Costly Self‐Control and Random Self‐Indulgence

We study the random Strotz model, a version of the Strotz (1955) model with uncertainty about the nature of the temptation that will strike. We show that the random Strotz representation is unique and characterize a comparative notion of “more temptation averse.” Also, we demonstrate an unexpected connection between the random Strotz model and a generalization of the Gul–Pesendorfer (GP) (2001) model of temptation which allows for the temptation to be uncertain and which we call random GP. In particular, a preference over menus has a random GP representation if and only if it also has a representation via a random Strotz model with sufficiently smooth uncertainty about the intensity of temptation. We also show that choices of menus combined with choices from menus can distinguish the random GP and random Strotz models.     

A Unique Costly Contemplation Representation

We study preferences over menus which can be represented as if the individual is uncertain of her tastes, but is able to engage in costly contemplation before selecting an alternative from a menu. Since contemplation is costly, our key axiom, aversion to contingent planning, reflects the individual's preference to learn the menu from which she will be choosing prior to engaging in contemplation about her tastes for the alternatives. Our representation models contemplation strategies as subjective signals over a subjective state space. The subjectivity of the state space and the information structure in our representation makes it difficult to identify them from the preference. To overcome this issue, we show that each signal can be modeled in reduced form as a measure over ex post utility functions without reference to a state space. We show that in this reduced‐form representation, the set of measures and their costs are uniquely identified. Finally, we provide a measure of comparative contemplation costs and characterize the special case of our representation where contemplation is costless.     

Temptation and Self‐Control

We study a two‐period model where ex ante inferior choice may tempt the decision‐maker in the second period. Individuals have preferences over sets of alternatives that represent second period choices. Our axioms yield a representation that identifies the individual's commitment ranking, temptation ranking, and cost of self‐control. An agent has a preference for commitment if she strictly prefers a subset of alternatives to the set itself. An agent has self‐control if she resists temptation and chooses an option with higher ex ante utility. We introduce comparative measures of preference for commitment and self‐control and relate them to our representations.     

Temptation and Revealed Preference

Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) model the static behavior of an agent who ranks menus prior to the experience of temptation. This paper models the dynamic behavior of an agent whose ranking of menus itself is subject to temptation. The representation for the agent's dynamically inconsistent choice behavior views him as possessing a dynamically consistent view of what choices he “should” make (a normative preference) and being tempted by menus that contain tempting alternatives. Foundations for the model require a departure from Gul and Pesendorfer's idea that temptation creates a preference for commitment. Instead, it is hypothesized that distancing an agent from the consequences of his choices separates normative preference and temptation.     

Dynamic Preference for Flexibility

We consider a decision maker who faces dynamic decision situations that involve intertemporal trade‐offs, as in consumption–savings problems, and who experiences taste shocks that are transient contingent on the state of the world. We axiomatize a recursive representation of choice over state contingent infinite horizon consumption problems, where uncertainty about consumption utilities depends on the observable state and the state follows a subjective Markov process. The parameters of the representation are the subjective process that governs the evolution of beliefs over consumption utilities and the discount factor; they are uniquely identified from behavior. We characterize a natural notion of greater preference for flexibility in terms of a dilation of beliefs. An important special case of our representation is a recursive version of the Anscombe–Aumann model with parameters that include a subjective Markov process over states and state‐dependent utilities, all of which are uniquely identified.     

MODEL UNCERTAINTY

We study decision problems in which consequences of the various alternative actions depend on states determined by a generative mechanism representing some natural or social phenomenon. Model uncertainty arises because decision makers may not know this mechanism. Two types of uncertainty result, a state uncertainty within models and a model uncertainty across them. We discuss some two‐stage static decision criteria proposed in the literature that address state uncertainty in the first stage and model uncertainty in the second (by considering subjective probabilities over models). We consider two approaches to the Ellsberg‐type phenomena characteristic of such decision problems: a Bayesian approach based on the distinction between subjective attitudes toward the two kinds of uncertainty; and a non‐Bayesian approach that permits multiple subjective probabilities. Several applications are used to illustrate concepts as they are introduced.     

Anticipating Regret: Why Fewer Options May Be Better

We study preferences over menus which can be represented as if the agent selects an alternative from a menu and experiences regret if her choice is ex post inferior. Since regret arises from comparisons between the alternative selected and the other available alternatives, our axioms reflect the agent's desire to limit her options. We prove that our representation is essentially unique. We also introduce two measures of comparative regret attitudes and relate them to our representation. Finally, we explore the formal connection between the present work and the literature on temptation.     

Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space

We extend Kreps' (1979) analysis of preference for flexibility, reinterpreted by Kreps (1992) as a model of unforeseen contingencies. We enrich the choice set, consequently obtaining uniqueness results that were not possible in Kreps' model. We consider several representations and allow the agent to prefer commitment in some contingencies. In the representations, the agent acts as if she had coherent beliefs about a set of possible future (ex post) preferences, each of which is an expected‐utility preference. We show that this set of ex post preferences, called the subjective state space, is essentially unique given the restriction that all ex post preferences are expected‐utility preferences and is minimal even without this restriction. Because the subjective state space is identified, the way ex post utilities are aggregated into an ex ante ranking is also essentially unique. Hence when a representation that is additive across states exists, the additivity is meaningful in the sense that all representations are intrinsically additive. Uniqueness enables us to show that the size of the subjective state space provides a measure of the agent's uncertainty about future contingencies and that the way the states are aggregated indicates whether these contingencies lead to a desire for flexibility or commitment.     

Multiple Temptations

We use a preference‐over‐menus framework to model a decision maker who is affected by multiple temptations. Our two main axioms on preference—exclusion and inclusion—identify when the agent would want to restrict his choice set and when he would want to expand his choice set. An agent who is tempted would want to restrict his choice set by excluding the normatively worst alternative of that choice set. Simultaneously, he would want to expand his choice set by including a normatively superior alternative. Our representation identifies the agent's normative preference and temptations, and suggests the agent is uncertain which of these temptations will affect him. We provide examples to illustrate how our model improves on those of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2009).     

Objective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model

A decision maker (DM) is characterized by two binary relations. The first reflects choices that are rational in an “objective” sense: the DM can convince others that she is right in making them. The second relation models choices that are rational in a “subjective” sense: the DM cannot be convinced that she is wrong in making them. In the context of decision under uncertainty, we propose axioms that the two notions of rationality might satisfy. These axioms allow a joint representation by a single set of prior probabilities and a single utility index. It is “objectively rational” to choose f in the presence of g if and only if the expected utility of f is at least as high as that of g given each and every prior in the set. It is “subjectively rational” to choose f rather than g if and only if the minimal expected utility of f (with respect to all priors in the set) is at least as high as that of g. In other words, the objective and subjective rationality relations admit, respectively, a representation à la Bewley (2002) and à la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Our results thus provide a bridge between these two classic models, as well as a novel foundation for the latter.     

Random Choice and Private Information

We consider an agent who chooses an option after receiving some private information. This information, however, is unobserved by an analyst, so from the latter's perspective, choice is probabilistic or random. We provide a theory in which information can be fully identified from random choice. In addition, the analyst can perform the following inferences even when information is unobservable: (1) directly compute ex ante valuations of menus from random choice and vice versa, (2) assess which agent has better information by using choice dispersion as a measure of informativeness, (3) determine if the agent's beliefs about information are dynamically consistent, and (4) test to see if these beliefs are well‐calibrated or rational.     

The Effect of Decisions About Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage on Residential Property Values

National, regional, state, and local surveys have revealed that people have intensely negative images of "nuclear" and "radioactive" technologies, activities, and facilities, as well as associated fears of stigmatization. In light of these perceptions, the debate over where to temporarily store or permanently dispose of spent nuclear fuel (at the reactor site, an interim storage facility, or a permanent repository) provokes immense concern among possible host jurisdictions. To address these concerns, one needs to know if people's subjective opinions conform with the choices they make and are therefore reflected in their economic behavior. Argonne National Laboratory researchers used a hedonic model to complete a study of residential property value dynamics over a 5-year period within a 15-mile radius of two California nuclear power plants. They tracked the economic ramifications of decisions about the spent nuclear fuel stored at those reactors. The study revealed that no significant negative effects on residential property values resulted from a decision to move spent nuclear fuel from wet storage to a dry-cask storage facility or from a request to extend the reactor operating permit (given future changes in the type of nuclear fuel storage facility that would accompany such an extension).     

Perceived Ambiguity and Relevant Measures

We axiomatize preferences that can be represented by a monotonic aggregation of subjective expected utilities generated by a utility function and some set of i.i.d. probability measures over a product state space, S^∞. For such preferences, we define relevant measures, show that they are treated as if they were the only marginals possibly governing the state space, and connect them with the measures appearing in the aforementioned representation. These results allow us to interpret relevant measures as reflecting part of perceived ambiguity, meaning subjective uncertainty about probabilities over states. Under mild conditions, we show that increases or decreases in ambiguity aversion cannot affect the relevant measures. This property, necessary for the conclusion that these measures reflect only perceived ambiguity, distinguishes the set of relevant measures from the leading alternative in the literature. We apply our findings to a number of well‐known models of ambiguity‐sensitive preferences. For each model, we identify the set of relevant measures and the implications of comparative ambiguity aversion.     

Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion

We characterize a generalization of discounted logistic choice that incorporates a parameter to capture different views the agent might have about the costs and benefits of larger choice sets. The discounted logit model used in the empirical literature is the special case that displays a “preference for flexibility” in the sense that the agent always prefers to add additional items to a menu. Other cases display varying levels of “choice aversion,” where the agent prefers to remove items from a menu if their ex ante value is below a threshold. We show that higher choice aversion, as measured by dislike of bigger menus, also corresponds to an increased preference for putting off decisions as late as possible.     

What guides subjective performance evaluation: Incentive alignment or norm enforcement?

This paper investigates the objectives guiding a superior’s subjective evaluation of subordinate performance. In a laboratory experiment, we implement a team production setting under uncertainty, where subordinates contribute to the organization’s output by choosing effort levels, but individual contributions are subject to random shocks. After observing joint output, the superior can invest into additional (perfect or imperfect) information about effort levels. We test two competing hypotheses about objectives guiding a superior’s subjective performance evaluation. The incentive alignment hypothesis states that the superior is guided by the objective to establish financial incentives that align a subordinate’s preferences with the organization’s goals such that it is in the subordinate’s self-interest to provide effort. In contrast, the norm enforcement hypothesis states that the superior has a focus on subordinate behavior and wants to enforce the norm of cooperation by rewarding high and punishing low effort. Our results reject the incentive alignment hypothesis and provide support for the norm enforcement hypothesis.     

The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold‐up and Risk Sharing)

The paper studies the implementation problem, first analyzed by Maskin and Moore (1999), in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient outcomes following play of the mechanism. We develop a first‐order approach to characterizing the set of implementable utility mappings in this problem, paralleling Mirrlees's (1971) first‐order analysis of standard mechanism design problems. We use this characterization to study optimal contracting in hold‐up and risk‐sharing models. In particular, we examine when the contracting parties can optimally restrict attention to simple contracts, such as noncontingent contracts and option contracts (where only one agent sends a message).     

Coordination in Games with Strategic Complementarities: An Experiment on Fixed vs. Random Matching

In this article, we study behavior in a series of two‐player supply chain game experiments. Each player simultaneously chooses a capacity before demand is realized, and sales are given by the minimum of realized demand and chosen capacities. We focus on the differences in behavior under fixed pairs and random rematching. Intuition suggests that long‐run relations should lead to more profitable outcomes. However, our results go against this intuition. While subjects' capacity choices are better aligned (i.e., closer together) under fixed pairs, average profits are more variable. Moreover, learning is slower under fixed pairs—so much so that over the last five periods, average profits are actually higher under random rematching. The underlying cause for this finding appears to be a “first‐impressions” bias, present only under fixed matching, in which the greater the misalignment in initial choices, the lower are average profits.     

A method of dissimilarity analysis

This paper finds the essential differences between objects in terms of available attributes in a knowledge representation system (KR-system) where neither condition nor decision attributes are distinguished. We find these differences by using the concepts of “almost indiscernibility relation” and “approximate decision logic (ADL)” language. Here, an information system has been considered where attribute values are not always quantitative, rather subjective having vague or imprecise meanings.     

Savage in the Market

We develop a behavioral axiomatic characterization of subjective expected utility (SEU) under risk aversion. Given is an individual agent's behavior in the market: assume a finite collection of asset purchases with corresponding prices. We show that such behavior satisfies a “revealed preference axiom” if and only if there exists a SEU model (a subjective probability over states and a concave utility function over money) that accounts for the given asset purchases.