ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF "WINNING" TELEVISED CAMPAIGN DEBATES

This study explores the long-neglected impact of a candidatebeing perceived as the "winner" of political debates on individualvoting behaviour in West Germany. While there has been muchresearch on the effects of debates on perceptions of candidatepolicy stands and personality atttributes, there has been littlework that attempts to guage how much "winning" the debate helpsa candidate at the polls. I investigate this process with straightforwardprobit models of the vote choice, including party identificationand candiate evaluation as well as whether the individual judgeda particular candidate as the "winner", or "fared best" in thedebate. These models are run for the 1972, 1976, 1980, and 1983elections in West Germany. The results show that there is aconsistent impact of "winning" the debate on individual votingchoices in West Germany; controlling for party and other factors,there is a significantly higher probability of voting for theparty of the politician the respondent feels won the contest.Debates, then, do ultimately make a substabtial electoral difference.     

Wirkungen des TV-Duells im Vorfeld der Bundestagswahl 2005 auf die Wahlentscheidung

During the election campaign to the German Federal Election 2005 the incumbent chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his challenger Angela Merkel met one another on the occasion of a televised debate, the so-called “TV-duel”. This debate was viewed by roughly one third of the German electorate. It is analyzed, whether the perception of the TV-duel winner has had an influence on the voting decision. In the empirical analyses special regard is given to the stability of the winner perception until election day and the influence of subjective expectations towards the debate performance of the candidates. The data analyzed were collected by means of a new interviewing technology via the television screen of the respondents. It is shown, that the winner perception was largely stable and only marginally influenced by the media coverage following the debate. Subjective expectations towards the debate performance of the candidates turn out to be of no importance for the voting decision. The effect of the winner perception on voting behaviour was mediated by changing candidate orientations.     

THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF A NEW VOTING GAP MARITAL DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN VOTING

There is now a marriage gap in presidential voting in the UnitedStates, with married people voting about 10%–15% moreRepublican than unmarried people. This voting difference developedin the 1972 election, and it is also evident in party identification.The proportion of unmarried people has doubled since 1964, sothis cleavage is important. The gap can be explained statisticallyin terms of race and income, but still may give politiciansthe opportunity to gain votes by appealing to voters on thebasis of family issues.     

Klasseneinflüsse auf das Wahlverhalten und die Wahlbeteiligung

The thesis of a declining impact of social class is widely accepted in the social sciences. A central tenet of this thesis is that in particular the impact of social class on voting has declined. Despite a plethora of empirical studies concerning this issue the mechanisms leading to this postulated decline have been relatively less explored. The current paper investigates the thesis of a substitution between class effects on voting and class effects on turnout. Under study are the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany. Using multinomial logit and logistic regression models for both countries a decline in class voting could be observed, but class effects on turnout increased in both countries. More specifically, the propensity to vote relatively to the non-manual classes has declined among the manual classes. In conjunction with the observation that class voting is higher among the manual classes this result supports the theory that the decline of class voting is due to an increasing political frustration within the manual classes. This reasoning suggests a substitution between class effects on voting and turnout.     

VOTING, PUNISHMENT, AND PUBLIC GOODS

Researchers have found that voting can help increase voluntary contributions to a public good—provided enforcement through a third party. Not all collective agreements, however, guarantee third-party enforcement. We design an experiment to explore whether a voting rule with and without endogenous punishment increases contributions to a public good. Our results suggest that voting by itself does not increase cooperation, but if voters can punish violators, contributions increase significantly. While costly punishment increases contributions at the price of lower efficiency, overall efficiency for a voting-with-punishment rule still exceeds the level observed for a voting-without-punishment rule. ( JEL C92, D72, H41)     

Massive Migration and Elections: Evidence from the Refugee Crisis in Greece

This article explores whether the massive arrival of refugees at Greek islands has had an impact on natives’ voting behaviour. Our results show a positive and significant effect of refugees’ presence on votes for the Greek extreme‐right party Golden Dawn. More precisely, we find that a 1 per cent increase in the share of refugees is associated with an increase of 5 per cent in the share of votes for Golden Dawn. This outcome is robust under different estimation methodologies and placebo regressions.     

How important are political interest and internal political efficacy in the prediction of political participation? Longitudinal evidence from Germany / La importancia del interés en la polític y dae la eficacia política interna en la predicción de la participación política. Datos longitudinales originados en Alemania

This study aims to disentangle the effects of interest in politics and internal political efficacy in the prediction of different political activities. The analysis examines the hypothesis that political interest is a more important precursor of electoral and unconventional political participation, and that both political interest and efficacy are required to promote participation in political parties. Using the German Longitudinal Election Study, multiple regression analyses yield that political efficacy is a strong and positive predictor of intentions to participate in party politics and unconventional political behaviour. Political interest has differential effects on voting conditional on whether respondents are surveyed before or after elections, and differential moderated effects appear for conventional and unconventional political action. The findings are discussed with respect to the importance of political interest and efficacy for citizen participation.     

Voting power: an information theory approach

In recent years, there has been increasing awareness of the importance of formal measures of voting power and of the relevance of such measures to real life political issues. Nevertheless, existing measures have been criticized, especially because of their dependence on the unrealistic assumption that different coalitions have equal probabilities. In this paper we show that the classical problem of measuring voting power can be naturally embedded in information theory. This perspective on voting power allows us to extend measures of voting power to cases in which there are dependencies among voters. In doing so, we distinguish between two different notions of a given voter’s power—‘control’ and ‘informativeness’—corresponding, respectively, to the average uncertainty regarding the outcome of a vote that remains when all others have voted and the average uncertainty that is eliminated when only the given voter has voted. This distinction settles a number of well-known paradoxes and enables the study of voting power on the basis of actual political behavior at all levels.     

Diversity Management: aus der Beratungspraxis geplaudert

The article describes two consulting cases out of the context of Diversity Management in Germany. It is shown that differences between persons are still interpreted as negative tensions, which call for quick dismissal. Taking differences as a chance instead of a threat and giving thereby a company new positive impulses remains a topic for the future.     

Voting barriers and solutions: the experiences of people with disabilities during the Dutch national election in 2017

Exercising the right to vote at elections is frequently denied to people with disabilities. In this study, we examined the voting behaviour of individuals with physical or learning impairments and the barriers they encountered during the national elections in 2017 in the Netherlands. A survey design was chosen to allow large-scale questioning of both target groups. Over 90% of people with physical impairments voted and respondents found that voting was accessible. Voter turnout among people with learning impairments was much lower (46%). They experienced difficulty to prepare themselves and at the polling station. The Netherlands seems well on the way to achieving an inclusive environment for people with physical impairments. Recommendations are given about accessibility for all and for exploring alternative methods of voting such as proxy voting and tailoring information and procedures to the needs of people with learning impairments.     

Erosion der Arbeitsregulierung?

The article refers to the discussion concerning the dramatic changes in the regulation of labor. There is no doubt that these changes really exist. But there is no agreement with respect to the degree and the direction of these changes. The article argues that the observable developments must not be interpreted as a dissolving of regulations, but as a process of re-regulation which takes place mainly in the fields of working-time and performance and which is fuelled to a great extent by the market-oriented reorganization of company structures. A case study of the Airbus production site in Nordenham (Germany) concentrates on how the impulses of company reorganisation are incorporated into the arena of industrial relations and how they lead to contingent processes of the construction of new regulations. One central empirical finding of the case study is that the new forms of production management as well as the emerging new regimes of regulation are still far from being as coherent as their fordistic predecessors.     

Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany

We report on two field experiments on Approval Voting conducted during actual state and federal elections in Germany. Voters provided approval ballots both for named district candidates and for state parties. The data reveal significant discrepancies in the outcomes under the official method and Approval Voting. Further, our analysis suggests that currently used voting methods do a poor job of representing the electorate??s preferences. As a consequence, some recurring features of the political landscape in a given country might be, in part, an artifice of the employed voting method.     

Scoring reversals: a major league dilemma

Recent work shows that, in theory scoring methods are very sensitive to the scoring points used. I analyze the results of Most Valuable Player voting in baseball as a test of the practical relevance of this work. I find that Most Valuable Player rankings are indeed quite dependent on the particular scoring points in use.The author thanks Bill Deane of the National Baseball Hall of Fame for supplying voting data, and Gary Cohen and Andy Schotter for discussions. Technical support from the G. V. Storr Center for Applied Economics is gratefully acknowledged.     

First and second best voting rules in committees

A committee of people with common preferences but different abilities in identifying the best alternative (e.g., a jury) votes in order to decide between two alternatives. The first best voting rule is a weighted voting rule that takes the different individual competences into account, and is therefore not anonymous, i.e., the voters’ identities matter. Under this rule, it is rational for the committee members to vote according to their true opinions, or informatively. This is not necessarily true for an anonymous voting rule, under which members may have an incentive to vote non-informatively. Thus, strategic, sophisticated voters may vary their voting strategies according to the voting rule rather than naively voting informatively. This paper shows that the identity of the best anonymous and monotone (i.e., quota) voting rule does not depend on whether the committee members are strategic or naive or whether some are strategic and some are naive. One such rule, called the second best rule, affords the highest expected utility in all cases.

“Wasn’t he sweet?” said Yossarian. “Maybe they should give him three votes.” Joseph Heller, Catch-22

     

Multiple votes,ballot truncation and the two-party system: an experiment

Duverger’s law states that Plurality Voting tends to favor a two-party system. We conducted laboratory experiments to study whether voting procedures other than Plurality Voting could favor a two-party system as well. Plurality Voting is compared with Approval Voting and Dual Voting, both of which allow to vote for multiple candidates, but differ in whether voters are required to cast all their votes. We find that in most elections held under Plurality Voting and Approval Voting, at most two candidates are viable. By contrast, three candidates are viable in a sizable number of elections held under Dual Voting due to strategic voting. Our evidence suggests that Approval Voting may encourage a two-party system, whereas Dual Voting may encourage multipartism. The voters’ ability to truncate ballots (i.e., not cast all their votes) is essential for supporting the two-party system under Approval Voting.     

Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees

A tenure committee first votes on whether to hire a candidate; if it does, it receives an informative performance signal, and then votes on whether to tenure the candidate; rejection at either stage returns the committee to a candidate pool, endogenising the value of the outside option. A candidate’s fate depends only on the behaviour of two ‘weather-vane’ committee members. Committee members may vote against favoured candidates if the weather-vane is opposed; enthusiastic assessments by one of these weather-vanes may harm a candidate’s chances by increasing others’ thresholds for hiring him; sunk time costs may lead voters who voted against hiring to vote for tenuring him, even after a poor probationary performance. For two member committees that are patient and perceptive, the optimal voting rule is a (weak) majority at the hiring stage and unanimity at the tenure stage; when such committees are impatient or imperceptive, the double (weak) majority rule is optimal. Perversely, the performance of a patient, imperceptive committee improves as its perceptiveness further declines. Consistent with practice, falling threshold rules are not optimal. Results on optimal voting rules are also presented in limit cases as committee members’ beliefs become more correlated. Finally, we compare the model to a discrete-time European options model.     

Age cohort voting effects in the breakdown of single-party rule

This article examines age cohort voting differentiation in the breakdown of the Leninist regimes in terms of the effects of rapid social change. The strong relationship found between age and conservative voting and the disproportionate vote of youth for all types of change-oriented parties in the “first” competitive elections (1989/1990) in Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Moscow is a product of cohort–period interaction with youth at the vanguard of social change. Taken together, a dramatic period effect (the rapid introduction of economic and political change), the skewing of younger groups in favor of more rapid social change, the generational socialization of the aged under communist values, and a greater investment of the elderly in the status quo explain age cohort voting in the breakdown of Leninism.     

The Presence of Others and Overreporting of Voting in American National Elections

This study uses the 1978 and 1980 vote validation studies conductedby the University of Michigan Survey Research Center to testthe extent to which false claims about voting are affected bythe presence of third parties during the interview. The presenceof third parties during interviews is far more frequent thanis commonly assumed. But the tendency of respondents to givesocially approved answers is not affected by the presence ofothers during the interview. Thus, additional efforts to avoidcontamination of interviews by eliminating third parties arenot likely to reduce the exaggeration of self-reported vote.The analysis suggests that the declared intention to vote isa far more important factor in whether people falsely reportvoting than is the presence of others. Additional effort tounderstand the motivational basis of voting and nonvoting couldhelp to account for variation in voting overreports.     

Political Economy of Immigration in Germany: Attitudes and Citizenship Aspirations1

This paper examines resident foreigners’ interest in German citizenship. We use a unique data set from a survey of foreign residents in the German states to study the roles played by factors such as attitudes towards foreigners and political interest of foreigners. We find that negative attitudes towards foreigners and generational conflict within foreigner families are significant negative factors. While interest in political participation is among the important positive factors, hostile attitudes, lack of voting rights, or uncertainty about staying in Germany mainly discourage foreigners who actively participate in the labor market, have more years of schooling, and are younger.