Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals

A policy is the outcome of negotiations between two three-party parliamentary states. An election in jurisdiction A determines the composition of the legislature that selects a representative to negotiate an intergovernmental policy agreement with the representative from the legislature of jurisdiction B. Negotiations are modeled using Nash (Econometrica 18(2):155?C162, 1950) bargaining framework. With heterogeneous parties, agreements and electoral outcomes depend on the concavity of the utility functions of negotiators and on the relative location of their ideal policies, i.e., depend on the negotiators relative willingness to compromise. Agreements between the bargainers may not follow the ordering of the parties?? ideal policies. An electoral outcome where support for the center party comes from extreme voters may emerge.     

Equality Bargaining: Where,Who, Why?

It is common to identify a role for trade unions in combating sex inequality at work through collective bargaining. This article uses a survey of paid union officers to identify the context in which equality bargaining by unions is likely to occur, using the specific issue of bargaining on equal pay. It concludes that equality bargaining is a function of women’s voice within unions, the characteristics and preferences of bargainers themselves and of a favourable public policy environment. Bargaining on equal pay is also more likely in centralized negotiations that cover multiple employers.     

Airline Negotiations and the New Concessionary Bargaining

I ask whether the highly confrontational collective bargaining in the airlines is unique to that industry or a sign of a deepening crisis in union–management relations nationally. First, airline labor relations are reviewed in the context of extremely contentious negotiations, intense industry competition, complex and fragmented bargaining structures, frequent bankruptcies, and unpredictable external shocks. Next, concessionary bargaining in the airlines is discussed, and a new and extreme form of concessionary bargaining is identified. The emergence of the new concessionary bargaining in the airlines and its spread to the automobile sector is then interpreted as the early signs of a fundamental transformation of collective bargaining. The implications of the new concessionary bargaining are then described at the workplace, company, union, and societal levels.

Strategic Bargaining Over Child Support and Visitation

When parents divorce, child support and visitation must be determined. The 1988 Family Support Act requires all states to have child support guidelines for courts to use in determining child support obligations. However, many divorcing couples arrive at agreements without court intervention, or they simply fail to enforce the court decision ex post. Given that the guidelines provide a starting point for negotiations, couples may be able to find self-negotiated, Pareto-improving solutions. In this paper we model the bargaining process that divorcing couples engage in when coming to agreements on visitation and child support. The model suggests that individuals may arrive at agreements that are Pareto improvements for both parents but that the children's welfare may decline as a result of these self-negotiated settlements. Data from the Stanford Child Custody Study show that the changes made in child support and visitation agreements are consistent with our model in only 30 percent of the cases. Therefore, we consider alternative specifications of the model and show that both significant costs of enforcing the original agreement and alternative assumptions on parental preferences can explain these empirical results.     

Spousal resources and relationship quality in eight European countries

ABSTRACT

We relate relationship satisfaction and thoughts about leaving a romantic relationship to a couple’s relative and absolute resources and check for context-dependency of those associations. Our theoretical point of departure is that the more resources women have compared to their spouses, the higher their intra-household bargaining power to negotiate themselves out of unpleasant tasks, particularly in gender-egalitarian and very income equal and unequal societies. In traditional societies (which score low on the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)), the inflexible role of men within the household presumably prevents women from bargaining a better position, which in turn negatively affects relationship quality. Income equality (low GINI coefficient) may be a prerequisite for women’s bargaining position, where more inequality (mid-GINI) may be detrimental for it. Nevertheless, extreme income inequality (high GINI) may again be favorable for women’s relationship power. Using country fixed effects models on data from the Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS), we compare men and women who are in a couple (formed after 1995) for eight European countries. We find that absolute resources matter more than relative resources, at least for relationship satisfaction: Higher educated couples are more satisfied with their relationships, which could suggest lower stress levels in those couples (in more traditional contexts). Second, we observe GINI context-dependency of the association between relative education and relationship satisfaction for women and relative education and exit thoughts for men, although opposite to what we expected. Perhaps reference group theory or gender display theory can explain these unexpected results. Finally, we find that women have more break-up plans in societies with a lower score on GEM. This last result is consistent with the notion that bargaining only works in egalitarian contexts.     

Battles through and about statistics in French pay equity bargaining: The politics of quantification at workplace level

This article proposes to study the discreet ‘battles of numbers’ at workplace level, particularly exacerbated on pay equity, in relation to its potential additional costs for employers. Figures are at once a framework, an object and a resource for power struggles between social partners. This approach is inspired by ‘statactivism’, a research perspective that studies the ways and contexts in which statistics can become tools for social mobilization. In a European context where bargaining is increasingly decentralized to company level, we argue that researchers should pay attention to statistical resources and quantification skills of negotiators, both on the management and unions side. They should also include in their analytical framework the influence of experts and specialists who advise social partners on how to strategically produce and use gender‐sensitive statistics. In this article, two case studies allow us to open the ‘black box’ of equality bargaining, revealing challenges and controversies of gender pay reporting.     

Research on the discourse of international negotiations: A path to understanding international conflict processes?

While both actual negotiators and social scientists have written extensively on international negotiations, study of the actual talk through which goals are or are not accomplished has been little studied; to a substantial degree, electronic records of the discourse of international negotiations have not been available. This paper describes the procedures of comprehensive discourse analysis and what sorts of things can be learned from its use, and identifies reasons why international (and other) negotiators have been reluctant to have their actual talk studied. Projected studies are described.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Research Council of the International Sociological Association meetings in Ljubljana in September 1988.     

Negotiating Interorganizational Orders*

Strauss' (1978) negotiation paradigm is used to analyze interorganizational relations leading to development of a complex of eleven rehabilitation agencies. Analysis is based on records over a twenty-five year period and four years of participant observation and interviewing. The structural context for the negotiations is described in terms of over-lapping societal, communal, interorganizational, organizational, and interpersonal levels. The analysis points out the importance of covert, informal negotiations to interorganizational relations. The negotiators who initiated the process employed a strategy of multiple-linked negotiations in which they attempted to select negotiators from the other organizations and the issues to be negotiated. Stakes were manipulated according to a cost-reward-involvement formula. Problematic issues were dealt with in informal covert negotiations which preceded overt negotiations in a peer type council. Consideration of the negotiation process aids in understanding several problems in interorganizational relations: power and autonomy and the consequences of interlocking directorates. The negotiated order approach suggests several lines of additional research.     

On the sustainability of bargaining solutions in family decision models

This paper analyses the sustainability of family bargaining agreements by developing a non-cooperative game between two spouses with symmetric preferences. To that end, we develop, by using a general utility function, a repeated non-cooperative game involving two players with symmetric preferences, where the characterization of a Nash sub-game perfect equilibrium allows us to demonstrate that the spouse with the greater bargaining power has a greater incentive to reach an agreement. This result is also reproduced by using a particular example of linear preferences in consumption. However, the influence of the bargaining power on the sustainability of a bargaining solution depends on the specification of the individual preferences, as well as the degree of altruism between the spouses.

Deal or no deal? How round vs precise percentage offers and price-ending mimicry affect impasse risk in over 25 million eBay negotiations

Negotiations can end with a successful deal or with an impasse. To minimize the impasse risk, how assertive and precise should negotiators’ first offers be? Recent studies diverge in their findings as to the advantages and disadvantages of making round vs precise offers. Based on over 25 million eBay negotiations, the present research establishes correlational evidence that buyer offers at round percentages of the seller’s list price—for instance, exactly 50% (75%, 90%, etc.)—coincide with a markedly smaller impasse risk than offers just above (e.g., 50.1%) or just below (49.9%) these round percentages. We also find that buyers who mimic sellers’ list price precision (e.g., offering $89.95 for a product listed at $99.99) and exact price endings ($30.13 for a list price of $40.13) incur markedly smaller impasse risks. Our findings show that the effectiveness of buyers’ round vs precise offers depends on the roundness of the seller’s list price, therefore extending previous research that focused on offer precision without taking the opponent’s list price into account. We discuss promising avenues for future research on the interpersonal effects of offer precision and price-ending mimicry.     

Outsourcing and union power

The outsourcing of union work and jobs either diffuses or diminishes union membership, depending on perspective and situation. The correlation of trends in union membership to trends in union power, while less than perfect, has until recently been relatively strong over the past sixteen years. The fact that as diverse a sample of unions as AFSCME, SEIU, and UAW have chosen to make outsourcing a prominent labor/public relations issue suggests that the correlation continues to be perceived by the union movement to be significant, notwithstanding the efforts of the “new” leadership of the AFL-CIO to break that link with respect to union political power by “taxing” member unions and their members to contribute both money and militancy to the 1996 election cycle. Although outsourcing may lead only to the diffusion of union membership either within or between unions, as opposed to the diminution of union membership, this fact has not received a great deal of attention. The net effect on total union membership of outsourcing from one union employer to another union employer is unclear, although the effect on the membership of the union at the outsourcing employer is not. The redistribution of membership within a union as a result of outsourcing is likely to have little immediate impact on union power. However, as even the best case scenario presented above suggests, it may have significant long-run deleterious effects on union bargaining power by taking labor out of a sheltered market and putting it into potentially competitive market. This is particularly likely to be the case when outsourcing (1) places the outsourced work into a different industry or wage contour and (2) creates the possibility of moving from sole-source to multiplesource supplier arrangements. The redistribution of membership between unions as a result of outsourcing is unlikely to have a major impact on union power broadly defined. It can have, however, serious deleterious effects in terms of the power of an individual union, as suggested in my “competitive case” scenario. The fact that one union’s losses due to outsourcing may be another union’s gain is of little consolation to the losing union. That act, in and of itself, may make the threat of outsourcing a potential union “Achilles heel” at the bargaining table by placing it into competition with some other, perhaps unknown, union as well as possibly nonunion competition. The most obvious threat to union power comes from outsourcing that diminishes union membership overall by transferring jobs from union to nonunion employers. The willingness and ability of employers to move work/jobs entirely out of the orbit of union control constitutes, in terms of power and particularly union bargaining power, a revisitation of the phenomenon of the “runaway shop.” It may also be viewed as a proactive form of hiring permanent replacements for (potentially) striking workers. The union options in dealing with such a challenge are to endeavor to preclude outsourcing through legislation or collective bargaining or to chase the work by organizing the unorganized, hopefully with the help of the unionized outsourcing employer. Neither option may be easy, but as the 1996 auto industry negotiations suggest, the former may be less difficult than the latter. The possibility that outsourcing from union to nonunion employer may provide unions with the power to organize from the top (outsourcer) down (outsourcee) cannot be entirely ignored as the issue of supplier “neutrality” reportedly was raised in the 1996 auto negotiations. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union political and financial power, by virtue of its impact on the level or distribution of union membership, can and may well be offset by an increase in union activism—as measured by dues levels, merger activity, organizing commitment, and political action. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union bargaining power are more problematical from the union standpoint. The effect of outsourcing, whatever its rationale or scenario, appears to be to put union labor back into competition. Thus, outsourcing constitutes yet another challenge to the labor movement in its ongoing and seemingly increasingly unsuccessful battle to take and keep U.S. union labor out of competition by proving itself able and willing to organize to the extent of the market and standardizing wages in that market.     

The Pay Equity Bargaining Process in Newfoundland: Understanding Cooperation and Conflict by Incorporating Gender and Class

In the latter half of the 1980s, when it was becoming apparent in Canada that previous equal pay policies had failed to close the gender wage gap, a number of provincial governments introduced pro–active pay equity policies. All these initiatives required the negotiation of pay equity in unionized workplaces. Leading up to the implementation of pay equity in Ontario, industrial relations specialists predicted an insurmountably conflictual process, whereas governments expected a new level of partnership with unions. Given these opposite expectations, the article aims to identify any significant patterns of cooperation and conflict in the pay equity bargaining process and to explore reasons for their dynamic. Based on a case study of Newfoundland’s health sector, neither prediction was correct as both conflict and cooperation occurred. It is argued that both the specificity and differences in the negotiations studied can be better understood by exploring the complex intertwinings of gender and class, namely, the ongoing articulation of their main manifestations: a reinforcing hierarchy and a transformative labour–feminist politic in the unions involved. The article concludes with some theoretical and policy observations concerning the importance of building in gender and class to current models of cooperative collective bargaining, as well as recognizing their importance in the pay equity process.     

Costing out a wage and benefit package

Labor costs represent the largest single cost of operation for most organizations. For the unionized employer, the compensation package is determined during contract negotiations. It is important for both union and management negotiators to be able to identify the cost of a proposed agreement. Both parties to a contract should know whether a proposed compensation package is consistent with an organization's ability to pay. In addition, when "trading" demands, both parties should be aware of the cost of the demands being traded. An approach to costing out a labor agreement has been presented in this article. While it can be described as the standard approach, it is subject to several criticisms. Typically, it is applied in a way that assumes that history will repeat itself. In addition, it focuses on the direct cost of a proposed compensation package. While this is certainly relevant, the impact of the compensation package on organization profits is more important. Finally, the time value of money is not taken into account. This would be important if a multi-year contract is being negotiated. While there are legitimate concerns about the approach presented here, our objective is to provide the reader with a basic approach to costing out a wage and benefit package. Anyone involved in contract negotiations or, in the nonunion firm, anyone responsible for administering a wage and benefit program, should be aware of the problems that we have described and seek out reference materials to provide guidance in addressing them.     

The backstage work negotiators do when communicating with persons in crisis

When a person in crisis threatens suicide, police negotiators engage them in a conversation to prevent death. Working in small teams, the primary negotiator's role is to talk directly to the person in crisis. A secondary negotiator, working “behind the scenes,” supports the ongoing negotiation. Using 31 hours of audio‐recorded British negotiations, we uncover the backstage work of secondary negotiators. We use conversation analysis to identify the sequential position, linguistic form, and action of the secondary negotiator's interventions on (1) the delivery (e.g. “sound angry”) and (2) next actions (e.g. “say please,” “try asking them to move”) of the primary negotiator, and how the primary incorporates them into the negotiation. Our analysis shows that, while some suggestions were effective, others disrupted the flow of the negotiation as well as the alignment between primary negotiator and person in crisis. The paper augments current sociolinguistic understandings of the high‐stakes language activity of crisis negotiation and highlights the importance of attending to linguistic features of interaction when training negotiators to work better as a team.     

Concord and contention in a dynamic unstructured bargaining experiment with costly conflict

We report experimental results from a dynamic real-time bargaining experiment. Players earn flows of income from the assets they possess at any point in the bargaining process, while they incur costs which are proportional to the size of the conflict between players’ current claims. We find that most bargaining interactions are characterised by small but non-zero amounts of contention, which arises from the process of tacitly coordinating claims, including from negotiating turn-taking approaches. Interactions with large losses from contention occur in a sizeable minority of interactions. There are significant individual differences in outcomes across participants. We do not find systematic gender effects, but do find that the locus of control of participants predicts bargaining outcomes.     

REPUTATION IN BARGAINING: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS

This article examines a sequence of two bargaining games where a single buyer participates in both. The bargaining games are modeled with two-sided private information and are "linked" through the buyer's valuation, which is positively correlated across bargaining games. I empirically test the comparative static results obtained from the model's unique equilibrium outcome using National Football League (NFL) contract data. The empirical results suggest that an NFL team's contract negotiations are affected by not only the terms agreed to in the team's prior contract negotiations but also the length of time required to negotiate these prior contracts.     

Wage indexation: Social benefits and private incentives

The question addressed in this paper is: Do social benefits from wage indexation coincide with private incentives to incorporate COLA clauses in union contracts? In general, market forces provide an “approximately correct” solution so that legislative remedies are not required. Based on the work of Gray and Fischer, full indexation is beneficial when the economy is subjected to stochastic nominal shocks, but only partial indexation is optimal when real disturbances dominate. If unions and management of firms are risk-averse they both have an incentive to adopt full indexation when monetary uncertainty exists. On the other hand, when the economy faces real shocks, union negotiators oppose indexation if the demand for labor is elastic, but insist on full indexation if demand is inelastic. Managers of firms prefer nominal wage contracts in either case. This suggests that both parties will agree to omit COLA clauses in the first case, but are likely to compromise with partial indexation in the second case. A role for government intervention is indicated only to the extent that bargaining strength may dictate a degree of indexation that deviates from the social optimum. The analysis is extended briefly to other assumptions about the utility function of the two parties at the bargaining table.     

Collective Bargaining and the Gender Pay Gap in the Printing Industry

This paper considers the effect of collective bargaining on the gender pay gap in the printing industry. This sector was subject to multi‐employer bargaining for around 90 years, until 2010. The article analyses gendered collective bargaining processes through the mechanism of symbolic power, that is, the power of interpretation and definition, and utilizes Walton and McKersie's seminal work on bargaining behaviour to understand the processes that have prevented the closing of the pay gap. It finds that symbolic power operates within the sub‐processes of attitudinal structuring and intra‐organizational bargaining to de‐legitimize women's role in equal pay bargaining, alongside distributive bargaining tactics that preclude equal pay bargaining, thereby creating the impression that women are irrelevant to bargaining processes and ensuring relative invisibility for issues of importance to equality bargaining.     

Government Intervention in Public Sector Industrial Relations: Lessons from the Alberta Teachers’ Association

In the public sector, Canadian governments intervene frequently in labor disputes by suspending collective bargaining and curtailing legal strikes. Previous research has focused on the contours of government intervention, such as its overall effects on collective bargaining and strikes. The discussion highlights one actor, a government, restricting the behavior of another actor, a union, using legislation and policy making. As a result, we know less about more micro-level elements and implications of the process of government intervention. I address these themes using a detailed case study of the Alberta Teachers’ Association and the strikes it coordinated in 2002.

Promoting Gender Equality without a Gender Perspective: Problem Representations of Equal Pay in Finland

The current locus of promoting equal pay in Finland is the workplace. Legal instruments, like gender equality planning and its pay surveys, are to be implemented in workplaces. This development raises important questions about the central role of the local trade union representatives as promoters of equal pay. This article analyses how local trade union representatives construct the problem of unequal pay and their role in narrowing the gender pay gap and their possible agonistic adversaries in negotiations on equal pay. Different problem representations concerning equal pay are analysed and evaluated on the basis of their potential to fracture the gender‐blind wage bargaining culture and ability to cash in on the promises made towards narrowing the gender pay gap.