政府补贴、所有权性质与企业研发决策

本文将企业研发行为分为"是否研发"和"投入多少"两个阶段,就政府补贴对不同所有制企业研发决策的影响进行研究.理论方面,构建企业研发决策的两阶段模型,讨论了补贴对企业研发投资的作用机制.实证方面,以中国工业企业为对象,选择Heckman两步法和2SLS分别处理了样本选择性偏误及变量间的内生性问题,对来自国有、私营和外资企业的分类样本进行了检验,结果表明:在不同的所有权性质下,政府补贴对企业研发投资的作用存在一定差别,国有企业面对优惠政策的倾斜和需要担负的社会责任,从事技术创新活动的概率较高,但由于特殊的产权关系和预算软约束等原因,缺乏扩大研发投入的动力;对于治理机制完善的外资企业和处于市场竞争弱势地位的私营企业而言,政府补贴的研发激励效果更为明显.     

Learning‐by‐Doing,Organizational Forgetting,and Industry Dynamics

Learning‐by‐doing and organizational forgetting are empirically important in a variety of industrial settings. This paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics. We show that forgetting does not simply negate learning. Rather, they are distinct economic forces that interact in subtle ways to produce a great variety of pricing behaviors and industry dynamics. In particular, a model with learning and forgetting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior, varying degrees of long‐run industry concentration ranging from moderate leadership to absolute dominance, and multiple equilibria.     

Crime,Search, and Ex‐offenders’ Accessibility to Labor Markets

Rehabilitation for ex‐offenders has positive (e.g. more production) and negative (e.g. more crime) effects on society. We investigate the effect of rehabilitation on criminal behavior and the labor market using a search model. In the case where ex‐offenders cannot join the labor market, promoting rehabilitation for them may reduce crime. In such a case, the equilibrium allocation may be inefficient. Moreover, under the Hosios condition, equilibrium labor market tightness is lower than the efficient outcome because of crime, as the crime option raises the value of unemployed workers. Because this option works as a negative externality on matched firms, equilibrium tightness is lower than the optimal level.     

An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily,Minorities, and Segregation

We develop a model of friendship formation that sheds light on segregation patterns observed in social and economic networks. Individuals have types and see type‐dependent benefits from friendships. We examine the properties of a steady‐state equilibrium of a matching process of friendship formation. We use the model to understand three empirical patterns of friendship formation: (i) larger groups tend to form more same‐type ties and fewer other‐type ties than small groups, (ii) larger groups form more ties per capita, and (iii) all groups are biased towards same‐type relative to demographics, with the most extreme bias coming from middle‐sized groups. We show how these empirical observations can be generated by biases in preferences and biases in meetings. We also illustrate some welfare implications of the model.     

New Product Design under Channel Acceptance: Brick‐and‐Mortar,Online‐Exclusive,or Brick‐and‐Click

In recent years, an increasing number of brick‐and‐mortar retailers have entered into the new brick‐and‐click era. Within this context, when a manufacturer presents a new product offering to a retailer, the ultimate decision is often made by the retailer regarding (1) whether to carry the new product, and (2) the channel outlet the product will be carried in (i.e., in‐store only, online‐exclusive, or brick‐and‐click). In response to this trend, we examine how a manufacturer may use product design to influence a dual‐channel retailer's outlet designation decision. This is the first study to investigate a manufacturer's optimal product design strategy when a brick‐and‐mortar retailer expands online. We demonstrate that, to induce the retailer to carry a new product both offline and online, it may not always be optimal for the manufacturer to enhance product quality (compared with when the retailer only operates offline). With the online store addition, the retailer may also be incentivized to adjust his participation criterion to a level less than what is determined by his outside option.     

PRODUCT OFFERING,PRICING, AND MAKE‐TO‐STOCK/MAKE‐TO‐ORDER DECISIONS WITH SHARED CAPACITY

In an era of mass customization, many firms continue to expand their product lines to remain competitive. These broader product lines may help to increase market share and may allow higher prices to be charged, but they also cause challenges associated with diseconomies of scope. To investigate this tradeoff, we considered a monopolist who faces demand curves, which for each of its potential products, decline with both price and response time (time to deliver the product). The firm must decide which products to offer, how to price them, whether each should be make‐to‐stock (mts) or make‐to‐order (mto), and how often to produce them. The offered products share a single manufacturing facility. Setup times introduce disceonomies of scope and setup costs introduce economies of scale. We provide motivating problem scenarios, model the monopolist's problem as a non‐linear, integer programming problem, characterize of the optimal policy, develop near‐optimal procedures, and discuss managerial insights.     

Manufacturing in the Nineties By H.J. STRUDEL and P.DESRUELLE(Van Nostrand Reinhold,New York, 1992). £31.50.

Abstract

Looking for a world model for the manufacturing information flow diagram has brought us to the conclusion that it is impossible to build an all-encompassing, all-inclusive system. The redundancy and overlap would make the system excessively complex and ineffective. The best way to generalize a model of this type is to simplify. The result is that we eliminate nearly the entire production control mechanism that is found in the labour intensive MRP system (Fig. 1). We come up with a system that is much closer to the material intensive JIT system (Fig. 2). The conclusion is that effective production control requires that you choose which resource you wish to optimize, and then select a system that controls the plant around the selected resource base. This is the function of books like International Management and Production. A second conclusion would be that complexity (MRP—Fig. 1) gains very little over simplicity (JIT—Fig. 2 or World Model—Fig. 4) in productivity or efficiency. As Shozo Hibino says in his book Breakthrough Thinking, we need to run our plants smarter, not harder.     

Context‐Specific,Scenario‐Based Risk Scales

Reacting to an emergency requires quick decisions under stressful and dynamic conditions. To react effectively, responders need to know the right actions to take given the risks posed by the emergency. While existing research on risk scales focuses primarily on decision making in static environments with known risks, these scales may be inappropriate for conditions where the decision maker's time and mental resources are limited and may be infeasible if the actual risk probabilities are unknown. In this article, we propose a method to develop context‐specific, scenario‐based risk scales designed for emergency response training. Emergency scenarios are used as scale points, reducing our dependence on known probabilities; these are drawn from the targeted emergency context, reducing the mental resources required to interpret the scale. The scale is developed by asking trainers/trainees to rank order a range of risk scenarios and then aggregating these orderings using a Kemeny ranking. We propose measures to assess this aggregated scale's internal consistency, reliability, and validity, and we discuss how to use the scale effectively. We demonstrate our process by developing a risk scale for subsurface coal mine emergencies and test the reliability of the scale by repeating the process, with some methodological variations, several months later.     

Discussion-"If It's Not Implemented,It Can't Work"

No abstract available for this article.     

Status,Intertemporal Choice,and Risk‐Taking

This paper studies endogenous risk‐taking by embedding a concern for status (relative consumption) into an otherwise conventional model of economic growth. We prove that if the intertemporal production function is strictly concave, an equilibrium must converge to a unique steady state in which there is recurrent endogenous risk‐taking. (The role played by concavity is clarified by considering a special case in which the production function is instead convex, in which there is no persistent risk‐taking.) The steady state is fully characterized. It displays features that are consistent with the stylized facts that individuals both insure downside risk and gamble over upside risk, and it generates similar patterns of risk‐taking and avoidance across environments with quite different overall wealth levels. Endogenous risk‐taking here is generally Pareto‐inefficient. A concern for status thus implies that persistent and inefficient risk‐taking hinders the attainment of full equality.