Changing patterns of first marriage in the United States

In this paper, we have traced changes in the patterns of first marriage in the United States for cohorts of men and women born in 1880 through 1965 and for the years from 1900 through 1983. There were striking changes in marriage rates associated with each of the world wars and with the depression of the 1930s. In addition to these short-term fluctuations, a long-term shift in marriage rates is observed over the period from after World War II until about 1970. By the end of the 1970s, however, marriage rates had returned to levels similar to those observed before the war. The basic similarity in the timing of changes in marriage rates across age levels and for both men and women, blacks and whites, is a striking characteristic of these marriage curves. There are also, however, important differences among these groups with respect to the magnitude and slopes of the shifts. The postwar marriage boom was strongest among the young (those under age 24) and among whites. Similarly, the declines in marriage rates observed in the 1970s were greatest among the young. The marriage rates for teenagers display trends that diverge in many respects from those of older persons. For example, the marriage rates of male teenagers did not show the "peaks" and "valley" associated with World War II for older age groups and female teenagers. Moreover, there is little sign of the postwar marriage boom among black teenagers of either sex. Indeed, the marriage rates of black teenagers began to decline soon after the war, and by the 1970s the marriage rates of both male and female black teenagers had fallen below those of their white counterparts, reversing the pattern that had existed through the first half of this century. During the twenty-five or so years of the postwar marriage boom, which we believe can be characterized best as a period phenomenon, there were trends-eddies within the mainstream-which are probably most easily interpreted as the consequence of a cohort effect.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

The marriage boom and marriage bust in the United States: An age–period–cohort analysis

In the 1950s and 1960s there was an unprecedented marriage boom in the United States. This was followed in the 1970s by a marriage bust. Some argue that both phenomena are cohort effects, while others argue that they are period effects. The study reported here tested the major period and cohort theories of the marriage boom and bust, by estimating an age–period–cohort model of first marriage for the years 1925–79 using census microdata. The results of the analysis indicate that the marriage boom was mostly a period effect, although there were also cohort influences. More specifically, the hypothesis that the marriage boom was mostly a response to rising wages is shown to be consistent with the data. However, much of the marriage bust can be accounted for by unidentified cohort influences, at least until 1980.     

America's baby boom generation: the fateful bulge

From 1955-64 nearly 42 million births occurred in the U.S., an unprecedented expansion. The roots of the baby boom lie in the universal rush to early marriage and favorable economic climate for the relatively scarce young men born of the Depression cohort. The impact of the boom interrupted a century-long fertility decline. Pro-marriage, pronatalist norms were revived by the Depression cohort who formed families of at least 2 children or more. During the 1960-70's schools, colleges, and universities were built to accomodate the boom and are now excessive for the baby bust cohort. Unemployment and crime rates rose and fell with the passing of the boom babies through late adolescence and early adulthood. In the 1980's, boom babies will be aged 20-30. Demands for housing will be high. Annual birth numbers will increase even if the rate of childbearing hovers below replacement level at about 1.8 per woman. Per capita earnings and overall labor productivity should improve as the boom baby cohort reaches middle age in the 1990s. However, chances for advancement will be fewer. As the cohort reaches retirement age, the over 65 population will double from 31 million in 2000 to almost 60 million in 2030. Although the burden will be somewhat offset by reduced proportions of under 18-year-olds, the ratio of active workers paying Social Security will fall drastically.     

An analysis of baby boom characteristics in China

This article analyzed the 3rd Chinese baby boom and its causes by focusing on the fertility intensity of women and the number of births per year. The 3rd baby boom is expected to end in 2002 and to peak in 1995. The baby boom in urban areas will last a much shorter time than in rural areas. Particular differences are manifested between provinces: 1) The baby boom will last 3-4 years in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, and will last 10 years in Liaoning, Jilin, and Jiangsu. In other provinces, the boom will last 15-23 years; 2) The peak years are different between provinces; 3) The base number of births curves are province-specific; 4) The absolute base birth numbers are different between provinces (Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, and Sichuan 700,000; Beijing, Tianjin, Qinghai, and Ningzia 100,000); and 5) The shapes of progressive increases for base number of births are province specific. The increase in the number of childbearing-age women, the unplanned higher parity births, and early marriage and childbearing have all contributed to the current baby boom. Recommendations to control the problem include controlling higher parity births, observing birth spacing, and controlling the age of marriage and childbearing.     

Studying the fertility peak in Beijing]

Beijing, China, is experiencing a baby boom in response to 2 periods of large population increase in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. The average number of annual births was 220,000 in the first period and 269,000 in the second period. The causes of the large increase in the population in the first period were an improvement of health conditions which led to a reduction in mortality, immigration flow, and an erroneous population policy. The causes in the second period were recuperative fertility after three years of natural calamity and increased fertility among immigrants. Net migration had an important role in population growth these two periods; it also will have an important impact in future population changes. According to population projections, another baby boom is expected to occur before the end of the end of the century. During the up-coming baby boom period, 1.54 million births are expected, 190,000 per annum. The average increase in population size is expected to 127,000 per year. In the peak year, it may be around 200,000. Thanks to the family planning (FP) program the occurrence of the third baby boom in Beijing has been postponed and the duration will be shortened. From 1972 to 1982, 2.57 million births was averted due to FP, which drastically reduced pressure on the demand for resources and on the momentum of the next baby boom. Another baby booms is not expected during the early half of the 21st century, although an elevated birth rate within the range of normal fluctuation is predicted. The projection was based on the assumption of restricted migration and the enforcement of the FP program. The realization of the projected population will depend on deferred marriage, deferred child-bearing, prolonged birth spacing, the prevention of high parity fertility, the maintenance of the current population policy, and control over the reproductive behavior of the new migrant population.     

Age at marriage and proportions marrying

This paper deals with the recent widespread increase in marriage rates in the Western world. The principal materials used are data on the proportions single in each age group at various times. These data are used to estimate how far the ‘marriage boom’ has reflected decreases in the proportions of persons remaining single throughout life or reductions in the age at marriage of those who do marry. The conclusion is that changes of both types have occurred; the mean age at marriage has been declining in several countries at a rate of more than one-tenth of a year per annum. A number of ancillary technical problems relating to the analysis of nuptiality are discussed.     

Can Pro-Marriage Policies Work? An Analysis of Marginal Marriages

Policies to promote marriage are controversial, and it is unclear whether they are successful. To analyze such policies, one must distinguish between a marriage that is created by a marriage-promoting policy (marginal marriage) and a marriage that would have been formed even in the absence of a state intervention (average marriage). We exploit the suspension of a cash-on-hand marriage subsidy in Austria to examine the differential behavior of marginal and average marriages. The announcement of an impending suspension of this subsidy led to an enormous marriage boom among eligible couples that allows us to locate marginal marriages. Applying a difference-in-differences approach, we show that marginal marriages are surprisingly as stable as average marriages but produce fewer children, children later in marriage, and children who are less healthy at birth.     

Estimating a marriage matching model with spillover effects

We use marriage matching functions to study how marital patterns change when population supplies change. Specifically, we use a behavioral marriage matching function with spillover effects to rationalize marriage and cohabitation behavior in contemporary Canada. The model can estimate a couple's systematic gains to marriage and cohabitation relative to remaining single. These gains are invariant to changes in population supplies. Instead, changes in population supplies redistribute these gains between a couple. Although the model is behavioral, it is nonparametric. It can fit any observed cross-sectional marriage matching distribution. We use the estimated model to quantify the impacts of gender differences in mortality rates and the baby boom on observed marital behavior in Canada. The higher mortality rate of men makes men scarcer than women. We show that the scarceness of men modestly reduced the welfare of women and increased the welfare of men in the marriage market. On the other hand, the baby boom increased older men's net gains to entering the marriage market and lowered middle-aged women's net gains.     

The Baby Boom and Its Causes: What We Know and What We Need to Know

This study analyzes the timing, magnitude, and volume of the mid‐twentieth century baby boom in European and non‐European Western countries. The baby boom is found to have been especially strong in the non‐European countries, fairly strong in some European countries, and quite weak in others. While the boom has often been linked with postwar economic growth and the recuperation of births postponed during the Depression era, we argue that this is only a limited part of the story. In most cases the recovery of the birth rate started well before the end of World War II, a fact not accounted for by existing theories. We investigate the roles played by the recovery of period as well as cohort fertility, the underlying marriage boom, and the recovery of marital fertility. We identify major puzzles for future research, including the reasons for strongly declining ages at marriage and the role played by contraceptive failure in the rise of high‐parity births.     

Role of the social and cultural factors in human fertility in India

During the 1940s and 1950s in India, a relatively low level of fertility of 6–8 children per woman of unbroken marriage is implicated by the social and cultural factors; the fertility was probably depressed by 15–20 percent. An appraisal of the trends over the last 2–3 decades of the pertinent variables—age at marriage (an early and almost universal marriage); the widow remarriage rates; the induced abortion rate; postpartum infecundability (breastfeeding) and postpartum abstinence; the son preference; and the other sexual attitudes and taboos—suggests that during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the fertility enhancing and retarding forces were offsetting each other. But, over the next two decades, the variables responsible for enhancing the fertility level will play a more dominant role than the corresponding fertility-reducing factors. However, the role of induced abortion remains somewhat unclear. For any significant reductions in the national crude birth rate in India during the 1990s, the family planning efforts will have to be considerably accelerated.     

The disappearing link between premarital cohabitation and subsequent marital stability, 1970–2001

Previous research has demonstrated that marriages preceded by premarital cohabitation have higher rates of dissolution than those in which the couple marry without first living together. Most of this research relies on data generated by couples who cohabited in the 1970s and early 1980s when premarital cohabitation was relatively uncommon and usually of brief duration. Since then, premarital cohabitation in Australia has become normative and thus less prone to selection effects. The period of premarital cohabitation has also lengthened and is thus more likely to provide opportunities to screen out unviable matches. This paper uses national survey data from Australia to explore whether, in the light of these changes, the previously observed higher level of marital dissolution among those who live together before marrying has persisted. It demonstrates that the higher risk of marital dissolution among those who cohabited before marriage has declined substantially in the 1990s marriage cohort and, after controlling for selection factors, has disappeared altogether.     

Child Marriage and Intimate Partner Violence in Rural Bangladesh: A Longitudinal Multilevel Analysis

Child marriage (before age 18) is a risk factor for intimate partner violence (IPV) against women. Worldwide, Bangladesh has the highest prevalence of IPV and very early child marriage (before age 15). How the community prevalence of very early child marriage influences a woman’s risk of IPV is unknown. Using panel data (2013–2014) from 3,355 women first married 4–12 years prior in 77 Bangladeshi villages, we tested the protective effect of a woman’s later first marriage (at age 18 or older), the adverse effect of a higher village prevalence of very early child marriage, and whether any protective effect of a woman’s later first marriage was diminished or reversed in villages where very early child marriage was more prevalent. Almost one-half (44.5 %) of women reported incident physical IPV, and 78.9 % had married before age 18. The village-level incidence of physical IPV ranged from 11.4 % to 75.0 %; the mean age at first marriage ranged from 14.8 to 18.0 years. The mean village-level prevalence of very early child marriage ranged from 3.9 % to 51.9 %. In main-effects models, marrying at 18 or later protected against physical IPV, and more prevalent very early child marriage before age 15 was a risk factor. The interaction of individual later marriage and the village prevalence of very early child marriage was positive; thus, the likely protective effect of marrying later was negated in villages where very early child marriage was prevalent. Collectively reducing very early child marriage may be needed to protect women from IPV.     

The changing American family

This Bulletin documents recent changes in American family patterns resulting both from longterm trends in urbanization, industrialization, and economic growth and the disruption of the Great Depression and World War 2, as well as changed attitudes toward marriage, parenthood, divorce, and the roles of women. Following a postwar boom in the 1950s and 1960s, marriage rates have now fallen to levels observed in the early 20th century. Since 1970, the number of unmarried couples living together has more than tripled to 1.9 million in 1983. The divorce rate has now stabilized after more than doubling since 1960, but at the current level, 1/2 of all recent marriages will end in divorce. Most divorced persons remarry fairly quickly, often creating complex families of "step-relatives." With 19% of households with minor children now headed by a women with no husband present, up to 1/2 of all children will live for sometime in a fatherless family before age 18. Over 1/2 of all married women, including 49% of married mothers of preschool children, now hold a paid job outside the home. Working wives boost a family's income by an average 40% but still are expected to shoulder most responsiblility for home and childcare. White women now in their 20s say they expect to have an average of 2 children, but are delaying childbearing to such an extent that 29% could end up childless. Most of the elderly live on their own but usually near children whom they see frequently. Despite changes in traditional family patterns, Americans consistently report that a happy marriage and good family are the most important aspects of life. And though most Americans now live with few or no family members, they maintain active contact with a large network of family.     

Does the marriage market sex ratio affect parental sex selection? Evidence from the Chinese census

Recent increases in the (male/female) sex ratio at birth in eastern Asia are thought to be associated with a preference for sons and to result from parental sex selection. However, males are less likely to marry and to have offspring as the ratio increases, and that decreases the expected number of grandchildren. Using data from the 2000 Chinese census, we test whether the sex ratio in the marriage market has an effect on the gender of subsequent births and hence on the sex ratio of the birth cohort. The slow population growth caused by the Great Famine in the early 1960s and the quick recovery that followed produced major changes in the sex ratio for those of marriageable age two decades later. We estimate that an increase of 1 % in the number of marriageable males relative to females, the marriage market sex ratio, would decrease the probability of having a son by 0.02 percentage points. That implies that the Great Famine, which occurred around 1960, led to an increase in the early 1980s of 5.8 extra male births per 100 females.     

Schooling,marriage, and age at first birth in Madagascar

The low school attainment, early marriage, and low age at first birth of females are major policy concerns in less developed countries. This study jointly estimated the determinants of educational attainment, marriage age, and age at first birth among females aged 12–25 in Madagascar, explicitly accounting for the endogeneities that arose from modelling these related outcomes simultaneously. An additional year of schooling results in a delay to marriage of 1.5?years and marrying 1?year later delays age at first birth by 0.5?years. Parents’ education and wealth also have important effects on schooling, marriage, and age at first birth, with a woman's first birth being delayed by 0.75?years if her mother had 4 additional years of schooling. Overall, our results provide rigorous evidence for the critical role of education—both individual women's own and that of their parents—in delaying the marriage and fertility of young women.     

养老倒逼婚姻：理解当前农村早婚现象的一个视角

农村近年来重新出现早婚高潮,早婚率甚至已经逼近上世纪80年代的水平。本文基于豫东西村的实地调查,认为当前农村的早婚现象是代际关系变动的结果,即养老倒逼婚姻：父母希望早日完成人生任务以便趁年轻力壮为自己积攒养老资源,子女在接受早婚要求的同时也通过婚姻向父母索取了大量家庭财富,代际之间的理性博弈助推了早婚的出现。在未来相当长的时期内,由代际关系变动推动的早婚仍将存在并可能有所发展。     

Young women's work and family formation in Sri Lanka

"Patterns of family formation in Sri Lanka resemble those of wealthier nations, with late marriage, delayed childbearing, and moderately low fertility. This article addresses two questions: How have these family formation patterns emerged in the absence of the normally expected levels of economic development? And what activities have occupied young women in the premarital, prechildbearing period? Answers are suggested by data from three sources: the 1981 census; a set of focus-group discussions on the rights, obligations, and aspirations of young women related to marriage, work, childbearing, and child care; and a sample survey of 1,535 women of ages 15-30 in Kalutara District. The article describes the interplay of socioeconomic and familial forces that have affected the status of young Sri Lankan women."     

Backlash or a Positive Response?: Public Opinion of LGB Issues After Obergefell v. Hodges

ABSTRACT

Following Obergefell v. Hodges, same-sex marriage remains controversial and anti-LGBT state legislation has been passed, which raises questions about whether the Supreme Court’s ruling may have created a backlash. We use data from two waves of a general population survey of Nebraskans conducted before and after the decision to answer three questions. First, we test three theories of how the court decision influenced public opinion. We find that support for same-sex marriage was significantly higher following the ruling, suggesting that there was not a backlash to it. Second, we assess whether people perceive that the court accurately reflects the public’s opinion. We find that people who favor same-sex marriage are more likely to think that the ruling refects public opinion very well; those who oppose same-sex marriage are more likely to think that the ruling does not at all reflect public opinion. Third, we examine the association between discussing gay rights and support for same-sex marriage, finding that those who talk about LGB issues very often are more likely to favor same-sex marriage. We discuss the implications of these findings in relation to two of the themes of this special issue: the influence of marriage equality on Americans’ understandings of marriage and the impact of marriage equality on future LGBT activism.