KNOWING THE RIGHT PERSON IN THE RIGHT PLACE: POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

We use a political economy model of Schumpeterian growth with entry to investigate how an incumbent politician can strategically use the level of red tape to acquire incumbency advantage. By setting sufficiently high red tape, the politician induces the incumbent firm in the intermediate sector to invest in political connections, which are valued also by voters, who recognize that bureaucratic costs can be reduced by connected firms. Within this framework, we study the Markov perfect equilibria of an infinitely repeated game among politicians, firms, and voters, and show that all equilibria are characterized by investments in political connections and the re‐election of the incumbent politician. Political connections may prevent entry of advanced competitors and cause the economy to lag behind the technological frontier. Our model provides a possible explanation for the persistence of inefficient democracies and political barriers to technology development, where these reflect shared rather than conflicting interests.     

The role of political ties and political uncertainty in corporate innovation

We examine the relationship between firms' political connections and corporate innovation in a European context. We also consider the moderating effect of political connections on the relationship between political uncertainty and firms' innovation. We use two different metrics of innovation: R&D (an input measure), and patent counts (an output measure). We find that firms with former politicians on their board of directors invest less in R&D than their counterpart firms. However, the presence of this type of director on the board is positively associated with the number of a firm's patent applications. It seems that, although political ties reduce the amount of resources devoted to R&D activities, they increase the effectiveness of intellectual rights protection. Results also show that political uncertainty decreases R&D investment but exacerbates the need for legal protection of innovation through patents. According to our results, political connections attenuate the effect of political uncertainty on firm innovation such that the negative (positive) effect of uncertainty on R&D intensity (patents) weakens when the firm is politically connected.     

政治关联与财务困境公司的政府补助——来自中国ST公司的经验证据

本文以2002-2007年沪深两市的ST公司为样本,实证研究了企业的政治关联对财务困境公司获取政府补助的影响.结果显示:(1)民营企业的政治关联对企业处于财务困境时获取政府补助有显著影响,但对国有企业作用不显著.(2)考虑企业所处的地区环境差异之后,本文发现民营企业的政治关联优势受到地区财政富余程度的显著影响,而地方政府干预要起作用也受到地区财政状况的制约.只有在地方财政有充足财力的情况下,民营企业才可能利用政治关联获得更多的政府补助.(3)从政府补助的效果来看,政府补助虽然可以在救助当年明显改善公司业绩,但对公司长期业绩的提升作用却因企业政治关联程度和企业性质的不同而存在差异:政治关联较弱的民营企业获得的政府补助对公司长期业绩的提高作用显著,但对于国有企业以及具有较强政治关联的民营企业作用则不显著,这在一定程度上说明政治关联导致了政府补助资金的低效运作.     

Political connections,gender diversity and compensation policy

In this paper we analyze the influence of corporate governance, specifically political connections and gender diversity, on board and managers’ remuneration in savings banks in Spain. We also analyze whether financial experience moderates the relation between political experience and board compensation. To the best of our knowledge, the effects of having politicians on remuneration levels of financial firm have not been studied. Connections are important in hiring decisions and in generating business so it is interesting to explore whether they are important when it comes to compensation policies. We use a panel data and financial and corporate governance information from 44 savings banks for the period 2004–2009. Our results show that the previous political activity of the chairperson positively influences board remuneration. Our study provides the first evidence for a link between political connection and compensation policy, showing that, in addition to the standard firm-level factors, political and financial experience are material determinants of economic significance in compensation policies. Specifically, we show that financial expertise may substitute for governance mechanisms that are lacking in firms with weak governance environments (e.g. saving banks with high politicization).     

Political connections and firm operational efficiencies: evidence from a developing country

This paper investigates the impact of political connections on firm operational efficiencies. We test the political interventions in investment and employment decisions. Our results provide strong support for the presence of investment inefficiencies and excessive employment amongst politically connected firms, whereas the detrimental effect of political interventions is substantially larger on employment decisions. We further find that such operational inefficiencies are more pronounced for low-growth connected firms. Finally, the economy-wide cost of the excessive employments is estimated to be 0.19 % of GDP annually.     

The More You Give,the More You Get? The Impact of Corporate Political Activity on the Value of Government Contracts

Firms have been relying on corporate political activity (CPA) to achieve access and to affect public policy change for decades. Most research on CPA and public policy outcomes has implicitly assumed that access afforded by CPA results in an either‐ or (dichotomous) policy outcome such as votes or election outcomes. Based on recent research on how CPA can be a strategic signal to government agencies, however, it is possible that CPA may in fact, have a linear association with public policy outcomes as opposed to merely a dichotomous one, and we explore this relationship in the unique public policy context of government contract awards. We specifically analyze how higher levels of CPA impact the financial value of government contracts awarded to firms. Utilizing the S&P 1500 sample for 16 years (1997–2012) we find that CPA has a one to one association with the value of contract awards, indicating that CPA and public policy outcomes can be linked in ways that motivate firms to continuously invest in CPA, to maximize their political rents. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this finding in light of extant research on CPA and its direct impact on public policy outcomes.     

Preemptive or promotive: The differential impact of strategic leaders’ political connections on firm long-term investment in China

Research on corporate leaders' political connections has remained silent on the impact of heterogeneity of political resources on firm behaviors and of how strategic leaders differentially leverage these resources. We propose that a firm whose chair had ascribed bureaucratic connections as opposed to achieved political connections acquires different types of resources and chair differentially leverages the resources when making long-term investment. These effects are weaker when a firm is performing well. Our analyses of Chinese firms from 2003 to 2016 generally support these predictions. This study contributes to literature on political connections by providing greater specificity with respect to the heterogeneity of political resources and offering new insights into how strategic leaders leverage these resources. This study also contributes to the literature on board chairs and corporate governance by suggesting that when considering a firm's long-term plan, chair plays an important role and it is also important to monitor chair behaviors. Finally, it highlights the role of the interface between strategic leaders and state matters when considering the antecedents of long-term investment.     

CONDITIONAL INVESTMENT–CASH FLOW SENSITIVITIES AND FINANCING CONSTRAINTS

We study the sensitivity of investment to cash flow conditional on measures of q in an adjustment costs framework with costly external finance. We present a benchmark model in which this conditional investment–cash flow sensitivity increases monotonically with the cost premium for external finance, for firms in a financially constrained regime. Using simulated data, we show that this pattern is found in linear regressions that relate investment rates to measures of both cash flow and average q. We also derive a structural equation for investment from the first‐order conditions of our model, and show that this can be estimated directly.     

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION,POLITICAL INTEGRATION OR BOTH?

We study the effects of economic and political integration by presenting a model in which firms compete with each other in both an economic market—where they produce a good and compete for market share—and in a political (rent seeking) market—where they compete for transfers from the government. Growth is driven by firms’ cost‐reducing innovation activity and economic and political integration affect firms’ incentive to innovate differently. In this setting, economic and political integration can be seen as complementary. Economic integration, when not accompanied by political integration, can lead to less innovation and slower growth as firms respond to increased competition in the economic market by focusing more on rent‐seeking activity. When economic integration is accompanied by political integration, innovation and growth will be stronger and welfare higher.     

The impact of managerial political ties on corporate governance and debt financing: Evidence from Ghana

In this study, we draw upon insights from agency theory to examine the impact of managerial political ties on cost of debt and also to explore whether corporate governance mediates this impact. We hypothesize that political ties reduce financial reporting quality, disclosure of non-financial information and board independence, and are therefore associated with higher interest rates. We also hypothesize that the negative effect of political ties on the cost of debt will be stronger if firms borrow from privately-owned banks versus government-owned banks. Using data from Ghana, we find support for our direct and moderation hypotheses; political ties are associated with high interest rates and poor corporate governance. However, we do not find evidence of mediation. Altogether, the findings reveal the dark side of political connections and highlight the cost of political embeddedness in emerging credit markets.     

The Skilled Wage Premium and the Growth of Small Firms in UK Manufacturing

We document the role of small firms in explaining the growth of the skilled/unskilled wage premium in UK manufacturing over the 1980s. Our major findings are (i) the share of manufacturing employment in small firms' (0–99) employees has risen by 35 percent over this period; (ii) small firms pay more unequal wages than do large firms: the non-manual/manual wage premium is 1.53 in small firms and 1.50 in firms of over 1,500 workers; (iii) the growth in small firms over the period explains about 20 percent of the rise in the skilled/unskilled wage premium.     

Financial Health Economics

We provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the link between financial and real health care markets. This link is important as financial returns drive investment in medical research and development (R&D), which, in turn, affects real spending growth. We document a “medical innovation premium” of 4–6% annually for equity returns of firms in the health care sector. We interpret this premium as compensating investors for government‐induced profit risk, and we provide supportive evidence for this hypothesis through company filings and abnormal return patterns surrounding threats of government intervention. We quantify the implications of the premium for the growth in real health care spending by calibrating our model to match historical trends, predicting the share of gross domestic product (GDP) devoted to health care to be 32% in the long run. Policies that had removed government risk would have led to more than a doubling of medical R&D and would have increased the current share of health care spending by more than 3% of GDP.     

民营企业治理转型、政治联系与公司业绩

基于系统理论,从治理结构视角构建以实际控制人、董事长、CEO、监事会主席为核心的政治联系指数,以2003年～2007年持续经营的234家中国民营上市公司为样本,采用回归分析方法,检验治理转型视角下民营企业的政治联系程度对公司业绩的影响.研究结果表明,对总样本而言,民营企业的政治联系指数逐年降低,验证了治理转型的观点;公司规模越大、第一大股东持股比例越高,政治联系程度越强,政治联系指数与资本负债率、长期负债率正相关;具有政治联系的民营企业,政治联系指数越高其财务业绩、市场业绩、资产周转率越差,高政治联系公司的政治联系指数与长期投资比率正相关.民营企业的政治联系既有优惠的融资收益,又面临公司业绩下降的风险,在政治联系对民营企业业绩双重影响的背景下,建议民营企业实现政治联系合规,推进公司治理转型.     

MEDIA MERGERS AND MEDIA BIAS WITH RATIONAL CONSUMERS

We present an economic model of media bias and media mergers. Media owners have political motives as well as profit motives, and can influence public opinion by withholding information that is pejorative to their political agenda—provided that their agenda is not too far from the political mainstream. This is true even with rational consumers who understand the media owners’ biases, because the public do not know how much information the news organizations have and so do not know when news is being withheld. In line with conventional wisdom, this problem can be undone by competition; but competition can be defeated in equilibrium by media mergers that enhance profits at the expense of the public interest. We thus derive a motive for media merger policy that is completely distinct from the motives behind conventional antitrust. While media bias may reduce the profit incentives to merge, media markets nonetheless err by being insufficiently competitive, and the consequences of merger are more severe than in other markets.     

Auswirkungen der IFRS-Umstellung auf die Risikoprämie von Unternehmensanleihen – Eine empirische Studie für Deutschland, Österreich und die Schweiz

Does an IFRS-adoption reduce the information asymmetry between firms and providers of debt capital and therefore the risk premium of corporate bonds? Contrary to prior empirical studies we examine the relationship between disclosure and cost of capital for debt financing. We analyse the impact of an IFRS-adoption on the risk premium of German, Austrian, and Swiss corporate bonds between 1997 and 2005. Our results indicate that the change in risk premium declines after an IFRS-adoption by 40%. However, the effect occurs with a time-lag.     

Does Rent‐sharing Profit Female and Male Workers? Evidence from Israeli Matched Employer–Employee Data

This paper analyses the impact of workplace characteristics on individual wages based on a unique cross‐section matched employer–employee data set for the Israeli private manufacturing sector in 1995. Specifically, we examine the effects of the interaction between profit‐sharing and wages on the gender wage gap. The empirical findings show that individual compensation is significantly and positively correlated with firms’ profits‐per‐employee, even when controlling for all of the following: group effects in the residuals, individual and firms’ characteristics, industry wage differentials and endogeneity of profits. Wage–profit elasticity is found to be 11 per cent and it does not significantly differ between genders. With respect to the overall gender wage gap (on average women earn 28 per cent less than men), the results show that within firms there is no gender discrimination and that 12 per cent of this gap can be explained by the wage–profits profile and by the fact that women are more likely to be employed in less profitable firms than men.     

The antecedents of new R&D collaborations with different partner types: On the dynamics of past R&D collaboration and innovative performance

We examine firms' propensity to adapt their R&D collaboration portfolio by establishing new types of R&D collaboration with different kinds of partners (suppliers, customers, competitors and universities & public research institutions). We argue that existing R&D collaboration with one of the two value chain partners (suppliers or customers) is associated with the formation of new R&D collaboration with the other value chain partner to ensure temporal alignment in innovation within the value chain. In contrast, issues related to governance and unintended knowledge spillovers suggest that ‘horizontal’ R&D collaboration with competitors only spurs R&D collaboration with other partner types if such competitor R&D collaboration has been discontinued earlier (‘delayed temporal alignment’). We posit that persistent prior R&D collaboration with institutional partners is an antecedent to the establishment of new R&D collaboration with industrial partners, and that discontinuation of a particular type of R&D collaboration is likely to lead to a restart of such R&D collaborative effort. Strong prior innovative performance is expected to increase the probability that firms establish R&D collaborations with new partner types, except for R&D collaboration with competitors, since the most innovative firms may fear leakage of proprietary knowledge to rivals. We find broad support for these predictions in a large panel of Spanish innovating firms (2004–2011). Our findings highlight that it is not just the configuration of R&D collaborations with existing partner types that predicts tie formation with new partner types, but also the intertemporal pattern of prior R&D collaboration and managerial discretion provided by past innovation success.     

Endogeneity: How Failure to Correct for it can Cause Wrong Inferences and Some Remedies

Although researchers in business and management are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of endogeneity affecting regression analysis, they frequently do not have the right methodological toolkit to adjust for this issue. In this paper we discuss such a toolkit. There are also areas in business and management research which to date seem to be mostly oblivious about the endogeneity issue. We highlight such an area, which studies the question of whether firms that are cross‐listed on a foreign stock exchange are charged premium fees by their auditors. When the same methodology (pooled ordinary least squares) as in the existing literature is used, the existence of an audit fee premium for cross‐listed firms seems to be confirmed. However, once methodologies are used which adjust for the various types of endogeneity (i.e. omitted variable bias, simultaneous and dynamic endogeneity) there is no longer support for the existence of such a generalized premium. Hence, not only do we illustrate that failure to adjust for endogeneity has severe consequences such as drawing the wrong inferences, but we also review various ways to control for the different types of endogeneity.     

The impact of family CEO’s ownership and the moderating effect of the second largest owner in private family firms

This study explores two ownership issues in private family firms. First, we investigate the relationship between the ownership of family CEOs and firm performance, and postulate that this relationship in private family firms is more complex than the inverted “U” relationship found in public family firms. Second, we predict a potential moderating effect of the second largest owner, who may exert a monitoring role on family CEOs. We focus on private family firms as recent studies show that private family firms have distinct features compared to public family firms, and that findings documented in public family firms may not apply to the ubiquitous, but much less studied, private family firms. We have applied agency theory to develop the two hypotheses, used secondary data on a large sample of private family firms, utilized an adjusted conventional quadratic technique to test the hypotheses, and validated the findings using a second method of piecewise linear specification. The results show that the non-linear relationship between the ownership of family CEOs and firm performance is more complicated than the often-documented inverted “U” shape from public firms. Meanwhile, the second largest owner with a high enough ownership stake can impose a positive moderating effect by mitigating potential agency problems caused by family CEOs.     

A Distributional Analysis of Public–Private Wage Differential in India

In this paper, we examine public–private wage differential among men in India across the entire wage distribution. We find that the raw wage gap between public and private sector is positive across the entire wage distribution in both urban and rural areas. A quantile regression‐based decomposition reveals that that the public sector workers enjoy a positive wage premium across the entire wage distribution in both urban and rural areas, although the magnitude of wage premium is smaller at the top quantiles.