In credit we trust: Building social capital by Grameen Bank in Bangladesh

In this paper we examine how a third-party – Grameen Bank in Bangladesh – created social capital that has been a boon to the explosive growth of Microfinance in Bangladesh and elsewhere. Using Putnam's definition, we show how Grameen Bank created social capital by forming horizontal and vertical networks, establishing new norms and fostering a new level of social trust to solve the collective action problems of poor people's access to capital. The fact that a Microfinance Institution (MFI) can create social capital has strong policy implications. Since social capital is a public good – non-excludable and non-rivalrous – the market will underprovide such good. This paper shows that Microfinance corrects another type of market failure—under provision of a public good, in addition to correcting the failure of the credit market. The social capital building aspects of an MFI need to be taken into account in the whole debate about the need for subsidy.     

In (a) democracy we trust: social and economic determinants of support for democratic procedures in central and eastern Europe

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, most of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe have begun adopting democratic procedures and institutions. In this paper, we argue that the presence or absence of social capital may very well be an important part of any equation that attempts to predict the extent to which the citizens of these nations will support the new democratic regimes. We apply Logit analysis to survey data collected in the Third Annual New Democracies Barometer (NDB III) to test this hypothesis. We also test the importance of economic variables on citizen support for democratic procedures in these nations. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the presence of social capital is a factor in explaining citizen support for democratic procedures. Moreover, we find indicators of social capital to be more important than economic variables in explaining citizen support for democratic procedures in our sample countries.     

Incentivising trust

We argue that trust can be incentivised by measures which increase the ability of trusters to protect themselves against risk. We work within the framework originally established by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) in which trust is measured experimentally as the ability to generate reciprocity in response to an initial offer of money within a two-person game. An incentive is conveyed both by means of variations in the multiplier applied to the first player’s initial offer and by giving the first player the opportunity to insure themselves against the possibility that the second player will fail to reciprocate their initial offer. Measured trust is strongly responsive to both these incentives. Thus third parties have the ability to influence the outcome of the game, not only, as in the analysis of Charness, Cobo-Reyes, and Jimenez (2008), by punishing failure to reciprocate and rewarding ‘good’ initial offers, but also by offering protection which strengthens the first player’s risk efficacy, or ratio of assets to risk.     

Abuse of trust

Abstract

Following a summary of proposed changes to Community Care in the United Kingdom, this paper focuses on case management as a key component of social work skill. Associations between marketplace interaction and the relationship between caseness and care are followed by an analysis of issues and psychological defenses to which case management is liable. These are addressed at the interpersonal level and in terms of boundaries between organizational systems. A hypothesis is proposed that case management is particularly susceptible to conflicts around issues of dependence, independence and interdependence. Finally, initial suggestions are made regarding the role that a psychodynamic understanding can play in addressing these problems.     

The belonging model of trust

Although we know that high‐quality employee–organization relationships are beneficial, these relationships are complex and not fully understood, especially among employees of nonprofit organizations. In particular, we know little about how these employees perceive trust, which may overlook an important contributor to effective management. We begin to address this issue by testing a new theoretical model that conceptualizes perceived insider status, psychological ownership, and organizational identification as foundations for the perception of justice and subsequent trust. Our results indicate that psychological ownership and perceived insider status relate to trust through procedural and interpersonal justice. These results contrast those typically found in for‐profit contexts in that organizational identification did not predict justice and that distributive and informational justice did not predict trust.     

Social trust and human development

A series of studies connect social trust to economic growth. In this paper, we explore the connection between trust and a broader measure of development, the UN Human Development Index. We find that trust is significantly associated with faster human development in the 1980–2005 period. The impact of trust occurs mainly in less democratic countries.     

Reputational cues in repeated trust games

The importance of reputation in human societies is highlighted both by theoretical models and empirical studies. In this paper, we have extended the scope of previous experimental studies based on trust games by creating treatments where players can rate their opponents’ behavior and know their past ratings. Our results showed that being rated by other players and letting this rating be known are factors that increase cooperation levels even when rational reputational investment motives are ruled out. More generally, subjects tended to respond to reputational opportunities even when this was neither rational nor explainable by reciprocity.     

Sex differences in trust and trustworthiness: A meta-analysis of the trust game and the gift-exchange game

We present a meta-analytic review of the literature on sex differences in the trust game (174 effect sizes) and the related gift-exchange game (35 effect sizes). Based on parental investment theory and social role theory we expected men to be more trusting and women to be more trustworthy. Indeed, men were more trusting in the trust game (g = 0.22), yet we found no significant sex difference in trust in the gift-exchange game (g = 0.15). Regarding trustworthiness, we found no significant sex difference in the trust game (g = −0.04), and we found men, not women, to be more trustworthy in the gift-exchange game (g = 0.33). These results suggest that men send more money than women do when their money is going to be multiplied, thereby creating an efficiency gain. This so-called “male multiplier effect” may be explained by a stronger psychological tendency in men to acquire resources.     

How rational we?

How rational people are is a question of interest to social sciences, public policy, and all educated persons. The answer depends, in part, on how widely or narrowly one defines the term. Wide definitions tend to make the term tautological. By narrow definitions, the recent evidence that people act rationally is not overwhelming and evidence that they frequently act on impulse or out of habit, considerable. This points to a binary approach, one that will take into account both kinds of behavior. The specific ways the two approaches may be combined are beginning to be discerned.     

The air we breathe

Public attitudes toward smoking are complex, but the facts for businesses are clear. Second-hand smoke is a major health hazard, and the most unhealthy places for second-hand smoke are bars and restaurants. While there is little support for a total smoking ban, selected bans are more popular. Even if new federal rules don't force restaurants to ban smoking, businesses can gain a competitive edge by going smoke-free.     

Patients' trust and the quality of physicians

Patients are uncertain of physicians' quality but learn about the quality of particular physicians through experience in treatment. Patients come to trust physicians who have served them well. This paper explores the economic consequences of patients' learning and trust within a model of the market for physicians' services. In a market equilibrium, there are too many incompetent physicians in practice. Surprisingly, even the more competent physicians have an interest in preventing patients from judging quality except through experience. As we show, all physicians, including the most competent, may oppose steps to inform patients of physicians' quality.     

Developing trust: First impressions and experience

Using the repeated Trust Game, we investigated how first impressions and experience affect trusting dispositions, beliefs, and behaviors. As in previous research, trusting beliefs and trust-related behaviors were greater at the start of the game for partners with trustworthy faces; and higher later in the game for partners who reciprocated. Three additional findings extended beyond the previous research. First, by measuring the discrete components of trusting beliefs rather than an umbrella “trustworthiness” measure, we confirmed that first impressions and experience influence judgments of competence, benevolence, and integrity. Moreover, we found suggestive evidence that perceptions of benevolence and integrity updated more quickly with experience than perceptions of competence. Second, by looking at trusting beliefs at the start of two consecutive repeated Trust Games, we found that judgments of competence, benevolence, and integrity continue to be influenced by trustworthy facial appearances, even after previous beliefs based on facial appearances were disconfirmed. Third, we found increased investment with a partner at the start of a second repeated Trust Game, even when participants expected their partners to betray them. Overall, our results clarify our understanding of how first impressions and experience influence trusting beliefs; provides evidence that changes in the repeated Trust Game represents learning about a specific partner rather than revisions of trusting dispositions; and highlights important distinctions between trusting beliefs and trust-related behaviors.     

Intentions and ethical behavior in trust games

This paper explores if knowledge of one's partner's intention affects cooperative behavior. Results of a trust game experiment show that Player 1's elicited intentions are consistent over an imperfect information treatment, when Player 2 is not aware of her partner's intention, and a perfect information treatment, when she knows it. Evidence highlights that people's intentions on one side of the games shape their beliefs as to how their partner wants them to act when the roles are reversed. Moreover, in the perfect information treatment, participants act in a manner consistent with their own intentions, suggesting that ethical considerations permeate behavior.     

Marketization process predicts trust decline in China

Although previous literature has revealed the predictive effect of trust on economic development, whether the level of China’s market economy development predicts changes in trust across birth cohorts remains unknown. Study 1, a cross-temporal meta-analysis of 82 studies (N = 34,151), indicated that Chinese college students’ scores on the Interpersonal Trust Scale (ITS) decreased significantly from 1998 to 2011, and that the decline in interpersonal trust across birth cohorts was negatively associated with and predicated by the marketization index. Study 2 found that the levels of marketization of different provinces in China were negatively associated with the levels of trust in these provinces. The present research first proposed that the marketization process in China may predict or correlate with a trend of declining trust, and then demonstrated the validity of the proposal based on both longitudinal and cross-sectional evidence.     

What are we talking about when we talk about ‘Neoliberalism’?

ABSTRACT

Based on a review of the critical literature, the article provides readers with an overview of neoliberalism’s main dimensions. In this sense, it furnishes an accessible conceptual foundation for a number of the articles in the themed issue. It is suggested that those seeking to comprehend neoliberalism should take into account six intermeshed facets: the overturning of ‘embedded liberalism’; the re-configuration of the state in order to better serve the interests of capital; new patterns of income and wealth distribution to benefit the rich and super-rich; insecurity and precariousness; the rise in mass incarceration; a strategic pragmatism. The article briefly dwells on the capitalist crisis which began in 2007 and goes on to suggest that we may be witnessing the emergence of what is termed ‘rhetorically recalibrated neoliberalism’ (RRN).