Investing in a Shared Supplier in a Competitive Market: Stochastic Capacity Case

When firms invest in a shared supplier, one key concern is whether the invested capacity will be used for a competitor. In practice, this concern is addressed by restricting the use of the capacity. We consider what happens when two competing firms invest in a shared supplier. We consider two scenarios that differ in how capacity is used: exclusive capacity and first‐priority capacity. We model firms' investment and production decisions, and analyze the equilibrium outcomes in terms of the number of investing firms and capacity levels for each scenario; realized capacity is a stochastic function of investment levels. We also identify conditions under which the spillover effect occurs, where one firm taps into the other firm's invested capacity. Although the spillover supposedly intensifies competition, it actually discourages firms' investment. We also characterize the firms' and supplier's preference about the capacity type. While the non‐investing firm always prefers spillovers from the first‐priority capacity, the investing firm does not always want to shut off the other firm's access to its leftover capacity, especially when allowing spillover induces the other firm not to invest. The supplier's preference depends on the trade‐off between over‐investment and flexibility.     

The Impact of Corporate Reputation on Firm Risk: A Panel Data Analysis of Spanish Quoted Firms

Researchers have traditionally addressed the influence of corporate reputation on firm performance, but have not considered the influence of corporate reputation on firm risk. This research develops hypotheses regarding the opposing influence of corporate reputation on a firm's systematic risk, unsystematic risk and total risk, as well as the moderation effect of firm size and industry concentration. Using a panel data method, these relationships are analysed, controlling for the effects of endogeneity, for a sample of Spanish quoted firms in the period 2001–2007. Specifically, two complementary analyses are performed. The first distinguishes firms included and not included in the MERCO index of the most reputable firms. The second analyses the impact of corporate reputation for the sub‐sample of most reputable firms. Being reputable reduces a firm's unsystematic risk and total risk, but increases systematic risk. In addition, firm size weakens these influences of corporate reputation on firm risk. However, among the most reputable firms, differences in reputation score have a lower effect on risk. Specifically, the corporate reputation level only influences firm unsystematic risk. It seems that what matters is not the degree of corporate reputation, but whether being or not being reputable is the question in terms of risk.     

Firms' R&D Cooperation Behavior in a Supply Chain

This study investigates firms' R&D cooperation behavior in a supply chain where two firms first cooperate in R&D investments and then decide the production quantity according to a wholesale price contract. By using a concept named contribution level that measures a firm's technological contribution to the R&D cooperation in the supply chain, we show that both firms can achieve win–win via cartelization only if their contribution levels are Pareto matched, i.e., when each firm's contribution level is comparable to its partner's. When spillovers are endogenized, we further establish that an increasing spillover always benefits both firms without any R&D cooperation, but only benefits the firm whose contribution level is relatively low when under R&D cartels. Finally, we show that the path of first increasing spillovers to be perfect and then forming a cartel has a higher chance of achieving the best mode in terms of profitability.     

How Does Centrality in Coopetition Networks Matter? An Empirical Investigation in the Mobile Telephone Industry

This research examines how a firm's position in a coopetitive network (formed through cooperation among firms within an industry) influences the extent of the firm's competitive aggressiveness and market performance. The authors collected data on the competitive and cooperative actions of firms in the mobile telephone industry from 2000 to 2006, using structured content analysis of news reports. The results show that the centrality of a firm in a coopetitive network contributes to the firm's competitive aggressiveness through increased volume and variety of competitive actions. Further, the more central a firm is in the network, the greater is its market performance. Firms that undertake more volume and variety of competitive actions improve their market performance. Overall, these results show that being in a central position in a coopetition network is quite advantageous for the firm.     

DEMAND MANAGEMENT: THE EVALUATION OF PRICE AND DUE DATE NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES USING SIMULATION

The research considers the problem of demand management in a firm where the firm's historical delivery service level reputation influences the number of quotation requests from its potential customers. Customers have a maximum and the firm has a minimum net price to due date tradeoff curve for each job. The demand management function bargains with the customer over price and promised due date. Bargaining finishes either with an agreed price and delivery date or with the customer refusing the firm's bid and placing the order elsewhere. The firm's objective is to maximize its long-term net revenue. The firm's demand management negotiation strategy guides this bidding process. The research demonstrates the use of simulation to test different demand management bidding and negotiation strategies for different market and firm scenarios. The demonstration uses 16 scenarios to test the different demand management negotiation strategies with a model of a classical job shop in a classical market. The investigation examines finite scheduling-based due date estimation methods, as well as the more traditional parameter-based methods. This demonstration shows that it is possible to test different bidding policies, using a simulation model of a firm and its customers, and to obtain usable results.     

Investment in Facility Changeover Flexibility for Early Entry into High‐Tech Markets

A model is introduced to analyze the manufacturing‐marketing interface for a firm in a high‐tech industry that produces a series of high‐volume products with short product life cycles on a single facility. The one‐time strategic decision regarding the firm's investment in changeover flexibility establishes the link between market opportunities and manufacturing capabilities. Specifically, the optimal changeover flexibility decision is determined in the context of the firm's market entry strategy for successive product generations, the changeover cost between generations, and the production efficiency of the facility. Moreover, the dynamic pricing policy for each product generation is obtained as a function of the firm's market entry strategy and manufacturing efficiency. Our findings provide insights linking internal manufacturing capabilities with external market forces for the high‐tech and high‐volume manufacturer of products with short life cycles. We show the impact of manufacturing efficiency and a firm's ability to benefit from volume‐based learning on the dynamic pricing policy for each product generation. The results demonstrate the benefits realized by a firm that works with its manufacturing equipment suppliers to develop more efficient and flexible technology. In addition, we explore how opportunities afforded by pioneer advantage enable a firm operating a less efficient facility to realize long term competitive advantage by deploying an earlier market entry strategy.     

Managing Technology Selection and Development Risk in Competitive Environments

Managing development decisions for new products based on dynamically evolving technologies is a complex task, especially in highly competitive industries. Product managers often have to choose between introducing an incrementally better, safe new product early and a superior, yet highly risky, product later. Recommendations for managing such performance vs. time‐to‐market trade‐offs often ignore competitive reactions to development decisions. In this paper, we study how a firm could incorporate the presence of a strategic competitor in making technology selection and investment decisions regarding new products. We consider a model in which an innovating firm and its rival can introduce a new product immediately or pursue a more advanced product for later launch. Further, the firm can reduce the uncertainty surrounding product development by dedicating more resources; the effectiveness of this investment depends on the firm's innovative capacity. Our model generates two sets of insights. First, in highly competitive industries, firms can adopt different technologies and effectively use introduction timing to mitigate the effects of price competition. More importantly, the firm could strategically invest in the advanced product to influence its rival's technology choice. We characterize equilibrium development and investment decisions of the firms, and derive innovative capacity hurdles that govern a firm's choice between the risky and safe alternatives. The effects of development flexibility—where firms might have the option to revert to the safe product if the advanced product fails—are also considered.     

Learning from international business affiliates: developing resource-based learning capacity through networks and knowledge acquisition

Resource-based learning capacity (RBLC) is an organization's specific resources – both human and tangible – that can be organized to enhance learning processes. This study develops and tests a model that examines the relationship between the learning efforts of focal firms from their international business affiliates (IBAs) – organizations located outside the focal firm's domestic market with whom the focal firm has a relationship – and the focal firms' RBLC. This learning process refers to the transfer of knowledge from the IBA to the focal firm. Results indicate that while learning effectiveness positively influences the RBLC of the focal firm, learning efficiency has a negative impact on RBLC. The IBA's home country network centrality and the tie strength between the focal organization and the IBA are found to influence learning effectiveness positively. Tie strength also enhances learning efficiency. Finally, the findings indicate that the IBA's home country network centrality enhances the strength of the ties between the focal organization and its IBA.     

STOCHASTIC COST-VOLUME-PROFIT ANALYSIS IN A COMPETITIVE OLIGOPOLY

Previous stochastic cost-volume-profit (CVP) models have assumed that the firm was operating under either perfect competition or monopolistic conditions. This paper presents a stochastic CVP model applicable to oligopolistic competition. Each firm is assumed to maximize a linear function of the expected value and the standard deviation of its random profits. The result is a game-theoretic model that is solved using the concept of a Nash equilibrium. The results of the model are used to examine a firm's competitive strength. The model can be easily modified to accommodate a measure of risk based on the capital asset pricing theory.     

Signaling to Partially Informed Investors in the Newsvendor Model

We analyze a signaling game between the manager of a firm and an investor in the firm. The manager has private information about the firm's demand and cares about the short‐term stock price assigned by the investor. Previous research has shown that under continuous decision choices and the Intuitive Criterion refinement, the least‐cost separating equilibrium will result, in which a low‐quality firm chooses its optimal capacity and a high‐quality firm over‐invests in order to signal its quality to investors. We build on this research by showing the existence of pooling outcomes in which low‐quality firms over‐invest and high‐quality firms under‐invest so as to provide identical signals to investors. The pooling equilibrium is practically appealing because it yields a Pareto improvement compared to the least‐cost separating equilibrium. Distinguishing features of our analysis are that: (i) we allow the capacity decision to have either discrete or continuous support, and (ii) we allow beliefs to be refined based on either the Undefeated refinement or the Intuitive Criterion refinement. We find that the newsvendor model parameters impact the likelihood of a pooling outcome, and this impact changes in both sign and magnitude depending on which refinement is used.     

Strategic Sourcing in the Presence of Uncertain Supply and Retail Competition

This study develops an analytical model to evaluate competing retail firms' sourcing strategies in the presence of supply uncertainty. We consider a common supplier that sells its uncertain supply to two downstream retail firms engaging in price competition in a horizontally differentiated product market. The focal firm has a dual‐sourcing option, while the rival firm can only source from the common supplier. We assess the system‐wide effects of supply uncertainty on the focal firm's incentive to pursue the dual‐sourcing strategy. We find that the focal firm's dual‐sourcing strategy can create a win–win situation that leads to increased retail prices and expected profits for both firms. Furthermore, under certain conditions, we show that it is beneficial for the focal firm to strategically source from the common supplier, even if its alternative supplier offers a lower wholesale price. Overall, we identify two types of incentives for adopting the dual‐sourcing strategy: the incentive of mitigating supply risk through supplier diversification and the incentive of strategic sourcing for more effective retail competition.     

Measuring the Contribution of Workers' Health and Psychosocial Work‐Environment on Production Efficiency

Increasingly many firms have started to implement programs intended to improve the workers' health and the psychosocial work‐environment, as well as other attributes of labor quality. Motivated by the need for evaluating to what extent the programs affect a firm's productivity performance, this study discusses a model for analyzing the contribution of labor quality attributes toward firm productivity. To assess the contribution from the labor quality attributes, we model firm productivity as the outcome of two separate processes within a firm: the physical production process and the labor quality process. Firm productivity is measured by a Malmquist‐like productivity index and is computed by Data Envelopment Analysis. Based on bootstrap methods we analyze potential statistical bias and provide bias‐corrected productivity estimates. The labor quality attributes are first modeled at an individual worker level as latent variables using Item Response Theory, and then aggregated to a firm‐level. The model is empirically validated using data from three manufacturing plants that participated in a coordinated worksite health promotion program. Over a 4‐year period (2000–2003), we observed a general improvement in efficiency of 2–5%, half of which could be attributed to an improvement in workers' health and psychosocial work‐environment. A key benefit with the model is that it is practical, easy to implement, and very fast to compute. The model also constructively contributes to the discourse on sustainability by providing a framework for deriving meaningful metrics and providing tangible measurements on the effect of sustainability‐related issues.     

Process Improvement,Learning, and Real Options

We use a real‐options approach to analyze investments in process improvement. We develop a simple, stochastic model of a firm making investment decisions in process improvement. Our analysis offers several interesting insights into investments in process improvement. First, early investment in process improvement results in valuable knowledge, which helps increase the value of the option to invest in process improvement in future periods. This may motivate a firm to invest in process improvements as early as possible. Second, it may be optimal for a firm to stop investing when such investments do not create enough value in the later stages of the investment horizon. Third, although one would expect the state of a firm's process relative to that of other firms to impact a firm's decision to invest in process improvement, this study finds that the impetus is conditional and identifies these conditions. Finally, in such an environment, the delay of investment in process improvement incurs an opportunity cost for a firm, and we show that the traditional net present value rule must incorporate this opportunity cost and the knowledge‐induced change in future option values to lead to a correct investment decision.     

An empirical examination of the science–technology relationship in the biotechnology industry

Understanding how a firm's scientific capability influences its technology development has important implications on the firm's research and development (R&D) strategies. However, the current literature reveals a puzzling outcome in its empirical investigations on the science–technology relationship. While many studies show the positive influence of a firm's scientific capability on its technological performance, a few others indicate that if a firm focuses its attention more on cutting edge science, its overall technological performance will suffer. We suggest that these findings can be reconciled by conceptualizing and measuring the scientific capability of the firm differently. This paper attempts to demonstrate how different notions of scientific capability are associated with different performance outcomes. Furthermore, a firm's scientific capability facilitates the integration of new knowledge to produce valuable technologies when a firm broadens its search for new knowledge. The paper highlights the nuances of conceptualizing and measuring the firm's scientific capability in two different ways: number of scientific publications and non-patent references. The findings also shed light on the mechanism through which science accelerates technological progress inside a firm.     

Equity‐Based Incentives and Supply Chain Buy‐Back Contracts*

We analyze the effect of equity‐based incentives in a supply chain with a downstream firm and an upstream supplier. By using the operational decision as a signal to influence external investors’ beliefs, the downstream firm's manager intends to maximize a convex combination of the interim share price and the terminal cash flows. We show that equity‐based incentives create a side effect. Specifically, with a universal buy‐back contract, the deadweight loss of signaling induced by equity‐based incentives could spread throughout the supply chain and cause chain‐wide damages. To mitigate such undesirable consequences, we propose a new mechanism to eliminate the inefficiency. We derive the optimal mechanism that maximizes the downstream firm's profits subject to the constraint that the supply chain efficiency is not undermined. In contrast to the full‐information benchmark, this mechanism gives positive surplus to the supplier. [Submitted: January 5, 2011. Revisions received: June 20, 2011; December 11, 2011. Accepted: December 22, 2011.]     

The Impact of Limited Supply on a Firm's Bundling Strategy

A firm's two‐product bundling decision is examined when the supply of one product is limited and consumer valuations are normally distSteckeributed. The firm can choose to sell products separately and/or through a bundle. We find that the impact of limited supply on a firm's bundling decision depends on the correlation between the consumer valuations of the two products as well as the symmetry level of the two products in terms of their attractiveness (how much they are valued by consumers). When the valuation correlation is high and the symmetry level of the two products is low, limited supply can drive bundling. When the valuation correlation is low or the symmetry level is high, limited supply can drive no bundling. When the attractiveness of both products are low or the valuation correlation is very high, limited supply has no impact on a firm's bundling decision: The firm should not bundle for all supply levels. This study offers a new driver for product bundling: the limited supply of a product. The existing bundling literature suggests that a firm should bundle symmetric products that have a low consumer valuation correlation, when bundling is driven by consumer valuation heterogeneity reduction. In contrast, when bundling is driven by limited supply, a firm should bundle asymmetric products with a high consumer valuation correlation. The benefit of supply‐driven bundling depends on the severity of supply limitation. When supply limitation is moderate, bundling creates value by expanding the market of the less attractive product. When supply limitation is severe, bundling enables a firm to extract a higher margin from the less attractive product.     

The Design and Introduction of Product Lines When Consumer Valuations are Uncertain

This article presents a model of the design and introduction of a product line when the firm is uncertain about consumer valuations for the products. We find that product line introduction strategy depends on this uncertainty. Specifically, under low levels of uncertainty the firm introduces both models during the first period; under higher levels of uncertainty, the firm prefers sequential introduction and delays design of the second product until the second period. Under intermediate levels of uncertainty the firm's first product should be of lower quality than one produced by a myopic firm that does not take product line effects into consideration. We find that when the firm introduces a product sequentially, the strategy might depend on realized demand. For example, if realized demand is high, the firm's second product should be a higher‐end model; if demand turns out to be low, the firm's second product should be a lower‐end model or replace the first product with a lower‐end model.     

Industry Implications of Value Creation and Appropriation Investment Decisions*

Managers face a critical task in making firm investment decisions that are targeted toward creating and appropriating value. As managers weigh their resource investment decisions, we argue that these investments have a direct impact on the growth and volatility of the firm's industry. With data covering 377 industries across 16 years, we investigate relationships for aggregate firm investments on the growth and volatility of industry profit and sales. Results reveal important, complex relationships between investment in value creation and appropriation and different elements of the industry environment. Implications for management theory and practice are discussed.     

Network Positions and the Probability of Being Acquired: An Empirical Analysis in the Biopharmaceutical Industry

This paper examines the relationship between the firm's direct ties, its inter‐firm network prominence and its likelihood of being acquired. The authors argue that firm's direct ties and prominence enhance the firm's visibility and signal its quality – and thus foster the firm's likelihood of being acquired. However, higher levels of direct ties and prominence, by providing access to resources and the firm's status, respectively, increase the firm's ability to remain independent and thus reduce its likelihood of being acquired. Thus, the authors posit the overall relation as an inverted U‐shaped. Furthermore, they show that, for firms that undergo an initial public offering, the aforementioned relation becomes much weaker. The hypotheses are empirically tested in the biopharmaceutical industry and important theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.     

Firm reputation and investment decisions: The contingency role of securities analysts' recommendations

Moving beyond resource-based consequences of a firm's reputation, we develop a behavioral perspective on the impact of corporate reputation. Although there has been extensive discussion in previous studies of the benefits of reputation in terms of gaining resource advantages, we apply theory on self-regulatory focus to suggest that highly reputable firms may tend to have a prevention focus rather than a promotion focus in their investment strategies. This tendency will lead the firm to opt for low-risk investments rather than high-risk investments. Furthermore, we develop a contingency model and argue that the main effect of reputation on the investment decisions of the firm is further strengthened by the negative recommendations of securities analysts. We find support for our hypotheses. In doing so, we address emerging theories about the potential negative consequences of a firm's reputation and provide important insights for our theoretical understanding of the behavior of highly reputable firms.