THE CHANGING RESPONSIVENESS OF WAGES TO PRICE-LEVEL SHOCKS: EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT INDEXATION

The article provides evidence for the U.S over the period 1961-84 that the responsiveness of nonunion wages to price-level shocks changes through time much as the degree of indexation in union contracts does, suggesting that there exists implicit as well as explicit indexation. When coupled with the result from previous research that indexation responds positively to inflation uncertainty, the findings indicate that greater inflation uncertainty may lead to reduced overall wage rigidity. In the context of a rational expectations model with long-term wage contracts, a decline in the effectiveness of an activist monetary policy could result.     

ISLANDS, INDEXATION AND MONETARY POLICY

This paper develops a synthesized macroeconomic model that incorporates the local-global informational asymmetries of an "islands" economy into a setting characterized by endogenous wage indexation. In such an economy, agents are unable both to filter out the separate influences of demand and supply shocks on observed output prices and to distinguish between the separate price effects of local and aggregate disturbances, so that optimal wage indexation depends upon both the variances of supply and demand disturbances and the information-conditioned forecasts of agents. As a result, optimal monetary policy generally depends upon the variances of local and aggregate supply and demand.     

CYCLICAL COMOVEMENTS IN INDUSTRIAL LABOR AND PRODUCT MARKETS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

We establish the theoretical connection between industrial labor and product markets within the contractual wage-rigidity new Keynesian explanation of business cycles. We estimate time-series and cross-sectional regressions for 28 private two-digit (S.I.C.) industries and find: (i) greater uncertainty is associated with upward flexibility of the nominal wage and moderates the countercyclical response of the real wage to aggregate demand shocks; (ii) an upwardly rigid nominal wage response to energy price shocks reduces the real contractionary effects of these shocks; (Hi) downwardly inflexible nominal wages are associated with downwardly rigid prices in response to productivity shocks.     

Does International Outsourcing Really Lower Workers’ Income?

We analyze the impact of international outsourcing on income, if the domestic labor market is imperfect, i.e. there is a bilateral bargaining between a firm and a labor union. In our analysis we distinguish between the cases where the parties negotiate over the wage only and where they negotiate over both wage and profit sharing. We find in the first case that outsourcing has an ambiguous effect on the workers’ income, while it increases the workers’ income in the second case. For the optimal amount of international outsourcing, we find that, depending on the wage effect of outsourcing, in a pure wage bargaining system it can be higher or lower than the level where domestic and foreign marginal labor costs are the same. In contrast, in a wage and profit share bargaining system, the amount of outsourcing lies below this level.     

The effect of type of union on member-nonmember wage differentials

The union-nonunion wage differential can be decomposed into bargaining and membership effects. While some analysts suggest that they are not separable and that bargaining power is a function of membership density, others argue that they are separable and that the former derives from monopoly power while the latter stems from socialization. Our results support the latter view. We derive estimates of bargaining and membership effects for workers covered by national, industrial, and craft union contracts as well as for all covered workers taken together. Since industrial and craft unions differ in structure and organization, we expect differences in the socialization effects among types of unions. It is clear from our results that union membership per se in each case gives a large positive wage advantage.     

INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT VARIABILITY AND REAL WAGE FLUCTUATIONS: DETERMINANTS AND IMPLICATIONS

The cyclical behavior of the real wage differentiates between the empirical validity of major new Keynesian sticky-wage and sticky-price explanations of business cycles. Across industries of the United States, an increase in price flexibility relative to wage flexibility correlates with a reduction in output fluctuations in the face of demand shocks. Further, industrial real output variability does not vary significantly with nominal wage flexibility. In contrast, an increase in price flexibility moderates industrial real output variability. Consistently, an increase in the real wage response to demand shocks correlates with an increase in industrial output variability. ( JEL E32, E31)     

The 2011 Industrial Relations Reform and Nominal Wage Adjustments in Greece

This study investigates nominal contractual base-wage adjustments in Greece associated with the 2011 industrial relations reform which re-defined the limits within which base wages could oscillate and allowed workers’ associations to negotiate for wages at the firm level. The assessment covers the period 2010–2013 and is based on information extracted from the universe of firm-level contracts signed in this period. We found that firm-level contracts increased dramatically shortly after the reform, now covering a larger pool of workers, especially in larger firms, and are associated with higher base-wage reductions in the post-reform period. At the firm level, wage reductions are higher when workers are represented by a workers’ association rather than a typical trade union. In addition, a heterogeneous effect is uncovered regarding the factors that shape base-wage adjustments (firm size, profitability, structure of bargaining body and aggregate unemployment) between new and traditional forms of workers’ representation in collective bargaining.     

ASYMMETRY IN THE EFFECTS OF MONETARY AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOCKS: CONTRASTING EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS

Using quarterly data for the United States, demand contraction exceeds expansion in the face of monetary and government spending shocks. Demand contraction in the face of government spending shocks, is absorbed in nominal wage and price deflation. The variability of government spending shocks decreases average wage and price inflation. In contrast, the upward flexibility of price appears in sharp contrast to its downward rigidity in the face of monetary shocks. Furthermore, output contraction is notably larger relative to expansion in the face of monetary shocks. Monetary variability accelerates average price inflation and decreases average output and real wage growth.     

Monopoly,efficient contract,and median voter models of union wage determination: A critical comparison

This article critically compares the monopoly, efficient contract, and median voter models of union wage determination. The models are first analyzed with respect to five theoretical issues: the aggregation of preferences, the principal-agent problem, strike costs, dynamics, and incentive compatibility. The models are then compared with regard to their ability to explain two features of union wage/employment determination: the asymmetric response of union wages to demand shocks and the wide variation in the presence of featherbedding restrictions in union contracts. While all three models suffer from significant short-comings, the median voter model is generally superior. The authors acknowledge the helpful comments of Hank Farber and the financial assistance received from the College of Business Administration, Georgia State University.     

Unions and wage inequality

Summary and Conclusions The impact of unions on the structure of wages has recently attracted renewed interest as analysts have struggled to explain the rise in earnings inequality in several industrialized countries. Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States provide a potentially valuable set of countries for examining this question. All three countries now collect comparable data on wages and union status in their regular labor force surveys. Several features of the collective bargaining institutions of these countries make them suitable for studying the relationship between unions and wage inequality. Bargaining is highly decentralized; there are no general mechanisms for extending collective bargaining provisions beyond the “organized” sector; and the fraction of the work force covered by collective bargaining is relatively modest. Thus it is possible to compare the structure of wages for workers covered by union contracts to those who are not covered, and potentially infer the effect of unions on overall wage inequality.     

Vocational Rehabilitation: Profession and Process. American Lecture Series,John G. Cull,Richard E. Hardy,Publication 831. Charles C. Thomas,Publisher, Springfield,Illinois. 1972. 547 Pages. $18.50, Hardbound

As unionization of professional social workers increases, so will the demand to better prepare social work students for their roles as managers and employees in the collective bargaining process. This paper explores labor relations developments as they apply to the unionization of social work personnel. Current research is reviewed, and labor contracts representing personnel in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Michigan are examined in order to identify typical contract clauses. Areas of needed research are outlined. Suggestions are made for introducing labor relations studies into the social work curriculum and a course taught at the University of Illinois is offered as an example.     

THE RELATIVE STICKINESS OF WAGES AND PRICES

While many modern business cycle theories posit the existence of nominal wage and/or output price stickiness, their relative importance remains an unsettled issue. Using a structural VAR model, this paper exploits evidence on the behavior of real wages to assess the relative importance of these two sources of stickiness. The empirical results suggest that a positive shock to aggregate demand causes a significant temporary fall in real wages. This is taken as evidence that sticky wages have played a more important role than sticky prices in transmitting aggregate demand shocks to real economic activity in the post-war U.S. (JEL E32)     

LABOR MARKET STRUCTURE AND UNION WAGE LEVELS

This paper uses disaggregated data taken from union collective bargaining agreements to test several hypotheses on the impact of labor market structure on the wage levels of union members in U. S. manufacturing. The structure of collective bargaining, specifically the bargaining unit, is shown to play an important role in the determination of wage levels although this role is in some cases different than has generally been believed.     

MINIMUM WAGE EFFECTS WITH OUTPUT STABILIZATION

What are the effects of legal minimum wage rates on the U.S. economy? Does minimum wage legislation promote the economic self-interest of high wage union labor and impede the economic self-interest of capitalists as our earlier research [Cox and Oaxaca 1982] suggested? This paper uses a nine sector econometric/simulation model of U.S. industry from 1975–1978 to answer these questions in the context of stabilization policies which hold aggregate real output constant. While most simulated percentage effects are small, those for the unskilled workers themselves are not. A 15.7 percent increase in the average nominal wage rate of unskilled labor, as a result of minimum wage legislation, produced an 11 percent decrease in unskilled employment, 2.2 million jobs lost, while increasing the real wage of unskilled workers by 15 percent. Simulated changes in several key variables support our earlier observations that the self-interests of labor unions, with skilled workers, conflict with those of capitalists over the issue of minimum wage legislation.     

WAGE DIFFERENTIALS ACROSS LABOR MARKETS AND WORKERS: DOES COST OF LIVING MATTER?

Wage differential studies rarely account for interarea differences in cost of living, owing both to data limitations and theoretical ambiguity. This study develops a price index for 185 metropolitan areas comprising about 70% of the U.S. labor force. Current Population Survey data for 1985–95 and data on site-specific amenities are used to estimate earnings differentials based on nominal wages, wages fully adjusted for measured cost of living, and a simple approximation of "real" wages with partial adjustment for price-level differences. Dispersion in approximate real wages across 185 labor markets and differentials by region and city size are substantially lower than dispersion in nominal or full adjustment wages. Estimates of racial and ethnic differentials display moderate sensitivity to choice of a wage measure, whereas other standard differentials do not. Both nominal wages and wages fully adjusted for cost of living may provide misleading estimates of real wage differentials. Absent data on interarea prices and amenities, researchers should include detailed controls for region and city size in nominal wage equations. ( JEL J31, R23)     

Union wages, rents, and skills in health care labor markets

We examine the effect of unions on the earnings of health care workers, with emphasis on the measurement and sources of union wage premiums. Using data constructed from the 1973 though 1994 Current Population Surveys, standard union premium estimates are found to be substantially lower among workers in health care than in other sectors of the economy, and to be smaller among higher skill than among lower skill occupational groups. Longitudinal analysis of workers switching union status, which controls for worker-specific skills, indicates a small impact of unions on earnings within both high and low skilled health care occupations. Evidence is found for small, but significant, union threat effects in health care labor markets. It has been argued that recent legal changes in bargaining unit determination should enhance union organizing and bargaining power. Although we cannot rule this out, such effects are not readily apparent in our data. The authors appreciate the assistance of David Macpherson, who helped develop the CPS data files used in the paper.     

Uncertainty and front-end loading of labor agreements

Uncertainty of future prices is offered as an explanation for front-end loading of real wages in nominal wage contracts. Exploitation of mutually beneficial gains from trade between risk-neutral employers and employees implies an expected future real wage that is lower the greater is the uncertainty of future prices, and the observed extent of front-end loading is consistent with plausible values of uncertainty of future prices. I would like to thank, without implicating, M. L. Burstein, George Fallis, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

The impact of deregulation on labor demand in class-I railroads

This paper examines the impact of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 on labor demand in Class-I railroads during 1961–1990. The demand for labor is a function of output, hourly wage rates, a time trend, and a vector of interactive dummy variables. Since deregulation, the labor demand curve has shifted downward; wage elasticities have become more elastic, ranging from −0.668 in 1980 to −1.187 in 1990; output elasticities trended upward from 0.557 to 0.809; and the marginal product of labor rose from 3.421 to 5.296 during 1980–1990. These findings suggest that unions’ bargaining power has declined, that the total wage bill is likely to decrease if the real wage rate rises further, and that cost savings and efficiency gains are realized through increases in the marginal product of labor. We thank an anonymous referee and Henry McFarland for insightful comments and assistance.     

The union wage effect in Canadian manufacturing industries

Data for Canadian manufacturing industries, at the two-digit level, are used to examine the component elements of the union wage effect. The results show that absence of compulsory union membership for all employees in the bargaining unit served by a union does not significantly impair the ability of the union to negotiate wage gains. That is, our results imply that there is little reason for unions to devote much effort to negotiating the stronger forms of union security — union or closed shops. A second implication of our results is that significant bargaining advantages may accrue to unions with an international (U.S.) link, relative to Canadian national unions.     

TRADING UNCERTAINTY, ENFORCEMENT AND LABOR UNIONS

It is shown that when contracts can be perfectly enforced, trading uncertainty leads to discrimination among workers with the same skills and experience. In this case anti-discrimination laws lead to inefficiencies. In the absence of perfect enforcement, anti-discrimination practices may be used as enforcement devices and need not lead to inefficiencies. In particular, firms may wish to precommit to an anti-discrimination policy, say by inviting in a labor union, in order to offer credible insurance to its workers. This leads to an equilibrium in which union workers get a higher wage than non-union workers, but unions do not have monopoly power.