Somebody versus nobody: An exploration of the role of celebrity status in an election

This study examines the role celebrity status may play in potential voters’ evaluation of a political candidate presented in a newspaper article. Participants indicated greater intention to vote for a candidate who was a recognizable Hollywood actor than an unknown candidate in a political race, regardless of how substantive the political information provided about the candidate was. This suggests that familiarity with a celebrity can act as a heuristic in peripheral processing. Younger people were more likely to vote for a celebrity candidate than older voters, but how liberal or conservative participants are was not a significant factor in the decision to vote for the celebrity. Nor did participants’ need for cognition or level of political involvement predict intention to vote for the celebrity, suggesting that celebrity status is meaningful to motivated and thoughtful voters as well as those who are less motivated and informed. The possibility is raised that this could be an indication of celebrity status being used as a component of deliberate political decision-making, and future research in this direction is suggested.     

Strategic voting in the 1984 democratic presidential primaries

When casting their ballots in primary elections, voters usually vote in a straight-forward manner for the candidate of their preference. But sometimes sophisticated voters vote for a second or third choice who has a better chance of winning in the general election or even cross over to the opposition party to vote for a candidate who will be easier to defeat in the general election. This article assesses the amount and importance of such strategic voting in Democratic presidential primaries in 1984 using discriminate analysis.     

Are Ballot Order Effects Heterogeneous?*

Objective. Past research on ballot order effects has typically focused on the average benefit a candidate receives if placed at the top of the ballot. This study addresses a gap in the literature by examining the possibility that a simple average may mask systematic differences in how the ballot order effect varies across candidates and voters. Methods. Using data from all Australian federal elections between 1984 and 2004, a sample that covers 1,187 separate electoral contests and 7,113 candidate × election observations, this study estimates the effect of ballot order on a candidate's share of the primary vote. To determine whether ballot order effects differ across voters as well as candidates, the study also makes use of electorate‐level demographic data from the 1996 and 2001 Australian censuses. Results. The results of these estimations indicate that being placed first on the ballot increases a candidate's vote share by about 1 percentage point. As a proportion of their total vote, this effect is much larger for independents and minor parties than for major parties. The ballot order effect appears to be similar for male and female candidates, and does not show strong trends upward or downward over the 20‐year period covered by our study. Across electorates, the ballot order effect is higher in places where voters are younger and fluency in English is lower. Conclusions. A statistically significant ballot order effect was a consistent feature of Australian federal elections between 1984 and 2004. Moreover, this study challenges the assumption that ballot order effects are homogenous, and finds that the effect of being placed atop the ballot varies across both candidates and voters.     

Bandwagon Effects and Two-Party Majority Voting

Empirical studies of voting behavior provide evidence of bandwagon effects. Some voters, believing that a particular candidate will win, vote for this candidate even though they prefer the alternative. This paper provides a non-expected utility explanation of such behavior by positing that voters may be averse to the uncertainty associated with an election.     

Bribing voters without verification

This article distinguishes between two types of vote buying mechanisms. If vote choices can be monitored, vote buyers will not discriminate amongst prospective voters, regardless of how they are expected to vote. If voting is secret, a vote buyer will pay opposition voters not to vote which forces the opposition to pay its own voters to ensure they do vote. This implies the secret ballot may be less effective in curbing bribery than originally thought.     

Social Policy at the 2004 Election

Social policy appeared to be a key battleground at the 2004 Australian Federal election. Opposition Leader Latham announced major policies on Medicare, family support and taxation, and schools funding during the election campaign. Using sample survey data from the Australian Election Study 2004, this paper analyses how these policies may have influenced voters. In brief, although a significant proportion of electors identified these issues as being extremely important to them when they were deciding about how to vote, many made up their mind about how to vote around the time of the announcement of the election or before. This mitigated the potential effect that these major policies could have on the election outcome. Nevertheless, these policies were important and Labor had a significant policy advantage amongst those who were late deciders about how to cast their vote.     

Gerrymandering on Georgia's Mind: The Effects of Redistricting on Vote Choice in the 2006 Midterm Election*

Objective. We make use of individual‐level survey data from the 2006 midterm election in order to determine the degree to which redistricting affected the vote choice of whites residing in Georgia Congressional Districts 8 and 12. Methods. A multivariate probit model was used to assess the probability of voting for the GOP House candidate among voters represented by the same incumbent before and after redistricting versus voters who had been newly drawn into one of these districts. Results. Despite a national tide that favored the Democratic Party in the 2006 elections, redrawn whites were more likely to vote for the Republican challengers in the districts surveyed. Conclusions. Our findings indicate that redistricting can be used to dampen the incumbency advantage. In addition, the findings of this research also speak to the continuing Republican realignment of white voters in the Deep South and to the recognition that the effects of redistricting are dependent on political context.     

Condorcet’s principle and the strong no-show paradoxes

We consider two no-show paradoxes, in which a voter obtains a preferable outcome by abstaining from a vote. One arises when the casting of a ballot that ranks a candidate in first place causes that candidate to lose the election, superseded by a lower-ranked candidate. The other arises when a ballot that ranks a candidate in last place causes that candidate to win, superseding a higher-ranked candidate. We show that when there are at least four candidates and when voters may express indifference, every voting rule satisfying Condorcet’s principle must generate both of these paradoxes.     

Black Voters,Black Candidates,and Social Issues: Does Party Identification Matter?*

Objective. Much is known about voting behavior generally; less is known about voting behavior of African Americans in particular due in part to the overwhelming support of black voters for Democratic candidates. However, some argue that black conservatism on social issues could lead to more Republican voting. Methods. We test this question with a set of data on black voting behavior in a 2004 congressional race where two black candidates ran against each other. We thus hold race of candidate constant and look at the influence of social issues and party identification on black vote choice. Results. We find evidence to suggest that evangelicalism and support for the war in Iraq is related to being Republican, but that Democratic Party identification plays the dominant role in black voter decision making. Conclusions. Black conservatism on at least certain social issues is real and has the potential to influence vote choice, but the influence of Democratic Party allegiance is still a very powerful cue for black voters.     

Three's a crowd? The Nader vote in the 2000 presidential, election in U.S. metropolitan areas

The 2000 U.S. presidential election resulted in one of the closest and most controversial outcomes in U.S. history. Green Party candidate Ralph Nader had little chance of winning, but nevertheless impacted the race in several close states and arguably swung the race from Al Gore to George W. Bush. This research examines Ralph Nader's “urban strategy” to win 5% of the vote for president and the bases of his electoral support. This study uses the METRO_2000 data set which contains a variety of publicly available variables for 276 U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the year 2000. The analysis uses OLS regression to examine the determinants of the percentage of the vote for Nader in each MSA. The results indicate that the Nader vote was positively influenced by key electoral variables such as the level of electoral participation, whether Nader was on the ballot or could be written in, and the closeness of the race in state polls leading up to the election. The Nader vote was also higher in MSAs with high percentages of voters who supported Nader programs including environmentalists, those favoring universal health care and gay rights, union members, and MSAs that were college towns or with high percentages of college-educated voters. Ralph Nader's urban strategy effectively mobilized enough of his electoral base to impact the 2000 election, but electoral constraints and the closeness of the race prevented him from achieving his goal of attaining 5% of the vote. This case holds lessons about the limits and possibilities of third party campaigns in U.S. presidential elections.     

Implicit Race Attitudes Predicted Vote in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election

In the week before the 2008 United States presidential election, 1,057 registered voters reported their choice between the principal contenders (John McCain and Barack Obama) and completed several measures that might predict their candidate preference, including two implicit and two self-report measures of racial preference for European Americans (Whites) relative to African Americans (Blacks) and measures of symbolic racism and political conservatism. Greater White preference on each of the four race attitude measures predicted intention to vote for McCain, the White candidate. The implicit race attitude measures (Implicit Association Test and Affect Misattribution Procedure) predicted vote choice independently of the self-report race attitude measures, and also independently of political conservatism and symbolic racism. These findings support construct validity of the implicit measures.     

A panacea for Latino and Black voters? Elevated turnout in vote by mail elections

This study analyzes U.S. Census data from citywide elections in Denver, Colorado from 2004 to 2007 in order to determine if a vote by mail format facilitated participation by Latino and Black voters. The multivariate results suggest that both Latino and Black voters participated more often in vote by mail elections, although the Black turnout increase was also affected by the recent change in Colorado's registration policies.     

选举权观念的更新——从选举法“四分之一条款”的废除说起

2010年选举法修改,废除"四分之一条款",实行城乡按相同人口比例选举人大代表,这象征着选举权观念从阶级论过渡到了权利论。选举权的阶级论,否定存在着抽象的、超阶级的选举权,其作为一种批判理论是深刻的,但也容易陷入工具主义的泥淖,将选举权局限在工具的意义上。选举权的权利论,强调权利主体的个体性、普遍性和平等性,其与政治正义论有着密切的关系。由于公平正义、和谐社会已成为我们社会的理想目标,选举权观念也有必要从阶级论过渡到权利论,承认选举权的道德权利性质。     

The geography of deprivation in New Zealand by electorate

ABSTRACT

In the run-up to the 2017 General Election, the economy, housing, health, education, inequality and justice were important policy issues. General Elections are a time when voters exercise their democratic right to vote for their preferred party and parliamentary candidate to represent themselves, their whānau and community. In many cases, political parties’ policies seek to improve the wellbeing of people who are living in more deprived communities, but people in deprived communities are typically less likely to vote. The recently released New Zealand Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) enables users to explore deprivation in electorates across the country. This paper compares the distribution of deprivation and voter turnout across a selection of General Electoral Districts (GEDs) and demonstrates that while overall patterns of deprivation may be similar between GEDs, the drivers of these patterns can differ immensely.     

Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting

Under approval voting, each voter can nominate as many candidates as she wishes and the election winners are those candidates that are nominated most often. A voter is said to have voted sincerely if she prefers all those candidates she nominated to all other candidates. As there can be a set of winning candidates rather than just a single winner, a voter’s incentives to vote sincerely will depend on what assumptions we are willing to make regarding the principles by which voters extend their preferences over individual candidates to preferences over sets of candidates. We formulate two such principles, replacement and deletion, and we show that, under approval voting, a voter who accepts those two principles and who knows how the other voters will vote will never have an incentive to vote insincerely. We then discuss the consequences of this result for a number of standard principles of preference extension in view of sincere voting under approval voting.     

Nader voters in the 2000 Presidential Election: what would they have done without him?

This research estimates the likely voting behavior of Nader voters if he had not been a candidate in the presidential race. Bivariate analysis of ANES data suggests that Nader voters fit the profile of likely voters and have a distinct preference for Democratic candidates. We utilize multinomial logit analysis to include the possibility of abstention as well as the option of voting for Gore, Bush, or another third-party candidate. The results suggest that Nader voters closely resembled the typical voter in educational achievement, and therefore it is likely that a majority of these individuals would have participated in the 2000 election if Nader had not been a candidate. In addition, it is likely that these individuals would have voted for Al Gore over George Bush. However, these Nader voters were younger, less partisan, and were more likely to express feelings of political alienation, so it is quite possible that the absence of the Nader candidacy would have kept a sizeable minority of them at home on election day.     

Stranger Danger: Redistricting,Incumbent Recognition,and Vote Choice*

Objectives. We take a step forward in examining the electoral effects of redistricting by: (1) demonstrating that voters with a new incumbent because of redistricting are less likely to recognize their representative, and (2) voters are less likely to vote for their representative if they fail to recognize him or her. Methods. Our data come from a survey of white respondents who resided in the redrawn Eighth District of Georgia for the 2006 U.S. House elections. We use probit regressions to first measure the effect of redistricting on incumbent recognition. Then, we assess the likelihood of voting for the incumbent depending on whether a respondent was redrawn or has the same incumbent after redistricting, and whether or not the respondent could recognize his or her representative. Results. Our analyses make it clear that redrawn voters were much less likely to recognize their incumbent and it is the inability to recognize one's incumbent, irrespective of whether the representative has changed due to redistricting, which accounts for a reduced likelihood of voting for the incumbent. Conclusions. Other scholars have examined the relationship between redistricting and incumbent recognition. Likewise, many have evaluated the effects of redistricting on vote choice. This article, however, is the first to merge these two relationships. We find that redrawn constituents are less likely to know who their representative is, and it is indeed a lack of familiarity that reduces an incumbent's vote share. Thus, we have shown empirically that the absence of a personal vote, which is exacerbated by redistricting, proves electorally harmful to the incumbent.     

Candidates and Competition: Variability in Ideological Voting in U.S. Senate Elections*

Objectives. In choosing candidates to support in congressional elections, voters consider both policy and nonpolicy factors. However, the relative importance of incumbency or presidential approval versus candidates' ideological platforms likely varies across elections. Specifically, stiffer electoral competition should encourage ideology‐based voting because candidate information is more plentiful. In contrast, incumbents' ability to garner votes simply by virtue of already holding office should depress proximity voting in elections with incumbents. Methods. Using data from the 1988–1992 Pooled Senate Election Study, I estimate logistic regression models of individual vote choice. Results. I find that open‐seat elections do promote the use of candidate ideological proximity in the voting calculus but that the effects of election competitiveness are less clear. Conclusions. The findings have important implications for normative democratic theory, for our constitutional framework, and for elite behavior and aggregate‐level electoral outcomes.     

Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences*

Many studies have considered the probability that a pairwise majority rule (PMR) winner exists for three candidate elections. The absence of a PMR winner indicates an occurrence of Condorcet's Paradox for three candidate elections. This paper summarizes work that has been done in this area with the assumptions of: Impartial Culture, Impartial Anonymous Culture, Maximal Culture, Dual Culture and Uniform Culture. Results are included for the likelihood that there is a strong winner by PMR, a weak winner by PMR, and the probability that a specific candidate is among the winners by PMR. Closed form representations are developed for some of these probabilities for Impartial Anonymous Culture and for Maximal Culture. Consistent results are obtained for all cultures. In particular, very different behaviors are observed for odd and even numbers of voters. The limiting probabilities as the number of voters increases are reached very quickly for odd numbers of voters, and quite slowly for even numbers of voters. The greatest likelihood of observing Condorcet's Paradox typically occurs for small numbers of voters. Results suggest that while examples of Condorcet's Paradox are observed, one should not expect to observe them with great frequency in three candidate elections.