the modular design reduces the generated scrap, and enhances cut‐to‐fit modularity, but incurs joining cost and yield loss. The incumbent supplier who supports the status quo choice of integral design can effectively recycle excessive material waste, as it is strategically located close to the source of material. The engineering design team at our study firm is currently exploring the option to source from alternative suppliers that can support either integral or modular designs, but have significantly lower effectiveness in recycling scrap material. We characterize the buyer's price sensitivity levels, component characteristics, supply chain configurations, and virgin and scrap specialty material prices that yield various design and sourcing policy alternatives. The buyer's optimal policy choice, the ensuing price–demand dynamics, and the resulting recycling implications demonstrate that the buyer can benefit from strategically tailoring his design decisions to affect the suppliers' material requirements and costs. We show that utilizing an alternative supply option is particularly valuable for components made from a material with a low price differential in virgin and scrap forms in supply chains wherein the new supplier base can recycle effectively. In such cases, the buyer induces severe price competition by dual sourcing the integral design, and competition may negate the seemingly obvious benefits of operational improvements (e.g., higher scrap material return rate).      

Procurement strategies in the presence of the spot market—an analytical framework

This paper investigates a problem in which a buyer can procure from a regular supplier as well as from a supplier in a spot market, possibly formed over the Internet. The contract with the regular supplier specifies a predetermined order volume and price, while the spot market has unlimited supply but a varying spot price. We analyse this problem from a buyer/supplier perspective, and an analytical model is developed to analyse two distinctive procurement strategies: the pure procurement system (PS) and the mixed procurement system of regular supplier with a supplier in spot markets (MS). Without loss of generality, we obtained a closed-forms solution that enabled us to provide numerical analysis on the procurement strategies, and allowed us to compare further the different characteristics between PS and MS. The results of our analysis demonstrate that the use of spot market could effectively mitigate the risk associated with demand uncertainty facing the buyer. The results also show that adopting MS can generate a higher buyer's profit than the PS, and significant supply-chain profit improvements can indeed be achieved through buyer/supplier coordination. Furthermore, spot price volatility leads to the facilitation of the use of spot markets, improving the buyer and the supply-chain profitability.     

E-business services and business performance: a study of the telecommunications manufacturing industry

The development of information and communication technologies has significantly changed the business interactions as well as created new approaches for improving business performances. While the benefits from this development have been well documented in the literature, it also poses a significant challenge for companies in tracking or further improving e-business services. This article contributes to this body of knowledge by investigating the impact of e-business service dimensions on business performance in the telecommunications manufacturing industry. Based on 121 usable responses from a questionnaire survey of the UK telecommunication manufacturers, structural equation modelling is employed to identify the main e-business service dimensions which affect business performance significantly. The data analysis reveals that two e-business service dimensions significantly influence suppliers’ performance from the buyer's perspective. It also indicates the significant relationships between suppliers’ performance, buyer-perceived buyer–supplier relationship maintenance and the buyer's competitive advantage. The findings in this research not only help the supplier to understand which practices significantly improve its overall performance (as perceived by the buyer), but also assist the buyer in its supplier development efforts to improve its own business performance.     

Governance Choice,Sourcing Relationship Characteristics,and Relationship Performance

Past work on exchange relationships has debated the efficacy of partnership versus arm's‐length governance on performance of a buyer–supplier relationship. However, how these governance approaches leverage key supplier specific relationship characteristics has not been examined. In this study, we examine the moderating role of governance choice (arm's‐length versus partnership governance) in leveraging key supplier specific characteristics to achieve superior performance for the buyer in a relationship. Specifically, drawing from residual rights theory, we argue that the governance choice buyers make moderates the impact of supplier flexibility, supplier human capital and relationship dependency on performance. Our findings suggest that, for a buyer, the benefits of supplier flexibility and relationship dependency are better realized in partnership governance as opposed to arm's‐length governance. Further, our findings suggest that although buyers choose a specific governance approach consistent with their outsourcing motivation, the choice of governance is critical to leveraging the impact of supplier characteristics due to the moderation effects studied. We elaborate on these effects and discuss the implications of our findings.     

Carrots or Sticks? Improving Social and Environmental Compliance at Suppliers Through Incentives and Penalties

Firms are increasingly looking to eradicate social and environmental non‐compliances at their suppliers in response to increasing regulations, consumer demand, potential for supply chain disruptions, and to improve their social, environmental, and economic supply chain performance. This study develops a model of the relationship between the buyer's supplier incentives and penalties for the supplier's social and environmental compliance, and the outcomes in terms of reduction in supplier social and environmental violations as well as the buyer's own operating costs. This model is tested empirically through analysis of a dataset of opinion‐based survey responses from practitioners at 334 companies across 17 industries. The analysis finds specific penalties and incentives that are positively associated with reduced supplier violations and reduced buyer operating costs. In particular, offering suppliers incentives of increased business and training for improving social and environmental performance is strongly associated with a reduction in both violations and operating costs.     

Capacity Allocation among Multiple Suppliers in an Electronic Market

An electronic marketplace typically provides industrial suppliers an alternative option for selling their capacity in addition to the traditional open market. However, suppliers face different sets of costs and risks in open market and in electronic market. Consequently, suppliers participating in an electronic market are likely to offer their capacity at a different price compared with traditional open market. We analyze this problem and derive the price‐capacity function for the supplier. We also derive a basis for allocating buyer's requirements among multiple suppliers so as to minimize his cost. Our model shows that suppliers with large capacities would quote a lower price in the electronic market. It also predicts that the unit bid price increases with bid quantity in the electronic market. Based on the price‐capacity curve, we model a scenario where the buyer announces, a priori, the number of suppliers to be selected for award of a contract that will minimize its costs.     

Reverse Auctions to Innovate Procurement Processes: Effects of Bid Information Presentation Design on a Supplier's Bidding Outcome

Information technologies (ITs) are being used to innovate various procurement processes. This research study focuses on the supplier‐side effects of IT design choices to conduct reverse auctions, which are increasingly used to procure a wide range of products and services. IT–enabled reverse auctions enhance supplier participation across geographical boundaries, leading to more efficient pricing. However, there are growing concerns about the adverse effects of IT–enabled reverse auctions on a supplier's performance. Supplier‐side issues are gaining prominence in the reverse auction literature and are critical for the long‐term success of reverse auctions. Therefore, we focus on suppliers’ bidding outcomes and assess how the design of an IT–enabled reverse auction facilitates the auction bidding outcomes of participating suppliers. Specifically, we examine the effects of two types of bid information presentation design—full price visibility and partial price visibility—on supplier's auction bidding outcomes, across auctions with different cost certainty and suppliers bargaining power vis‐à‐vis the buyer. The results of this study contribute new knowledge about the ways to use IT for creating effective auction designs and innovating procurement through auctions to enhance both the buyer's and suppliers’ performance. We present the detailed theoretical contributions of our study and discuss the managerial implications for designers of reverse auctions.      

The Role of Contract Negotiation and Industry Structure in Production Outsourcing

Despite the spread of cost‐driven outsourcing practices, academic research cautions that suppliers' cost advantage may weaken manufacturers' bargaining positions in negotiating outsourcing agreements, thereby hurting their profitability. In this study, we attempt to further understand the strategic impact of low‐cost outsourcing on manufacturers' profitability by investigating the contractual form of outsourcing agreements and the industry structure of the upstream supply market. We consider a two‐tier supply chain system, consisting of two competing manufacturers, who have the option to produce in‐house or to outsource to an upstream supplier with lower cost. To reach an outsourcing agreement, each manufacturer engages in bilateral negotiation with her supplier, who may be an exclusive supplier or a common supplier serving both manufacturers. Our analysis shows that wholesale‐price contracts always mitigate the competition between manufacturers regardless of whether they compete with price or quantity. In contrast, two‐part tariffs intensify the competition when the manufacturers compete with quantity, but soften it when they compete with price. As a result, when outsourcing with two‐part tariffs, the manufacturers may earn lower profits than they would from in‐house production, although the suppliers are more cost efficient. This suggests that managers have to be wary about the downside of using coordinating contracts such as two‐part tariffs when pursuing low‐cost outsourcing strategies. Our analysis also sheds some light on the profitability of using an exclusive supplier for outsourcing. When outsourcing with wholesale‐price contracts, the competing manufacturers are better off outsourcing to an exclusive supplier. However, when outsourcing with two‐part tariffs, the manufacturers may earn higher profits by outsourcing to a common supplier than to an exclusive one when the manufacturers' bargaining power is sufficiently strong (weak) under quantity (price) competition.     

Quantity Discount‐Based Inventory Coordination: Effectiveness and Critical Environmental Factors

It is understood that quantity discounts provide a practical foundation for coordinating inventory decisions in supply chains. The primary objective of this research is to test, under a variety of environmental conditions, the effectiveness of quantity discounts as an inventory coordination mechanism between a buyer and a supplier. A comprehensive simulation experiment with anova has been designed to investigate the impacts of (1) choice of quantity discount‐based inventory coordination policies, (2) magnitude of demand variation, (3) buyer's and supplier's relative inventory cost structure, and (4) buyer's economic time‐between‐orders on the effectiveness of supply chain inventory coordination. The analytical results confirm that the quantity discount policies have managerial properties as a mediator for inventory coordination. The results also show that the performance of quantity discount‐based inventory coordination policies is influenced significantly by environmental factors, such as the magnitude of demand variation, the buyer's and the supplier's inventory cost structure, and the buyer's economic time‐between‐orders.