What's happening to U.S. family size?

A telephone survey by Zero Population Growth demographers found that birthrates have risen slightly for the 1st quarter of 1977. Average estimated family size is now 1.85 children per women compared with 1.77 for the 1st quarter of 1976. For all of 1976 the total fertility rate was 1.76 children per woman. It is predicted, on the basis of the informal survey, that the total fertility rate will rise to 2.0 or 2.1 children by the early or mid-1980s. In 1976, married women expected an average of 2.4 children each. Wives 18-24 expected 2.1 children each while older women (35-39) expected 3.0. Many women are delaying births. Wives 18-24 have an average of .8 children each, wives 25-29 have 1.6 children each. Campbell Gibson, former chief of the projections branch of the Census Bureau, believes births will not reach levels of expectations becuase of the financial, employment, and social problems the huge Baby Boom age group faces throughout its lifetime. The undecided women in the surveys reduce the predictive value. 18% of single women aged 14-39 and 8% of married women in the same age group said they were uncertain about how many children they would have. Since the personalitites and motivations of this undecided group are similar to those who expect to remain childless, it is possible that this group will have fewer children. Such nondemographic factors as media publicity about low fertility rates may inspire some couples to have children. Conversely, the postponement of births may enable couples to become comfortable with a certain lifestyle and these couples may not have as many children as they expect. Social norms are already changing. The percent of wives expecting to be childless rose from 1.3 to 4.1% between 1967-1975. Those expecting only 1 child rose from 6.1 to 11.2%.     

Why do English-speaking countries have relatively high fertility?

In broad terms, the division in Europe between countries with very low fertility and countries with sustainable fertility matches Esping-Anderson’s classification of the same countries into ‘conservative’ and ‘social democratic’ (Esping-Anderson 1990). A central difference between these two types relates to their preferred models of the family. The conservative countries hold more to the ‘breadwinner’ model of the family while the social democratic countries seek higher levels of gender equity within the family and in the workplace. State support in both conservative and social democratic countries is designed to be consistent with these differing views of the family. Would we then not expect fertility to be very low in Esping-Anderson’s third group of countries, the ‘liberal’ countries, essentially English-speaking countries? By the Esping-Anderson definition, liberal countries are notable for their lack of support for families from public sources. Instead, according to Esping-Anderson, families must rely upon market provision for the services that they may need to combine work and family and they must rely on market employment to generate the income required to support their children. Contrary to this theory, whether measured by contemporary cross-sectional fertility or completed cohort fertility, with the exception of Canada, English-speaking countries now have the highest fertility rates among the countries that were classified by Esping-Anderson. Given the strength of theoretical explanation that arises from comparative studies of fertility in Europe, the paper examines why fertility in English-speaking countries seems not to follow expectation.     

Can fertility be estimated from current pregnancy data?

Summary This paper explores the feasibility of estimating fertility from reports on current pregnancies collected in single-round sample surveys. Data from 15 countries in the World Fertility Survey are used to evaluate the possibilities. The results indicate that neither the age pattern of fertility nor the total fertility ratio can be reliably estimated from current pregnancy data. For almost all countries, the total fertility ratio based on recent births is higher than that based on current pregnancies, even when the latter estimate is restricted to higher durations of pregnancy.     

Has the Chinese family planning policy been successful in changing fertility preferences?

Has China’s strict one-child policy been successful in changing fertility preferences? Using linked data from surveys conducted in four counties of northern China in 1991 and 1994, we compare reproductive behavior against prior fertility preferences and show when and where women change from wanting to not wanting more children. The acceptance of policy-sanctioned family size follows a development gradient and reflects the degree of enforcement. High acceptance occurs in the most urban, industrialized county and in the county with the most rigid family planning policy. Acceptance is weaker among women living in the poorest county and in the county where enforcement is most lenient.     

Why does migration decrease fertility? Evidence from the Philippines

We model the impact of past migration on fertility, assessing the separate effects of relative urbanization of the destination, as a proxy for norms, and post-migration employment, as a proxy for opportunity costs. In the Philippines, we find that large fertility declines accompany post-migration employment. If not followed by work for pay, the estimated fertility impact of migration is small. We find little evidence of migrant selectivity in fertility, and offer speculative evidence that fertility disruption accompanying migration may be large enough to account for much of the apparent effect of normative adaptation.     

Does welfare reform affect fertility? Evidence from the UK

This paper provides evidence on the effect of welfare reform on fertility, focusing on UK reforms in 1999 that increased per-child spending by 50% in real terms. We use a difference-in-differences approach, exploiting the fact that the reforms were targeted at low-income households. The reforms were likely to differentially affect the fertility of women in couples and single women because of the opportunity cost effects of the welfare-to-work element. We find no increase in births among single women, but evidence to support an increase in births (by around 15%) among coupled women.     

Does welfare reform affect fertility? Evidence from the UK

This paper provides evidence on the effect of welfare reform on fertility, focusing on UK reforms in 1999 that increased per-child spending by 50% in real terms. We use a difference-in-differences approach, exploiting the fact that the reforms were targeted at low-income households. The reforms were likely to differentially affect the fertility of women in couples and single women because of the opportunity cost effects of the welfare-to-work element. We find no increase in births among single women, but evidence to support an increase in births (by around 15%) among coupled women.     

Are there crisis-led fertility declines? Evidence from central Cameroon

Past demographic transitions have beenobserved with and without economic progress, but thereis little empirical record of crisis-driven fertilitytransitions. In recent years, several authors haveargued that conditions for such transitions are met inAfrican countries under economic crisis and structuraladjustment. Using retrospective family histories,this study examines fertility responses to crisis inCameroon, a country with a particularly abrupteconomic reversal. The thesis of a crisis-led declineis tested on the basis of five criteria includingtiming of the decline, statistical and substantivesignificance, rural-urban response differentials andsocial salience. Findings are consistent with acrisis-led effect.     

Is mass schooling essential for fertility decline to begin?

The article explores the significance of mass schooling in fertility decline. Population Council researchers have investigated these links in 17 sub-Saharan African countries. Using data from the Demographic and Health Surveys for these countries, three indicators of the extent of mass schooling for 15-19 year olds were investigated: the percentage ever in school, the percentage completing 4 years, and the percentage completing primary education. Results showed that only six countries in which at least 90% of the 15-19 year olds have ever attended school; at least 75% in 8 of the countries had attended school for 4 years; and at least 60% in Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe completed primary school. For the fertility transition, two indicators were taken into account for the 17 countries: the percent decline in fertility from 1960 or 1965 to the present, and the percent of currently unmarried women practicing contraception. 7 of the 17 countries have had fertility declines of less than 10%; 3 countries had less than 10%. In comparing the fertility data and schooling data, investigators found a strong statistical relationship between the percentage of 15-19 year olds completing 4 years of schooling and the phase of the fertility transition. However, other factors have played a role in the fertility decline in certain countries.     

Below-repiacement fertility in Tropical Africa? Some evidence from Addis Ababa

In the past few years there has been a gradual but progressive shift away from the long held scepticism about the prospect of reproductive change in Tropical Africa. Consequendy, the question is now not so much whether Tropical Africa remains a spectator of fertility transition, but whether and how soon fertility in the region will decline to level attained in other parts of the world. Using data from a series of censuses and surveys conducted in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, a country which itself has high fertility, this study explores emerging evidence of fertility levels below two children per woman in an African city. Postponement of marriage and increased incidence of non-marriage, as well as a decline in marital fertility recorded across all birth orders and all age group, are the routes by which the observed transition to below-replacement fertility has been achieved. The paper outlines some tentative institutional and cultural factors that may have contributed to these changes. Revised version of an essay awarded the W.D. Borrie prize (postgraduate section), 1998.     

Do male reproductive preferences really point to a need to refocus fertility policy?

Independently collected data from a 1994 survey in Accra, Ghana, are used here to verify earlier findings from Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data which indicate the existence of a closer tie between men's reproductive preferences and contraceptive use, than between the latter and women's preferences. Indeed, the findings corroborate the earlier studies and suggest that fertility transition in Africa may be accelerated if the family planning establishment would recognize the contribution of the male role, and bring men into the mainstream of their agenda.     

Does granting citizenship to immigrant children affect family outmigration?

This study examines the effect of birthright citizenship on the outmigration behavior of migrant families in Germany. Using the introduction of birthright citizenship on 1 January 2000 and cohort-level data from the German Microcensus from 2001 to 2006, I exploit the differential treatment of birth cohorts around the enactment date to conduct a regression discontinuity analysis. Comparing the outmigration behavior of foreign-citizen families with children born in Germany directly before and after the cutoff, I find evidence that granting citizenship to immigrant children reduces the likelihood that their parents leave the country again.     

Do fertility transitions influence infant mortality declines? Evidence from early modern Germany

The timing and sequencing of fertility transitions and early-life mortality declines in historical Western societies indicate that reductions in sibship (number of siblings) may have contributed to improvements in infant health. Surprisingly, however, this demographic relationship has received little attention in empirical research. We outline the difficulties associated with establishing the effect of sibship on infant mortality and discuss the inherent bias associated with conventional empirical approaches. We offer a solution that permits an empirical test of this relationship while accounting for reverse causality and potential omitted variable bias. Our approach is illustrated by evaluating the causal impact of family size on infant mortality using genealogical data from 13 German parishes spanning the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. Overall, our findings do not support the hypothesis that declining fertility led to increased infant survival probabilities in historical populations.     

On high fertility rates in developing countries: birth limits, birth taxes, or education subsidies?

In this paper, we consider two types of population policies observed in practice: birth limits and birth taxes. We find that both achieve very similar equilibrium solutions if tax revenue finances lump-sum transfers. By reducing fertility and promoting growth, both birth policies may achieve higher welfare than conventional education subsidies financed by income taxes. A birth tax for education subsidies can achieve the first-best solution. The welfare gain of the first-best policy may be equivalent to a massive 10–50% rise in income, depending on the degree of human capital externalities and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.      

By what measure? family time devoted to children in the united states

We argue that previous research on time devoted to child care has paid insufficient attention to the conceptualization of care time. Three separate problems are evident. First, the conventional focus on explicit activities with children distracts attention from the larger responsibilities of "passive" care, which ranges from time when children are sleeping to time when they are in the same general area but are not engaged in an activity with parents. Second, the empirical analysis of activity time focuses almost exclusively on parents, overlooking the role of relatives such as grandmothers and siblings. Third, the measurement of active care time often ignores the impact of overlaps among both care providers and recipients. Our analysis of the Child Development Supplement of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics sheds light on these three problems and presents new measures of passive and active care time.     

Who benefits from paid family leave? Impact of expansions in Canadian paid family leave on maternal employment and transfer income

This paper estimates the impact of a recent expansion in Canadian paid family leave from 25 to 50 weeks on maternal employment and transfer income. It finds the expansion coincided with increases in transfers to mothers of children age zero to one relative to mothers of children age three to four, and with decreases in returns to work in the year after birth. These changes were concentrated among economically advantaged groups of women, defined by marital status, education, and non-wage income. Despite these changes, there was no evidence of a decrease in returns to work or relative employment for mothers of children age one.

Escape route to dependency? Female migration from Sri Lanka to the Middle East

This article looks at labor migration with the sex component turned upside down, where the woman leaves hearth and home in search of work in distant lands. The sending country is Sri Lanka, and the women migrate as maids to Arab households in the Gulf area. Labor migration must be understood in the context of the economic and social development that has made migration possible, or rather pushed it forward. Today, the export of labor is the 2nd biggest source of foreign earnings for Sri Lanka, and females constitute the largest single group of labor migrants. There is 1 clear aspect of female migration: it is almost without exception the poorest strata of society that send their women to the Gulf as housemaids. 3 factors tend to reduce the value of wages earned in the Middle East: 1) for a majority of the migrants there are high social costs involved, 2) there are high transaction costs just to obtain a Gulf job, and 3) performing paid housework tends to be regarded as a low-status occupation and is less attractive to households that have alternative means of income. Not only are the migrant women themselves exposed to a very different society, with different values and ways of living, but also the whole community at home gets a concept of "abroad." The Sri Lankan government expects the contingent of female migrants to grow, though against this is the fact that Sri Lanka now faces stronger competition in female labor exports from other Asian countries.