An Introduction to Reading Georg Simmel's Sociology

This study begins by viewing Georg Simmel's sociology as the focal point of controversy. That is, it begins with an interest in the historic dialogue between Simmel and the academic community. Through an explication of critics'complaints against Simmel's work, and through an analysis of Simmel's own essay, "The Secret Society," this investigation succeeds in uncovering in Simmel's writing a significant, alternative form of sociological life.     

THE PROBLEM OF TEMPORALITY IN THE WORK OF GEORG SIMMEL

While Georg Simmel's work is predominantly recognized as contributing to the formal analysis of social interaction and temporally is an issue not conceived of as a feature of his work, formal analysis is not incompatible with a temporal approach to the study of social life. This article discusses issues of temporality as they appeared in the work of Georg Simmel by first presenting some general comments about his work and its status within the discipline, as well as some problems present in his writings that contribute to confusion regarding his views on temporality as well as formal sociology itself. Next, his views on temporality as they relate to his dualistic perspective are discussed. This is followed by a discussion of his evolutionary epistemology, which is also relevant to the issue of temporality in his work. In conclusion, the ways in which Simmel's view of temporality could enhance current sociological inquiry are discussed.     

Dreams of Pure Sociology

Unlike older sciences such as physics and biology, sociology has never had a revolution. Modern sociology is still classical—largely psychological, teleological, and individualistic—and even less scientific than classical sociology. But pure sociology is different: It predicts and explains the behavior of social life with its location and direction in social space—its geometry. Here I illustrate pure sociology with formulations about the behavior of ideas, including a theory of scienticity that predicts and explains the degree to which an idea is likely to be scientific (testable, general, simple, valid, and original). For example: Scienticity is a curvilinear function of social distance from the subject. This formulation explains numerous facts about the history and practice of science, such as why some sciences evolved earlier and faster than others and why so much sociology is so unscientific. Because scientific theory is the most scientific science, the theory of scienticity also implies a theory of theory and a methodology for the development of theory.     

Science, Religion and Secularization

The persistence of religion among scientists is the background question from which is derived a number of theoretical questions previously explored only tentatively in the sociology of religion and less by the sociology of science. The examination, organized around the differences in style and subject of these two sociological specialties, argues that the social study of science could benefit from and supplement theoretical concepts recently developed in the sociology of religion. Propositions are developed on the idea of scientism as a general ideology functioning as a substitute religion, and the proposition that modern consciousness is more able to sustain normative dissonance, including dissonance between religious and scientific norms. The discussion is theoretical and programmatic rather than empirical.     

Simmel and the Dialectic of the Double Boundary: The Case of the Metropolis and Mental Life

George Simmel's sociology was only one expression of his overall project of understanding the modern human condition. Works such as "The Metropolis and Mental Life" have been appropriated by sociology for their substantive insights. These works are more fully understood when they are interpreted in terms of Simmel's late philosophical writings, which are based on an image of man as standing between boundaries and therefore of being a boundary for them. In light of the boundary dialectic the metropolis becomes, for Simmel, a symbol of the failed mediations attempted in modernity between the objective culture of things and the subjective culture of personal development.     

A Dialectic Technological Science Perspective: Reply to Bell

Abstract Bell's (1995) critique of our discussion of a technological science perspective for sociology is a helpful effort to maintain a balance between our emphasis on agency and creativity and on the constraining side of society. We emphasize agency as part of a dialectic between human effort and societal resistance for three reasons. First, it forces reconceptualization of the nature of the science of sociology by shifting from a positivist mode to one that is pragmatic. The meaning of scientific findings changes. Second, agency has been ignored historically while constraint has been over-emphasized. We seek to establish a balance by reentering the notion of agency into sociological discourse. Third, agency is a mechanism for modifying constraints and solving the problems associated with social technologies. In the closing paragraphs of the reply, we suggest that the view under discussion be seen as an ethical pragmatism. Agency forces us to ethical questions and a pragmatic understanding of science.     

Comment on Conflict Methodology: a Protagonist Position

In response to Lundman and McFarlane's assessment of what they understand to be conflict methodology, several points of exception and clarification are offered. Conflict methodology is neither a new data collection technology nor an abandonment of professional ethics by sociologists. It is an emerging movement away from the orthodoxy of consensus methodology by sociologists who recognize the ethical and epistemological weaknesses inherent in the dogmas of positivistic science. It proposes an evolutionary epistemology in opposition to the reductionism, operationalism, objectivism, and technocracy of consensus methodology Conflict methodology affirms the unity of science and the social discourse, the centrality of subjectivity in science, and the emancipatory interest in knowledge, while recognizing the threat to the scientific standing of sociology posed by institutional domination of social research.     

“The Littlest Science” Revisited

I revisit Allan Mazur’s 1968 claim that sociology is “The Littlest Science.” In doing so, I review four decades of disciplinary battles on how sociology might raise its scientific profile. I examine data on public attitudes toward sociology as a science and how sociology is perceived by the larger scientific community. I conclude that taking a more interdisciplinary perspective will improve the scientific status of sociology.     

Collaboration in sociology and other scientific disciplines: A comparative trend analysis of scholarship in the social, physical, and mathematical sciences

This inquiry examines comparative trends in collaboration among scholars, both over several decades and for several scientific disciplines. Findings suggest that in sociology specifically and science generally the trend is toward greater collaborative scholarship. At the turn of the twentieth century, better than 90 percent of the articles appearing in major periodicals in physics, biochemistry, biology, and chemistry were sole authored. Today, over 95 percent of such articles are collaboratively published. Disciplines affiliated with the social and mathematical sciences have experienced similar monotonic increases in collaborative activity, albeit, at a slower rate. A discussion of plausible explanations is offered for this observed growth in scientific collaboration.     

The question of mathematical social theory revisited: Some methodological considerations

Methodologically, the most advanced social science discipline is considered economics, especially its neoclassical version. A number of practitioners in the other social sciences, especially sociology and political science, perceive economics as a scientific exemplar in methodological (and theoretical) terms. This methodological exemplar has been, particularly in the last decades, attempted to emulate by some of these social scientists. The outcome of this emulation, by adopting and extending its methods, of neoclassical economics in parts (but not all) of sociology, political science, and elsewhere has been rational choice theory as a general social paradigm. This paper tries to show that many misapplications of the methodology of neoclassical economics in rational choice theory have ensued from such methodological emulation. That neoclassical economics does not necessarily contain or lead to a mathematical rational choice model is the core argument of this paper. The paper fills in a gap created by the current literature’s focus on the methodological bases of mathematical rational choice theory in neoclassical economics.     

Georg Simmel and Erving Goffman: Legitimators of the Sociological Investigation of Human Experience

By originating and developing the sociological investigation of human experience, Georg Simmel and Erving Goffman have shifted social phenomena at the edge of awareness to the center of attention, and have legitimated their study for contemporary sociologists. Both Simmel and Goffman describe these subtle social phenomena by distinguishing their perceptual boundaries and crossover elements, pointing out their common features when their statuses differ, and reversing their traditional location in means-end and cause-effect chains. But Durkheim's influence on Goffman's basic conceptions of interaction, individual, and society differentiated his interpretation of these social phenomena from Simmel's. Moreover, Simmel's and Goffman's explanations of these social phenomena evolve in different directions, revealing the antithetical goals toward which spiritual transcendental Simmelians and cynical reductive Goffmanians would lead sociology.     

Für Einen Moderaten Relativismus in der Wissenschaftssoziologie

The new sociology of science makes the relativist claim that social factors influence the generation and evaluation even of valid scientific knowledge, and mainly for its relativism it is sharply criticized by philosophers. The central objections of the critics concern the philosophical presuppositions and consequences of relativism. It is thus objected, on the one hand, that the relativism of the sociology of science is based on wrong philosophical assumptions about science; and, on the other hand, that the reflexivity of this relativism leads to unresolvable problems. The article provides a critical examination of the arguments given for these objections, especially of Popper’s rejection of relativism. A differentiation of two forms of relativism is proposed, and it is argued that the objections raised against relativism in general are justified for only one variety of relativism. While extreme relativism, holding that the evaluation of scientific knowledge is solely dependent on social factors, is indeed untenable, moderate relativism, holding that social factors are co-determinants of evaluation, has plausible epistemological presuppositions and allows the reflexive turn of relativism. Since moderate relativism is coherent with the research programme of the new sociology of science and the philosophical point of view, sociology of science should opt for this form of relativism.     

Beyond Presentism and Historicism: Understanding the History of Social Science

The revival of interest in the social scientific past has stimulated a growing literature on the methodology of the history of social science. Existing "presentist" type histories have been criticized for their "Whiggish" assumptions about scientific progress. The critique of presentism is the product of a new school of historians of social science who advocate a "historicist" historiography. My paper is addressed to this discussion and falls into three parts. First, I review the principles of presentist and historicist historiographies, relating their methodological positions to their theories of science. Second, I take up the argument of the "new historicism" in more detail, criticizing its theory of textual interpretation and its theory of social scientific development. I conclude by offering an alternative historiographic model of social scientific development based upon a theory of science that I outline.     

Sociological Knowledge and Scientific Knowledge

Some significant insights in relation to science and its claims emerged in early sociology. However, sociologies of knowledge and science remained separate until the late 1960s. Questioning scientific knowledge raised questions about career interests, language, interaction, class and gender in shaping scientific claims. Offering insights, this new sociology tended towards 'epistemological polarisation'. New waves further distanced themselves from the validity claims of 'scientists'. Insulating within a self-referential field of peers, journals, conferences and subdisciplinary norms, epistemological polarisation, emulated natural sciences, but had a marginalising effect. Attention to symmetry in the social study of scientific beliefs, such that social causation of belief is not said to invalidate such belief, was often ignored, and the sociology of scientific knowledge tended towards debunking. This article challenges this spiral and suggests a 'reflexive epistemological diversity' that recognises the value of many forms of explanation, promoting interaction between different explanations, at different levels of causation, and across the divide between natural and social sciences. Recent feminist science studies go furthest in developing this trend. In line with recent developments in the natural sciences, such an approach does not suggest that 'anything goes', yet opens up explanation beyond narrow conceptions of expertise, reductionism and relativism.     

Sociology's misfortune: disciplines, interdisciplinarity and the impact of audit culture

This paper is about tendencies to the subversion of sociology as a discipline. It connects external factors of the wider socio-political environment of higher education in the UK, especially those associated with the audit culture and new systems of governance, with the internal organization of the discipline. While the environment is similar for all social science subjects, the paper argues that there are specific consequences for sociology because of characteristics peculiar to the discipline. The paper discusses these consequences in terms of the changing relationship between sociology and the growing interdisciplinary area of applied social studies as a form of 'mode 2 knowledge'. It argues that while sociology 'exports' concepts, methodologies and personnel it lacks the internal disciplinary integrity of other 'exporter' disciplines, such as economics, political science and anthropology. The consequence is an increasingly blurred distinction between sociology as a discipline and the interdisciplinary area of applied social studies with a potential loss of disciplinary identity. The paper concludes with a discussion of how this loss of identity is associated with a reduced ability to reproduce a critical sensibility within sociology and absorption to the constraints of audit culture with its preferred form of mode 2 knowledge.     

The Scientific Training of Introductory Sociology Students: Seventeen Years Later*

To measure the level of effectiveness with which the scientific basis of sociology is presented to introductory students, questionnaires were administered to two hundred students enrolled in three comparable sections of introductory sociology at a large state university. These indicated that students in general began the course almost totally ignorant of science and, when subjected to conventional introductory sociology materials, ended the course at the same level–a finding consistent with that of a similar study conducted seventeen years before.     

Between the Ethos of Science and the Ethos of Ideology

Abstract

This paper attempts to explain the continuous friction between Marxist sociology and Marxist ideology in terms of the premises of the theory of scientific communism, which accords to proletarian ideology the status of scientific truth. The successive stages of the evolution of Soviet sociology are related to the parallel development of views on the scientific ethos. The notion of the “ethos of ideology” is introduced and applied to the analysis of the ideological turmoil Soviet sociology underwent in the course of its establishment as an academic discipline. “Value tolerance” is advocated as an alternative to the “value-partisan” and “value-neutral” orientations in social science.     

Sociology and value neutrality: Limiting sociology to the empirical level

The scientific objectivity of sociology depends upon adherence to value neutrality, an adherence that strengthens the social power of sociologists. Yet all disciplines, including science, are motivated by values. This article argues that value neutrality is both possible and desirable for sociology, even though a number of values appear to be necessary to the sociological project. Among those values, some are necessary to the project of science as such, while others guide research interests. I argue that value consensus among sociologists regarding any extrascientific (research guiding) value raises questions of scientific integrity: Critical rationalism and humanitarianism are considered in this context. The scientific status of sociology is also compromised by nonempirical pronouncements, including the advocacy of certain values (such as egalitarianism) and of positions regarding the status of values (e.g., cultural relativism). I propose that the role of social scientist be kept distinct from the roles of moral philosopher and of theologian, and that this division of labor be accomplished by a scientific adherence to value neutrality. An earlier version of this paper was first presented at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association.     

Barbarians at the Open Gates

Burawoy’s manifesto connects to a long series of debates on the role of science in society as well as on the myth of pure science. This paper argues that the gap between professional sociology and public sociology is far from being unbridgeable and that public sociology is not suppressed to the extent portrayed by Burawoy. In late modern societies a number of schools, including various scientific, public and intellectual movements have questioned the possibility, value position and social relevance of a functionally differentiated pure science by applying the sine qua non of modernity, i.e. critical reflection, to science. According to the argument developed here, also illustrated by a personal example, Burawoy could possibly prevent the gate-keepers of the empire of pure science from closing the otherwise open gates in front of his program and in front of critical reflection if only he used less harsh war-cries and were more careful in detecting the changes he himself urges.