Determinants of state long-term debt: The political market framework

Because it focuses on the moderating role of political institutions – which emphasize equilibrium policy outcomes under different institutional arrangements derived from the interaction of policy supply and demand – the political market framework provides useful insights for analyzing the determinants of state long-term debt. Thus, different types of state political institutions should affect the degree of long-term debt in terms of specific demands and supply. Despite the numerous studies that have either applied the political market approach to local governments in policy areas or have analyzed the determinants of long-term debt from only a financial management perspective, few studies have applied the political market framework to state governments. Thus, adopting a state financial management perspective and conducting a panel data analysis using state data from 1980 to 2014, this study identifies the reasons why state governments act on long-term obligations in terms of the political market framework. This study also aims to expand the application of the political market framework to state governments and to integrate determinants of state long-term indebtedness.     

Revisiting History: The Creation of Provinces and the Politics of Social Policy in a Democratic South Africa

The pre‐democracy negotiations between the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP) established nine provincial forms of government to replace the four provinces of the apartheid era. The nine provinces contrasted with the historical goal of the ANC to create a ‘democratic, non‐racial and unitary South Africa’. The NP wanted nine new provinces to prevent centralized state power under an ANC government and saw possibilities for winning electoral power in the Western Cape. The ANC conceded following political pressure from the Inkatha Freedom Party, which threatened civil war, and a policy shift after examining the German federal governance system. The article analyzes the history, politics, process and outcomes of the establishment of the nine provinces for social policy delivery in South Africa. It explores the contention that the nine provinces re‐fragmented service delivery (although not on a statutory racial basis) and created a system of fiscal decentralization with serious implications for social policy: weakening bureaucratic capacity, institutional capability and political accountability. The provincial governance mechanisms and fiscal institutions created a particular ‘path dependency’ which, 18 years after democratic, rule still impacts negatively on service delivery and more equitable policy outcomes. This is in part due to the undermining of provincial governance mechanisms and fiscal institutions by a significant minority of corrupt and incompetent provincial civil servants. The corruption of these provincial governance mechanisms and fiscal institutions erodes the egalitarian values aimed at creating a non‐racial, non‐sexist, democratic and unitary South Africa which historically underpinned the policy agenda of the ANC. It also has weakened social citizenship on a geographical and ultimately racial basis given the continuing co‐incidence of race and place in a democratic South Africa.