DOES DELEGATION INCREASE WORKER TRAINING?

We model a principal‐firm offering training to its agent‐worker under two alternative organizational structures: integration, where the principal retains authority to overrule the investment project recommended by the worker; and delegation, where the principal cannot overrule the worker's preferred investment project. We assume that training reduces the worker's effort cost of assembling information about alternative projects' payoffs and identify the conditions under which delegation increases the profit‐maximizing intensity of training. Empirical estimates from matched employer–employee data show that workplaces delegating authority do provide more worker training. This result persists in two cross sections, in panel fixed‐effect estimates and, critically, in an instrumental variable exercise that also controls for establishment fixed effects. (JEL D21, D22, D23, M53, M54)     

CORPORATE TAX GAMES WITH CROSS‐BORDER EXTERNALITIES FROM PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE

We construct a model of corporate tax competition in which governments also use public infrastructure investment to attract foreign direct investment, thus enhancing their tax bases. In doing so, we allow for cross‐border infrastructural externalities. Depending on the externality, governments are shown to strategically over‐ or underinvest in infrastructure. We also examine how tax cooperation influences investment in infrastructure and find that welfare may be lower under tax cooperation than under tax competition; this is the case when infrastructure is very effective in raising the tax base and generates a large negative cross‐border externality. (JEL F23, H40)     

MEASURING THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS' FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

Earlier work found evidence for geographic linkages of aggregate foreign direct investment across countries and country‐pairs. From a theoretical point of view, such linkages at the macroeconomic level may root in between‐firm as well as within‐firm linkages and originate from information spillovers across or within firms in exploring unknown markets, and vertical linkages between production plants across different locations within the firm. We use data on the universe of German multinational enterprises (MNEs) to empirically explore how marginal investments at one foreign affiliate depend on investments at other affiliates within the same MNE. The empirical approach employs two channels or modes of cross‐affiliate interdependence: mere geography (capturing horizontal linkages through correlated learning and horizontal competition within the firm) and input–output relationships within or across industries (which capture vertical linkages). Adding to earlier findings at the aggregate level, we find evidence of a significant interdependence of investments within the firm. In the firm‐level data at hand, vertical linkages appear to be more important than horizontal ones. Investments at one location tend to stimulate investments at other locations of the same MNE, particularly if input linkages are strong. The opposite seems to be true for output linkages. Beyond vertical linkages, mere geographic proximity matters only to a minor extent. This suggests that evidence of linkages through geographic closeness at aggregate data levels accrue mainly to reasons of vertical linkages within networks of affiliates. (JEL C31, D22, F21, F23, F68, G31, H32)     

Decomposing Gender Beliefs: Cross‐National Differences in Attitudes Toward Maternal Employment and Gender Equality at Home

Few cross‐national studies distinguish between different aspects of gender egalitarianism and compare them systematically. In this study, we examine cross‐national differences in attitudes toward mothers' participation in the labor market and toward gender equality within the household, using a multilevel analysis of individual data from 33 nations. The results indicate greater support for employed mothers, but a lower level of approval of gender equality at home, among residents of countries that offer women more educational and economic opportunities. We argue that macrolevel gender equality increases individuals', particularly women's, incentives to support female labor force participation. Because of a persistent belief in gender differentiation, however, macrolevel gender equality has the opposite relationship with attitudes toward altering gendered practices beyond enabling women's public sphere participation. The fewer explicit barriers to women's achievement in society, the more likely individuals will feel a need to defend gendered roles in the private sphere. That the potential harm of advocating gendered practices in the private sphere is smaller in societies with fewer impediments for women is also likely to account for the negative association between macrolevel gender equality and support for egalitarian gender roles at home.     

IQ IN THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION: EVIDENCE FROM IMMIGRANT EARNINGS

We show that a country’s average IQ score is a useful predictor of the wages that immigrants from that country earn in the United States, whether or not one adjusts for immigrant education. Just as in numerous microeconomic studies, 1 IQ point predicts 1% higher wages, suggesting that IQ tests capture an important difference in cross‐country worker productivity. In a cross‐country development accounting exercise, about one‐sixth of the global inequality in log income can be explained by the effect of large, persistent differences in national average IQ on the private marginal product of labor. This suggests that cognitive skills matter more for groups than for individuals. (JEL J24, J61, O47)     

BENIGN NEGLECT OF COVENANT VIOLATIONS: BLISSFUL BANKING OR IGNORANT MONITORING?

Theoretically, bank's loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalization. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers' investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank‐firm relationships observed in the syndicated loan market, we document substantial heterogeneity in monitoring across banks and through time. Better capitalized banks are more lenient monitors that intervene less with covenant violators. Importantly, this hands‐off approach is associated with improved borrowers' performance. Beyond enhancing financial resilience, regulation that requires banks to hold more capital may thus also mitigate the tightening of credit terms when firms experience shocks. (JEL G21, G32, G33, G34)     

FDI AND INCOME INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL OF U.S. STATES

This study employs state‐level panel data to explore the relationship between inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and income inequality in the United States. Using panel cointegration techniques that allow for cross‐sectional heterogeneity and cross‐sectional dependence, we find that, in the long run, FDI exerts a significant and robust negative effect on income inequality in the United States. This result for the United States as a whole does not imply that FDI narrows income gaps in each individual state. There is considerable heterogeneity in the long‐run effects of FDI on income inequality across states, with some states (21 out of 48 cases) exhibiting a positive relationship between FDI in income inequality.(JEL F21, D31, C23)     

IMPACT OF COMPETITION,INVESTMENT, AND REGULATION ON PRICES OF MOBILE SERVICES: EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE

In this paper, we assess the impact of competition, investment, and regulation on prices of mobile services in France. We estimate hedonic price regressions using data on tariff plans offered by the main mobile telecommunications operator in France between May 2011 and December 2014. In this time period, the obtained quality‐adjusted price index decreased by about 42.8% as compared to a decline in weighted average prices without quality‐adjustment of 8.7%. In a second step, we relate the quality‐adjusted prices to a set of competition, investment, and regulation variables and find that the launch of 4G networks by mobile operators was the main driver of price reductions for classic tariffs with commitment. Low‐cost tariffs without commitment which were introduced to pre‐empt the entry of low‐cost competitor declined at the time of entry. Moreover, we find that regulation, which is approximated by the level of mobile termination charges and international roaming price caps for voice and data, has a joint significant impact on quality‐adjusted prices. In percentage terms, competition is responsible for about 23.4% of total price decline and investments in 4G for 56.1%. We conclude that the reduction in quality‐adjusted prices in the last years was largely caused by competition between operators for a new 4G technology and by entry of a fourth low‐cost operator. (JEL L13, L50, L96)     

LEARNING ABOUT EDUCATION

Limited human capital investment is a common characteristic of low‐income countries despite the fact that estimated returns to educational investment in low‐income countries are generally higher than those in high‐income countries. Empirical evidence suggests that income and credit constraints can only account for a part of this underinvestment. Recent experimental evidence shows that families' misperceptions about the returns to education play a role in their low‐investment levels. This paper builds a heterogeneous‐agent model of human capital and growth that incorporates an adaptive learning mechanism to capture the way agents form perceptions about returns to education. We find natural conditions guaranteeing existence of stable equilibria. Along transition paths, agents' misperceptions about returns to education depress realized returns, which serves to reenforce and perpetuate low human‐capital investment. If human capital investments have both private and public returns, we find multiple stable equilibria, including those which are characterized by low investment and low returns. (JEL D83, O10, I25)     

INDEPENDENT AGENCIES,POLITICAL INTERFERENCE,AND FIRM INVESTMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION

Investment in network infrastructure is crucial for economic growth. This article studies the impact of the presence of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) on the investment of European regulated firms. We account for measurement error in formal independence of IRAs by exploiting cross‐country heterogeneity in the quality of political institutions. Results show that regulatory independence increases firms' investment rate by around 1.2%–3.3%. The positive effect survives when we control for social capital accumulation, investor protection, and market liberalization. However, the effect of IRAs is not immune to politics, as we find that political interference in regulatory functions persists in the European Union and is detrimental to firm investment. (JEL D78, L50, D92, H1)     

DO BETTER INFORMED INVESTORS ALWAYS DO BETTER? A BUYBACK PUZZLE

We explore the value of private investment information using data from a singular source: auctions of yearling racehorses. Horse breeders possess superior information about their own horses and have strong financial incentives to buy the best of these back at auction. However, those they repurchase subsequently perform significantly worse on average, earning 30% less at the racetrack than horses purchased by outsiders. Moreover, this underperformance is concentrated in male horses, despite these being purchased exclusively for racing purposes. These puzzling findings cannot be explained by differences in horse risk or breeder abilities, or by nonfinancial objectives, or by behavioral or selection biases. (JEL G02, G11, G14, L83, D44)     

INTERNATIONAL DEAL EXPERIENCE AND CROSS‐BORDER ACQUISITIONS

I show that corporate directors' human capital facilitates international investments. Directors' experience with cross‐border transactions positively influences firms' decisions to conduct their first cross‐border acquisitions. Cross‐border acquirers are more likely to buy firms headquartered in countries with which the directors have prior deal experience. This effect is strongest for target firms headquartered in culturally and institutionally dissimilar countries. Announced cross‐border acquisitions are received more favorably by financial markets and are more likely to be completed successfully when the announcing firm has a director with cross‐border acquisition experience. These effects are not driven by investment bank involvement in the deal process or by other forms of directors' human capital, and they are robust to endogeneity of director hires. (JEL F23, F21, J24, L23)     

INFORMATION,INSTITUTIONS, AND BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN WEST AFRICA

Using a new West African panel data set, we provide evidence on the determinants of individual banks' loans and assets in some of the poorest countries in the world. Higher loan default rates reduce both the loans to assets ratio and the volume of assets. However, the size of these effects is sensitive to bank age and ownership structure. Younger, private, domestically owned banks are most affected, suggesting that such banks face the most severe informational disadvantages. Very old government‐owned banks benefit from high default rates. We also explore how the quality of governance impacts on loans and assets. (JEL G21, O16)     

WHO QUITS NEXT? FIRM GROWTH IN GROWING ECONOMIES

We document novel facts about the relationship between aggregate growth and firm dynamics using a large set of countries. We argue that firm employment patterns are not necessarily informative about cross‐country differences in aggregate growth because they are induced by changes in the productivity of a firm relative to others. In contrast, aggregate growth is linked to average firm‐level productivity growth and firm age. We formalize this intuition through a tractable model of endogenous aggregate growth and firm dynamics where firms realize positive returns to investment with some probability. We find that cross‐country disparities in this probability can account for two‐thirds of the variation in aggregate growth. (JEL D21, D22, E23, O4)     

The Relationship Between Private Safety Nets and Economic Outcomes Among Single Mothers

This article examines the relationship between private safety nets and economic outcomes among 2,818 low‐income single mothers in three U.S. counties in the 1990s. I define private safety nets as the potential to draw upon family and friends for material or emotional support if needed. Using a combination of survey and administrative records data collected for the National Evaluation of Welfare‐to‐Work Strategies, I find that human capital deficits, depressive symptoms, and low self‐efficacy are associated with having less private safety net support, suggesting that social network disadvantages compound individual‐level disadvantages. I also find that mothers with strong private safety nets worked more, earned more, and were less reliant on welfare compared with mothers with more meager private safety nets.     

DIVIDEND POLICY IN REGULATED NETWORK INDUSTRIES: EVIDENCE FROM THE EU

We study the dividend policy of firms in regulated network industries, focusing on the impact of different regulatory regimes and government control. We link payout and smoothing decisions to different regulatory mechanisms (cost‐based vs. incentive regulation) and state versus private ownership. We test our predictions on a panel of listed European electric utilities, accounting for potential endogeneity of the choice of regulatory and ownership patterns. We find that incentive‐regulated firms smooth their dividends less than cost‐based regulated firms and that they report higher target payout ratios. Consistent with the interest group theory of regulation, we find that incentive regulation schemes are less likely when the state is still an important shareholder in the sector. Additionally, our results show that government control undermines the efficiency‐enhancing effects of incentive regulation on dividend policy, for example, lower smoothing is only due to private firms. (JEL G35, L51, L32, L9)     

R&D AND CREDIT RATIONING IN SMEs

We study the effects of credit rationing on research and development (R&D) investment using survey and accounting data on a large representative sample of manufacturing small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs). Our econometric model accounts for the endogeneity of our credit rationing indicator and employs an innovative theory‐based identification strategy. We find that credit rationing has a significantly negative effect on both the probability to set up R&D activities and on the level of R&D spending (conditioned on the R&D decision), but the overall estimated reduction in R&D spending is largely to be associated with the first effect. (JEL G21, D82, O32, C35)     

SENTIMENT BIAS AND ASSET PRICES: EVIDENCE FROM SPORTS BETTING MARKETS AND SOCIAL MEDIA

Previous research using attendance‐based proxies for sentiment bias in sports betting markets confirmed the presence of investor sentiment in these markets. We use data from social media (Facebook “Likes”) to proxy for sentiment bias and analyze variation in bookmakers' prices investor sentiment. Based on betting data from seven professional sports leagues in Europe and North America, we find evidence that bookmakers increase prices for bets on teams with relatively more Facebook “Likes,” indicating the presence of price‐insensitive investors with sentiment bias. These price changes do not affect informational efficiency in this market. (JEL L81, G14)     

MILITARY SPENDING AND THE GROWTH‐MAXIMIZING ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC CAPITAL: A CROSS‐COUNTRY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In this paper we present an endogenous growth model to analyze the growth maximizing allocation of public investment among N different types of public capital. Using this general model of public capital formation, we analyze the stability of the long‐run equilibrium and we derive the growth‐maximizing values of the shares of public investment allocated to the different types of public capital, as well as the growth‐maximizing tax rate (amount of total public investment as a share of GDP). Then we proceed with an empirical investigation of the theoretical implication of the model that both the effects of the shares of public investment and the tax rate on the long‐run growth rate are non‐linear, following an inverse U‐shaped pattern. Using data of public investment in infrastructure and military capital formation, we derive empirical estimations that confirm the theoretical implications of the model. (JEL E62, H56, O40).