The power of directional predictions in psychology

The vast majority of empirical hypotheses in psychology, or in the social sciences more generally, are directional whereas in other sciences, such as the physical sciences, there are more point or narrow-interval empirical hypotheses. Characteristics of theories and auxiliary assumptions play a role in the difference. Given that psychology research strongly features directional predictions, it is important to question the extent to which these provide convincing tests of theories that they are designed to test. The present work aims to provide a nuanced view that considers the complex interaction between the obviousness of directional predictions, the obviousness of the theory from which they derive, and the quality of the auxiliary assumptions that push towards directional predictions. Then, too, there is the related issue of vulnerability of directional predictions to alternative explanations and how to address them.     

Philosophical Anthropology Can Help Social Scientists Learn from Empirical Tests

Popper's theory of demarcation has set the standard of falsifiability for all sciences. But not all falsifiable theories are part of science and some tests of scientific theories are better than others. Popper's theory has led to the banning of metaphysical and/or philosophical anthropological theories from science. But Joseph Agassi has supplemented Popper's theory to explain how such theories are useful as research programs within science. This theory can also be used to explain how interesting tests may be found. Theories of rationality may be used to illustrate this point by showing how they fail or succeed in producing interesting and testable hypotheses in the social sciences.     

The 'Subject' in Social Work

Summary Theories of social work are usually defined by reference totheir oppositions regarding the subject in social work and theaims of practice. This position connects up with a dominantview of theories of social work which regards them as opponentsengaged in a struggle to dominate the field. This paper characterizesthis view as a ‘gladiatorial paradigm’ It assaysthe vaidity of this paradigm. lists the main defects, and setsout the case for a structuralist approach to social work.     

Formalism, Behavioral Realism and the Interdisciplinary Challenge in Sociological Theory

In this paper, I argue that recent sociological theory has become increasingly bifurcated into two mutually incompatible styles of theorizing that I label formalist and behavioral-realist. Formalism favors mathematization and proposes an instrumentalist ontology of abstract processes while behavioral-realist theory takes at its basis the "real" physical individual endowed with concrete biological, cognitive and neurophysiological capacities and constraints and attempts to derive the proper conceptualization of social behavior from that basis. Formalism tends to lead toward a conceptually independent sociology that in principle requires only minimal reference to the empirical and ontological storehouse of other disciplines, while behavioral-realist theory leads to an interdisciplinary sociology that can be located within a hierarchy of behavioral sciences, leading to questions regarding the relationship between sociology and other disciplines as well as issues of transdisciplinary unification and possible interdisciplinary reduction. I explore the consequences of this split for the project of explanatory sociological theory within the context of how it has manifested itself in sociological network theory and social psychology. I close with a critique and assessment of formalist tendencies in sociological theorizing.     

全面贯彻"三个代表"重要思想繁荣和发展哲学社会科学事业

当前要深刻认识和高度重视哲学社会科学的重要地位和作用。“三个代表”重要思想是衡量我国哲学社会科学性质、方向和水平的根本尺度。用“三个代表”重要思想统领哲学社会科学工作 ,必须坚持理论创新 ,在马克思主义中国化、时代化上下功夫 ,用发展着的马克思主义指导新的实践 ;必须坚持先进性 ,在代表“发展要求”和“前进方向”上下功夫 ,使理论研究始终走在时代潮流的前头 ;必须坚持围绕中心、服务大局 ,在落实党执政兴国的第一要务上下功夫 ,全力推动经济社会的发展 ;必须坚持牢记宗旨 ,在代表根本利益上下功夫 ,把科学回答广大干部群众关心的重大理论和现实问题作为哲学社会科学研究的出发点和落脚点 ;必须坚持面向社会、推动普及 ,在促进领导干部掌握基本知识、增强执政能力上下功夫 ;必须坚持贯穿全部、统筹全局 ,在全部哲学社会科学工作中充分体现“三个代表”重要思想。坚持用“三个代表”重要思想统领哲学社会科学工作 ,必须牢牢把握四个突出 :突出现实 ,贴紧要务 ;突出重点 ,破解难题 ;突出优长 ,打造精品 ;突出创新 ,繁荣学术 ,在理论创新中推进哲学社会科学的繁荣和发展。     

On misunderstanding ‘understanding’

Philosophers of Science have recently put a good deal of energy into locating the precise methodological boundaries between the natural and the social sciences. The methodological affinities of the latter with certain aspects of the humanities have been as yet too little explored. A convenient starting point for this discussion, and one which is adopted in this paper, is a reconsideration of the role and nature of interpretive understanding in the social sciences. However, before a serious examination of this issue can be undertaken, a clearing operation on the encrusted misunderstandings which are part of the legacy of logical positivism is necessary. In this paper I argue that the neo-positivistic account of understanding rests on a misunderstanding of the concept; that a more adequate conception of the issues involved - and one closer to the traditional Verstehen problematic of Dilthey et al. - can be gleaned from the work of Peter Winch; and that this development is furthered in a number of important respects by recent work done in hermeneutic philosophy - especially that of H.-G. Gadamer. The discussion of Gadamer suggests that the problem of locating the boundaries with the humanities might be as serious a problem for the theory of the social sciences as has been that concerning the natural sciences. The paper concludes with several suggestions as to the implications of the analysis of understanding for the thesis of the methodological unity of the sciences.     

从莫斯到列维—斯特劳斯:“玛纳”与实践观念的可译性

“玛纳”这一典型的巫术概念构成了社会人类学的一个经典“案例”。莫斯与列维—斯特劳斯对它的不同诠释体现了从法国社会学派到结构主义人类学的转折及分歧。本文从莫斯的文本出发将“玛纳”定义为“实践观念”，并以“可译性”为切入点，试图证明在“实践观念可译性”问题上的分歧背后隐含着社会本体论、社会科学方法论和行动哲学这三个层面的分歧。最后，本文认为，关于莫斯与列维—斯特劳斯之关系的最常见观点实际上是对这一关系的过度简化。     

自然科学与社会科学的融合是中国科学体系健康发展的必然

科学是一个完整的体系,只有把自然科学的求＂真＂和社会科学的求＂善＂完美地融合起来,才能达到真正意义上的科学之＂美＂。但自从培根和孔德把科学分为自然科学和社会科学后,因研究领域的完全不同,加之知识界的文人相轻,使自然科学和社会科学完全断裂,互相排斥。本文就是从科学发展的必然性上,主张自然科学和社会科学融合,促使自然科学家和社会科学家结盟,探索又好又快发展的科学体系。     

证伪：社会科学研究的可能与必然 兼与张杨商榷

本文针对张杨《证伪在社会科学中可能吗？》一文展开争鸣与论述,指出证伪是理论检验的必然结果之一,相对于证实而言,证伪更有效、更可靠。本文还就张杨文中对波普尔证伪理论的误解做了澄清,指出波普尔的证伪并非“单个反例证伪”,证伪、可证伪性、证伪主义三者之间也存在着明显的区别,不能加以混淆。文章就张文提出的证伪在社会科学中面临的四个挑战做出一一回应：（1）“迪昂奎因命题”不能成为证伪的诘问;（2）穆勒命题不能挑战证伪主义;（3）统计陈述不是概率陈述;（4）限界条件与证伪的结合使社会科学的理论更加科学。     

Re‐conceptualizing Abstract Conceptualization in Social Theory: The Case of the “Structure” Concept

I this paper, I draw on recent research on the radically embodied and perceptual bases of conceptualization in linguistics and cognitive science to develop a new way of reading and evaluating abstract concepts in social theory. I call this approach Sociological Idea Analysis. I argue that, in contrast to the traditional view of abstract concepts, which conceives them as amodal “presuppositions” removed from experience, abstract concepts are irreducibly grounded in experience and partake of non‐negotiable perceptual‐symbolic features from which a non‐propositional “logic” naturally follows. This implies that uncovering the imagistic bases of allegedly abstract notions should be a key part of theoretical evaluation of concepts in social theory. I provide a case study of the general category of “structure” in the social and human sciences to demonstrate the analytic utility of the approach.     

论哲学社会科学创新能力的构成

哲学社会科学创新能力是指哲学社会科学创新主体为适应社会时代需要和理论自身发展的需要,对已有哲学社会科学理论与体系的推进和发展,主要表征为提出新理论、发展新方法、发现新材料和完善既有理论等。哲学社会科学创新主体由单个哲学社会科学工作者和机构（企业和科研单位）和国家（政府）构成,所以哲学社会科学创新能力的构成主要由创新主体取得创新理论成就的知识转化能力、人格品性素质、思想观念意识以及社会体制机制构成。     

承认的社会构成

霍耐特的承认理论是当代最受重视的社会理论之一。然而,在霍耐特援用米德的理论将承认概念加以社会理论化的工作中,没有进一步探讨社会互动,使得他的承认理论存在内在缺陷。对此,本文尝试进一步从社会互动的生成分析出发,探讨承认的社会构成。通过对承认的社会构成机制的分析,可以将承认明确定义为一种社会互动,其中,由于行动者因与其他行动者有相同、或被接受的观念与实践方式,故有可能被其他行动者同意该行动者的存在价值,使之能获得所需的社会行动的支持。一方面,霍耐特的理论内在缺陷可以从社会学的角度在一定程度上得以弥补;另一方面,经修补之后,也可望让承认理论为社会学提供新的研究视角。     

Service users' knowledges and social work theory: conflict or collaboration?

Summary So far, service users have not been systematically involvedin social work theorizing. However, disabled peoples's movements,mental health service users/survivors and other service usershave developed their own knowledges based on direct experienceand they have generated their own conceptual frameworks andbodies of theory. There are fundamental problems in social workseeking to interpret service user knowledges. Their developmentsand interpretation require the direct involvement of serviceusers and their organization in social work theorizing. Thereare strong practical, philosophical and political argumentsfor involving the knowledges and theories of service users andtheir organizations in the process of social work theory-building.This paper considers an inclusive approach to social work theorizing.While highlighting the importance of service users and theirorganizations being effectively included in social work theorizing,it also argues the need for them to have support and opportunitiesto develop their own prior and separate discussions about theory,including social work theory.     

再论证伪主义的问题:对尹海洁、庞文商榷的答复

本文回应了尹海洁等两位作者对笔者的批评,并再次质疑了证伪主义在社会科学中的适用性。本文指出,由于“迪昂奎因”命题的存在以及社会科学命题的或然性,简单证伪并不可能;而波普尔和尹文所谓的复杂证伪则不可取,因为这种证伪本质上基于归纳法,相对于证实并无优越性和简便性,因而也就失去了波普尔立论的根基。同时,社会科学的统计检验自有其意义,并不需要冠以“证伪”的名号;而“可证伪性”即使存在,但在定量研究中既缺乏操作性,又完全被涵盖于 “解释力”这个概念之中。基于以上理由,“可证伪性”不具备成为社会科学和非科学的划界标准的意义,证伪主义不是社会科学赖以立基的逻辑基础。本文还延伸讨论了证伪、限界条件和发展社会科学经验研究的关系。     

势科学理论的普适性与科学意义——信息人社会与势科学理论研究之二

＂势＂概念的科学定义揭示了信息的本质属性,即信息量与信息势是等价的。从自然科学到人文社会科学各领域的活动,其本质都可以归结为生产更多的信息量、营造更大的信息势。势科学理论本质上是一个求导过程,其构建了一个系统的逻辑体系,使社会科学与自然科学融通起来,为人文社会科学研究提供了强有力的工具,尤其为信息科学的研究提供了真正的逻辑起点。     

Converging perspectives of dynamic theory and evolving neurobiological knowledge

Exciting findings in recent research in neurobiology do not regularly appear in the social and psychological sciences literature. Yet, there is neurobiological evidence that variously supports, qualifies, and elaborates on the understanding of dynamic treatment. Early in his career, Freud lamented that the science necessary to support and advance his theorizing in the psychological realm would only become available to future generations. A case in point is that recent findings reveal that neurobiological transformations in the brain can result from specific and focused relationship interactions. Addressed here are some biological phenomena which seem to lend support for the following analytic hypotheses: structural theory (id, ego, super‐ego), defense mechanisms, object relations, free association, transference, countertransference, the therapeutic alliance, and working through.     

Does Infant Cognition Research Undermine Sociological Theory? A Critique of Bergesen's Attack on Durkheim

This article discusses how the results of infant research challenge the assumptions of the classical sciences of social behaviour. According to A.J. Bergesen, the findings of infant research invalidate Durkheim's theory of mental categories, thus requiring a re‐theorizing of sociology. This article argues that Bergesen's reading of Emile Durkheim is incorrect, and his review of the infant research in fact invalidates his argument. Reviewing the assumptions of sociology in the light of the findings of infant research, it is argued that the real challenge is to formulate a research strategy that combines the findings of the two sciences.     

Where Should We Look for Mental Representations? On the Need for Epistemic Ethics

Recent scientific studies of consciousness reveal the challenges involved in striking the proper balance between concrete fact and abstract theory. Christof Koch believes he is on the road to a scientific understanding of consciousness because he has a research paradigm which appears to create solvable puzzles. Unfortunately, work in other areas of neuroscience reveal that these puzzles rely too heavily on Aristotelian common sense to account for the unique nature of connectionist processing. William Ramsey claims that biological versions of traditional theories of representation, of the sort embraced by Koch, Fodor, and others, are so inadequate that we should give up all attempts to create high level abstract theories about human cognition. I argue, however, that what is needed is more abstract theorizing, not less. The intelligible entities described by Dynamic Systems Theory should be seen as embodiments of mental representations. These embodiments are physical in the sense that they are comprehensible in terms of modern physics, even if they are not material items that can be directly perceived.