Bubbles and Self‐Enforcing Debt

We characterize equilibria with endogenous debt constraints for a general equilibrium economy with limited commitment in which the only consequence of default is losing the ability to borrow in future periods. First, we show that equilibrium debt limits must satisfy a simple condition that allows agents to exactly roll over existing debt period by period. Second, we provide an equivalence result, whereby the resulting set of equilibrium allocations with self‐enforcing private debt is equivalent to the allocations that are sustained with unbacked public debt or rational bubbles. In contrast to the classic result by Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), positive levels of debt are sustainable in our environment because the interest rate is sufficiently low to provide repayment incentives.     

A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY OF FISCAL POLICY AND UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper presents a political economy theory of fiscal policy and unemployment. The underlying economy is one in which unemployment can arise but can be mitigated by tax cuts and increases in public production. Such policies are fiscally costly, but can be financed by issuing government debt. Policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from different political districts. With the available policies, it is possible for the government to completely eliminate unemployment in the long run. However, with political decision making, the economy always has unemployment. Unemployment is higher when the private sector experiences negative shocks. When these shocks occur, the government employs debt‐financed fiscal stimulus plans which involve both tax cuts and public production increases. When the private sector is healthy, the government contracts debt until it reaches a floor level. Unemployment levels are weakly increasing in the economy's debt level, strictly so when the private sector experiences negative shocks. Conditional on the level of workers employed, the mix of public and private output is distorted.     

INSULATION IMPOSSIBLE: MONETARY POLICY AND REGIONAL DEBT SPILLOVERS IN A FEDERATION

This paper studies the effects of monetary policy in the presence of debt spillovers within a monetary union. When capital markets are integrated, the fiscal policy of any member country will generally influence equilibrium wages and interest rates across the whole union. We ask whether there exists a monetary policy which can offset these spillovers. Within a general class of monetary policy rules, there does not exist one that completely insulates agents in one region from fiscal policy in the other. These debt spillovers will affect welfare through two channels: intertemporal efficiency and redistribution.     

SOVEREIGNS VERSUS BANKS: CREDIT,CRISES, AND CONSEQUENCES

Two separate narratives have emerged in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. One interpretation speaks of private financial excess and the key role of the banking system in leveraging and deleveraging the economy. The other emphasizes the public sector balance sheet and worries about the risks of lax fiscal policy. However, the two may interact in important and understudied ways. This paper examines the co‐evolution of public and private sector debt in advanced countries from 1870 to 2012. We find that in advanced economies financial crises are not preceded by public debt build‐ups nor are they more likely when public debt is high. However, history shows that high levels of public debt tend to exacerbate the effects of private sector deleveraging after financial crises. The economic costs of financial crises rise substantially if large private sector credit booms are unwound at times when the public sector has little capacity to pursue macroeconomic and financial stabilization.     

DISTRIBUTIONAL INCENTIVES IN AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF DOMESTIC SOVEREIGN DEFAULT

Europe's debt crisis resembles historical episodes of outright default on domestic public debt about which little research exists. This paper proposes a theory of domestic sovereign default based on distributional incentives affecting the welfare of risk‐averse debt and nondebtholders. A utilitarian government cannot sustain debt if default is costless. If default is costly, debt with default risk is sustainable, and debt falls as the concentration of debt ownership rises. A government favoring bond holders can also sustain debt, with debt rising as ownership becomes more concentrated. These results are robust to adding foreign investors, redistributive taxes, or a second asset.     

财政风险:从经济总量角度的分析

在干预公共风险的过程中,政府会承受各种各样的支出压力,这些支出压力表现为政府的各种形式的负债,即未来一个时期政府资源的流出。作为公共主体,政府面对的债务是不确定的,不能仅仅从会计学角度来认定。公共债务与经济总量是一种历史的循环关系,不同的循环状态决定了政府财政风险是趋向收敛还是发散。不同的债务结构对经济总量及其增长产生不同的影响,因而具有不同的风险。认清不同公共债务类型的来源、不确定性程度及其风险可控性,是把握公共债务与经济总量的关联向哪一种循环转化的重要一环,仅仅关注债务总量是远远不够的,抽象地谈公共债务负担率的高低没有意义。改善公共债务结构,降低整个公共债务的不确定性程度至关重要,这比控制债务规模更迫切。     

REPATRIATION OF DEBT IN THE EURO CRISIS

With the beginning of the Euro Crisis, the long‐standing trend of European financial integration reversed. Investors unwound cross‐border positions of debt obligations and increased holdings of locally issued debt. In other words, debt obligations were repatriated. We use data on bank portfolios to document three new empirical regularities of the financial disintegration: (i) repatriation affected mainly debt of crisis countries; (ii) repatriation affected mainly public debt; (iii) the public debt of crisis countries that was not repatriated was reallocated to large and politically influential countries within the Euro area. We read these results in light of standard theories of cross‐border portfolio allocation and argue that the sum of these patterns constitutes evidence for the secondary market theory of public debt.     

SLOW INFORMATION DIFFUSION AND THE INERTIAL BEHAVIOR OF DURABLE CONSUMPTION

This paper studies the aggregate dynamics of durable and nondurable consumption under slow information diffusion (SID) due to noisy observations and learning within the permanent income hypothesis framework. We show that SID can significantly improve the model's predictions on the joint behavior of income, durable consumption, and nondurable consumption at the aggregate level. Specifically, we find that SID can significantly improve the model's predictions for: (i) smoothness in durable and nondurable consumption, (ii) autocorrelation of durable consumption, and (iii) contemporaneous correlation between durable and nondurable consumption.     

RETHINKING THE EFFECT OF IMMIGRATION ON WAGES

This paper calculates the effects of immigration on the wages of native US workers of various skill levels in two steps. In the first step we use labor demand functions to estimate the elasticity of substitution across different groups of workers. Second, we use the underlying production structure and the estimated elasticities to calculate the total wage effects of immigration in the long run. We emphasize that a production function framework is needed to combine own‐group effects with cross‐group effects in order to obtain the total wage effects for each native group. In order to obtain a parsimonious representation of elasticities that can be estimated with available data, we adopt alternative nested‐CES models and let the data select the preferred specification. New to this paper is the estimate of the substitutability between natives and immigrants of similar education and experience levels. In the data‐preferred model, there is a small but significant degree of imperfect substitutability between natives and immigrants which, when combined with the other estimated elasticities, implies that in the period from 1990 to 2006 immigration had a small effect on the wages of native workers with no high school degree (between 0.6% and +1.7%). It also had a small positive effect on average native wages (+0.6%) and a substantial negative effect (−6.7%) on wages of previous immigrants in the long run.     

IS THERE A FISCAL FREE LUNCH IN A LIQUIDITY TRAP?

In this paper, we use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to examine the effects of an expansion in government spending in a liquidity trap. If the liquidity trap is very prolonged, the spending multiplier can be much larger than in normal circumstances, and the budgetary costs minimal. However, given this fiscal free lunch, it is unclear why policymakers would want to limit the size of fiscal expansion. Our paper addresses this question in a model environment in which the duration of the liquidity trap is determined endogenously, and depends on the size of the fiscal stimulus. We show that even if the multiplier is high for small increases in government spending, it may decrease substantially at higher spending levels; thus, it is crucial to distinguish between the marginal and average responses of output and government debt.     

PUBLIC DEBT UNDER LIMITED PRIVATE CREDIT

There is a conventional wisdom in economics that public debt can serve as a substitute for private credit if private borrowing is limited. The purpose of this paper is to show that, while a government could in principle use such a policy to fully relax borrowing limits, this is not generally optimal. In our economy, agents invest in a short‐term asset, a long‐term asset, and government bonds. Agents are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks prior to the maturity of the long‐term asset. We show that a high public debt policy fully relaxes private borrowing limits and is suboptimal. This is because agents expecting such a policy respond by investing less than is socially optimal in the short asset which can protect them in the event of a liquidity shock. The optimal policy is more constrained and it induces a wedge between the technological rate of return on the long asset and the rate of return on bonds. In such a regime, agents subject to liquidity shocks are also borrowing constrained, and this expectation of being borrowing constrained induces them to invest the optimal level in the short asset.     

MARKET DISTORTIONS AND GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY

In this paper, we investigate how government transparency depends on economic distortions. We first consider an abstract class of economies in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the exogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this information. Our key result is that distortions limit communication: even if transparency is ex ante Pareto superior to opaqueness, it cannot constitute an equilibrium when distortions are sufficiently high. We next confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts, in which monopoly power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions.     

SOVEREIGNS,UPSTREAM CAPITAL FLOWS,AND GLOBAL IMBALANCES

We construct measures of net private and public capital flows for a large cross‐section of developing countries considering both creditor and debtor side of the international debt transactions. Using these measures, we demonstrate that sovereign‐to‐sovereign transactions account for upstream capital flows and global imbalances. Specifically, we find that (i) international net private capital flows (inflows minus outflows of private capital) are positively correlated with countries' productivity growth, (ii) net sovereign debt flows (government borrowing minus reserves) are negatively correlated with growth only if net public debt is financed by another sovereign, (iii) net public debt financed by private creditors is positively correlated with growth, (iv) public savings are strongly positively correlated with growth, whereas correlation between private savings and growth is flat and statistically insignificant. These empirical facts contradict the conventional wisdom and constitute a challenge for the existing theories on upstream capital flows and global imbalances.     

Sequential Estimation of Structural Models With a Fixed Point Constraint

This paper considers the estimation problem of structural models for which empirical restrictions are characterized by a fixed point constraint, such as structural dynamic discrete choice models or models of dynamic games. We analyze a local condition under which the nested pseudo likelihood (NPL) algorithm converges to a consistent estimator, and derive its convergence rate. We find that the NPL algorithm may not necessarily converge to a consistent estimator when the fixed point mapping does not have a local contraction property. To address the issue of divergence, we propose alternative sequential estimation procedures that can converge to a consistent estimator even when the NPL algorithm does not.     

THE POLITICAL COLOR OF FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY

We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model that yields testable implications about the fiscal policy run by governments of different political color. Successive generations of voters choose taxation, expenditure, and government debt through repeated elections. Voters are heterogeneous by age and by the intensity of their preferences for public good provision. The political equilibrium switches stochastically between left‐ (pro‐public goods) and right‐leaning (pro‐private consumption) governments. A shift to the left (right) is associated with a fall (increase) in government debt, an increase (fall) in taxation, and an increase (fall) in government expenditures. However, left‐leaning governments engage in more debt accumulation during recessions. These predictions are shown to be consistent with the time‐series evidence for the United States in the postwar period, and also with the evidence for a panel of OECD countries. (JEL: D72, E62, H41, H62, H63)     

Leverage and the performance of buyouts

In this paper we investigate the effects of debt usage on (risk-adjusted) equity returns in private equity-backed buyout transactions. We use a proprietary data set of more than 700 realized European and North American buyouts acquired between 1990 and 2006 to empirically assess theoretical predictions. Our results show a positive relationship between debt levels and equity returns indicating the return-enhancing effects related to leverage. However, our results also provide evidence that it is possible to ‘over-leverage’ a company, i.e. at very high levels of leverage (debt to total capital of approximately 90%) the increased company default risk outweighs the positive effects related to leverage resulting in decreasing equity returns. On the other side, we find no significant relationship between leverage and risk-adjusted equity returns which implies that the return increase through higher debt ratios comes along with increasing risk. In addition, we show that private equity sponsors successfully conduct debt-equity-arbitrage in times of favorable debt market conditions. This implies that these investors successfully time debt markets.     

Towards more sustainable debt attitudes and behaviors: the importance of basic economic skills

This research builds on the idea that debt-related financial distress faced by an individual results primarily from the inability to understand and apply fundamental economic concepts to debt decisions rather than from a lack of highly specific financial knowledge. This notion offers a potential explanation for why current financial literacy programs, which generally focus on the latter aspect, are considered to be mostly ineffective. We hypothesize that the understanding of fundamental economic concepts plays an essential role in explaining debt attitudes and behaviors. To test this hypothesis, we empirically examine how basic economic skills relate to these traits among German adolescents while controlling for their levels of financial literacy. Our results indicate that basic economic skills beneficially relate to both individual debt attitudes and behaviors. In contrast, we do not find a significant impact of financial literacy. Therefore, a stronger consideration of fundamental economic concepts in financial literacy programs might be a fruitful way to increase their effectiveness.     

Does employee welfare affect corporate debt maturity?

This study examines the effect of employee well-being on the corporate debt maturity structure of U.S. firms. It hypothesizes that a firm's degree of commitment to employee welfare affects its debt maturity structure. Using a sample of 19,347 firm-year observations over the period 1991–2014, we find evidence that firms with higher employee welfare scores prefer long-term debt over short-term debt. This relationship is more pronounced for firms operating in human-capital-intensive industries and firms with lower labor union-membership rate. Our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns and insensitive to the use of alternative regression methods, variable measurements, and sample compositions. This paper provides novel evidence on the role of employment policies and practices in explaining variations in debt maturity.     

Why adding firm value with a put feature in debt contracts is better than renegotiation

In this paper, we analyze the ability of putable debt to add firm value. To stress the impact of a put feature, we compare the resulting optimal firm values and capital structures to those of a firm with straight debt that can be renegotiated. For this purpose, we consider a time-independent firm value model with tax-deductibility of coupon payments, bankruptcy costs in the case of a default, and dynamic restructuring. We find that a put right can always be designed so that a put is enforced for low asset values but the bond remains alive for high asset values. The optimal firm value arising from this type of equilibrium strategy is remarkable for several reasons: The optimal firm value under putable debt is always higher than under straight debt even under renegotiation with arbitrary negotiation power of debt and equity holders. Moreover, the optimal firm value under putable debt always benefits from higher bankruptcy costs, while the optimal firm value under straight debt suffers. Accordingly, a higher volatility of asset value returns can be favorable for a high firm value under putable debt, while it always destroys value of a firm with straight debt.     

Convergence Properties of the Likelihood of Computed Dynamic Models

This paper studies the econometrics of computed dynamic models. Since these models generally lack a closed‐form solution, their policy functions are approximated by numerical methods. Hence, the researcher can only evaluate an approximated likelihood associated with the approximated policy function rather than the exact likelihood implied by the exact policy function. What are the consequences for inference of the use of approximated likelihoods? First, we find conditions under which, as the approximated policy function converges to the exact policy, the approximated likelihood also converges to the exact likelihood. Second, we show that second order approximation errors in the policy function, which almost always are ignored by researchers, have first order effects on the likelihood function. Third, we discuss convergence of Bayesian and classical estimates. Finally, we propose to use a likelihood ratio test as a diagnostic device for problems derived from the use of approximated likelihoods.