EFFICIENT USER CHARGES IN A RENT-SEEKING MODEL

This paper examines efficient user charges on governmentally provided facilities in the presence of rent seeking. We find that the efficient user charge depends upon the relative slopes of the demand curve for the use of the facility and the corresponding marginal cost curve, as well as the level of rent seeking over the revenue raised. Except for a special case, the efficient user charge is found to differ from the charge indicated by the intersection of demand and marginal cost curves. Examples show that actual user charges on government facilities are often set at inefficient levels.     

Determinants of Charitable Donations to Large U.S. Higher Education,Hospital, and Scientific Research NPOs: New Evidence from Panel Data

We provide improved evidence on effects that fund-raising, government support, and program revenue of U.S. higher education, hospital, and scientific research nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have on donations to those NPOs and provide improved estimates of price elasticities of donations to, and donor demand for output of, those NPOs. Applying econometric tests, we find the best-specified model is two-way fixed effects, which controls for organization-specific and time-specific factors. Results suggest that U.S. higher education, hospital, and scientific research NPOs fund-raise to the point where the marginal fund-raising dollar brings in zero dollars of donations, donor demand for output of hospitals and scientific research NPOs is price inelastic and price elastic, respectively, and results are not sensitive to specification of price.     

Convexity of integer veto and Elimination Procedures

Elimination Procedures generated by marginal contribution in an integer veto function implement through sincere (respectively sincere and sophisticated) behavior the core correspondence of the veto function if the latter is convex (respectively additive). Moreover a partial converse of this result is proved. A characterization of a subclass of convex (respectively additive) veto functions is thus obtained.I am indebted to Hervé Moulin for helpful comments concerning this paper. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for his remarks.     

Marginal revenue and labor strife in major league baseball

An improved model of baseball player performance and revenue generation shows that, overall, major league players are paid more than the marginal revenue they generate from spectators at the ballpark. Broadcast revenue is shown to be a factor in player salaries, although this revenue is not sensitive to individual player output. Under the current bargaining procedure, collective action in baseball is therefore viewed as the only way to entice owners to pay players for the broadcast revenue they generate.     

OUTPUT EFFECTS OF INFLATION WITH FIXED PRICE– AND QUANTITY–ADJUSTMENT COSTS

This article examines how the aggregate production varies with inflation when there are fixed price– and quantity–adjustment costs. It shows that such variation is determined by the elasticity of the firms’ marginal real revenue with respect to demand. The aggregate production decreases with inflation if this elasticity always exceeds minus unity, whereas the aggregate production increases with inflation if the elasticity is always less than minus unity. The aggregate production is independent of inflation in the special case that the elasticity always equals minus unity. The latter occurs if demand is derived from a log‐quadratic utility function. (JEL E31)     

AN ESTIMATE OF THE RENT GENERATED BY A PREMIUM COLLEGE FOOTBALL PLAYER

The National Collegiate Athletic Association limits the payments athletes can receive for their services. Colleges are effectively monosony employers so players will not be paid their marginal revenue product. Therefore, colleges capture an economic rent from players. This paper measures these rents by estimating the marginal revenue product of a top college football player. The empirical results suggest that a premium college player generates over $500,000 in annual revenues for his team.     

EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISONS OF AUCTIONS UNDER SINGLE-AND MULTI-UNIT DEMAND

An English clock auction and a sealed-bid auction with lowest accepted-bid pricing are studied in a controlled laboratory setting. Buyers bid for either a single unit or two units of the good. The sealed-bid auction generates more revenue than the English clock auction in both cases. The revenue from the English clock auction is lower in the two-unit demand environment than in the single-unit demand environment, due to strategic demand reduction on the part of bidders. (JEL C92, D44)     

THE MARKET FOR MOTION PICTURES: RANK, REVENUE, AND SURVIVAL

Every motion picture is an innovation that competes for theater screens and audiences during its brief life against a changing array of imperfect substitutes. We analyze a large sample of motion pictures as an evolving rank tournament of survival and death. The results indicate that the failure rate of motion pictures is time-dependent and survival time is strongly related to the number of initial bookings. Weekly box office revenue is highly convex in rank, which is consistent with Rosen's superstar phenomenon. Our results have implications for motion picture licensing arrangements, which have been severely restricted by U.S. court decisions.     

Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness

Each one of n users consumes an idiosyncratic commodity produced in indivisible units. The n commodities are jointly produced by a central facility and total cost must be shared by the users.  A “sequential stand alone mechanism” shares costs incrementally according to a fixed ordering of the users: the first user always pays stand alone cost, the second pays the stand alone cost of the first two users minus that of the first and so on. If the second derivatives of costs are of a constant sign, such a method yields a unique strong equilibrium at every profile of convex preferences in the game where each user chooses his own demand. This equilibrium, in turn, defines a coalition strategy-proof social choice function.  Under decreasing marginal costs and submodular costs, the sequential stand alone mechanisms are almost characterized by these properties; the only exception is the binary demand case (each agent consumes zero or one unit) where a rich family of cost sharing methods (the Shapley value among them) yields a coalition strategy-proof equilibrium selection. Under increasing marginal costs and supermodular costs, coalition strategy-proofness characterizes a richer family of cost sharing methods: they give out one unit at a time while charging marginal costs, with the users taking turns according to a sequence fixed in advance. These methods contain serial cost sharing as a limit case. Received: 8 July 1997/Accepted: 22 January 1998     

DEBT BAILOUTS AND CONSTITUTIONS

A demand‐based theory of subnational debt bailouts is presented. It is shown that demand for bailouts among politicians with regional constituencies is affected by revenue sharing arrangements as a bailout implies a shift of taxation toward the federal tier. Automatic revenue sharing may lead to the formation of pro‐bailout coalitions formed by indebted states and states that are net recipients of the revenue sharing arrangement. The model shows that the state debt bailouts approved by the Brazilian Senate prior to the enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Act were consistent with politicians who maximize the proceeds accruing to their constituencies. (JEL H70, D70)     

APPLICATIONS BARRIER TO ENTRY AND EXCLUSIVE VERTICAL CONTRACTS IN PLATFORM MARKETS

Our study extends the empirical literature on whether vertical restraints are anticompetitive. We focus on exclusive contracting in platform markets, which feature indirect network effects and thus are susceptible to an applications barrier to entry. Exclusive contracts in vertical relationships between the platform provider and software supplier can heighten entry barriers. We test these theories in the home video game market. We find that indirect network effects from software on hardware demand are present, and that exclusivity takes market share from rivals, but only when most games are nonexclusive. The marginal exclusive game contributes virtually nothing to console demand. Thus, allowing exclusive vertical contracts in platform markets need not lead to domination by one system protected by a hedge of complementary software. Our investigation suggests that bargaining power enjoyed by the best software providers and the skewed distribution of game revenue prevents the foreclosure of rivals through exclusive contracting. (JEL L42, L63, D12)     

AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAFFER CURVE

The Laffer curve shows the relationship between tax revenue and the personal income tax rate, with tax revenue being a presumably concave function of the tax rate and equal to zero at tax rates of zero percent and 100 percent. If the personal income tax rate is reduced, then tax revenue will decrease (increase) if the economy is on the positively (negatively) sloped section of the Laffer curve. This paper derives a sufficient condition for the economy to be on the positively sloped section of the Laffer curve. In light of the current knowledge of the elasticities of supply of labor and supply of saving, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a decrease in U.S. personal income tax rates will decrease tax revenue.     

TAX EVASION AND THE MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS

Tax evasion and deadweight loss have similar implications for the rules of public finance. The optimal mix of taxes can be derived from the minimization of the sum of aggregate deadweight loss and aggregate cost of tax evasion. Similarly, the marginal cost of public funds includes allowances for marginal deadweight loss and marginal cost of tax evasion per dollar of public revenue acquired.     

THE CHALLENGE OF REVENUE SHARING WITH BUNDLED PRICING: AN APPLICATION TO MUSIC

Although bundling can substantially increase profits relative to standalone pricing, particularly for zero‐marginal‐cost information products, it has one major problem: bundling produces revenue that is not readily attributable to particular pieces of intellectual property, creating a revenue division problem. We evaluate several possible solutions using unique song valuation survey data. We find the Shapley value, a well‐motivated theoretical solution, is universally incentive compatible (all bundle elements fare better inside the bundle than under standalone pricing), but revenue‐sharing schemes feasible with readily available consumption data are not. Among feasible schemes, Ginsburgh and Zang's modified Shapley value performs best. (JEL C71, D79, L14)     

DO CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX RATES MAXIMIZE REVENUE?

Buchanan and Lee [1982] suggest that politicians choose tax rates on the positively sloped segment of the short-run rate-revenue curve but the negatively sloped segment of the long-run curve. This paper uses recent estimates of the slope of the cigarette demand curve by Becker, Grossman and Murphy [1994] to test the hypothesis. Becker, Grossman and Murphy's parameter estimates combined with state-by-state data on key variables yields strong evidence against the hypothesis and instead suggests that marginal revenues from cigarette excise taxes are positive in every state.     

DETERMINANTS OF REVENUE IN SPORTS LEAGUES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT

This study investigates determinants of revenue in North America's four major professional sports leagues. Revenue is positively associated with on‐field success in baseball (MLB), basketball (NBA), and hockey (NHL), but not in football (NFL). The returns to success are not diminishing as commonly assumed, which casts doubt on the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, and differences across leagues are consistent with revenue sharing arrangements. Estimates indicate a strong negative but diminishing relationship between stadium age and revenue. Teams in larger markets generate more revenue than smaller markets, but the returns to success do not differ according to market size. (JEL Z21)     

SPORTS‐LED TOURISM,SPATIAL DISPLACEMENT,AND HOTEL DEMAND

We analyze the relationship between professional sports events and concerts held in LA's Staples Center and nearby hotel performance. Government‐led economic redevelopment projects often envision sports facilities as tourist magnets. Little evidence exists supporting links between sporting events and hotel demand. An empirical analysis exploiting exogenous daily variation in the timing of games and concerts from 2002 to 2017 shows a small positive impact on room revenue at hotels within one mile and larger room revenue decrease at hotels located one to 4 miles away. The overall impact on hotel room revenue and rooms rented was not positive. Nearby hotel room rates increased during NBA and NHL work stoppages. The city granted four new hotels built very near the arena exemptions from occupancy taxes for 20–25 years; these exemptions reduced hotel tax revenues by a minimum of $4.5 million annually and may not have been needed to spur new hotel development. (JEL H26, H71, Z28)     

Risk and diversification of nonprofit revenue portfolios: Applying modern portfolio theory to nonprofit revenue management

This study uses modern portfolio theory (MPT) to estimate the risk of nonprofit revenue portfolios and examines to what degree the revenue concentration measure based on Herfindahl–Hirschman Index is associated with the portfolio risk measure based on MPT. The findings suggest that nonprofits with greater revenue concentration have lower revenue portfolio risk in the whole sample analysis. However, it is plausible that this result is dominated by organizations reliant on commercial income, which comprise over half of the sample. In fact, when examined separately, the relationship varies by an organization's primary funding structure. While higher revenue concentration is positively associated with portfolio risk for organizations relying on donations or those without a consistent primary funding source, it appears to associate with a lower portfolio risk for commercial organizations and those relying on government grants. This study reflects on the concept of diversification derived from portfolio theory and calls attention to a more nuanced approach to nonprofit revenue strategy.     

PRODUCTION EXTERNALITIES AND LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIA: BARGAINING AND PIGOVIAN TAXATION

This paper analyzes bargaining and Pigovian taxation solutions to inefficiencies from production externalities with free entry. The Coase Theorem fails in a decentralized context but remains valid if the property rights holder can act like a command economy planner. A less powerful price-taking rights holder's objective function is nonconcave, causing an inefficient bargaining outcome. Bargaining complicates Pigovian taxes with a nonlinear tax scheme required to sustain the optimum. Polluting firms pay a franchise tax whose revenue is given lump sum to consumers and face a marginal charge only on excess output, which thus raises no revenue in equilibrium.     

OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY,FAN TRAVEL,AND AGGREGATE ATTENDANCE

The uncertainty of outcome hypothesis (UOH) informs economists' understanding of consumer decisions to attend sporting events and team revenue generation. We develop a model of fan behavior based on standard expected utility methods which incorporates fan heterogeneity in terms of decisions to travel to away games and strong preferences for wins. The model reflects aggregate attendance outcomes across local and visiting fans, generates predictions consistent with the UOH, and gives rise to concave league-wide revenue functions. Empirical analysis of game outcomes and attendance at regular season National Basketball association games from 1979 to 2013 supports key predictions of the model. (JEL L83, D12, Z20)