Dupont-Nash从业战略识别准则和Palepu-Little假设检验北大核心CSSCI

本文将系统的数理建模方法首次引入战略管理领域并与财务分析结合,建立基于不对称效用函数并含有Dupont体系财务参数的Nash均衡模型,发现通过Nash均衡解和绩效相等约束条件导出从业战略的基本性质、检验Palepu-Little识别假设的路径,以M.Porter的差异化战略定义为前提,初次从数理模型导出几个从业战略的性质定理和Dupont-Nash战略识别准则。理论推演显示:成本领先战略是内生的;纯成本领先战略的基本特性是具有对纯差异化战略的成本优势、生产率优势和价格优势;纯差异化战略具有单位产品利润优势;而混合战略则具有除价格以外的全部优势,澄清了战略领域的某些错误观念。通过数理推演和数据检验首次给出了Palepu-Little假设Dupont-Nash战略识别准则不等价且与Porter学说相矛盾的证明。最后引入定量描述战略取向强度的指标(纯战略极化比),实证分析表明二者识别结果相近。以上结论为新兴的Dupont战略识别方法和从业战略研究奠定了初步数理基础,对从业战略大量实证研究结论的评价、理论解释和概括,以及进一步理论和实证研究提供了依据。     

一般竞争战略的逻辑基础重构

在评价波特的竞争战略理论、基本战略理论和相关实证研究科学性的重大缺陷的基础上,尝试建立在新的产业环境中发展竞争战略理论所必需的新的逻辑概念基础,给出了公司所在产业、参照产品和相对溢价的定义,以及成本领先战略和标歧立异战略的定义,修正了两种基本战略相容的经典条件,界定了低成本差异化战略,提出若干假设及推论供分析和实证检验。     

双寡头垄断市场的价格竞争与产品差异化策略——一个博弈论模型及其扩展

分析三阶段Bertrand-Stackelberg市场价格竞争与产品差异化选址策略,将之与Bertrand-Nash市场均衡进行静态比较;其次,构造一个具体的数字例子,演示随着产品差异化程度的提高,双寡头垄断市场中企业均衡利润的变动规律.在此基础上,识别经典的产品差异化定位博弈模型的各种假设条件,并在放松假设以讨论存在边际成本优势、消费者选择行为以及重复动态博弈的情形下,寡头垄断市场中的企业均衡利润和均衡价格的变化趋势及其稳定性问题.放松传统模型的假设条件有助于完整地理解和分析许多长期被孤立研究的产业竞争问题.     

煤炭企业集团建立战略成本管理体系的探讨

成本优势是企业可拥有的两种竞争优势之一。成本不仅对实施成本领先战略的公司非常重要,而且对于实行差异化战略的公司也极为重要,因为差异化的企业必须保持与其竞争者近似的成本。除非由此而得的溢价超过别具一格的成本,否则差异化者就不能取得出色的业绩。正是因为成本在竞争中的重要地位,许多企业管理者都把建立成本领先(cost leadership)或成本削减(cost reduction)作为公司的战略目标。对于煤炭企业集团来说,由于受到煤炭资源自身条件的限制,煤炭企业差异化战略的实施难度一般较大,因此,煤炭企业集团之间的竞争主要在于煤炭产品成本的竞争。煤炭企业集团要实实在在抓成本,建立健全全员参与、全方位、全过程的成本管理与控制机制。层层分解指标,横向到物,纵向到人,通过分解和细化成本定额,做到事事有人管,人人都管事,构建起责、权、利相结合的责任体系。     

煤炭企业集团建立战略成本管理体系的探讨

成本优势是企业可拥有的两种竞争优势之一.成本不仅对实施"成本领先战略"的公司非常重要,而且对于实行差异化战略的公司也极为重要,因为差异化的企业必须保持与其竞争者近似的成本.     

人力资源竞争优势研究

人力资源的竞争是企业竞争成败的关键因素，人力资源的竞争优势影响着企业的竞争优势。在满足客户利益的价值链活动中，当人力资源以低于他人的价格提供同等劳动，或所提供的独特劳动产生的价值补偿劳动力溢价还有余时，人力资源竞争优势即形成，也可以体现为成本领先和差异化竞争优势。     

出口企业竞争战略对产品创新的影响:以市场导向为中介变量

本研究基于220家中国制造型出口企业的数据,探讨了两种竞争战略(差异化战略和成本领先战略)如何通过顾客导向和竞争者导向影响企业创新倾向和新产品绩效。研究结果显示:(1)差异化战略通过促进顾客导向和竞争者导向间接改善创新倾向和新产品绩效;(2)成本领先战略直接正向影响创新倾向进而改善新产品绩效;(3)差异化战略对出口企业产品创新的影响更为显著。研究为中国制造型出口企业如何改善竞争战略执行、提高产品创新绩效提出了管理上的启示意义。     

竞争性品牌策略:进入遏制角度的分析

作为品牌延伸战略的重要表现形式之一,竞争性品牌策略是产业组织理论的一个重要研究领域.作者从市场进入遏制的视角研究竞争性品牌策略,通过构建一个具有产品差异化的动态博弈模型,分析在位者如何创建一个与进入者的品牌直接竞争的"竞争性品牌"并进行相应的产量竞争以达到遏制进入的目的.研究发现:旨在遏制进入的竞争性品牌策略与进入成本密切相关;不但从理论上证明了存在启动竞争性品牌策略的进入成本区间,还在一定的参数条件假设下通过一个简单数值例子给出该成本区间范围;最后对一些竞争性品牌案例进行了分析.     

伯川德价格博弈中的正利润均衡

在不变边际成本的同质产品伯川德价格博弈中,通常认为唯一均衡结果是各个企业获得零利润的纯战略纳什均衡.本文的研究表明,存在使企业获得正利润的混合战略纳什均衡,并给出了伯川德悖论均衡存在条件、正利润均衡存在条件和伯川德悖论结果的充分条件.     

企业成本领先战略和差异化战略融合的分析

当今,全球经济一体化及全球信息化进程加快,使企业间的竞争越来越激烈,面对激烈的竞争和快速变化的市场,企业要想依靠单一的竞争战略采维持长期的竞争优势变得越来越困难,成本领先战略与差异化战略并不总是相互冲突的.企业为了能适应激烈的竞争,采取成本领先战略与差异化战略相结合的战略显得十分必要.     

TIME‐BASED PRICING AND LEADTIME POLICIES FOR A BUILD‐TO‐ORDER MANUFACTURER

We studied time‐based policies on pricing and leadtime for a build‐to‐order and direct sales manufacturer. It is assumed that the utility of the product varies among potential customers and decreases over time, and that a potential customer will place an order if his or her utility is higher than the manufacturer's posted price. Once an order is placed, it will be delivered to the customer after a length of time called “leadtime.” Because of the decrease in a customer's utility during leadtime, a customer will cancel the order if the utility falls below the ordering price before the order is received. The manufacturer may choose to offer discounted prices to customers who would otherwise cancel their orders. We discuss two price policies: common discounted price and customized discounted price. In the common discounted price policy, the manufacturer offers a single lower price to the customers; in the customized discounted price policy, the manufacturer offers the customers separately for individual new prices. Our analytical and numerical studies show that the discounted price policies results in higher revenue and that the customized discounted price policy significantly outperforms the common discounted price policy when product utility decreases rapidly. We also study two leadtime policies when production cost decreases over time. The first uses a fixed leadtime, and the second allows the leadtime to vary dynamically over time. We find that the dynamic leadtime policy significantly outperforms the fixed leadtime policy when the product cost decreases rapidly.     

具有两阶段生产模式和需求信息更新的供应链契约研究

针对二级供应链,在基于Stackelberg博弈的批发价契约中,分析了折扣价格与零售商最优提前订购量的关系及对契约双方期望收益的影响;设计了价格折扣与回购联合的协调契约,分析了供应链系统的最优提前生产量、供应链协调条件及协调契约下制造商和零售商的期望收益变化,并在协调契约不满足制造商的个体理性约束时,提出采用不对称Nash谈判模型设计两阶段生产与订购的回购契约,在保证供应链系统整体绩效最优的条件下,使制造商和零售商利润都能得到满意增长。研究表明,三级供应链实行两阶段订购的必要条件是分销商与零售商的最优提前订购量相等,与二级供应链相比,价格折扣契约下三级供应链效率更低,但价格折扣与回购联合的契约同样能协调三级供应链,该协调契约满足零售商与分销商激励相容约束。     

Optimal Per‐Use Rentals and Sales of Durable Products and Their Distinct Roles in Price Discrimination

We consider a setting in which consumers experience distinct instances of need for a durable product at random intervals. Each instance of need is associated with a random utility and the consumers are differentiated according to the frequency with which they experience such instances of need. We use our model of consumer utility to characterize the firm's optimal strategy of whether to sell, rent, or do a combination of both in terms of the transaction costs and consumers' usage characteristics. We find that the two modes of operation serve different roles in allowing the firm to price discriminate. While sales allow the firm to discriminate among consumers of different usage frequencies, rentals allow it to discriminate according to consumers' realized valuations. Consequently, even when transaction costs are negligible, it is often optimal for the firm to simultaneously rent and sell its product. In addition, we find that although sales and rentals are substitutes and that the offering of sales weakly increases rental prices, it is possible that the introduction of rentals to a pure selling operation can either increase or decrease the optimal sales prices.     

基于消费者情绪效用下劣势耐用品企业的延保服务策略有效性研究

基于消费者情绪效用对耐用品企业延保服务策略有效性的影响，构建双寡头微分博弈模型，研究耐用品企业的延保服务策略对产品均衡价格的影响特征，并进一步讨论了劣势耐用品企业延保服务策略的有效性。结论表明：服务投入在不同范围内，产品均衡价格随着服务投入的增加而变化的特征不同；高质量企业的延保最优价格与服务投入成递增关系变化，而低质量企业的延保最优价格随服务投入增加的变化特征还与其故障率、延保期等因素有关。低质量耐用品企业的服务投入满足大于1时，采取增加服务投入缩小与高质量产品的价格差是有效的；只有在一定条件下，采取延长质保期、延保期策略缩小价格差才是有效的。最后，利用数值分析法进一步验证了结论的合理性。研究可为耐用品企业有效实施延保服务策略提供决策支持。     

On pricing and protection of complementary products

The business literature advises firms producing complementary products to sell the core product at a low price, but to price the complementary product at a higher premium. This strategy, however, is problematic if firms face competitors in the market for complementary products as well, as observed in recent years for instance in the market for printers/ink cartridges. Motivated by several measures the firms have taken in this market, the current paper analyzes whether firms are interested in protecting their complementary product from outside competition. We find that firms protect their products only if consumers underestimate the demand for the complementary product when deciding which core product to buy. Moreover, we investigate how the decision to protect the complementary product interacts with a firm’s pricing decision. We show that the price policy proposed in the business literature should only be applied, if consumers sufficiently underestimate their demand for the complementary product so that firms strongly protect these products from outside competition.     

Coordinating Sales and Raw Material Discounts in a Global Supply Chain

In this paper, the supplier of a key component to a global manufacturer offers a one‐time price discount; we study the firm's optimal response to the discount under two different strategies. In the first strategy, the firm does not pass along the discount to its customers (sales subsidiaries); the firm simply coordinates purchasing and production among the different factories to take advantage of this one‐time price discount. In the second strategy, the firm offers price discounts for its most profitable products in different sales subsidiaries to increase their demand. We carried out experiments for the two strategies based on a mathematical programming model, built around Toshiba's global notebook supply chain. Model constraints include, among others, material constraints, bill‐of‐materials, capacity and transportation constraints, minimum lot size constraints, and a constraint on minimum fill rate (service level constraint). Unlike most models of this type in the literature, which define variables in terms of single arc flows, we employ path variables, which allow for direct identification and manipulation of profitable and non‐profitable products.     

可加效用下基于消费者惰性的易逝品动态定价

本文在考虑销售商的风险规避态度和消费者惰性的情况下，研究了易逝品的动态定价策略。首先给出风险规避的销售商实施动态定价的马尔可夫决策过程，并运用MNL随机效用模型来刻画惰性消费者的购买决策，在此基础上，以风险规避销售商的期望效用最大化为目标，利用动态规划方法建立了可加效用下的易逝品动态定价模型，并探讨了消费者的惰性行为和销售商的风险规避态度对最优价格的影响。结论表明：在销售商的风险态度为风险规避的情况下，考虑消费者惰性行为的最优价格随库存水平的增加而降低，随剩余销售时间的增加而提高，消费者的惰性行为和销售商的风险规避态度对最优价格都存在负向影响，即最优价格随惰性深度的增加而降低，随惰性宽度的增加而降低，同时，销售商的风险规避态度越强烈，其制定的产品价格越低。     

非对称信息条件下成本控制模型研究

运用委托代理理论方法探讨了信息不对称条件下,生产管理者如何激励生产者努力降低成本的问题。信息不对称情况下,管理者不能观测到生产者为降低成本而付出的努力,因此管理者需要对生产者进行激励。管理者根据自己的要求和生产者的自报数确定了一个合约基数,并建立了满足生产者个体理性约束和激励相容约束条件下的管理者期望效用最大化模型,分别以奖励系数和惩罚系数为决策主量。运用进化规划算法作了仿真计算。