A decomposition of immigrant divorce rates in Australia

Crude divorce rates of overseas-born Australians by birthplace are not comparable because different birthplace groups have different age structures and marriage patterns that affect the rates. This paper decomposes the crude rates into components due to the effects of age structrue, marriage patterns and the divorce rate of married men and women. This allows for a better comparison of the level of divorce by birthplace. The range in the standardized divorce rates by birthplace is smaller than that indicated by the crude rates. Nonetheless, there remains considerable variation in immigrant divorce rates in Australia.     

Relation of marriage and education to fertility in the U.S.S.R

Abstract One-half of the variation in Soviet fertility as measured by the child-woman ratio is attributable to the proportion of married women in the 20-24 age group. The familar sociological hypothesis of an inverse relation between human fertility and education also is fully substantiated with data for the 36 major ethnic groups in the U.S.S.R. The second and third best predicting variables fall into the two extreme age groups: (a) those 16 to 19 years of age with more than seven years of school completed and (b) those men and women aged 60 and over with the equivalent formal education. Results of this study support the modified hypothesis that complements previously publicized findings. It asserts that variations in fertility attributable to the traditionally religious values can be explained in terms of the age-specific marriage and educational differentials known to have existed in the past and still characteristic of the multi-national society in the Soviet Union.     

Reconstruction of fertility trends for the female population of the U.S.S.R

Abstract The article describes fertility trends among Soviet women during the past 40 years as compared to American women during the same period of time. Period-specific fertility rates were arrived at by relating the annual total of live births to a pattern of age-specific fertility rates estimated for each year and also to the number of women for each single year of age. These rates were then appropriately re-arranged and compressed into five-year age groups to form a series of cohort-specific fertility rates. The findings rest on somewhat conjectural estimates of live births and numbers of women in the U.S.S.R., some of which were originally prepared before the 1959 Soviet census. The tentative evidence shows that changes in the period-specific fertility of Soviet women were far more irregular and dramatic in the past, than among American women. After World War II these rates dropped in the U.S.S.R. below those of the United States, except for women over 30 years of age. On the other hand, the cohort-specific rates of Soviet women, although declining from one cohort to the next, at present show their magnitude in the cumulative series for older ages to be marked by higher than among American women. This experimental investigation of fertility in the Soviet Union makes no claim to high standards of accuracy and validity. Its intended purpose is to stress the desirability of shifting emphasis from the temporal and prognostic type of study, characteristic of present-day demographic research about the U.S.S.R., to the generational and historical approach.     

The status of women in the rural U.S.S.R.

Degree of sex equality in rural areas of the U.S.S.R. is assessed with reference to a multi-variable model which specifies demographic, technological, social, and ideological factors associated with sex stratification. Such analysis reveals that the emphasis in the U.S.S.R. on women's participation in production as the key to sex equality ignores other dimensions of sex stratification which are not changed using this tactic. In particular, rural traditions of higher birth rates, more authoritarian families, greater religious emphasis, and male scorn for women have kept the status of rural women even lower than that of their urban counterparts. Additionally, the agrarian techno-economic base and lack of institutional supports for childcare and housework help perpetuate sex stratification. Increasing sex differentiation is probably in store for the Soviet Union, because official pronatalist policies are likely to be facilitated by expanding the service sector, which will further increase the division of labor in the market.     

Fertility and economic dependency of Soviet women

The study addresses itself to the question: If it can be shown that economic dependency of women is not associated with fertility, then what are the variables that favor their abstention from work outside home? Results based on an extensive statistical analysis of Soviet data bring into focus new evidence. It was found thateconomic dependency of women is associated with themarriage differential between sexes. This relationship is especially evident in the regions where birth rates are of a low order. In the geographic areas where fertility is high, the percentage of economically inactive women increases with an increase in the urban population portion in an administrative area. Five principal components of urbanization have been identified: (1) educational level, (2) increasing rates of marriage, (3) divorce, (4) equal educational status of women as compared with men, and (5) the rising proportion of economically dependent women in the 16–54 age span. Most of the data are based on the 1959 Census and vital statistics by administrative areas for the U. S. S. R. For analytic purposes these were sorted into 30 areas of low birth rates, 62 areas with moderate rates, and 48 administrative areas corresponding to the high-fertility region in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and in several autonomous non-Slav republics.     

Expectancy of life at birth in 36 nationalities of the Soviet Union: 1958-60

Abstract In the 36 nationalities of the Soviet Union the estimated expectancy of life at birth ranged from 50·0 years for Chechens to 71·1 years for Latvians with a median of about 67·5 years for Russians. In essence, the life table function e(0) was generated from the child-woman ratios with the use of intricate equations based on empirical data obtained from official Soviet publications. A modified version of Bourgeois-Pichat's model was used to estimate life expectancies at birth among the 36 nationalities on the basis of their crude death rates and the percentage of population aged 65 years and over. The 1959 U.S.S.R. Census of Population provided information pertaining to the older age groups. The crude death rates were estimated separately with the aid of second-degree polynomials fitted to the crude demographic measures for 109 administrative areas of the Soviet Union for 1960. Information about recent improvements in public health, as well as conjectural evaluations of economic advancement in recent years were examined and related to the past and present level of mortality among the Russian people and the remaining population of minorities.     

Expectancy of life at birth in 36 nationalities of the Soviet Union: 1958-60

In the 36 nationalities of the Soviet Union the estimated expectancy of life at birth ranged from 50·0 years for Chechens to 71·1 years for Latvians with a median of about 67·5 years for Russians.

In essence, the life table function e₀ was generated from the child-woman ratios with the use of intricate equations based on empirical data obtained from official Soviet publications. A modified version of Bourgeois-Pichat's model was used to estimate life expectancies at birth among the 36 nationalities on the basis of their crude death rates and the percentage of population aged 65 years and over. The 1959 U.S.S.R. Census of Population provided information pertaining to the older age groups. The crude death rates were estimated separately with the aid of second-degree polynomials fitted to the crude demographic measures for 109 administrative areas of the Soviet Union for 1960.

Information about recent improvements in public health, as well as conjectural evaluations of economic advancement in recent years were examined and related to the past and present level of mortality among the Russian people and the remaining population of minorities.     

Social indicators of marital instability,U.S.A., 1920–1969

A social indicators model which included demographic variables (birth rate and aged child ratio), economic variable (unemployment) and marriage rates (control variable) was utilized in explaining changes in divorce rates over time. Analysis of time series data for two distinctive periods in the U.S.A. (1920–1940 and 1946–1969) revealed the following significant results:

1. Demographic changes in the age structure of the population while controlling for marriage rates explains significantly larger amounts of the variance in marital instability than economic changes alone (unemployment).
2. In the post-World War II era unemployment was not found to be a statistically significant predictor of marital instability when control for demographic changes were established.
3. In the post-World War II era marriage rates appear to be a significant predictor of divorce rates when control for demographic changes were maintained.
4. In the post-World War II era marriage rates were found to be more sensitive to changes in economic conditions than marital instability (divorce rate).

     

Divorce in sub‐Saharan Africa: Are Unions Becoming Less Stable?

Divorce is one of the main drivers of family instability in sub‐Saharan Africa. Using data from 101 Demographic and Health Surveys and novel estimation techniques, we 1) provide the first systematic estimates of divorce across 33 countries; 2) assess trends in divorce in 20 countries; and 3) investigate the key country‐level correlates of divorce both across and within countries. Despite considerable geographic variation, our estimates show that divorce is common in most countries. Contrary to expectations, however, we find no evidence that divorce is increasing. Instead, divorce has been either stable or declining in recent decades. We show that socioeconomic factors associated with industrialization have countervailing effects on divorce. Urbanization and female employment are associated with higher levels of divorce, while age at first marriage and female education correspond to lower rates. These findings have implications for current and future family dynamics in sub‐Saharan Africa.     

Crude death rates in the U.S.S.R.: Comment on Grandstaff's remarks

Abstract My appraisal of death rates in the U.S.S.R. goes beyond the question whether a simple correlation really measures what the critic purports to measure. Normally, the crude death rates depend upon the age structure and the force of mortality. If one persists in assuming that a reasonably high correlation between the official death rates and their independent estimates should be the main criterion of validity, the best technique will be to relate the proportion of persons aged 60 and over to the official death rates recorded for some 109 observations. The force of mortality would be approximately reflected by a given proportion of survivors to the first or second year of age. But in the 1959 Soviet Census the latter data had been concealed within the 0 to 9 age group, possibly for no other reason than to prevent the curious few from tinkering with infant mortality.     

Social class and socio-economic differentials in divorce in England and Wales

Summary The characteristics of a national sample of over 2,000 couples who divorced in 1979 are analysed according to the social class and socio-economic position of the husband. The demographic variables investigated for social class and socio-economic differentials include ages at marriage and divorce, duration of marriage, previous marital status, family size and the presence of a pre-maritally conceived child. In addition, an age-standardized measure, the 'standardized divorce ratio' is used to summarise the relative rates of divorce for the different social classes and socio-economic groups. Using this measure, the rate of divorce for couples in Social Class I is only half that for the average couple, whereas for couples in Social Class V and couples in which the husband is unemployed it is more than double.     

Comment on 'expectancy of life at birth in 36 nationalities of the Soviet Union: 1958-60'

Abstract In D. Peter Mazur's recent article, 'Expectancy of Life at Birth in 36 Nationalities of the Soviet Union: 1958-1960', crude rates of death and expectancies of life for nationalities are derived from a scant base of data that includes crude rates of natural increase for administrative units and various ratios of composition of the populations of both administrative units and nationalities. Students of Soviet demography genuinely appreciate Mazur's attempt to derive rich results from meagre data. Of course, to do this strong assumptions are required and Mazur warns that 'the quantitative results ... are valid only to the extent that the underlying methodology is theoretically sound'. One way to test the quantitative results is to examine how well the crude death rates for the nationalities calculated by Mazur reproduce the crude death rates for administrative units with which Mazur started. Mazur feels that the estimated death rates for nationalities closely agree with the death rates for administrative areas. The present author is sceptical. Application of the method described below does not show close correspondence, and this matter, which is crucial in the evaluation of Mazur's results, seems problematical.     

第二次世界大战对苏联人口状况的影响

第二次世界大战期间为了赢得战争胜利,苏联付出了惨重的人口代价。战争对苏联人口状况产生了深刻的影响,不仅加重了战前已存在的人口危机程度,而且对居民的身体健康状况、结婚率和家庭规模造成了更深程度的破坏。战后流行病大规模爆发,出生率下降、死亡率上升,性别比例、年龄结构严重失衡,人口数量大幅减少,并持续数十年,为20世纪90年代初俄罗斯爆发的人口危机埋下了隐患。     

Comment on ‘expectancy of life at birth in 36 nationalities of the Soviet Union: 1958–60’

In D. Peter Mazur's recent article, ‘Expectancy of Life at Birth in 36 Nationalities of the Soviet Union: 1958–1960’, crude rates of death and expectancies of life for nationalities are derived from a scant base of data that includes crude rates of natural increase for administrative units and various ratios of composition of the populations of both administrative units and nationalities. Students of Soviet demography genuinely appreciate Mazur's attempt to derive rich results from meagre data. Of course, to do this strong assumptions are required and Mazur warns that ‘the quantitative results ... are valid only to the extent that the underlying methodology is theoretically sound’. One way to test the quantitative results is to examine how well the crude death rates for the nationalities calculated by Mazur reproduce the crude death rates for administrative units with which Mazur started. Mazur feels that the estimated death rates for nationalities closely agree with the death rates for administrative areas. The present author is sceptical. Application of the method described below does not show close correspondence, and this matter, which is crucial in the evaluation of Mazur's results, seems problematical.     

The slowing metabolism of marriage: Figures from 1988 U.S. marital status life tables

Marital status life tables for the United States, 1988, show a continuing retreat from marriage. For both sexes, the proportion ever marrying declined and the average age at first marriage rose. The 1988 rates imply that 43% of marriages end in divorce. That represents a slight decline from the 1983 figure, and suggests that divorce has peaked at a level below that estimated in earlier analyses.     

Recent trends in marital disruption

The post-1980 decline in the crude divorce rate must be interpreted in the context of the long-term trend and in terms of what we know about composition effects on crude measures-particularly given shifts in age at marriage and the age composition effects of the baby boom. Data from the June 1985 Current Population Survey permit more detailed, exposure-specific measurements as well as the use of separation as the event terminating marriage. Estimates from these data suggest a decline followed by a recovery. Taking into account well-known levels of underreporting, we find that recent rates imply that about two-thirds of all first marriages are likely to end in separation or divorce. We examine the persistence of major differences in marital stability and evaluate the comparative stability of first and second marriages.     

Constructing fertility tables for Soviet populations

Because the 1970 Soviet Union census does not provide information on the age structure of men and women separately by sex and according to their ethnic affiliation, the 1959 USSR census data serve as the basis to infer knowledge about ethnic fertility. The model takes into account (1) the total number of births in 1960, estimated from the child-woman ratio in 1959, (2) the age structure of women in 1959, and (3) the assumed pattern of age-specific birth rates structured in terms of the modal age at childbearing and the length of the fertility age span. The results show that Ukrainians among the Slav populations ranked as the lowest with 2.07 children born per woman. Their total fertility contrasts with that of Kazakhs native to Central Asia, who reportedly according to Soviet sources had 7.46 children per woman in 1958-1959, and whose estimated rate is around 8.59 children. Extreme variations appear in the estimates of fertility among nationalities of the Caucasus region, Volga Basin, and to a lesser degree in Siberia. Official Soviet calculations of crude birth rates and age-specific rates for 15 Union Republics in 1967-1968 are transcribed and compared with the estimates for nationalities in 1959-1960. The same theoretical model used to generate the Soviet rates may be adapted under different assumptions to non-Soviet populations in other situations where the data are scanty or incomplete.     

The incidence of divorce within cohorts of American marriages contracted since the civil war

The proportion of marriages that end in divorce can be estimated from vital registration or from census data. The former source suggests considerably higher levels of divorce than does the latter. A new series, combining the two sources, is presented for annual marriage cohorts back to 1867. Actual experience to 1970 is traced and a projection beyond that point is made for cohorts with incomplete divorce histories. The cohort divorce series moves steadily upwards and shows much less variability than an equivalent series of period divorce rates. Factors related to high divorce within a cohort are armed service mobilization and high unemployment rates in the year of marriage, and slow national economic growth between pre- and post-marital periods.     

The Retrenchment of Marriage: Results from Marital Status Life Tables for the United States, 1995

Marital status life tables were calculated using 1995 US rates of marriage, divorce, and mortality. Compared to figures for 1988, the proportion of persons surviving to age 15 who ever marry remained fairly steady at about five‐sixths of all men and seven‐eighths of all women. The average age at first marriage rose substantially: to 28.6 years for men and 26.6 years for women. The probability of a marriage ending in divorce changed little and was .437 for men and .425 for women. It is likely that no US period or cohort will ever have half of all marriages end in legal divorce, though the highest cohort may reach 47 percent. Patterns of marriage and divorce observed since 1970 show the effect that cohabitation continues to have on the American family, where it is delaying, but not replacing, marriage.     

American families: trends and correlates

Discussion focused on the nature of the roles of the family, a review of the major demographic changes (marriage, cohabitation, nonfamily households, remarriage, fertility, teenage pregnancy, and female employment) affecting the American family in the past decades, and the nature of the impact on women, men, and children. There were four major trends identified: 1) increased proportions of children living in single-parent families due to high rates of divorce and increased childbearing outside of marriage; 2) increased proportions of adults in nontraditional living arrangements; 3) increased female labor force participation during all stages of the life cycle; and 4) decreased proportions of children and increased proportions of older people out of total population due to declining mortality and fertility rates. Family formation arises out of childbearing and childrearing roles, the need for companionship and emotional support, and the opportunities for specialization and trade, and the economies of scale. The costs of family living may include the potential for disagreement, conflict, loss of privacy, and time and money. There were a number of reasons identified for not maintaining traditional families consisting of a married couple with children. The trends were for later age at marriage: 24.4 years in 1992 for women, increased cohabitation (almost 50% cohabiting prior to first marriage in 1985-86), decreased number of married couple households, and increased number of adults in non-family households. The divorce rate has risen over the past 100 years with peaks in the 1970s; the reasons were identified as increased baby boomers and new marriages, increased labor participation of women, and changes in gender roles. The stabilization and slight decline in rates may be due to a natural leveling, the likelihood of greater stability within new marriages, and the aging of the baby boomers. An anticipated increase in divorce rates in the future was also justified. Remarriage rates varied by gender, age at separation/divorce, presence of children, race/ethnicity, and education. Fertility remained stable at 1.8 during the late 1970s and early 1980s and increased slightly to 2.0 in 1989. IN 1990, there were 25% out-of-wedlock births compared to 5% in 1960. About 12% of births in 1989 were to teenagers. There has been an increase in female-headed households, the median income of which in 1992 was $13,012, or 33% of married couple income.