INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS AND THE VOLATILITY OF TRADE

Were the large import fluctuations around the 2007–2009 recession because of increasing trade volatility? I show that import volatility relative to gross domestic product (GDP) increased in the 2000s and examine whether vertical specialization (VS) trade can explain this increase. I develop and calibrate a model of VS trade that generates most of the observed increase in relative import volatility from the 1960s to the 2000s. The increase is because of GDP's shift to less volatile services production. VS trade has a negligible impact. VS causes trade to fall more in recession but also increases the share of output that is traded, leaving volatility unaffected. It increases volatility by shifting trade to more volatile sectors, but this effect is quantitatively small. (JEL E3, F1)     

TRADE ADJUSTMENT,POLITICAL PRESSURE,AND TRADE PROTECTION PATTERNS

This paper introduces trade adjustment considerations as active determinants of trade policy. Using novel U.S. data sets, I show that, despite their small monetary value, trade‐induced unemployment and trade‐adjustment costs can incite an incumbent politician to grant protection to an unorganized industry, even in the presence of political pressure by organized sectors. This finding complements the theoretical predictions from Grossman and Helpman (American Economic Review, 84, 1994, 833–50) who argue that the government should protect organized industries but should subsidize imports in unorganized sectors. (JEL D73, F13, F14, F16, J68)     

THE HOME MARKET EFFECT IN INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE

I show that military spending contributes to international arms proliferation through a push effect: large demand encourages production growth in the domestic market if transport costs are non‐negligible. Under increasing returns to scale, the country can then supply weapons on the global market at low prices. This is a manifestation of the home market effect (HME), which states that countries with higher demand for a differentiated good will be net exporters of that good. I construct a monopolistic competition model of international trade that accounts for differences in demand across countries, and test its predictions using post‐Cold War data. (JEL F1, H5, R1)     

VOLATILITY AND IRISH EXPORTS

We analyze the impact of volatility per se on real exports for a small open economy concentrating on Irish trade with the United Kingdom and the United States. An important element is that we take account of the time lag between the trade decision and the actual trade or payments taking place by using a flexible lag approach. Rather than adopting a single measure of risk, we adopt a spectrum of risk measures and detail varied size characteristics and statistical properties. We find that the ambiguous results found to date may be due to not taking account of the timing effect, which varies substantially depending on which volatility measure is used. (JEL C32, C51, F14, F31)     

DETERMINANTS OF TRADE AND SPECIALIZATION IN THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO‐OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES

This paper empirically investigates the relative importance of productivity, factor endowments, trade costs, and tastes in determining the current pattern of trade and specialization. The results show that productivity and taste differences are the first and second most significant determinants of trade and specialization. Factor endowments are the least influential for the average country in the data set, but their effects are much greater in the poorer than richer countries. The results also show the substantial role of trade costs, which is amplified through interactions with other determinants of trade. Trade costs affect the relative costs of intermediate inputs and final goods, link preferences with specialization, and reduce the geographical range of comparative advantages. (JEL F1, F10)     

DOES THE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CYCLE MODELS MATTER?

Until the 1980s, standard models with two large open economies (i.e., the United States and Europe) provided plausible representations of the world economy. However, with the emergence of many developing countries since the 1990s, this approach no longer seems reasonable. In line with this change to the global economic environment, cross-country output correlations between the United States and other countries have risen. This paper extends the standard two-country model to many countries to show that doing so produces closer cross-country correlations to the data. In particular, based on analytical investigation with a simple model and quantitative analysis with a more general model, I show that the cross-country output correlation rises and the cross-country consumption correlation falls as the number of countries in the two models increases. (JEL F40, F41, F44)     

THE HAZARDOUS EFFECTS OF ANTIDUMPING

We investigate the extent to which antidumping actions eliminate trade altogether. Using quarterly 10‐digit HS‐level export data for products involved in U.S. antidumping cases we find that antidumping actions increase the hazard rate by more than 50%. We find strong evidence of investigation effects with the impact during the initiation and preliminary duty phases considerably larger than once final duties are imposed. There are also important differences with respect to the size of duties with cases with large duties experiencing very large investigation effects. We show the antidumping (AD)‐affected countries are less likely to return to the market even after the AD order is removed. (JEL F13, F14)     

CAN TRADE REALLY HURT? AN EMPIRICAL FOLLOW‐UP ON SAMUELSON'S CONTROVERSIAL PAPER

This paper investigates Samuelson's [Samuelson, P. A. “Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(3), 2004, 135–46] argument that technical progress of the trade partner may hurt the home country. We illustrate this prospect in a simple Ricardian model for situations with outward knowledge spillovers. Within this framework Samuelson's Act II effects may occur. Based on industry level panel data for 17 OECD countries for the period 1973–2000 we show econometrically that the outflow of domestic knowledge via exports or foreign direct investment (FDI) to the rest of the world may have a negative impact on industry output in the home country. This is particularly so when exporting to technologically less advanced countries and, more specifically, China. (JEL F10, F11, F14, O30)     

TRADE COSTS AND TRADE COMPOSITION

In this paper, we investigate whether countries' trade costs act like other national endowments by affecting the composition of countries' exports. Using an econometric approach that controls for endogeneity by accounting for potentially relevant omitted variables, we find strong evidence for a sample of 37 industrialized and transition countries that national trade costs systematically affect the composition of trade and can be viewed therefore as a source of comparative advantage. Industries located in countries with low trade costs capture significantly higher shares of world exports, where this effect is stronger in trade cost intensive industries. (JEL F11, F14)     

FINANCIAL CONTAGION ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE NETWORK

We combine data on international trade linkages with a network approach to map the global trading system as an interdependent complex network. This enables us to obtain indicators of how well connected a country is into the global trading system. We use these network‐based measures of connectedness to explain stock market returns during recent episodes of financial crisis. We find that a crisis is amplified if the epicenter country is better integrated into the trade network. However, target countries affected by such a shock are in turn better able to dissipate the impact if they are well integrated into the network. A network approach can help explain why the Mexican, Asian, and Russian financial crises were highly contagious, while the crises that originated in Venezuela and Argentina did not have such a virulent effect. We suggest that a network approach incorporating the cascading and diffusion of interdependent ripples when a shock hits a specific part of the global trade network provides us with an improved explanation of financial contagion. (JEL F10, F36, F40, G15)     

SENSE AND SURPRISE IN COMPETITIVE TRADE THEORY2010 WEAI PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

Economic models are often judged by the reality of their assumptions or their success at predicting realistic outcomes. In this paper I suggest a different criterion for judging models in international trade theory in competitive settings: (i) Does the model conform to common sense in leading to results that even suggest the model is not necessary, and yet (ii) Can the same model be used as a tool to reveal in simple terms why certain outcomes that may appear surprising (often labeled a paradox in trade theory) nonetheless are correct. Many trade theory paradoxes appear as the result of income effects in simple general equilibrium models. Here attention centers instead on two of the familiar production models: the specific factors model and the Heckscher‐Ohlin model, either separately or when combined. It is shown that very basic properties of production underlie many of the surprising results in competitive trade theory. (JEL F11, D50)     

INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND WORLD BUSINESS CYCLE

Understanding international transmission mechanism that generates the world business cycle is of immense interest. In this paper, we compile a rich global dataset and utilize a trade‐linked structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model with a relatively realistic identification scheme to construct a worldwide dynamic interdependency system. Empirical results indicate that the trade‐linked SVAR system can largely capture the common dynamic properties of national business cycle fluctuations, providing a meaningful transmission foundation to the world business cycle derived from dynamic factor models. Based on the worldwide trade‐linked SVAR system, we further shed light on three crucial topics in international economics. The findings and methods in this paper help to evaluate the macroeconomic consequences of recent trade dispute between world major economies. (JEL F41, F44, O19)     

THE WELFARE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION

This paper analyzes the distributional welfare impact of trade liberalization reforms on heterogeneous households. We develop a static applied general equilibrium model, and using a Social Accounting Matrix and Household Expenditure Survey, we calibrate it to match Slovenian data. We simulate the case of Slovenia joining the EU and quantify its welfare impact on households that differ in terms of age, income, and education. Additionally, we compare this benchmark case with two alternative scenarios: (1) a free trade agreement between Slovenia and the EU and (2) a custom union arrangement where tariff revenues are rebated proportionally to the households. We find that while trade liberalization leads to falling consumer prices, increased production in the export sectors, and aggregate welfare gains, the differentiated welfare impacts across heterogeneous households vary in their degrees. (JEL D58, F14, F15)     

HIERARCHICAL TRADE

Commodity trading is typically organized hierarchically: Large‐scale trade takes place at the global price system while individuals trade at local price systems within their countries. Agencies or trading houses establish the link between these different market places. In this paper, we devise a framework to study this type of hierarchical trade. We identify the free trade and the autarky equilibrium as polar cases. We show that no other two‐stage market equilibria exist if the commodity space is two‐dimensional. An example demonstrates that other, so‐called intermediate equilibria exist for three‐dimensional commodity spaces. We then provide an explicit construction of special classes of intermediate equilibria. Moreover, we study the consequences when some countries control the agency that organizes trade at the global level and we analyze the role of international goods arbitrage. Finally, we show that profit‐maximizing agencies may not promote free trade outcomes. (JEL D43, D50, F10)     

FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AS DYNAMIC FARSIGHTED NETWORKS

In the presence of multilateral negotiations, are Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) necessary for, or will they prevent, global free trade? I answer this question using a dynamic farsighted model of network formation among asymmetric countries. Ultimately, FTAs prevent global free trade when there are two larger countries and one smaller country but FTAs can be necessary for global free trade when there are two smaller countries and one larger country. The model provides insights into the dynamics of recent real‐world negotiations and recent results in the literature on the empirical determinants of trade agreements. (JEL C71, F12, F13)     

DOES THE VAT TAX EXPORTS?

While a VAT should in principle be neutral with respect to international trade, it may in practice function as a tax on exporters' input purchases if firms receive incomplete VAT refunds. Using data for over 100 countries that span the majority of historical VAT adoption episodes, this paper finds that—consistent with this hypothesis—the VAT reduces the exports of an industry with a 10 percentage point higher intermediate goods share of output by over 8% relative to an industry with a lower share. This effect is driven by developing countries and is absent for high-income countries. (JEL F13, F14, H25, H87, O11)     

Export Performance,Labor Standards and Institutions: Evidence from a Dynamic Panel Data Model

I investigate the role of labor standards in international trade. While the literature has used many different measures of labor standards, I use two: the rate of work injuries and the rate of strikes and lockouts — allowing me to construct both measures for 112 countries from 1980 until 2004. This allows dynamic panel data methods to be used in estimation. Three measures of the quality of institutions are also used for the same period: the number of years the chief executive is in office, the concentration of a country’s legislature measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, and whether the legislature is controlled by a party representing a special interest. The results show that countries with better labor standards and institutions do trade more — their exports to GDP ratio is higher.     

TRADE COSTS AND JOB FLOWS: EVIDENCE FROM ESTABLISHMENT‐LEVEL DATA

Changes in the costs of trading inputs or final goods affect establishment‐level job flows. Using a longitudinal database containing the universe of manufacturing establishments in California from 1992 to 2004, we find that a decline in input or final‐good trade costs is associated with job destruction in the least productive establishments, job creation in the most productive establishments, and an increase in the death likelihood of the least productive establishments. The evidence is consistent with predictions of models of trade with heterogeneous firms. Additionally, the evidence shows that the effects of input trade costs on establishment‐level job flows are larger than the effects of final‐good trade costs. (JEL F14, F16)     

INPUT TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND MARKUP DISTRIBUTION: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

We utilize an unprecedented liberalization episode in China, namely its World Trade Organization accession, to estimate the impact of trade liberalization on firm markup and markup distribution. Using a panel data quantile regression, we show that the impact of tariff reduction on markup can be heterogeneous to different firms, resulting in an unevenly distributed markup change across firms. In particular, reduction in output tariff reduces markup and markup dispersion, while reduction in input tariff increases markup and markup dispersion. (JEL F12, F13)     

SKILLED‐UNSKILLED WAGE INEQUALITY AND URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT

The impact of trade liberalization on the labor market in the North has drawn tremendous attention in the face of the growing skilled‐unskilled wage gap but in the South it has been somewhat neglected. One of the key structural differences between the North and the South is that the South experiences a pronounced rural‐urban migration in the presence of urban unemployment. We introduce this feature in the structure of a simple general equilibrium model to analyze the effects of trade liberalization and fragmentation on employment and the skilled‐unskilled wage differential in the South. In particular, we show that while fragmentation necessarily improves the unskilled wage and the skilled wage, more lucrative global opportunities for the skilled final product, in the absence of fragmentation, can reduce the rural wage and increase urban unemployment. The effect of fragmentation, ceteris paribus, on the skilled‐unskilled wage gap is sensitive to the degree of substitutability between land and unskilled labor. As such, fragmentation can magnify the increase in the skilled‐unskilled wage gap resulting from an improvement in the terms of trade. It is also shown that a technological progress in the intermediate goods sector increases the skilled‐unskilled wage gap and raises urban unemployment. (JEL F1, O1, F11, F12)