考虑消费者参照效应与策略行为的多产品动态定价

在考虑客户同时表现出参照依赖和策略行为的场景下，本文构建了一个垄断厂商两阶段的多产品动态定价模型。该模型将易逝品的销售分为正常价格阶段和促销价格阶段，每个阶段又分为多期。客户分为短视型和策略型，其中策略型客户会根据两个阶段价格的差异和获得商品的概率，决定是在第一阶段和等到第二阶段购买商品。基于随机动态规划的结构属性和超模理论，得到了两个阶段稳态价格的解析解，并且证明最优价格路径是单调且随着初始参照价格变化而变化。最后，通过对两种产品的数值实验，分析了各种参数对最优稳态价格的影响。结果显示，零售商可以采取多产品联合定价策略，即基于商店水平的定价策略，并通过调整核心产品的比重来获得更高的利润。     

考虑策略性消费者的生鲜农产品定价和库存决策

消费者的策略性行为使零售商的生鲜农产品的定价和库存决策面临更大挑战。本文基于报童模型,综合考虑消费者的策略性行为,对生鲜农产品价值下降进行离散化处理。刻画策略性消费者的决策行为,构建零售商的单阶段和两阶段定价及库存决策模型,分析了产品价值剩余率对消费者行为、零售商最优定价、最优库存水平以及零售商利润的影响机理。研究发现,在单阶段模型中零售商最优价格和最优库存水平均随产品价值剩余率的递增而递增;而在两阶段模型中,第二阶段最优价格随价值剩余率的变化趋势可能存在阈值。     

考虑多种等待成本策略型消费者的零售商定价研究

策略型消费者为选择购买时机而估计立即或推迟购买产品的效用时，除了考虑价格和可得性，还应考虑等待成本。考虑消费者等待成本的差异性，将消费者分为高等待成本消费者、居间等待成本消费者和零等待成本消费者。基于报童模型和理性预期均衡原理，考虑三种类型策略型消费者的不同比例，构建了零售商的定价决策模型。分析比较了三种情形的定价决策：以高等待成本消费者为销售目标的定价（TM定价）、以高等待成本和居间等待成本消费者为销售目标的定价（TMξ定价）以及以所有消费者为销售目标的定价（TA定价）。研究显示，即使消费者都是理性的，由于等待成本的差异也会表现出短视型或者是部分理性的消费特征。采用TM定价时，零售商最优收益随高等待成本消费者比例的增大而提高；采用TMξ定价时，零售商最优收益随零等待成本消费者比例的提高而降低；采用TA定价时，零售商有固定的最优收益，零售商可以通过权衡每个消费者群体的保留价格和相应的买家数量来获得最优的定价策略。当零等待成本消费者的比例大于阈值，不管其他消费者的类型和比例如何，都应采用TA定价策略。在存在降价销售期的情况下，零售商在两个销售阶段的均衡价格与消费者在这两个销售阶段的等待成...     

面对策略型消费者的企业最优创新与定价策略

本文研究企业的最优产品创新策略及其对企业运营的影响。通过构建两阶段动态博弈模型，分析企业在渐进式创新与突破式创新两种模式下和策略型消费者之间的定价与购买博弈，以及企业和消费者的策略性程度对于最优产品创新策略的影响。研究结果表明，第一，企业的最优产品创新策略受到高创新产品相对于低创新产品的创新提升程度、二者成本差异，以及消费者的策略性程度的共同影响。第二，在考虑策略型消费者购买行为的背景下，当高创新产品的创新程度足够高，或者二者成本差异有限时，突破式创新策略对于企业而言不仅能提供更高的利润，还能占据更大的市场份额。第三，消费者与企业策略性程度的增加，均在一定程度上提高了突破式创新相比渐进式创新而言的优势。     

考虑策略型消费者和退货的零售商定价和订货决策研究

考虑策略型消费者对产品估值的异质性和无缺陷退货行为，应用理性预期（RE）均衡构建了两期决策模型，引入产品的耐用性参数，得到了允许（不允许）无缺陷退货两种模式下零售商的定价区间和订货策略。研究发现，产品的耐用性越弱，零售商可制定的价格越高；高类型的消费者越多，零售商定价越高；产品折扣率越低，第二阶段购买的消费者越多；零售商允许消费者无缺陷退货时，消费者退货成本越低，零售商定价越高。在两种模式下，产品定价与其耐用性程度呈负相关，当产品具备高度潮流性特征时，不允许退货更占优势；随商品耐用性程度的提升，允许退货带来的优势逐渐明显，而且退货成本越低，允许退货优势越强；随产品耐用性参数增加，允许退货缓解策略型消费者消极影响的作用愈加明显，退货成本越高，缓解越有效。本文合理刻画了策略型消费者的行为，考虑了消费者跨期决策中产品耐用性的影响，同时考虑了现实中广泛存在的消费者无缺陷退货行为与零售商的退货补贴政策，从而为零售商的定价和订货退货决策提供了理论参考。     

考虑消费者网购体验滞后的产品定价研究

随着电子商务技术的发展，网络购物越来越便利。与此同时，网络购物带来的产品体验滞后也导致了消费者对产品的认知不确定性。而这种不确定性正在成为消费者策略性退货行为的主要原因，如消费者同时购买多件具有横向差异的产品，在收到货物后经亲身体验后保留一件而将其他产品退货。本文通过构建Hotelling模型，探讨了企业在考虑此种影响情况下的最优定价策略，分析得出：当消费者的退货成本增加时，企业最优定价也随之增加；消费者对产品的先验效用差异化越小，企业的最优定价也越低。同时发现，若某种产品无消费者单独购买，企业的最优定价会随消费者偏好的增加而增加；而当两种产品均有消费者单独购买且消费者退货成本较大时，企业的最优定价不但不会随消费者偏好的增加而提高，反而会随消费者偏好增加而减少。此外，本文给出了消费者策略性退货行为存在的临界条件，当消费者的退货成本高于这一临界条件时消费者的策略退货行为将消失。     

歧视性定价下的两阶段水平差异模型

在大多数研究产品水平差异的两阶段Hotelling 模型中, 厂商的选址总是偏离社会最优 结果. 根据消费者总剩余的不同取值分析了当双头垄断厂商采用歧视性策略时的两阶段选址 - 定价模型. 两个厂商在博弈的第一阶段中选址定位, 并在第二阶段制定出相应的歧视价格. 模型的子博弈精炼纳什均衡表明歧视性定价下厂商的选址为社会最优.     

考虑零售商实行歧视行为的两阶段动态定价策略研究

消费者对产品使用的习惯性将影响其复购选择,而企业根据消费者的历史消费行为制定相应的价格策略也影响着消费者的行为。本文构建了一个两阶段动态定价模型,研究企业是否存在歧视行为及消费者的产品习惯程度对企业定价策略的影响,利用博弈方法得到了不同情境下的制造商和零售商的最优策略。研究表明:(1)消费者对产品的习惯程度不仅能够影响消费者行为,也能影响企业定价策略;(2)转移成本加大了企业对消费者的歧视程度;(3)企业倾向于采取歧视定价策略即给新客户提供价格优惠而给老客户收取高价有利于自身利益最大化;(4)企业第一阶段的市场份额不能影响第二阶段定价,但能够影响企业两阶段利润。     

考虑策略型消费者的在线零售商库存信息披露及联合定价、库存决策模型

在两期销售环境下,研究了面向策略型消费者的在线零售商库存信息披露及联合定价、库存决策问题。考虑在线零售商库存信息共享和隐藏两种库存披露策略,构建了在线零售商两期销售利润模型。通过分析消费者的购买行为,讨论了在具有策略型消费者的市场中,在线零售商应如何选择库存信息披露策略,以及如何制定最优定价和库存决策。在此基础上,分析了相关参数对在线零售商决策及利润的影响。研究结果表明,在线零售商的最优定价及库存决策受消费者估值折扣系数和第二期定价策略的影响。特别地,当在线零售商选择第一期缺货时,更倾向于共享其库存水平信息;当在线零售商选择第二期缺货或者两期均不缺货时,消费者估值折扣系数存在一个阈值,当低于该阈值时,在线零售商会选择隐藏库存水平信息,当高于该阈值时,在线零售商会选择共享库存水平信息。     

顾客策略行为下差异产品两阶段定价模型研究

互联网和信息技术的发展,为零售商收集顾客信息带来方便的同时,也使得消费者变得越来越具有策略性和选择性。首先,构建零售商只销售一种高质量产品的情形,研究其两阶段的定价策略,并分析产品的跨期折扣因子对产品的零售价格、销售量和零售商利润的影响。然后,考虑零售商可提供高质量和低质量两种产品的情形,顾客在第一销售期、第二销售期都可以选择两种产品。构建两阶段的定价决策模型,并分析产品的跨期折扣因子、顾客对低质量产品的接受度等参数对产品两阶段的零售价格、销售量的影响。最后,用数值算例分析了第二种模型下顾客对低质量产品的接受度等模型参数对零售商两阶段总利润的影响,然后比较了第一种和第二种模型下高质量产品的零售价格和销售量。研究结论较全面的分析了顾客策略行为对差异产品两阶段销售期的定价决策的影响,为零售商进行定价优化决策提供了十分重要的参考。     

Optimal Temporal Customer Purchasing Decisions Under Trade‐In Programs with Up‐Front Fees

To entice customers to purchase both current and new generation products over time, many firms offer different trade‐in programs including programs that require customers to pay an up‐front fee. To examine the effectiveness of the trade‐in programs, we develop a two‐period model in which a firm sells the first generation product in the first period and the second generation product in the second period; however, the firm offers a trade‐in program that customers can participate in when purchasing the first generation product in the first period. To participate, each customer has to pay a nonrefundable fee in the first period so that she has the option to trade‐in her first generation product and receive a prespecified trade‐in value to be used for the purchase of the second generation product in the second period. To capture market heterogeneity and market uncertainty, we examine the case when the valuation of the first generation product varies among customers and the valuation of the second generation product is uncertain a priori. By analyzing a two‐period game, we determine the optimal purchasing behavior of each rational customer, and we show that the firm is always better off by offering its own trade‐in programs. Also, our numerical analysis reveals that trade‐in programs can benefit the firm significantly especially when (i) the residual value of the first generation product is high; (ii) the expected incremental value of the second generation product is high; or (iii) the valuation of the second generation product is highly uncertain.     

消费者短视和以旧换新情形下设计架构与定价策略研究

耐用品的耐用性会抑制了新一代耐用品的销售,企业通常会采用以旧换新政策来激励新一代耐用品的销售。企业有两种产品设计架构策略:一体化架构策略与模块化架构策略,同时企业也有两种定价策略:静态定价策略和动态定价策略。在这种情况下,企业该如何确定产品设计架构和定价策略?在假定两期内消费者是短视情形下,论文建立了消费者与企业博弈模型分析和比较了三种情况。研究发现,无论是静态定价还是动态定价,无论是模块化架构还是一体化架构,购买了第一代产品的消费者都会整体更换成第二代产品;随着第二代核心系统的质量提升,以旧换新促使企业产品架构选择从一体化架构转变为选择模块化架构;当采用动态定价、第二代核心系统质量提升适中和折扣因子高时,企业会选择模块化架构;当企业采用模块化架构时,以旧换新政策会降低模块化产品第二代核心子系统和基础子系统之间的兼容性;如果两代产品之间的质量差距比较大,企业将会选择动态定价策略,反之会选择静态定价策略。     

Optimal Pricing of Two Successive‐Generation Products with Trade‐in Options under Uncertainty

To entice consumers to purchase both current and next generation products, many manufacturers and retailers offer trade‐in programs that allow buyers of the first generation product to trade‐in the product and purchase the new generation product at a lower price. By considering the interactions between “forward‐looking” consumers and a firm when a trade‐in program is offered, we analyze a two‐period dynamic game to determine the optimal prices of two successive‐generation products in equilibrium, and examine the conditions under which trade‐in programs are beneficial to the firm. Our model incorporates market heterogeneity (valuation of the first generation product varies among the consumer population), product uncertainty (the incremental value of the new product is uncertain before its introduction), and consumers' forward‐looking behavior (consumers take future product valuation and prices into consideration when making purchasing decisions). With the trade‐in option, we show that consumers are willing to pay a price that is higher than their valuations of the current product. Furthermore, trade‐in programs are more beneficial to the firm when: (i) the durability of the current product is high; (ii) the market heterogeneity is low; or (iii) the uncertainty level (or the expected incremental value) of the new product is high. Finally, when the incremental value of the new product is more uncertain, consumers are more willing to purchase the current product because of the “option” value of the trade‐in programs and thus trade‐in programs can be more beneficial to the firm in this case.     

竞争环境下的以旧换新策略

企业通过对拥有旧产品的老消费者提供以旧换新补贴能够提升自身销量与利润。然而,面临竞争对手时企业的以旧换新决策是否会受到影响?本文求解了先后进入市场的双寡头竞争企业所面临的以旧换新与定价博弈均衡,并分析了竞争存在与否对于企业以旧换新策略产生的影响。研究结果表明,第一,面对竞争时企业的定价决策受到市场中老消费者比例、两家竞争企业各自新产品的创新提升水平、老产品的使用残值这四个因素的共同影响。第二,当老产品残值相对较低而市场中老消费者数量适中时,两企业均不提供以旧换新可能成为博弈均衡,而其他条件下,两企业均提供以旧换新为博弈均衡。第三,先进入的企业没有动机单独为消费者提供以旧换新补贴。第四,竞争对手的存在对于先进入企业自身的以旧换新决策与相应的定价策略都产生了显著的影响。     

The comparison between trade-in and leasing of a product with technology innovations

Companies can adopt trade-in and/or leasing to shorten consumers׳ upgrade cycle and gain control over secondary markets. In this paper, we consider a monopolistic manufacturer who offers a technology product to a market consisting of heterogeneous consumers. We focus on an exogenous, stochastic innovation process that determines the availability of new technology and consequently, residual value of the current product. We derive the optimal pricing strategy of trade-in and leasing, respectively, examine its impact on the manufacturer׳s expected profit, and compare the performance of the two strategies. Trade-in protects the manufacturer against residual value risk and allows the flexibility of offering the option at different innovation states separately. Leasing, on the other hand, provides the manufacturer an opportunity to circumvent low new product prices and thus increases expected profit when product reuse profitability is high. The interplay between the two forces, product reuse profitability and new product price, determines the preference between trade-in and leasing. Our findings provide monopolistic manufacturers guidance on how to optimally employ the trade-in and leasing strategies.     

考虑策略型消费者行为的零售商订货及忠诚计划联合决策研究

顾客忠诚计划是零售商的重要销售策略之一. 本文针对两期折扣问题中零售商的订货和积分回馈计划投入的联合决策问题,基于完全理性假设,并结合问题的实际情况,考虑了全价期单期以及全价期和折扣期两期的积分回馈计划,构建了基于这两种积分回馈计划下的策略型消费者决策模型. 分析了不同积分回馈计划对策略型消费者行为的影响,进而讨论了零售商在不同决策下的收益情况,探索了零售商订货和积分回馈计划联合决策的制定. 研究发现：(1)积分回馈计划会对策略型消费者行为产生影响,从而影响零售商的决策和收益;(2)订货和忠诚计划制定的联合决策有利于零售商提高收益;(3)对于单位成本低的商品,面向全价期的积分回馈计划的最优收益提升较大;(4)对于商品价值与实际价格差异较小的商品,积分回馈计划对最优收益的提升作用较大. 具体而言,如果商品单位成本小于等于折扣价,则面向全价期的积分回馈计划的最优收益提升较大,反之,则面向全价期和折扣期的积分回馈计划的最优收益提升较大.     

两种激励条件下三级供应链产品质量控制策略研究

本文基于四阶段Stackelberg博弈分析,研究了在三级供应链中如何进行产品质量控制策略问题。构建了由制造商、零售商与最终顾客组成的三级供应链博弈模型,制造商进行产品质量决策,即生产高质量产品或者低质量产品,零售商进行产品采购决策和零售定价决策,最终顾客根据两种产品质量水平和零售价格的差异,决定产品的购买数量;当零售商采购高质量产品时,制造商将会向其提供价格折扣策略;当零售商采购低质量产品时,制造商将会向其提供延迟付款策略。运用最优化原理,求解了制造商的产品质量水平、价格折扣、延迟付款期限和零售商的零售价格、最终顾客的购买数量,及期望收益函数。进行了算例分析,结果表明:高质量产品零售价格关于价格折扣下降幅度更大,而低质量产品零售价格关于延迟付款期限下降幅度更大;制造商提供的价格折扣越大、延迟付款期限越长,其期望收益将会减少,此时零售商的期望收益将会增加,最终顾客产品需求量将会增加;制造商的总期望收益函数将呈现"倒U"型,求解了期望收益的最大值及各契约参数的值,结果证明所提出的产品质量控制策略是可行的。     

消费者寻求多样化与厂商折扣定价竞争

在很多市场环境中，消费者喜欢尝试不同产品的特性，重复消费同一商品会产生滞留成本。本文通过构建两期动态博弈模型，研究了滞留成本对企业折扣券定价行为的影响，并与其他定价策略的市场绩效进行了比较。本文研究结果表明：（1）企业会通过折扣券奖励忠诚的消费者，即企业会对重复购买自己产品的消费者给予价格优惠，而对新消费者制定高价格；（2）在均衡中，随着滞留成本的提升，消费者剩余和社会总福利降低，企业利润上升；（3）与其他定价机制相比较，折扣券定价策略下的社会总福利较低，政策制定者应当限制此类策略的应用。     

Optimal trade-in strategy of business-to-consumer platform with dual-format retailing model

B2C platforms are increasingly implementing trade-in programs to boost sales. Most of these platforms have adopted dual-format retailing model including both self-run stores and third-party stores. Under trade-in program framework, B2C platforms will determine the optimal trade-in rebate, and whether to offer the rebate to consumers with gift card (GC) or cash coupon (CC). GC can only be used in self-run stores, while CC can be used in both stores. To entice more consumers to trade-in products, platforms may launch trade-in efforts in the market. To address such decision-making challenges, we consider a B2C platform who owns a self-run store and hosts a third-party store, and examine the optimal trade-in strategy for the platform by developing four theoretical models. We first present two models without considering trade-in efforts, i.e., one model regarding GC payment, and one model regarding CC payment, and then extend them by taking trade-in efforts into consideration. Some interesting findings and insights are achieved. In particular, we find that both GC and CC do not always benefit the platform. Interestingly, offering high quality and low selling price for products in both the self-run store and the third-party store are also not always beneficial to the platform. So is the competition between both stores. Launching trade-in efforts may lead to a lower trade-in rebate but a higher profit for the platform. A counterintuitive finding is obtained that a higher gift card redemption rate is not beneficial to the platform, and vice versa.     

Coordinating Sales and Raw Material Discounts in a Global Supply Chain

In this paper, the supplier of a key component to a global manufacturer offers a one‐time price discount; we study the firm's optimal response to the discount under two different strategies. In the first strategy, the firm does not pass along the discount to its customers (sales subsidiaries); the firm simply coordinates purchasing and production among the different factories to take advantage of this one‐time price discount. In the second strategy, the firm offers price discounts for its most profitable products in different sales subsidiaries to increase their demand. We carried out experiments for the two strategies based on a mathematical programming model, built around Toshiba's global notebook supply chain. Model constraints include, among others, material constraints, bill‐of‐materials, capacity and transportation constraints, minimum lot size constraints, and a constraint on minimum fill rate (service level constraint). Unlike most models of this type in the literature, which define variables in terms of single arc flows, we employ path variables, which allow for direct identification and manipulation of profitable and non‐profitable products.