A COMPETITIVE MODEL OF WORKER REPLACEMENT AND WAGE RIGIDITY

We adapt the models of Menzio and Moen (2010) and Snell and Thomas (2010) to consider a labor market in which firms can commit to wage contracts but cannot commit not to replace incumbent workers. Workers are risk averse, so that there exists an incentive for firms to smooth wages. Real wages respond in a highly nonlinear manner to shocks, exhibiting downward rigidity, and magnifying the response of unemployment to negative shocks. We also consider layoffs and show that for a range of shocks labor hoarding occurs while wages are cut. We argue these features are consistent with recent evidence. (JEL E32, J41)     

NEW MEASURES OF THE COSTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE SUBJECTIVE WELL‐BEING OF 3.3 MILLION AMERICANS

Using two large U.S. surveys, we estimate the effects of unemployment on the subjective well‐being (SWB) of the unemployed and the rest of the population. For the unemployed, the nonpecuniary costs of unemployment are several times as large as those resulting from lower incomes, while the indirect effect at the population level is 15 times as large. For those who are still employed, a one percentage point increase in local unemployment has an impact on well‐being roughly equivalent to a 4% decline in household income. We also find evidence indicating that job security is an important channel for the indirect effects of unemployment. (JEL E24, H23, J64, J68)     

HYSTERESIS IN A NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL

This paper provides a simple, tractable way of incorporating “hysteresis,” in which persistent unemployment takes on structural characteristics, into a macroeconomic model. Hysteresis is modeled as deterioration in labor market matching efficiency as the average duration of unemployment increases. This is embedded in a basic New Keynesian macro model. A decline in labor market matching efficiency would be consistent with the observed rightward shift of the Beveridge curve since the 2007–2009 recession. Hysteresis is shown to lead to larger and more persistent responses of the unemployment rate and unemployment duration to productivity, intertemporal preference, and monetary shocks. Hysteresis also generates an increase in the natural rate of unemployment. (JEL E24, J64, E32)     

WAGES,EMPLOYMENT, AND STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE LABORATORY

We report results from laboratory experiments designed to examine statistical discrimination. Our design expands upon existing research by generating data both on wage contracts and unemployment rates of directly competing worker groups. We find some evidence for statistical wage discrimination against workers having an identical expected productivity but a higher productivity variance. However, those same subjects are less likely to be unemployed, suggesting that our employer‐subjects view hiring choice and wage contracts as substitutable. A clear implication is that field data discrimination estimates based on wages alone may overestimate the true impact of such discrimination. (JEL C90, J71)     

FIRMS AND FLEXIBILITY

The United States and France have very similar labor productivity levels while there are considerable differences between the firm‐size distributions and firm dynamics in the two countries. To reconcile these observations we introduce a joint model of endogenous entrepreneurship and firm‐size dynamics with firing costs, unemployment benefits, entry costs, and a tax wedge between wages and labor costs. We use our model to analyze the role of these rigitidies in explaining firm dynamics and productivity patterns in the United States and France. We find that our model with all rigidities goes a long way in accounting for firm‐size differentials between the United States and France while generating similar labor productivity outcomes. (JEL C78, D21, E24, J6)     

THE EARLY BIRD GETS THE WORM? BIRTH ORDER EFFECTS IN A DYNAMIC FAMILY MODEL

Birth order effects are found in empirical work but lack solid theoretical foundations in economics. Our new modeling approach to children provides this. Each child’s needs change as it grows, and births are sequential. Each child has the same genetic makeup and parents do not favor one child over the other. Parental childcare time lowers the caregiver’s current and future wages; this opportunity cost varies across time. Benefits also vary and when parental childcare is a public input, coresident children allow economies of scope in childcare. Birth order effects emerge from the changing benefits and costs. (JEL D13, D91, J13)     

NOMINAL WAGE CONTRACTS AND THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM

We introduce staggered and synchronized nominal wage contracts into a one‐sector monetary dynamic general equilibrium model to analyze the importance of the monetary transmission mechanism. We find a stronger monetary propagation mechanism under a synchronized setting as compared to a staggered setting. This causes the economy under staggering to be less volatile, better matching the data, as well as bringing about lower welfare costs (measured in terms of consumption). However, our results are mixed when it comses to evaluating the contemporaneous correlations and cross‐correlations. We conclude that overall staggered contracts do better in matching the U.S. economy. (JEL E32, E51, J41)     

DO SUNK COSTS MATTER?

That sunk costs are not relevant to rational decision making is often presented as one of the basic principles of economics. When people are influenced by sunk costs in their decision making, they are said to be committing the “sunk cost fallacy.” Contrary to conventional wisdom, we argue that in a broad range of situations, it is rational for people to condition behavior on sunk costs because of informational content, reputational concerns, or financial and time constraints. Once all the elements of the decision‐making environment are taken into account, reacting to sunk costs can often be understood as rational behavior. (JEL D0, D01, D8, D81, D83, D9, D90)     

The role and significance of endogenous firing costs in a matching model with endogenous job destruction

Traditional models of the labor market assume fixed firing costs. This paper explores the implications of variable firing costs, building this new assumption into a matching model with endogenous job destruction. The available evidence on the outcomes of cases brought to labor courts suggests that firing costs are negatively related with labor market tightness. In such a case, we may no longer invoke “rigidities” on labor markets as the cause of their poor performance. Our model yields three interesting results. First, labor markets may have multiple equilibria that cannot be Pareto-ordered; each with its own configuration in terms of average duration of unemployment and filled jobs, as well as employment protection. Second, the variability of firing costs produces a positive externality affecting the stability properties of these equilibria. Finally, the two externalities affect the efficiency of the social optimum, modifying the Hosios [Hosios, A.J., 1990. On the efficiency of matching and related models of search and unemployment. Review of Economic Studies 57, 279–298] condition. We use these results to interpret the recent history of European unemployment.     

THE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS AT GRADUATION ON OVEREDUCATION

This article shows that unfavorable economic conditions at graduation decrease the likelihood of a good job‐worker match over a worker's subsequent career. Mismatch is quantified in terms of overeducation by both industry and occupation. The German Socio‐Economic Panel and region‐level unemployment rates from 1994 to 2012 are used. Instrumental variables estimates account for endogenous graduation timing. A single percentage point increase in regional unemployment causes an increase in the probability of overeducation of 1.6–1.7 percentage points for university graduates. Effects for technical tertiary education and apprenticeship graduates are smaller. Labor market entry conditions affect workers for up to 9 years after graduation. (JEL J23, J22, E32, I23)     

THE EVOLUTIONARY LOGIC OF HONORING SUNK COSTS

Although economics claims that sunk costs should not figure in current decision‐making, there is ample evidence to suggest that people squander resources by honoring bygones. We argue that such wastage of resources was tolerated in our evolutionary past by Nature because it served fitness‐enhancing functions. In this study, we propose and model one such function. We demonstrate how the honoring of sunk costs could have arisen as a commitment device that Nature found expedient for scenarios where conflicts over temptations between the emotional and rational centers of the brain might sabotage long‐term investments. By applying this idea to the self‐concept, we argue that this model provides a rationale for cognitive dissonance, a well‐established phenomenon in social psychology. (JEL D01, D03)     

IQ IN THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION: EVIDENCE FROM IMMIGRANT EARNINGS

We show that a country’s average IQ score is a useful predictor of the wages that immigrants from that country earn in the United States, whether or not one adjusts for immigrant education. Just as in numerous microeconomic studies, 1 IQ point predicts 1% higher wages, suggesting that IQ tests capture an important difference in cross‐country worker productivity. In a cross‐country development accounting exercise, about one‐sixth of the global inequality in log income can be explained by the effect of large, persistent differences in national average IQ on the private marginal product of labor. This suggests that cognitive skills matter more for groups than for individuals. (JEL J24, J61, O47)     

INTERMARRIAGE AND THE LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES OF ASIAN WOMEN

The impact of intermarriage with natives, on labor market outcomes of immigrants, is not homogeneous across ethnic groups. Wages of Asian women are compared with non‐Asians. Both ordinary least squares and instrumental variables estimates of the effects of intermarriage on the wages of Asian women are negative and significant. Non‐Asian women earn a wage premium that becomes insignificant when controls for selection into marriage are introduced. One possible explanation for the intermarriage penalty for Asians is an income effect of having a high‐earning native husband. Intermarriage penalties rise with husband's education. Assimilation patterns of intermarried Asians indicate that they have lower initial wages, market hours, and employment, but exhibit faster rates of growth over their years of stay. The results are robust across Asian subgroups and husband's ethnicity. (JEL J16, J12, J31, J61)     

INFLATION AND WAGE RIGIDITY/FLEXIBILITY IN THE SHORT RUN

A recent literature uses accurate wage data from payroll records and provides compelling evidence against the conventional belief that nominal wages are downward sticky. This paper provides a unique contribution to this literature by conducting a formal analysis of the role of inflation in cyclical wage rigidity/flexibility. Analysis of payroll‐based wage data from the Korean labor market for the period 1971–2014 finds that the degree of downward nominal wage flexibility is countercyclical, and the countercyclicality becomes stronger during a deflationary, relative to inflationary, recession. This serves as a counter‐example to the conventional theory of cyclical wage rigidity. (JEL E24, E32, J30, J64)     

A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION OF THE MISSING DEFLATION PUZZLE

Following the Great Recession, despite large and persistent slowdown in economic activity, the fall in inflation was modest. This is known as the missing deflation puzzle. In this paper, we develop and estimate a New Keynesian model to provide an explanation for the puzzle. The new model allows for time-varying volatility in cross-sectional idiosyncratic uncertainty and accounts for changes in intermediate input prices. We show that inflation did not fall much because intermediate input prices were increasing. (JEL E31, E32, E52)     

EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS OF IMMIGRANTS VERSUS NATIVES: EVIDENCE FROM THE BOOM‐BUST PERIOD IN SPAIN, 2000–2011

This article studies whether the durations in unemployment and employment for immigrants and natives respond differently to changes in economic conditions and to the receipt of unemployment benefits. Using Spanish administrative data for the period 2000–2011, we estimate multi‐spell duration models that disentangle unobserved heterogeneity from true duration dependence. Our findings suggest that immigrants are more sensitive to changes in economic conditions both in terms of unemployment and employment hazards. The effect of the business cycle is not constant but decreases with duration at a higher rate among immigrants. We provide evidence that the higher job separation rates and lower capital‐labor complementarity of immigrants are mechanisms that are possibly compatible with these results. We also find evidence of a disincentive effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration, which is stronger for immigrants, but only at the beginning of the unemployment spell, especially under good economic conditions. Finally, unemployment benefits increase job match quality only for native workers with temporary contracts. (JEL J64, J61, C23, C41, J65)     

DOES THE GREAT RECESSION IMPLY THE END OF THE GREAT MODERATION? INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

In this paper we examine whether or not the Great Recession had a temporary or permanent effect on output growth volatility after years of low macroeconomic volatility since the early eighties. Based on break detection methods applied to a set of advanced countries, our empirical results do not give evidence to the end of the Great Moderation period but rather that the Great Recession is characterized by a dramatic short‐lived effect on the output growth but not on its volatility. We show that neglecting the breaks both in mean and in variance can have large effects on output volatility modeling based on GARCH specifications. (JEL E32, C22, O40)     

EMPLOYMENT AND DEADWEIGHT LOSS EFFECTS OF OBSERVED NONWAGE LABOR COSTS

To assess the employment effects of labor costs, it is crucial to have reliable estimates of the labor cost elasticity of labor demand. Using a matched firm‐worker data set, we estimate a long‐run unconditional labor demand function, exploiting information on workers to correct for endogeneity in the determination of wages. We evaluate the employment and deadweight loss effects of observed employers' contributions imposed by labor laws (health insurance, training, and taxes) as well as of observed workers' deductions (social security and income tax). We find that nonwage labor costs reduce employment by 17% for white collars and by 53% for blue collars, with associated deadweight losses of 10% and 35% of total contributions, respectively. Since most firms undercomply with mandated employers' and workers' contributions, we find that full compliance would imply employment losses of 4% for white collars and 12% for blue collars, with respective associated deadweight losses of 2% and 6%. (JEL J23, J32)     

LABOR CONTRACTS AND FLEXIBILITY: EVIDENCE FROM A LABOR MARKET REFORM IN SPAIN

This paper evaluates the effects of a labor market reform in Spain that removed restrictions on fixed‐term or temporary contracts. Our empirical results are based on longitudinal firm‐level data that cover observations before and after the reform. We posit and estimate a dynamic labor demand model with indefinite and fixed‐term labor contracts, and a general structure of labor adjustment costs. Experiments using the estimated model show important positive effects of the reform on total employment (i.e., a 3.5% increase) and job turnover. There is a strong substitution of permanent by temporary workers (i.e., a 10% decline in permanent employment). The effects on labor productivity and the value of firms are very small. In contrast, a counterfactual reform that halved all firing costs would produce the same employment increase as the actual reform, but much larger improvements in productivity and in the value of firms. (JEL J23, J32, J41)     

REGIONAL AND SECTORAL EVIDENCE OF THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF LABOR REALLOCATION: A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

This article revisits the sectoral shifts hypothesis by examining unemployment fluctuations for 48 U.S. states over the period 1990:M01–2011:M12. We develop a panel approach that incorporates dynamics, parameter heterogeneity, aggregate factors, and cross‐sectional dependence (CSD). Our findings provide support for a positive and significant effect of the employment dispersion index on unemployment. This outcome is robust under alternative specifications and measures of employment dispersion. The empirical evidence corroborates the presence and relevance of CSD and heterogeneity among states. The results show that, once unobserved common factors and cross‐state heterogeneity are taken into account, labor reallocation has a significant effect on unemployment that is half the size of the estimate when cross‐sectional dependence is not taken into account. (JEL E24, E32, J21, R23, C23)