基于顾客心理期望等待时间的服务策略研究

顾客在排队系统获取服务时，会存在心理上的期望等待时间，该期望会影响顾客在排队系统中的行为变化和流动，从而影响企业收益。本文以传统的M/M/1排队系统为背景，基于顾客存在期望等待时间的前提下，以企业收益最大化为优化目标进行研究。首先，对相应基础理论和模型假设进行介绍；其次，对顾客存在心理期望等待时间情形提出三种新的策略：重新定价、通过折扣对顾客期望值进行调整、提高服务率；然后，分别对上述三种策略进行优化分析，并同现有结果进行比较；研究表明：三种策略都比维持原有定价带来更大收益；当折扣力度较小时或顾客对费用感知强于时间感知时，折扣策略优于重新定价策略；当折扣力度较大或顾客对时间感知强于费用感知时，重新定价策略优于折扣策略；最后，通过对最优结果分析提出相应管理启示。本文的研究对于顾客存在心理期望等待时间的服务定价具有重要的指导意义和实际应用价值。     

基于顾客等待厌恶的会员制排队服务设计与差异化定价研究

设计合理的服务机制以及制定完善的服务定价策略对于企业的发展至关重要,服务提供商通过设计合理的服务策略可以获得最优的服务收益。在会员制排队服务中,通常会存在会员顾客和非会员顾客两类顾客,服务非会员顾客势必会增加会员顾客的排队等待时间,进而引发会员顾客等待厌恶的心理。因此,本文以会员制排队服务为研究背景,针对市场中存在的会员顾客和非会员顾客,在服务提供商对两类顾客实施差异化定价时,研究会员顾客等待厌恶心理对服务提供商服务策略和服务定价的影响。结果表明,当会员顾客等待厌恶程度较小或适中时,服务提供商可以同时服务非会员顾客和会员顾客;当会员顾客等待厌恶程度较大时,服务提供商应该只服务会员顾客。此外,随着等待厌恶程度的增大,会员顾客的最优定价会先减小后增大,非会员顾客的最优定价会先保持不变后逐渐增大。本文的研究对于会员制服务提供商服务策略和服务价格的设定具有一定的指导作用和应用价值。     

基于异质性顾客心理期望等待时间的优先权服务定价研究

本文以非抢占式M/M/1排队系统为背景,以企业收益最大化为目标,基于顾客异质性(单位时间等待成本不同)将顾客分为两类,针对顾客的心理期望等待时间对服务提供商最优定价策略的影响进行研究。首先研究优先权顾客心理期望等待时间对企业收益的影响以及相应的优先权定价,然后研究优先权顾客和普通顾客同时存在心理期望等待时间对企业收益的影响和相应的优先权定价。研究表明:仅考虑优先权顾客的心理期望等待时间,企业应通过提高优先权定价来获得最优收益;当优先权顾客和普通顾客同时存在心理期望等待时间时,企业仍然采取提高优先权定价的策略,若普通顾客的价值大(获取服务的基本费用大),企业应对普通顾客提供一定的折扣来消除其心理期望等待时间增加企业收益;如果普通顾客的价值较小,企业应"有意"流失部分普通顾客,吸引更多顾客到优先权队列获取服务来获得更多收益。本文研究对于服务提供商在考虑顾客心理期望等待时间基础上设置最合理的队列机制有一定的指导意义和实际应用价值。     

教育改革不能只是“看上去很美”——择校之艰

6月14日，对郑州不少“小升初”学生家长来说，是比较难熬的一天。这天，是郑州民办初中“小升初”开始报名的日子，很多家长凌晨就要去排队报名。河南省实验文博学校门口，4点多就有人开始排队等待报名：排了一上午队才拿到评价通知单；仅两个小时，就报了1000多人……这一串鲜活的数字不断地刺激着家长和学生的神经。“四月比信息，五月比孩子，六月比大人，七月比钱财。”无论在哪个城市，“小升初”都是一场持久消耗战。无数想通过择校进入优质初中的考生和家长的“明战”，甚至学校之间的“暗战”愈发激烈。     

概率论在经济管理中的应用——最优收银台数

在超市运营中,排队时间的长短影响着顾客的对超市的整体满意度,合理的开放收银台的数目也是每个管理者所需要认真考虑的问题。实际上,管理者往往是根据经验去作决定,缺乏相关的理论依据。文章从数学角度出发,以某超市为研究对象,将顾客排队到接受服务的过程建立成一个数学模型,通过统计该超市各时间段的客流量,运用Matlab进行仿真计算,得出了各时间段最优的收银台数目,为超市提供了一种有效的管理方案,同时结果说明了超市"如您前面超过5人请按铃"的策略在高峰时刻无意义。     

动态车辆路径问题排队模型分析

分析了一类动态车辆路径问题,其中顾客需求以泊松流形式出现,现场服务时间服从一般分布.提出解决该问题的两种策略:顺序服务策略和中点改进策略,利用排队论、几何概率论等领域的知识分别求出了这两种策略的系统时间,并通过仿真数据实验验证了这两种策略的有效性.     

道歉承诺类管理反馈策略对顾客二次满意度的影响——基于顾客多样情绪调节效应

O2O模式下，众多学者和商家都关注何种在线管理反馈策略能提升顾客满意度，然而多数研究仅针对顾客负向情绪，忽略了顾客多样情绪对在线管理反馈策略影响的调节作用。实际上顾客在接受在线管理反馈时带有矛盾情绪，表现为多种情绪。因此本文针对消费者多样情绪，研究不同情绪调节下道歉承诺类管理反馈策略与顾客满意度之间的关系。通过梳理在线管理反馈策略、顾客满意度、顾客多样情绪等相关研究，提出代表顾客多样情绪的在线评论类型包括：积极评论、偏积极评论、消极评论、偏消极评论，研究不同类型评论（顾客多样情绪）对顾客满意度有不同影响；道歉承诺类管理反馈策略对顾客二次满意度有积极影响；不同类型在线评论（消费者多样情绪）对道歉承诺类管理反馈策略的积极影响有调节作用等假设。本文以国内某旅行网站99027名顾客二次入住酒店数据为样本，用机器学习的方法对顾客评论和管理反馈策略进行分类，通过多元线性回归模型进行实证分析，结果表明：（1）偏积极评论、偏消极评论、消极评论对顾客二次满意度有负向影响；（2）道歉承诺类管理反馈策略对顾客二次满意度有积极作用；（3）顾客偏消极、消极情绪能够加强道歉承诺类管理反馈策略对顾客二次满意度的正向影响，即道歉承诺在调节顾客的消极情绪方面具有一定的积极作用。研究结果丰富了在线管理反馈策略理论和方法，为服务商进行在线管理反馈时应采取的措施提供了一些参考，对服务商通过第三方平台加强顾客关系管理具有一定的指导意义。     

基于闭环数据供应链的数据产品定价策略研究

近年来随着大数据的广泛应用，个人与企业数据快速增长，数据成为公司的重要资产。数据交易的快速发展，为数据供应商和数据服务商带来了新的商业契机，同时也对数据定价机制提出了新的挑战。闭环数据供应链是由终端用户、数据供应商和数据服务商构成，也是数据交易的主要利益相关者。本研究针对闭环数据供应链的数据产品定价策略问题，分析不同利益相关者的数据交易过程，提出基于闭环数据供应链的集中定价、分散定价和收益共享三种不同数据定价模型；讨论不同数据定价策略对终端用户提供个人的数据质量、规模与激励的影响；得到不同定价策略下的最优定价、数据供应商与数据服务商的收益以及消费者剩余；为数据定价及利益相关者提供有效的决策依据。     

DRGs与DIP的对比研究：基于医院运营的视角

打包预付方式将控制医疗费用的责任转移至医方，能激励医院做好成本管控，会对医院的日常运营产生重大影响.本文主要研究按疾病相关组付费(DRGs)和按病种分值付费(DIP)两种支付方式，通过构建排队和竞争博弈模型探讨两种支付方式下的医院间服务速率决策问题以及相同医疗预算下的医疗服务质量、医院利润和社会福利的对比研究，并通过数值方式探讨了医院数量和服务成本系数对系统性能的影响.研究发现：1)DIP与DRGs相比，医院的服务速率相对降低，服务的病人数量较少，但医院利润更大.2)从社会福利来看，患者损失的成本较高时，DRGs较优；反之，DIP较优，且此时DIP是帕累托改进策略.3)只有当医院数量适中、服务成本系数较大时，DIP的优势才更明显.     

集装箱码头外部集卡预约优化模型与算法

针对集装箱码头闸口拥堵问题,建立集卡预约优化模型,目的是减少集卡排队等待时间和拥堵期间的碳排放。该模型在给定的集卡到达调整量水平的限制下,确定每个时段最优的预约份额,同时利用非平稳排队模型描述集卡到达随时间到达的特点。为求解模型,设计基于遗传算法与逐点固定流体近似算法(PSFFA)的求解方法,该算法利用遗传算法搜索最优解,基于PSFFA算法计算集卡排队时间。最后,利用算例对模型和算法的有效性进行了验证。结果表明,集卡预约优化模型可以有效地减少集卡排队时间,PSFFA方法可以较好地求解到达过程不平稳的排队问题。     

Modeling and Managing the Percentage of Satisfied Customers in Hidden and Revealed Waiting Line Systems

We perform an analysis of various queueing systems with an emphasis on estimating a single performance metric. This metric is defined to be the percentage of customers whose actual waiting time was less than their individual waiting time threshold. We label this metric the Percentage of Satisfied Customers (PSC.) This threshold is a reflection of the customers' expectation of a reasonable waiting time in the system given its current state. Cases in which no system state information is available to the customer are referred to as “hidden queues.” For such systems, the waiting time threshold is independent of the length of the waiting line, and it is randomly drawn from a distribution of threshold values for the customer population. The literature generally assumes that such thresholds are exponentially distributed. For these cases, we derive closed form expressions for our performance metric for a variety of possible service time distributions. We also relax this assumption for cases where service times are exponential and derive closed form results for a large class of threshold distributions. We analyze such queues for both single and multi‐server systems. We refer to cases in which customers may observe the length of the line as “revealed” queues.“ We perform a parallel analysis for both single and multi‐server revealed queues. The chief distinction is that for these cases, customers may develop threshold values that are dependent upon the number of customers in the system upon their arrival. The new perspective this paper brings to the modeling of the performance of waiting line systems allows us to rethink and suggest ways to enhance the effectiveness of various managerial options for improving the service quality and customer satisfaction of waiting line systems. We conclude with many useful insights on ways to improve customer satisfaction in waiting line situations that follow directly from our analysis.     

Service Systems with Experience‐Based Anecdotal Reasoning Customers

The existing queueing literature typically assumes that customers either perfectly know the expected waiting time or are able to form rational expectations about it. In contrast, in this article, we study canonical service models where customers do not have such full information or capability. We assume that customers lack full capability or ample opportunities to perfectly infer the service rate or estimate the expected waiting time, and thus can only rely on past experiences and anecdotal reasoning to make their joining decisions. We fully characterize the steady‐state equilibrium in this service system. Compared with the fully rational benchmark, we find that customers with anecdotal reasoning are less price‐sensitive. Consequently, with a higher market potential (higher arrival rate), a revenue‐maximizing firm may increase the price if the service rate is exogenous, and it may decrease the price if the service rate is at the firm's discretion. Both results go against the commonly accepted pricing recommendations in the fully rational benchmark. We also show that revenue maximization and welfare maximization lead to fundamentally different pricing strategies with anecdotal reasoning, whereas they are equivalent in the fully rational benchmark.     

Ice‐Breaker vs. Standalone: Comparing Alternative Workflow Modes of Mid‐level Care Providers

Capitalizing on the operational concept of division‐of‐labor, clinics often reduce physician service time by off‐loading some of his/her clinical activities to lower‐cost personnel. These personnel, such as nurse practitioners and physician assistants, are often collectively referred to as “mid‐level providers” (MLPs) and can perform many patient‐consultation tasks. The common rationale is that using an MLP allows the physician to serve more patients, increase patients’ access to care, and, due to MLPs’ lower salaries, improve the clinic's financial performance. An MLP is typically integrated into the outpatient clinic process in one of two modes: as an “ice‐breaker,” seeing each patient before the physician, or as a “standalone” provider, a substitute for the physician for the entirety of some patients’ visits. Despite both of these modes being widely used in practice, we find no research that identifies the circumstances under which either one is preferable. This study examines these two modes’ effects on operational performance, such as patient flow and throughput, as well as on financial measures. Using queueing and bottleneck analysis, discrete‐event simulation, and profit modeling, we compare these two deployment modes and identify the optimal policies for deploying MLPs as either ice‐breakers or as standalone providers. Interestingly, we also find there exists a range of scenarios where not hiring an MLP at all (i.e., the physician works alone) is likely to be most profitable for the clinic. Implications for practice are discussed.     

Optimal Uniform Pricing Strategy of a Service Firm When Facing Two Classes of Customers

When facing heterogeneous customers, how should a service firm make its pricing decision to maximize revenue? If discrimination is allowed, then priority schemes and differentiated pricing are often used to achieve that. In many applications, however, the firm cannot or is not allowed to set discriminatory prices, for example, list price in retail stores, online shopping, and gas stations; thus a uniform price must be applied to all customers. This study addresses the optimal uniform pricing problem of a service firm using a queueing system with two classes of customers. Our result shows that the potential pool of customers plays a central role in the firm's optimal decision. Depending on the range of system parameters, which are determined explicitly by the primitive data, the firm's optimal strategy may choose to serve only one class of customers, a subset of a class of customers, or a combination of different classes of customers. In addition, the optimal price is in general not monotonic with respect to the potential market sizes because their changes may lead to a major shift in the firm's decision on which customer class to serve. However, unless such a shift occurs, the optimal price is weakly decreasing in the potential market sizes.     

Competition and Coordination in Two‐Tier Public Service Systems under Government Fiscal Policy

As a result of government budgetary limits and rapid market growth, many public service systems—such as health care—are characterized by extensive customer wait times that have become a serious problem. This problem might be solved by allowing private firms to enter these markets, which would provide customers with a choice between a free (governmental) public service provider (SP) and a fee‐charging (or “toll”) private SP. In such a two‐tier service system, the two SPs are differentiated by service quality and cost efficiency. This study focuses on the competition and coordination issues for two‐tier service systems with customers who are sensitive to both service quality and delay. The free system attempts to maximize its expected total customer utility with limited capacity, whereas the toll system attempts to maximize its profit. Neither goal is aligned with the social welfare goal of the public service. To achieve the social welfare goal, the government plays a crucial role in coordinating the two‐tier service system via the budget, the tradeoff of social members' goals, and tax‐subsidy policies. Using a mixed duopoly game, we establish Nash equilibrium strategies and identify the conditions for the existence of the two‐tier service system. We employ several interesting and counter‐intuitive managerial insights generated by the model to show that the public service can be delivered more efficiently via customer choice and SP competition. In addition, we show that a relatively low tax‐subsidy rate can almost perfectly coordinate the two SPs to achieve most of the maximum possible benefit of the two‐tier service system.     

Dynamic capacity adjustments with reactive customers

In this paper we develop a behavioural model in which customers come and go based on their perception of waiting time (relative to other facilities) while managers gradually adjust the capacity of the facility based on their perception of demand. We explicitly account for the difference in access to information between existing and potential customers, which implies that the perception of potential customers lags the perception of current customers. We investigate the outcome of the interaction between these simultaneous dynamic decision processes, and in particular the impact of the lags created by the perception formation process and the time to implement desired changes in capacity. These multiple delays may result in customers and service provider being out of step: customers walk away just as the service provider manages to bring extra capacity online.     

基于顾客公平偏好的服务机制与定价研究

由于顾客异质性（单位时间等待成本不同），服务提供商通常对顾客采取分类服务策略，然而分类服务会引起服务系统中不同类型顾客之间等待时间和服务价值的差异性，从而给顾客带来心理上的不公平感，进而引起顾客在服务系统中的流动和转移，进一步影响企业收益和社会福利。本文针对非抢占M/M/1服务系统顾客分类情形为背景，由两种顾客之间期望等待时间的不同和公平偏好参数相结合构建普通顾客的公平心理效用模型，以垄断型服务系统为背景，分别从企业收益、社会福利与顾客效用三个视角进行分析。研究表明，服务提供商应对顾客采取可观测型的分类服务机制来获得最大收益；从社会福利视角，服务提供商应对顾客采取不可观测型的分类服务机制；从顾客效用视角，服务提供商应取消顾客分类服务，仅保留普通顾客。最后同现有结论进行比较分析，并进行拓展研究。本文研究对服务提供商采取合理的服务机制及相应的服务定价具有重要参考价值和指导意义。     

Increasing productivity in exponential queues by server-sharing

This paper sets out to investigate the effects of productivity improvements on the operation of queueing systems, the most noticeable effect being a change in the quality of the service that is provided to customers. A bulk-service queueing model is developed and solved, in which the average service time per batch is assumed to increase with the batch size, and the implications for service quality are discussed. The analysis shows that, under certain conditions, the benefits of group service over those of serving customers individually are quite substantial.     

Quality‐Speed Competition in Customer‐Intensive Services with Boundedly Rational Customers

We consider a system in which two competing servers provide customer‐intensive services and the service reward is affected by the length of service time. The customers are boundedly rational and choose their service providers according to a logit model. We demonstrate that the service provider revenue function is unimodal in the service rate, its decision variable, and show that the service rate competition has a unique and stable equilibrium. We then study the price decision under three scenarios with the price determined by a revenue‐maximizing firm, a welfare‐maximizing social planner, or two servers in competition. We find that the socially optimal price, subject to the requirement that the customer actual utility must be non‐negative, is always lower than the competition equilibrium price which, in turn, is lower than the revenue‐maximizing monopoly price. However, if the customer actual utility is allowed to be negative in social optimization, the socially optimal price can be higher than the other two prices in a large market.