PRICE‐LEVEL CHANGES AND THE REDISTRIBUTION OF NOMINAL WEALTH ACROSS THE EURO AREA

We show that unexpected price‐level movements generate sizable wealth redistribution in the Euro Area (EA), using sectoral accounts and newly available data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. The EA as a whole is a net loser of unexpected price‐level decreases, with Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain losing most in per capita terms, and Belgium and Malta being net winners. Governments are net losers of deflation, while the household (HH) sector is a net winner in the EA as a whole. HHs in Belgium, Ireland, Malta, and Germany experience the biggest per capita gains, while HHs in Finland and Spain turn out to be net losers. Considerable heterogeneity exists also within the HH sector: relatively young middle class HHs are net losers of deflation, while older and richer HHs are winners. As a result, wealth inequality in the EA increases with unexpected deflation, although in some countries (Austria, Germany, and Malta) inequality decreases due to the presence of relatively few young borrowing HHs. We document that HHs' inflation exposure varies systematically across countries, with HHs in high‐inflation EA countries holding systematically lower nominal exposures.     

CREDIT CONSTRAINTS AND THE CYCLICALITY OF R&D INVESTMENT: EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE

We use a French firm‐level data set containing 13,000 firms over the period 1994–2004 to analyze the relationship between credit constraints and firms’ R&D behavior over the business cycle. Our main results can be summarized as follows: (i) R&D investment is countercyclical without credit constraints, but it becomes procyclical as firms face tighter credit constraints; (ii) this result is only observed for firms in sectors that depend more heavily upon external finance, or that are characterized by a low degree of asset tangibility; (iii) in more credit‐constrained firms, R&D investment plummets during recessions but does not increase proportionally during upturns.     

MUST‐TAKE CARDS: MERCHANT DISCOUNTS AND AVOIDED COSTS

Antitrust authorities often argue that merchants cannot reasonably turn down payment cards and therefore must accept excessively high merchant discounts. The paper attempts to shed light on this must‐take cards view from two angles. First, the paper gives some operational content to the notion of must‐take card through the avoided‐cost test or tourist test: would the merchant want to refuse a card payment when a non‐repeat customer with enough cash in her pocket is about to pay at the cash register? It analyzes its relevance as an indicator of excessive interchange fees. Second, it identifies four key sources of potential social biases in the payment card systems' determination of interchange fees and compares the industry and social optima both in the short term (fixed number of issuers) and the long term (in which issuer offerings and entry respond to profitability).     

REDUCING OVERREACTION TO CENTRAL BANKS' DISCLOSURES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT

Financial markets are known for overreacting to public information. Central banks can reduce this overreaction either by disclosing information to only a fraction of market participants (partial publicity) or by disclosing information to all participants but with ambiguity (partial transparency). In theory, overreaction can be similarly reduced by either communication strategy. A laboratory experiment shows that both communication strategies succeed in reducing overreaction, though not as much as theory predicts. The opportunity in our information age for central banks to choose between partial publicity and partial transparency to control the market reaction is then discussed.     

EXPECTATIONS‐BASED REFERENCE‐DEPENDENT PREFERENCES AND ASSET PRICING

This paper explores the quantitative asset‐pricing implications of expectations‐based reference‐dependent preferences, as introduced by Koszegi and Rabin (2009, American Economic Review, 99(3), 909–936), in an otherwise traditional Lucas‐tree model. I find that the model easily succeeds in matching the historical equity premium and its variability when the preference parameters are calibrated in line with micro evidence. The equity premium is high because expectations‐based loss aversion makes uncertain fluctuations in consumption more painful. Additionally, loss aversion introduces variation in returns because unexpected cuts in consumption are particularly painful, and the agent wants to postpone such cuts to let his reference point decrease. This variation generates strong predictability. However, it also causes counterfactually high volatility in the risk‐free rate, which I address by allowing for variation in expected consumption growth, heteroskedasticity in consumption growth, time‐variant disaster risk, and sluggish belief updating.     

INSTITUTION‐INDUCED PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES AND PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS

This paper studies theoretically how the cross‐country differences in the institutional quality (IQ) of domestic credit markets shape the patterns of international capital flows when such IQ differences also cause productivity differences across countries. IQ affects productivity by changing productivity–agency‐cost trade‐offs across heterogeneous investment projects. Such institution‐induced productivity differences are shown to have effects on the investment and capital flows that are opposite of exogenous productivity differences. This implies that the overall effect of IQ could generate U‐shaped responses of the investment and capital flows. Among other things, this means that capital could flow from middle‐income countries to both low‐income and high‐income countries, and that, starting from a very low IQ, a country could experience both a growth and a current account surplus after a successful institutional reform. More generally, the results here provide some cautions when interpreting the empirical evidence on the role of productivity differences and institutional differences on capital flows. It also calls into question the validity of treating the degree of financial frictions as a proxy for the quality of financial institutions, as commonly done in the literature.     

MEASURING SELF‐CONTROL PROBLEMS: A STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION

Abstract We adopt a two‐stage Method of Simulated Moments to estimate the preference parameters in a life‐cycle consumption‐saving model augmented with temptation disutility. Our approach estimates the parameters from the comparison between simulated moments with empirical moments observed in the US Survey of Consumer Finances; to identify the parameters we consider moments from liquid and illiquid asset holdings at different ages. We find evidence of a small but significantly positive degree of temptation. The temptation model predicts consumption choices similar to the model with standard preferences, and holdings of liquid and illiquid assets closer to those observed in the empirical data.     

EXPONENTIAL‐GROWTH BIAS AND LIFECYCLE CONSUMPTION

Exponential‐growth bias (EGB) is the tendency for individuals to partially neglect compounding of exponential growth. We develop a model wherein biased agents misperceive the intertemporal budget constraint, and derive conditions for overconsumption and dynamic inconsistency. We construct an incentivized measure of EGB in a US‐representative population and find substantial bias, with approximately one third of subjects estimated as the fully biased type. The magnitude of the bias is negatively associated with asset accumulation, and does not respond to a simple graphical intervention.     

SEPARATING MORAL HAZARD FROM ADVERSE SELECTION AND LEARNING IN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: LONGITUDINAL EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE

The identification of information problems in different markets is a challenging issue in the economic literature. In this paper, we study the identification of moral hazard from adverse selection and learning about risk within the context of a multi‐period dynamic model. We extend the model of Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet (2003, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1, 767–820) to include learning about risk and insurance coverage choice over time. We derive testable empirical implications for panel data. We then perform tests using longitudinal data from France during the period 1995–1997. We find evidence of moral hazard among a sub‐group of policyholders with less driving experience (less than 15 years). Policyholders with fewer than five years of experience have a combination of learning about risk and moral hazard, whereas no residual information problem is found for policyholders with more than 15 years of experience.     

DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY–COMPETENCE TRADE‐OFF

The possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most autocrats throughout history. More competent viziers are better able to discriminate among potential plotters, and this makes them more risky subordinates for the ruler. To avoid this, rulers, especially those who are weak and vulnerable, sacrifice the competence of their agents, hiring mediocre but loyal subordinates. Furthermore, any use of incentive schemes by a personalistic dictator is limited by the fact that all punishments are conditional on the dictator’s own survival. We endogenize loyalty and competence in a principal‐agent game between a dictator and his viziers in both static and dynamic settings. The dynamic model allows us to focus on the succession problem that insecure dictators face.