OWN‐NATIONALITY BIAS: EVIDENCE FROM UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE FOOTBALL REFEREES

We examine the existence and magnitude of own‐nationality bias. Using player‐match level data from 12 seasons of the UEFA Champions League (UCL) and referee assignment policies that pair players and referees from the same country, we determine the bias that referees exhibit toward players from their native country. Players officiated by a referee from the same country receive a 10% increase in beneficial foul calls. Referees' own‐nationality bias is more pronounced for national team players, players at home, and in later stages of the tournament. Elite referees exhibit as much, or more, own‐nationality bias as their less experienced counterparts. (JEL L83, J15)     

QUANTIFYING BIAS IN DRIVING‐UNDER‐THE‐INFLUENCE ENFORCEMENT

As the marginal suspect and propensity to commit crime are unobserved across racial categories, it is difficult to quantify racial bias with law enforcement outcomes data. We test for racial bias in driving‐under‐the‐influence of alcohol enforcement. The assessment outcome variable, blood alcohol content (BAC), provides information about motorist's choices and allows for a more refined test for racial bias compared with other law enforcement outcome data. We find no evidence of racial bias in the relevant range where our model applies. However, we do find differences in find rates at the lowest levels of BAC, where there should be no impairment. (JEL J7, K42)     

RACE AND EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES: EVIDENCE FROM NBA COACHES

We study the impact of management diversity on employment outcomes using data on NBA head coaches that includes information on the race of each coach and his supervisor. We find that a supervisor is more likely to hire a coach of his own race. We also find that black coaches are less likely to be rehired to a second job within three years than their white counterparts, and that a head coach's race affects the quality of the opportunities he is offered. These findings are stronger for first-time coaches than experienced coaches, suggesting that observable information on performance mitigates bias. (JEL J0, J4, J7)     

ACCOUNTING FOR COMPLEMENTARY SKILL SETS: EVALUATING INDIVIDUAL MARGINAL VALUE TO A TEAM IN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION

Identifying an individual worker's contribution to firm production can be difficult in a team setting where spillovers in labor productivity exist among team members. This paper studies a model of labor productivity where workers have heterogeneous abilities, and can differently affect the productivity of their fellow teammates. Applying the model to the setting of the National Basketball Association (NBA), I can identify the marginal value that a basketball player brings to a particular team lineup, both through his own individual contributions and his complementary contribution to teammates' productivity. Estimates from the model imply that teammates have a significant impact on individual player productivity, and that taking into account spillovers across teammates is important to assessing both overall team productivity and an individual player's contribution to team productivity. I then evaluate whether player complementarities are valued in the NBA labor market in terms of higher salaries, and find that they are undervalued, and that players are instead paid mainly for their individual offensive production. This creates an asymmetry between player incentives and the team objective. To assess the size of this inefficiency, the top trading cycle algorithm of Shapley and Scarf (1974) is used to identify a Pareto optimal matching between players and teams, that accounts for the complementarities between heterogeneous players' skill sets. (JEL J30, L25, L83, M51)     

Enforcing cooperation in public goods games: Is one punisher enough?

We experimentally investigate a finitely repeated public goods game setting where, in each round, access to sanctioning power is exclusively awarded to one single player per group. We show that our central ‘Top Contributors as Punishers’ institution – a mechanism by which a player needs to be the highest contributor in her group in order to earn the right to sanction others – is extremely effective in raising cooperation and welfare due to turnover in the top contributor role and to top contributors’ willingness to substantially sanction others. Our findings yield implications for the design of mechanisms intended to foster cooperation in social dilemma environments.     

WAGES,EMPLOYMENT, AND STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE LABORATORY

We report results from laboratory experiments designed to examine statistical discrimination. Our design expands upon existing research by generating data both on wage contracts and unemployment rates of directly competing worker groups. We find some evidence for statistical wage discrimination against workers having an identical expected productivity but a higher productivity variance. However, those same subjects are less likely to be unemployed, suggesting that our employer‐subjects view hiring choice and wage contracts as substitutable. A clear implication is that field data discrimination estimates based on wages alone may overestimate the true impact of such discrimination. (JEL C90, J71)     

SOCIAL HIERARCHIES: A LABORATORY STUDY ON PUNISHMENT PATTERNS ACROSS NETWORKS

We experimentally study punishment patterns across network structures, and their effect on cooperation. In a repeated public goods setting, subjects can only observe and punish their neighbors. Centralized structures (like the star network) outperform other incomplete networks and reach contribution levels like the ones observed in a complete network. Our results suggest that hierarchical network structures with a commonly observed player benefit more from sanctions not because central players punish more, but because they follow, and promote, different punishment patterns. While quasi-central players in other incomplete architectures (like the line network) retaliate, and get trapped in the vicious circle of antisocial punishment, central players in the star network do not punish back, increase their contributions when sanctioned by peripheral players, and sanction other participants in a prosocial manner. Our results illustrate recent field studies on the evolutionary prevalence of hierarchical networks. We document a network-based rationale for this positive effect in an identity-free, fully anonymous environment. (JEL C72, C91, C92, D90, H41)     

LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE IN THE WEAK‐LINK GAME

We investigate the effects of leadership in a four‐player weak‐link game. A weak‐link game is a coordination game with multiple Pareto‐ranked Nash equilibria. Because the more efficient equilibria involve a degree of strategic uncertainty groups typically find it difficult to coordinate on more efficient equilibria. We wanted to see whether leadership by example, in the form of one player acting publicly before the rest of the group, could help groups do better. Our results suggest that leadership can increase efficiency but is far from being a guarantee of success. Specifically, in a significant number of groups we observed successful leadership and increased efficiency, but in most groups efficiency was low despite the efforts of leaders. We did not find any difference between voluntary leaders and leaders that are randomly assigned. (JEL C72, H41)     

ANTI‐POACHING AGREEMENTS IN LABOR MARKETS

We analyze competition for experienced workers among wage‐setting firms. The firms can design poaching offers with higher wages to workers who switch from rivals relative to wages paid to their own existing employees. We evaluate the profit and welfare effects of anti‐poaching agreements that eliminate poaching offers as a recruiting method. Anti‐poaching agreements increase industry profits, whereas workers are made worse off. We show that the effects of anti‐poaching agreements on total welfare are determined by the magnitude of workers' switching costs and the productivity change associated with switching employers. (JEL L41, L40, J42)     

“Call to Home?” Race,Region, and Migration to the U.S. South, 1970–20001

This research examines recent migration patterns of native‐born blacks and whites to the U.S. South. Our primary research questions concern race and regional migration dynamics, and whether new insights into such can be gleaned by comparing migrants to the South with persons moving within the non‐South. Using samples of 1970–2000 census data, we focus on race differences in the tendency to choose the South as a migration destination, and whether whites and blacks differ in key selection mechanisms shaping movement to different regional destinations. We observe increasing rates of black (compared to white) migration to the South. Additionally, patterns of selectivity within this growing African‐American migration stream are especially dramatic when southern migrants are compared to persons moving within the non‐South. Our analyses also show that black migrants are targeting particular parts of the South (e.g., states where blacks are a larger share of the population), suggesting that future research should disaggregate the “Census South” region to provide a more comprehensive picture of contemporary interregional migration in the United States.     

THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL LITERACY IN DETERMINING RETIREMENT PLANS

Workers nearing retirement face many important, and often irreversible, choices. We collected detailed demographic and financial literacy data on over 1,500 workers nearing retirement at three large companies to assess how individuals are planning for retirement. Many respondents display limited knowledge and understanding of public and company‐provided retirement benefits. Controlling for basic demographics and wealth, we find that misconceptions about eligibility ages and plan generosity influence workers' expected age of retirement. Although retirement‐related decisions will affect workers' well‐being for the remainder of their lifetimes, many do not possess enough basic financial knowledge to confidently make optimal choices. (JEL J26, J320, J240)     

SIMULTANEOUS DECISION‐MAKING IN COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTS

We experimentally investigate simultaneous decision‐making in two contrasting environments: one that encourages competition (lottery contest) and one that encourages cooperation (public good game). We find that simultaneous participation in the public good game affects behavior in the contest, decreasing sub‐optimal overbidding. Contributions to the public good are not affected by participation in the contest. The direction of behavioral spillover is explained by differences in strategic uncertainty and path‐dependence across games. Our design allows us to compare preferences for cooperation and competition. We find that in early periods, there is a negative correlation between decisions in competitive and in cooperative environments. (JEL C72, C91)     

SALARIES OR PIECE RATES: ON THE ENDOGENOUS MATCHING OF HARVEST WORKERS AND CROPS

The objective of this paper is to determine whether the choice of payment schemes (hourly vs. piece rates) is systematically related to the workers' risk aversion and ability. We derive the equilibrium relationship between agents' risk aversion and ability and the power of incentives (payment scheme) in a market where many heterogeneous principals and agents are endogenously matched. The equilibrium matching between principals and agents depends on the traits and is critical in determining the contract choice. Using confidential data from the National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS), we find evidence of matching between agricultural workers and the riskiness of their jobs (crops they harvest) based on workers' risk aversion and no matching based on ability. When controlling for matching, we find strong evidence that high risk‐averse workers choose hourly rates and low risk‐averse workers choose piece rates. We also found that high ability types choose piece rates and low ability types choose hourly rates but the evidence is weaker. (JEL J33, D82, Q12)     

EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS OF IMMIGRANTS VERSUS NATIVES: EVIDENCE FROM THE BOOM‐BUST PERIOD IN SPAIN, 2000–2011

This article studies whether the durations in unemployment and employment for immigrants and natives respond differently to changes in economic conditions and to the receipt of unemployment benefits. Using Spanish administrative data for the period 2000–2011, we estimate multi‐spell duration models that disentangle unobserved heterogeneity from true duration dependence. Our findings suggest that immigrants are more sensitive to changes in economic conditions both in terms of unemployment and employment hazards. The effect of the business cycle is not constant but decreases with duration at a higher rate among immigrants. We provide evidence that the higher job separation rates and lower capital‐labor complementarity of immigrants are mechanisms that are possibly compatible with these results. We also find evidence of a disincentive effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration, which is stronger for immigrants, but only at the beginning of the unemployment spell, especially under good economic conditions. Finally, unemployment benefits increase job match quality only for native workers with temporary contracts. (JEL J64, J61, C23, C41, J65)     

PAYING MORE TO HIRE THE BEST? FOREIGN FIRMS,WAGES, AND WORKER MOBILITY

In the context of the debate on the labor‐market consequences of globalization, we adopt an original approach toward the identification of the wage differences between foreign and domestic firms: worker mobility. Using matched employer‐employee panel data for Portugal, we consider virtually all spells of interfirm mobility over a period of 10 yr. We find that foreign firms offer significantly more generous wage policies, although there is also a (smaller) selection effect. The results are robust to the consideration of displaced workers, wage growth differences in the new firms, and different subsets of workers. (JEL J31, J63, F23)     

THREE‐PLAYER TRUST GAME WITH INSIDER COMMUNICATION

We examine behavior in a three‐player trust game in which the first player may invest in the second and the second may invest in the third. Any amount sent from one player to the next is tripled. The third player decides the final allocation among three players. The baseline treatment with no communication shows that the first and second players send significant amounts and the third player reciprocates. Allowing insider communication between the second and the third players increases cooperation between these two. Interestingly, there is an external effect of insider communication: the first player who is outside communication sends 54% more and receives 289% more than in the baseline treatment. As a result, insider communication increases efficiency from 44% to 68%. (JEL C72, C91, D72)     

THE EFFECT OF INCENTIVE‐INDUCED RETIREMENT ON SPOUSAL RETIREMENT RATES: EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL EXPERIMENT

We identify, quantify, and explain the impact of incentive‐induced early retirement (ER) of husbands on their wives' probability to retire within 1 year, using administrative data from the Netherlands. Our identification strategy is based on a policy intervention by which targeted individuals working at the central government level became unexpectedly and temporarily eligible for very generous ER benefits. This retirement window of opportunity implied for interested workers that transitions from the current job into full retirement had to be effected swiftly and irreversibly. We find that induced ER of husbands increased their wives' probability to retire by 10 percentage points. This is a strong and robust local average treatment effect. Partly, the effect runs through wives at ages when they may have been eligible for ER programs themselves. (JEL C26, J26, J120, J140)     

LABOR CONTRACTS AND FLEXIBILITY: EVIDENCE FROM A LABOR MARKET REFORM IN SPAIN

This paper evaluates the effects of a labor market reform in Spain that removed restrictions on fixed‐term or temporary contracts. Our empirical results are based on longitudinal firm‐level data that cover observations before and after the reform. We posit and estimate a dynamic labor demand model with indefinite and fixed‐term labor contracts, and a general structure of labor adjustment costs. Experiments using the estimated model show important positive effects of the reform on total employment (i.e., a 3.5% increase) and job turnover. There is a strong substitution of permanent by temporary workers (i.e., a 10% decline in permanent employment). The effects on labor productivity and the value of firms are very small. In contrast, a counterfactual reform that halved all firing costs would produce the same employment increase as the actual reform, but much larger improvements in productivity and in the value of firms. (JEL J23, J32, J41)     

NETWORKS AND SELECTION IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION TO SPAIN

We offer fresh evidence on the effect of migrant networks on two essential aspects of migration: (1) the total scale of migration and (2) the skill composition of migration. Our analysis is for the remarkable case of Spain, which experienced a full‐blown immigration boom from the mid‐1990s up to the Global Financial Crisis. To accommodate flexible substitution patterns across alternative migrant destinations, we use a three‐level nested multinomial logit model. We find a strong positive network effect on the scale of migration and a strong negative effect on the ratio of high‐skilled to low‐skilled migrants. Simplifying restrictions on the structure of cross‐destination substitutability are rejected by the data. (JEL F22, J61)     

NOMINAL WAGE CONTRACTS AND THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM

We introduce staggered and synchronized nominal wage contracts into a one‐sector monetary dynamic general equilibrium model to analyze the importance of the monetary transmission mechanism. We find a stronger monetary propagation mechanism under a synchronized setting as compared to a staggered setting. This causes the economy under staggering to be less volatile, better matching the data, as well as bringing about lower welfare costs (measured in terms of consumption). However, our results are mixed when it comses to evaluating the contemporaneous correlations and cross‐correlations. We conclude that overall staggered contracts do better in matching the U.S. economy. (JEL E32, E51, J41)