Deal or no deal? How round vs precise percentage offers and price-ending mimicry affect impasse risk in over 25 million eBay negotiations

Negotiations can end with a successful deal or with an impasse. To minimize the impasse risk, how assertive and precise should negotiators’ first offers be? Recent studies diverge in their findings as to the advantages and disadvantages of making round vs precise offers. Based on over 25 million eBay negotiations, the present research establishes correlational evidence that buyer offers at round percentages of the seller’s list price—for instance, exactly 50% (75%, 90%, etc.)—coincide with a markedly smaller impasse risk than offers just above (e.g., 50.1%) or just below (49.9%) these round percentages. We also find that buyers who mimic sellers’ list price precision (e.g., offering $89.95 for a product listed at $99.99) and exact price endings ($30.13 for a list price of $40.13) incur markedly smaller impasse risks. Our findings show that the effectiveness of buyers’ round vs precise offers depends on the roundness of the seller’s list price, therefore extending previous research that focused on offer precision without taking the opponent’s list price into account. We discuss promising avenues for future research on the interpersonal effects of offer precision and price-ending mimicry.     

What affects customer success when bargaining for a new car? Some empirical evidence

Data about 233 new car models were collected, and a measure of customer success in bargaining for a new car (alpha) was created by computing the ratio between the discount received on the manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP) and the negotiable range (MSRP − dealer's car cost). One hypothesis was that customers who purchase more expensive cars succeed less in bargaining because of their higher time value. A second hypothesis was that a positive correlation between the negotiable range and alpha should exist, because of either customer incentives to bargain or dealer's bargaining strategy. Both hypotheses were supported by the data.     

ARBITRAGE ACROSS BORDERS: WHY ITUNES GIFT CARDS SELL ABOVE FACE VALUE ON EBAY

This paper is one of the first to explore international price differences and arbitrage opportunities in the market for downloadable content, by linking the sale of iTunes gift cards above face value on eBay to the arbitrage of iTunes' products (which include downloadable music and videos). This paper shows that iTunes gift cards targeted to non‐U.S. buyers tend to sell for higher prices, controlling for seller reputation, shipping costs, and other variables. Information about the buyers' countries allows us to see whether it is the U.S. store's greater product availability or its lower prices that buyers are interested in. (JEL D40, L10, F10)     

DISCOUNT PRICING

We investigate the practice of framing a price as a discount from an earlier price, with information such as “was $200, now $100.” We discuss two reasons why a discounted price—rather than a merely low price—can make a consumer more willing to purchase. First, a high initial price can indicate the seller has chosen to supply a high-quality product. Second, when a seller with limited stock runs a clearance sale, later consumers infer that unsold stock has higher expected quality when its initial price was higher. We also suggest a behavioral explanation, which is that consumers with reference-dependence preferences are more likely to buy if they perceive the price as a bargain relative to the earlier price. Discount pricing is therefore an effective marketing technique, and a seller may wish to deceive potential customers by offering a false discount. The welfare effects of regulation to prevent fictitious pricing are subtle, with potential unintended consequences, and depend on whether consumers are sophisticated or naive. (JEL D18, D42, D83, L15, M31)     

MONEY AND PRODUCT QUALITY UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

This article examines the effects of money on product quality, as well as the price pattern of heterogeneous quality goods, in a search‐theoretical monetary model with divisible money and divisible commodities. We establish the existence and uniqueness/multiplicity of monetary equilibrium in several different cases. The steady‐state equilibrium of our model displays several properties that are absent or distinct from those of previous studies. In particular, we find that under egalitarian bargaining, the Friedman rule cannot achieve socially efficient allocation due to asymmetric information. We find that the price of informed high‐quality goods is higher than the price of uninformed quality goods. We also find that an increase in inflation can improve product quality. (JEL E40)     

Take-it-or-leave-it offers in negotiations: Behavioral types and endogenous deadlines

This paper studies a reputational bargaining model, and investigates the effects of “exit threat” on negotiators’ equilibrium behaviors. Although it is a purely cheap talk message, exit threat is effective and has two main effects: (1) it renders the final outcome efficient and unique, and (2) shifts the bargaining power towards the negotiator who can make this threat. Setting a deadline for negotiations pressures the opponent and incentivizes her to compromise. However, a deadline that is too early makes the opponent less willing to compromise. Thus, effective deadline is uniquely determined. Last minute agreements occur with a positive probability if negotiators cannot reach an immediate agreement. Frequency of agreement has peaks at the beginning and at the end of negotiations (deadline effect), and is flat otherwise.     

Do buyers and sellers evaluate air pollution reduction differently? Experimental evidence from China

This paper is the first study to investigate the good dealness account of the endowment effect in non-market goods. We designed a within-subjects experiment to measure the value of air pollution reduction through the evaluation of a market good, PM 2.5 filters. We divided the subjects into buyers and sellers and asked them to trade four PM 2.5 filters using the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak auction under two treatments: a) a drop in air quality, which served to increase the market price of the filters; and b) the receipt of information on the relationship between death rates and air pollution, which served to increase the intrinsic value of the filters. Our results show that buyers’ willingness to pay for pollution reduction did not increase when air pollution worsened but did increase when informed of the possibility of health damage from air pollution. Sellers’ willingness to accept for air quality deterioration increased when pollution worsened but remained the same upon receiving information about health damage. We conclude that sellers are more sensitive to changes in market price, while buyers are more sensitive to changes in intrinsic value. Our findings support the theory of seeking a good deal in explaining the endowment effect.     

Balancing the balance: Self-control mechanisms and compulsive buying

Previous research has mainly focused on identifying why compulsive buyers engage in excessive buying, while their attempts to control problematic buying behavior have largely been ignored. The present research examines the self-control attempts of compulsive buyers. Study 1 uses qualitative in-depth interviews to provide initial insights into the self-control attempts of compulsive buyers. Study 2 adopts a quantitative survey approach, and examines how prudent and compulsive buyers differ in their self-control attempts. The studies demonstrate that compulsive buyers engage in self-control, but differ from prudent buyers in how they apply self-control measures. These differences have implications for interventions that aim to enhance the success of compulsive buyers’ self-control.     

Spousal resources and relationship quality in eight European countries

ABSTRACT

We relate relationship satisfaction and thoughts about leaving a romantic relationship to a couple’s relative and absolute resources and check for context-dependency of those associations. Our theoretical point of departure is that the more resources women have compared to their spouses, the higher their intra-household bargaining power to negotiate themselves out of unpleasant tasks, particularly in gender-egalitarian and very income equal and unequal societies. In traditional societies (which score low on the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)), the inflexible role of men within the household presumably prevents women from bargaining a better position, which in turn negatively affects relationship quality. Income equality (low GINI coefficient) may be a prerequisite for women’s bargaining position, where more inequality (mid-GINI) may be detrimental for it. Nevertheless, extreme income inequality (high GINI) may again be favorable for women’s relationship power. Using country fixed effects models on data from the Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS), we compare men and women who are in a couple (formed after 1995) for eight European countries. We find that absolute resources matter more than relative resources, at least for relationship satisfaction: Higher educated couples are more satisfied with their relationships, which could suggest lower stress levels in those couples (in more traditional contexts). Second, we observe GINI context-dependency of the association between relative education and relationship satisfaction for women and relative education and exit thoughts for men, although opposite to what we expected. Perhaps reference group theory or gender display theory can explain these unexpected results. Finally, we find that women have more break-up plans in societies with a lower score on GEM. This last result is consistent with the notion that bargaining only works in egalitarian contexts.     

Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption

We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of others. If price effects are drastic, the welfare of all household members moves in the same direction when bargaining power shifts, at the expense (or for the benefit) of outside consumers. Typically a shift of bargaining power within a set of households also impacts upon other households. We show that each individual of a sociological group tends to benefit, if he can increase his bargaining power, but suffers if others in his group do the same.     

TRACKING CUSTOMER SEARCH TO PRICE DISCRIMINATE

The electronic technologies of the Internet make it possible for sellers to track potential customers and discriminate between the informed and uninformed. In this article, we report an experiment that investigates the market impact of firms tracking customers and offering discriminatory prices based on search history. We find that consumers, on average, face the same prices when sellers have the ability to track customers and price discriminate as when sellers post a single price for all buyers. However, informed buyers receive lower prices when sellers can detect buyer search, whereas uninformed buyers receive lower prices when firms cannot track customers. (JEL D43 , L13 , C92 )     

RATIONING BY SELLER'S PREFERENCE AND PACIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION

This paper investigates the behavior of a seller who has a preference for a certain group of customers. The seller maintains stable prices over time and supplements price rationing with a nonprice rationing. In this situation the preferred buyers would have priority over nonpreferred buyers in purchasing the commodity, and if the latter purchase the commodity they may be paying higher prices. It is proposed here that the premium paid by the nonpreferred buyers is a necessary bribe to induce the seller to forego his search for the preferred buyers.     

The effect of listing price strategy on real estate negotiations: An experimental study

When selling a home, an important decision facing the homeowner is choosing an optimal listing price. This decision will depend in large part on how the chosen list price impacts the post negotiation final sale price of the home. In this study, we design an experiment that enables us to identify how different types of common list price strategies affect housing negotiations. Specifically, we examine how rounded, just below, and precise list prices impact the negotiation behavior of the buyer and seller and, ultimately, the final sale price of the home. Our results indicate that the initial list price strategy does play an important role in the negotiation process. Most notably, a high precise price generates the highest final sale price, smallest percentage discount off the list price, and the largest fraction of the surplus to the seller, while just below pricing leads to the lowest final price, largest percentage discount, and smallest fraction of the surplus to the seller. This pattern seems to be largely driven by sellers making persistently higher and more precise counter-offers throughout the negotiation process when the initial list price is high precise. Interestingly, these effects generally attenuate with negotiating experience. Importantly, our experimental results are generally consistent, both in direction and magnitude, with the limited transactions-based empirical studies relating to real estate listing prices.     

Ask Prices, Offers, and Time to Sale in an Online Exchange

By examining an online computer exchange, we find that sellers who place higher nonbinding ask prices have higher outstanding offers and remain on the exchange longer, suggesting a willingness to hold out for higher offers. Additionally, higher ask prices deter buyers from making offers. The results are stronger in thinner market segments, suggesting that gains from waiting for a high price are greater when buyers' tastes are idiosyncratic. These relationships are consistent with models in which buyers engage in costly search and suggest that online exchanges may not eliminate the frictions related to bilateral transactions.     

A THEORY OF BILATERAL OLIGOPOLY

In horizontal mergers, concentration is often measured with the Hirschman–Herfindahl Index (HHI). This index yields the price–cost margins in Cournot competition. In many modern merger cases, both buyers and sellers have market power, and indeed, the buyers and sellers may be the same set of firms. In such cases, the HHI is inapplicable. We develop an alternative theory that has similar data requirements as the HHI, applies to intermediate good industries with arbitrary numbers of firms on both sides, and specializes to the HHI when buyers have no market power. The more inelastic is the downstream demand, the more captive production and consumption (not traded in the intermediate market) affects price–cost margins. The analysis is applied to the merger of the gasoline refining and retail assets of Exxon and Mobil in the western United States. (JEL L13, L41)     

Determinants of buyers' aspiration and reservation price

Previous research has suggested that an initial offer or an estimated market price is adopted as cognitive reference point in a price negotiation. In contrast, in an experiment with 24 psychology and 24 business administration students playing the role of buyers of condominiums, it was found that subjects adopted their reservation price as a reference point although it was influenced by an estimated market price. In a second and third experiment with a total of 32 psychology and 75 business administration students, a close correspondence was also observed between buyers' indicated aspiration prices and their estimates of sellers' reservation prices in that both were similarly affected by an estimated market price. In choosing an aspiration price, buyers may attempt to infer how the sellers' reservation price changes with an estimated market price.     

QUALITY OF AVAILABLE MATES,EDUCATION, AND HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY

We investigate the impact of sex ratios by education and metropolitan area on spouses’ bargaining power and labor supplies, to capture the local and qualitative nature of mate availability. Using Current Population Survey and Census data for 2000, 1990, and 1980, we estimate these effects in a collective household framework. We find that a higher relative shortage of comparably educated women in the couple’s metropolitan area reduces wives’ labor supply and increases their husbands’. The impact is stronger for couples in higher education groups but not significant for high school graduates. Results are similar across decades. No such effects are found for unmarried individuals. (JEL D1, J22)     

Believe it when you see it: Dyadic embeddedness and reputation effects on trust in cryptomarkets for illegal drugs

Large-scale online marketplace data have been repeatedly used to test sociological theories on trust between strangers. Most studies focus on sellers’ aggregate reputation scores, rather than on buyers’ individual decisions to trust. Theoretical predictions on how repeated exchanges affect trust within dyads and how buyers weigh individual experience against reputation feedback from other actors have not been tested directly in detail. What do buyers do when they are warned not to trust someone they have trusted many times before? We analyze reputation effects on trust at the dyadic and network levels using data from an illegal online drug marketplace. We find that buyers’ trust decisions are primarily explained by dyadic embeddedness - cooperative sellers get awarded by repeated exchanges. Although buyers take third-party information into account, this effect is weaker and more important for first-time buyers. Buyers tend to choose market exit instead of retaliation against sellers after negative experiences.     

A THEORY OF EX POST VERSUS EX ANTE PRICE DETERMINATION

The traditional theory of exchange implicitly assumes instantaneous exchange at the contractually determined price. However, actual exchange may entail payment before or after supply as well as determination of effective price ex ante or ex post of supply. The paper demonstrates that the market determination of price timing arises in conjunction with the resolution of mutual uncertainty among buyers and sellers concerning product quality and product cost. The conditions are identified under which ex post pricing will result rather than the more traditional ex ante pricing. The theory accounts for the simultaneous use of ex post and ex ante pricing in a single market. Legal service pricing is used to illustrate the theoretical principles derived in the paper.     

Power,governance and distributional skew in global value chains: Exchange theoretic and exogenous factors

The relationship between power, governance and value creation/capture is a central concern in global value chain (GVC) research. In the context of calls to develop a more expansive view of power in GVCs, we argue for retaining a focus on bargaining power, but shifting the conceptualization of bargaining power from the dyad to the network. We advance two arguments. First, we elaborate an exchange theoretic model in which skew of value capture is a function of the degree of power asymmetry inherent in the ratio of buyers to suppliers. Second, we explain how this model can be expanded to consider the role of external factors, such as the institutional and normative contexts in which exchange occurs. Rather than see these factors as contending forms of power, we treat them as forces that can affect value skew by either attenuating the bargaining power of lead firms or by moderating the distributional effects of power asymmetries between exchange partners. We conclude that an exchange theoretic approach to bargaining power in GVCs provides a parsimonious framework for explaining how inter-firm governance shapes the distribution of value capture in global production.