Fertility desires and fertility outcomes

Over the last 30 years Australian fertility rates have fallen more than could have been predicted from changes in the numbers of children desired by women when they first married. This paper charts changes in desired and completed fertility in Australia, matches originally desired fertility with that ultimately achieved and explores some factors which may affect the relation between fertility desires and fertility outcomes.     

The prediction of completed fertility

There has been considerable interest in the relation between familysize desires and completed fertility. Longitudinal data from the Princeton Fertility Study provide a unique opportunity to compare the number of children desired after the birth of a second child to the size of completed families. The average number of children desired by women after the birth of their second child predicts very well the average size of their completed families. The average family size desired at the first interview and average estimated completed family size some eight years later are identical for the total sample, and vary hardly at all within religious or education subgroups. One-third of the variance in the completed fertility of couples is "explained" by wife's family-size desires and the proportion of explained variance increases to two-fifths when we include the husband's first interview desires and the interval between marriage and second birth. Yet in spite of the relatively high correlation between desires and achievement, only 41 percent of these women achieved exactly the number of children they desired at the first interview, while 14 percent had two children more or fewer than originally desired. Nevertheless, data on contraceptive efficiency indicate that desires after the birth of the second child constitute meaningful goals in terms of which the respondents regulate their subsequent behavior-efficacy of contraceptive practice shows substantial improvement after the desired number has been achieved.     

Evolving Fertility Goals and Behaviors in Current U.S. Childbearing Cohorts

In the post-Recession era, U.S. fertility rates have continued to fall. It is unclear if these declines are driven by shifts in fertility goals or growing difficulty in achieving goals. In this paper, we construct synthetic cohorts of men and women to examine both cross-cohort and within-cohort changes in fertility goals using multiple cycles of the National Survey of Family Growth. Although more recent cohorts exhibit lower achieved fertility at younger ages than earlier cohorts at the same age, intended parity remains around two children, and intentions to remain childless rarely exceed 15 percent. There is weak evidence of a growing fertility gap in the early 30s, suggesting more recent cohorts will need considerable childbearing in the 30s and early 40s to “catch up” to earlier goals, yet low-parity women in their early 40s are decreasingly likely to have unfulfilled fertility desires or intentions to have children. Low-parity men in their early 40s, though, are increasingly likely to intend children. Declines in U.S. fertility thus seem to be largely driven not by changes in early-life fertility goals so much as either a decreasing likelihood of achieving earlier goals or, perhaps, shifts in the preferred timing of fertility that depress period measures.     

Fertility desires and fertility: Hers,his, and theirs

The relationship between desired and achieved fertility may be misspecified by excluding husbands' fertility desires or by confounding effects of shared desires with the resolution of conflicting desires. Using couple data from the classic Princeton Fertility Surveys, we find relatively large husband effects on fertility outcomes as well as unique effects of spousal disagreement. Wives and husbands were equally likely to achieve fertility desires, and disagreeing couples experienced fertility rates midway between couples who wanted the same smaller or larger number of children. These conditions do not hold, however, when we include willingness to delay births for economic mobility as part of the measure of fertility desires. Among couples who both wanted a third child, only husbands' willingness to delay births had significant negative effects on birth rates.     

Determined to stop? Longitudinal analysis of the desire to have no more children in rural Mozambique

Classic demographic theories conceptualize desired family size as a fixed goal that guides fertility intentions over the childbearing years. However, a growing body of research shows that fertility plans, even nominally long-term plans for completed childbearing, change in response to short-term conditions. Because of data limitations, much of this research has focused on low-fertility contexts, but short-term conditions are likely to be even more important in high-fertility contexts. This paper uses three waves of survey data collected in rural Mozambique to study predictors of the desire to stop childbearing in a context of relatively high fertility and high individual and social instability. We use fixed effects models to assess how women’s desires to stop childbearing are shaped by demographic factors, household economic conditions, and health status, controlling for constant individual characteristics. Results provide evidence that fertility desires both reflect stable underlying goals and evolve in response to individual and social circumstances.     

Fertility transition in Arab countries: A re-evaluation

During the two decades extending from the late 1970s, average TFR in Arab countries declined by more than two births per woman. The paper examines changes in the proximate determinants of Arab fertility and evaluates some of the underlying factors that are variously held to have influenced the fertility transition. The proximate and underlying determinants of fertility in Arab countries are compared with those of other regions. Among the factors examined are economic hardship, delayed marriage, and female education and labour force participation. The roles of oil revenues and of the Islamic religion are also considered. An interesting feature is that fertility declined despite continued desires for large families.     

Recent changes in Negro fertility

Crude birth rates for the Negro population of the United States indicate that fertility declined while Negroes remained in the South and them climbed in the last twenty-five years as Negroes became urbanized. Cohort rates show more precisely the effects of the Depression upon childbearing as well as the magnitude and persistence of the post-Depression rise in fertility. More Negro women now become mothers, average family size has increased, and the proportion of women bearing six, seven, or eight children has risen. Negro fertility has risen despite the urbanization of Negroes and improvements in their socio-economic characteristics. Negro fertility rates present the paradox of falling when demographic transition theory would predict the maintenance of high rates and then rising when a decline would be expected. Urbanization does not appear to have reduced Negro fertility. Traditionally, urban living has dampened childbearing in two ways—first, health conditions in cities were inferior to those of rural areas, and thus urbanization affected fecundity adversely; second, city residents are more likely to know about and adopt birth control than rural residents. Negroes migrated to cities at the very time when diseases were being controlled and when public health and welfare facilities were being expanded to serve all residents. This has contributed to higher Negro fertility rates. If fertility rates are to fall because of family planning, not only must birth control be available but there must be a desire to limit family size. Such a desire may be linked to opportunities for social mobility. Negroes have not been assimilated into urban society as previous in-migrant groups were, and opportunities for mobility have been restricted. For these reasons Negroes may be slow to adopt stable monogamous families and the intentional control of fertility.     

Fertility and mortality in Finland since 1750

Summary In this paper the development of fertility and mortality in Finland, and their interrelations with each other and with economic factors is discussed. An analysis by individual years shows that rises and falls in mortality and fertility rates did not always coincide with poor and good harvests. Fertility in Finland decreased slightly at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but fell sharply over the period 1876-1925. This fall corresponded closely to changes in the death rate, especially for infants, and appears to justify the conclusion that the changes were connected. These population shifts have been called the first and second demographic transitions, of which the latter was the more dramatic. Factors tending to reduce mortality among infants and in other age groups during the second demographic transition are obvious; those underlying the first demographic transition are less clear. In this connection, the importance of breast feeding and campaigns designed to favour the practice are stressed. These helped to reduce infant mortality and were one of the main reasons for the first demographic transition. Finnish material also suggests that some kind of family planning existed during the pre-industrial period; it is only by making this assumption that the various figures can be made compatible.     

Family composition preferences in a developing culture: The case of Taiwan, 1973

Abstract As fertility comes increasingly under voluntary control in a developing society, it can be argued that individual desires or preferences about children will become more salient and more significant for eventual fertility. Hence, the study of preferences is increasingly important as contraceptive use is extended and results in decreasing the number of unwanted births.(1) Further changes in fertility then depend on changes in preferences. The assumption is that people will at least try to achieve the families they want, if the means to do so are available. The fact that contraception is used at all is some evidence of the soundness of this assumption, although it should be recognized that family size desires operate in a complex of preferences, under varying degrees of conflict and control. To expect a one-to-one relationship between attitudes or preferences and overt behaviour would be simplistic.     

Fertility decline in the modern world and in the original demographic transition: Testing three theories with cross-national data

This study uses aggregate data on a large number of the world's societies to test three theories of fertility decline in the modern world and in the original demographic transition. One prominent theory relates fertility decline to the changing economic value of children. With industrialization and overall modernization the economic value of children's labor shifts from positive to negative. This interpretation has been challenged by those who claim that the flow of wealth in preindustrial societies is always from parent to child rather than from child to parent. An alternative interpretation is that fertility levels reflect people's efforts to promote their reproductive success, and that this requires the careful tracking of infant and child mortality. Fertility rates are adjusted to the rate of infant and child survival, and will be high when survival rates are low and low when survival rates are high. A third theory emphasizes female empowerment. Fertility will be high when women are highly subordinated to men, but as women gain more autonomy and control over their own lives they reduce their fertility levels because, among other possibilities, higher levels of fertility present them with serious burdens. We tested all three theories through multiple regression analyses performed on two samples of societies, the first a large sample of the world's nation-states during the period between 1960 and 1990, and the second a sample of now-developed societies between 1880 and 1940. Our findings showed that infant mortality was an excellent predictor of fertility, and that female empowerment was a good predictor. However, there was only weak support for the argument that the economic value of children's labor plays an important role in fertility decisions. The findings were discussed in the context of a broader interpretation of fertility behavior in societies with high levels of industrialization and modernization.     

独生子女和非独生子女生育意愿差异的比较研究——基于江苏省生育意愿和生育行为调查

根据“江苏省生育意愿和生育行为”基线调查数据,本文使用交叉分析,多元线性回归等方法,探讨独生子女和非独生子女生育意愿的差异。结果表明,在意愿生育数量、意愿生育性别和意愿生育时间方面独生子女和非独生子女没有显著差异。     

The End of the Demographic Transition: Relief or Concern?

Demographic transition theory might seem to imply that, after a period of exceptional population growth resulting from the time lag between mortality and fertility declines, every population, and then the whole world population will stabilize and, consequently, no more acute population problems will appear. Does the claim, recently gaining credibility, that the end of the transition is at hand actually imply a stage without major population problems? Nothing is less sure. First, it is just a claim, the realization of which still entails a period of dramatically rapid population growth in some countries, especially the poorest. But more tellingly, the end of the transition is also the end of the paradigm on which we have been relying to understand and anticipate demographic changes. Nobody knows what might ensue later: How long and low can fertility fall? How long and high can life expectancy increase? How far can population aging go? As many questions without answer and probably as many problems whose size we cannot even imagine lie ahead.     

The Differential Mortality of Undesired Infants in Sub-Saharan Africa

With high rates of infant mortality in sub-Saharan Africa, investments in infant health are subject to tough prioritizations within the household, in which maternal preferences may play a part. How these preferences will affect infant mortality as African women have ever-lower fertility is still uncertain, as increased female empowerment and increased difficulty in achieving a desired gender composition within a smaller family pull in potentially different directions. I study how being born at a parity or of a gender undesired by the mother relates to infant mortality in sub-Saharan Africa and how such differential mortality varies between women at different stages of the demographic transition. Using data from 79 Demographic and Health Surveys, I find that a child being undesired according to the mother is associated with a differential mortality that is not due to constant maternal factors, family composition, or factors that are correlated with maternal preferences and vary continuously across siblings. As a share of overall infant mortality, the excess mortality of undesired children amounts to 3.3 % of male and 4 % of female infant mortality. Undesiredness can explain a larger share of infant mortality among mothers with lower fertility desires and a larger share of female than male infant mortality for children of women who desire 1–3 children. Undesired gender composition is more important for infant mortality than undesired childbearing and may also lead couples to increase family size beyond the maternal desire, in which case infants of the surplus gender are particularly vulnerable.     

Evolution of fertility and mortality

Historical and current fertility trends in both Quebec and Canada as a whole are surveyed. While fertility among French Canadians was higher than that in neighboring provinces until the mid-20th century, in 1968 Quebec's crude birthrate was the lowest in Canada, and in 1972 it was 13.8 vs. 15.9 (the national birthrate). This reversal is explained in terms of the demographic transition theory, the declining influence of organized religion, and new opportunities for social mobility for minority groups. The birthrate throughout Canada is also declining. Although recent cohort studies are incomplete because women have not yet finished their reproductive years, it appears that completed family size will be lower than at any time in Canadian history. The period total fertility rate indicates an average family size of 1.8 children in 1976, but it is unclear whether this represents an actual reduction in family size or the postponement of childbearing. The sharpest fertility decline has been among women aged 35-49, but peak fertility rates have shifted from the 20-24 age group to those aged 25-29. Fertility is negatively related to education, and the lowest fertility is found among the intermediate income groups. Since the 1969 lifting of the ban on contraceptive sales and advertising, family planning activities have been stepped up. Also removed was the total ban on abortion. In 1975 there were 14.9 therapeutic abortions per 100 live births, but it has been charged that abortion standards are being applied inequitably from hospital to hospital.     

Motivational and nonmotivational determinants of child-number desires

The number of children desired by individuals—often referred to as family size desires or preferences—is a central construct in much research designed to understand and predict fertility. It is often used as a proxy for the construct of childbearing motivation. This paper presents a theoretical framework that organizes and elucidates the relationship between these two constructs. That relationship is examined using a reliable, valid measure of childbearing motivation and data from 195 husbands and 196 wives with no children and 196 husbands and 196 wives with one child. The results indicate that childbearing motivation has a complex relationship with child-number desires, characterized by curvilinearity and a failure to distinguish among those desiring more than two children. We discuss the implications of this pattern.     

An Econometric Investigation of Easterlin's ‘Synthesis Framework’: The Philippines and the United States

In this paper we estimate a fertility model based on Easterlin's synthesis framework. The model assumes that not all couples are able to achieve their desired number of living children because of supply constraints and that, for other couples, the number of living children may exceed desired fertility, depending upon child mortality, the level of fertility in the absence of control, and the degree of contraceptive regulation practised. Estimates of the model for samples of women with completed fertility taken from the Philippines (1973) and the United States (1965) indicated that a higher proportion of Filipino women than women in the U.S. were unable to achieve desired fertility because of supply constraints, that levels of fertility control of Filipino women not supply-constrained were lower, and that excess fertility of Filipino women was much higher. Demand-for-children equations based on the constraints model were quite different from those not taking into account the possibility that some women were supply-constrained, or that some women may have had more children than desired.     

Can spouses be trusted? A look at husband/wife proxy reports

This paper examines biases that may occur when models of couple behavior are estimated using one partner’s report of own and of spouse’s desired family size rather than independent reports obtained from both partners. When estimates of random measurement error are incorporated in a model of couple fertility expectations, proxy reports are valid indicators of spouse desires. In particular, there is little evidence that proxy reports are affected by systematic errors arising from projection of own beliefs onto the spouse. For desired family size, random measurement error in both proxy and self reports is of far greater concern than is systematic error.     

曲折、艰难、辉煌的中国生育转变

从1979～2009年30年人口变动的历程来看,中国人口转变是成功的,其结果是辉煌的,但其转变的历程,尤其是生育转变的历程是曲折和艰难的,历史留给人们的经验和教训是深刻的。本文将近30年来的生育转变历程为四个阶段,从而突显了不同阶段生育水平的变化,以及生育水平与社会经济变革、生育行为以及生育政策博弈的结果。1979～1984年生育水平反弹波动,反映出严格的生育政策遇到强大阻力,结果是欲速而不达。1985～1991年生育高峰如期而至,显示了人口内在规律的强大威力,从而最大限度地调动了人口控制的力量。1992～1999生育率再次下降,并穿透替代水平生育率,宣告人口转变基本完成。2000～2009低生育水平持续稳定,人口结构性问题逐步显现,统筹解决人口问题势在必行。     

Fertility Transition in China:A Zigzag and Splendid Course

Examining China’s population changes in the past three decades demonstrates that China’s demographic transition has been successfully completed with a splendid and zigzag path.There are profound historical experiences and lessons.This paper reviews China’s fertility transition which is divided into four periods and argues that fertility changes are a result of the interactions between socioeconomic development,fertility behaviors and fertility policies.Substantial resistance to the "one-childpolicy" during 1979 to 1984 resulted in rebounding and fluctuating fertility.The baby boom occurred in the period 1985 to 1991 was a manifestation of the inherent laws of demographic dynamics,and subsequently forceful birth control was again mobilized.The period from 1992 to 1999 witnessed large declines in fertility which penetrates the replacement zone,showing that China was completing the fertility transition.China’s stabilizing low fertility and emerging population structural issues since 2000 call for comprehensive ways in addressing the population problems.