面向延时敏感患者的转诊系统定价与能力规划

针对我国当前社区医院首诊而后向上转诊系统中医疗资源利用严重失衡的现状,研究了我国医疗转诊系统的服务能力设计与定价问题.通过建立一个排队和博弈的集成模型,分析了延时敏感病人选择行为下,三甲医院以利润最大化、社区医院以服务人数最大化的不同目标的竞争均衡.发现社区医院的最优服务能力随政府的补贴递增、三甲医院的诊疗费在政府补贴超过某个阀值时开始下降.结果表明政府的补贴政策是医疗转诊体系优化设计中有效的协调机制.     

公司控制权转移与盈余管理研究

本文基于控制权市场理论,研究控制权转移公司高管为应对离职风险而与买方合谋策略及其后果。研究发现,公司控制权转移前存在向下盈余管理;且公司盈余管理越严重,股权转让价格越低,控制权转移后高管留任福利越多;特别地,国有公司民营化前更显著地向下盈余管理,且转让价格更低,民营化后高管留任、加薪福利更多,公司业绩更好。研究表明,在资本市场不完善且公司治理不健全条件下,高管通过向下盈余管理协助买方降低受让成本以换取个人福利的行为更严重;且控制权转移前的盈余管理策略使控制权转移效率玄机更大。本文拓展了控制权市场理论,丰富了股权转让各主体博弈、目标公司盈余管理及民营化效率的研究。     

不同权力结构下制造商双渠道供应链的博弈分析

在单个拥有线下传统批发及线上直销双渠道的制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链中,基于供应链成员博弈权力的差异,构建制造商占优或零售商占优的两类Stackelberg博弈及双方同等权力的Nash博弈模型,分析了三种博弈权力结构对供应链成员价格,需求和利润的影响。研究发现：当制造商线下传统批发渠道所占市场份额较小时,（1）渠道交叉价格弹性系数为0时和不为0时,三种博弈权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链均衡解的影响具有一定的鲁棒性;（2）三种博弈权力结构下,制造商线上直销渠道价格相同;两类Stackelberg博弈权力结构下,线下传统批发渠道价格相同且大于Nash博弈下的传统渠道价格;制造商批发价格随其博弈主导地位下降逐渐降低;（3）当渠道交叉价格弹性系数为0时,三种博弈权力结构对线上直销渠道需求的影响是无差异的;当渠道间交叉价格弹性系数不为0时,两类Stackelberg博弈权力结构下的线下传统批发渠道需求相同且小于Nash博弈下的传统渠道需求,线上直销渠道需求相同且大于Nash博弈下的线上直销渠道需求;（4）三种博弈策略下,制造商收益及零售商收益随其博弈主导地位下降逐渐降低;Nash博弈下,供应链总利润最大。     

中国股市限售股解禁的减持效应研究

限售股解禁及其减持现象将在中国股市长期存在,利用博弈分析和实证研究以深刻认识该现象并阐述其影响机制和影响程度,进而为相关治理途径选择提供依据.通过序贯博弈模型和同时决策的静态博弈模型分析限售股解禁的减持效应,并基于事件研究法进行实证研究.博弈模型推导表明.减持效应可能存在;当已流通股与解禁股的相对规模差异不大时存在减持效应的自稳定机制.实证分析证实了前述推断.并发现减持效应出现自稳定机制时往往伴随着股价的显著下跌;解禁日后存在一段观望期,期间减持效应不显著,但之后出现大规模的减持行为;提前反应明显强于减持效应,限售股解禁的心理冲击影响可能大于实际减持压力.要缓解限售股的解禁和减持压力,关键在于大幅度提升市场时股票的需求,有效承接供给规模的巨量增加,而其重点是提升市场投资需求和持股信心.     

Bertrand模型与超模博弈

将近年来博弈论中出现的一种新的研究方法--超模博弈理论应用于Bertrand寡头博弈中,对于具有一般成本函数的差异产品的Bertrand寡头博弈,当企业的策略只是选择价格水平时,比较了博弈为超模和对数超模博弈的充分条件,表明虽然一个对数超模博弈一定是拟超模的,因而较超模博弈的适用范围更广泛,但二者的充分条件之间不具备可比性,即不能由其中一个推出另外一个.同时既使该博弈既不是超模的也不是对数超模的,仍可能存在对利润函数的其它单调转换使博弈成为超模的.当边际生产成本为常数时,给出了具体的反例.当企业的策略为同时选择价格和广告水平,且企业的边际生产成本为常数时,表明在一般的假设下博弈为超模博弈,从而说明了为什么通常情况下较高的广告水平对应着较高的价格.     

考虑消费者预期的电动汽车分时租赁市场价格竞争模型

分时租赁平台作为电动汽车推广的主要方式，其特征与打车软件类似，在风险资本的推动下极易引发价格战。各租车公司的市场需求量不仅与自己的定价有关，也与竞争对手的定价策略相关，目标都是各自利润的最大化。本文在考虑消费者预期的基础上，研究了需求函数为线性情形下的多人博弈，证明了此博弈是超模博弈以及Nash均衡的存在性和唯一性。并进一步揭示了降价幅度、交叉价格和价格敏感消费群体占比对均衡价格、均衡需求量和利润的影响关系，讨论了价格竞争过程中各租车公司的决策过程与利弊关系。结果表明：任意租车公司的降价行为都会引发整个市场的降价反应，且降价幅度随着博弈阶段的推进逐渐减小，最终收敛于均衡价格；动态定价博弈存在最优组合策略，市场竞争时应当把握好降价幅度，避免过度的价格竞争；均衡价格是关于消费者预期的单调减函数，价格敏感的消费群体占比越大，租车公司间价格竞争越激烈，降价幅度会越大，均衡价格越低；对于市场份额大的租车公司利润是关于价格敏感型消费者占比的单调增函数，但对中小租车公司而言则是单调减函数，价格敏感的消费者越多，对大公司有利，对中小公司不利。     

体验式服务系统的“价格－速度”竞争策略研究

本文研究体验式服务系统的“价格－速度”竞争策略． 区别于服务速度越快消费者越满意的传统服务系统,在以医疗保健、个人护理、法律/管理咨询为代表的体验式服务系统中,服务速度越快,消费者可能越不满意,企业因此面临着服务速度与服务质量的两难抉择． 基于排队理论,构建博弈模型,本文首先分析垄断结构下企业的价格与速度决策,然后分析竞争结构下的情形,最后对比两种结构下的均衡结果． 研究发现: 其一,竞争的引入并不一定降低服务价格,当市场规模在中间范围时,竞争反而引起服务价格的提高; 其二,竞争的引入并不提高服务速度,但提高社会福利; 其三,不同市场规模下,消费者的服务时间敏感度对企业的服务价格与服务速度决策影响不同． 一些反直观结论有利于指导体验式服务系统下的企业运营实践．     

谈判势力视角下平台独占交易行为效应研究——兼论中国B2C市场的"二选一"与反垄断规制

近年来,B2C平台为阻止商家多归属而提出的"二选一"行为受到业界广泛关注.从理论层面看,平台"二选一"行为折射出双边市场结构下独占交易行为的效应问题.本文以Hotelling模型为基本框架,从平台与商家谈判博弈的角度出发,引入纳什讨价还价模型,探究平台独占交易行为效应.研究发现:商家相对于平台的议价能力是决定商家和平台达成独占交易的重要因素.当商家的议价能力居中或较弱时,平台要求商家签订独占交易协议的动机较强.从竞争效应角度看,独占交易行为会打破"竞争瓶颈",抑制市场竞争,削减竞争平台的市场份额以及利润水平.从福利效应角度看,当消费者搜索成本较低时,随着交叉网络外部性参数以及平台价格补贴的递增,独占交易并非总是降低消费者福利以及社会总福利.基于上述分析结论,结合B2C平台独占交易案例,提出了相应反垄断规制建议.     

董事会特征影响上市公司违规行为的实证研究

本文以2001-2005年间因为违规行为被监管层公开谴责、公开批评或公开处罚的195家A股上市公司及其195家配对公司为研究对象,应用二分类Probit回归、广义线性模型和排序Probit回归分析方法,研究董事会特征是否会影响公司违规的发生概率、发生频率和严重程度等违规行为.结果表明,董事会规模过大会降低工作效率;独立董事比例越高,公司经营越规范;审计委员会的设立可以在一定程度上监督约束公司行为.美中不足的是,它们在统计上均不显著,这可能是因为我国的上市公司治理制度建设才刚刚起步,其治理作用尚未充分显现.与代理理论相矛盾,关于董事会领导结构的实证结果支持现代管家理论,董事长兼任总经理的公司越不容易违规,违规程度越轻微,这可能意味着董事会是一个复杂的体系以至单一的理论无法完全诠释其运营原理.此外,董事会会议越频繁并不意味着董事越勤勉,更可能是公司隐患越多.本文结论将为上市公司董事会的设置乃至公司治理机制建设提供经验证据和启示.     

存在研发投资溢出时的企业市场绩效分析

在古诺竞争市场结构下,建立了具有R&D过程的双寡头博弈模型,从促进技术进步、产品的价格、企业的生产规模、企业的利润以及总福利的角度出发,分析了存在研发投资溢出时,在不同的R&D策略下企业的市场绩效。研究表明,企业的市场绩效不仅与研发投资溢出率以及产品的差异度大小有关,而且与R&D效率的高低有关。     

Insurer Competition in Health Care Markets

The impact of insurer competition on welfare, negotiated provider prices, and premiums in the U.S. private health care industry is theoretically ambiguous. Reduced competition may increase the premiums charged by insurers and their payments made to hospitals. However, it may also strengthen insurers' bargaining leverage when negotiating with hospitals, thereby generating offsetting cost decreases. To understand and measure this trade‐off, we estimate a model of employer‐insurer and hospital‐insurer bargaining over premiums and reimbursements, household demand for insurance, and individual demand for hospitals using detailed California admissions, claims, and enrollment data. We simulate the removal of both large and small insurers from consumers' choice sets. Although consumer welfare decreases and premiums typically increase, we find that premiums can fall upon the removal of a small insurer if an employer imposes effective premium constraints through negotiations with the remaining insurers. We also document substantial heterogeneity in hospital price adjustments upon the removal of an insurer, with renegotiated price increases and decreases of as much as 10% across markets.     

The Economic Value of Market Information for Farmers in Developing Economies

In developing countries, farmers lack information for making informed production, manufacturing/selling decisions to improve their earnings. To alleviate poverty, various non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) and for‐profit companies have developed different ways to distribute information about market price, crop advisory and farming technique to farmers. We investigate a fundamental question: will information create economic value for farmers? We construct a stylized model in which farmers face an uncertain market price (demand) and must make production decisions before the market price is realized. Each farmer has an imprecise private signal and an imprecise public signal to estimate the actual market price. By examining the equilibrium outcomes associated with a Cournot competition game, we show that private signals do create value by improving farmers' welfare. However, this value deteriorates as the public signal becomes available (or more precise). In contrast, in the presence of private signals, the public signal does not always create value for the farmers. Nevertheless, both private and public signals will reduce price variation. We also consider two separate extensions that involve non‐identical private signal precisions and farmers' risk‐aversion, and we find that the same results continue to hold. More importantly, we find that the public signal can reduce welfare inequality when farmers have non‐identical private signal precisions. Also, risk‐aversion can dampen the value created by private or public information.     

隐匿价值、社群学习与知识付费动态定价

互联网知识付费中,知识产品价值对供需双方皆具有“隐匿性”。而网络社群作为产品体验信息的重要来源,在知识价值“显现化”过程中发挥着关键作用。基于此,本文将社群交互因素纳入知识付费两期动态定价博弈模型,深入探讨社群学习机制对最优定价策略的影响。模型分析发现：①最优社群价格存在上限阈值,以确保营造良好社群学习氛围。②最优市场价格依赖于知识成本、消费者参与收益和知识价值后验信念,与知识价值之间呈现“非线性”关系。③知识产品一般应采取渗透式定价方式,而消费者耐心程度、社群活跃度与社群交互效率对均衡价格具有重要影响。进一步福利分析表明,互联网社群学习情境将提升提供者收益。本文揭示了互联网知识交易定价的深层逻辑：社群学习引致的“策略效应”和“信息效应”重塑了消费者行为模式,进而倒逼提供者采取适应性动态定价机制。     

Manufacturer's pricing strategy for supply chain with warranty period-dependent demand

This article presents a review of the issues associated with a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a two-echelon supply chain that comprises one manufacturer and two competing retailers, with warranty period-dependent demands. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, specifies wholesale prices to two competing retailers who face warranty period-dependent demand and have different sales costs. The manufacturer considers three pricing options: (1) setting the same price for both retailers, while disregarding their difference with regard to sales cost; (2) setting a different price to each retailer on the basis of their sales cost; and (3) setting the same price to both retailers according to the average sales cost of the industry. In this article, the retailers' optimal warranty periods and their optimal profit, manufacturer's optimal wholesale price, and his/her optimal profit associated with different pricing strategies have been derived using the game theory. Our analysis shows that the results for retailers are the same with Strategy 1 or Strategy 3. In addition, we compared the effects of different pricing strategies of the manufacturer on supply chain decisions and profit. We conclude from the results that the manufacturer should either adopt Strategy 2 with symmetrical sales cost information or Strategy 3 if retailers' sales costs are asymmetrical.     

Impacts of demand uncertainty on retailer's dominance and manufacturer-retailer supply chain cooperation

Recent studies in marketing and distribution channels have shown that the balance of power between manufacturers and retailers is shifting. Based on this observation, we investigate a two-echelon supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer in this paper. We first develop retailer-dominant non-cooperative game models by introducing a sensitivity of retailer's order quantity to manufacturer's wholesale price; then we analyze two cooperative scenarios, in which the Nash bargaining model is utilized to implement profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Under the assumption that the manufacturer and the retailer are risk-neutral, we find that the manufacturer and the retailer can bargain to cooperate at any level of retail-market demand uncertainty with exogenous retail price. However, the cooperation is conditional on retail-market demand uncertainty with endogenous retail price: it can be implemented if the fluctuation of retail-market demand is relatively small, and the measure of retail-market demand uncertainty does not exceed an upper bound. Theoretical and numerical analyses show that the retailer's dominance over the manufacturer increases with the increase in the sensitivity of retailer's order quantity to manufacturer's wholesale price under a limitation of retail-market demand uncertainty. Numerical analyses also show that the retailer's dominance decreases with the increase in retail-market demand uncertainty.     

内生时机下多阶段R&D博弈的均衡行动顺序

基于内生时机的博弈理论,研究了内生的R&D时机下双寡头企业先进行R&D活动后进行产品市场价格竞争的多阶段动态博弈的均衡R&D顺序,其中产品市场上的需求函数是线性的且企业在产品市场上的行动是同时进行的。运用逆向归纳法研究表明均衡R&D顺序只由企业的R&D外溢水平决定：若两企业的外溢水平都较低（较高）,则均衡R&D顺序为两企业同时行动（分别以两企业为领头者的序贯行动）;若一个企业的外溢水平较低而另一企业的外溢水平较高,则均衡R&D顺序为以低外溢水平的企业为领头者的序贯行动。在序贯R&D时两企业的R&D总水平、社会总福利水平及产品市场产量（价格）都高于（低于）同时R&D时的情形。     

竞争性网络间的互联互通问题分析

竞争性网络的运营商基于自身利益可能拒绝互通或合谋相互征收高额接入费,这两种行为都将损害消费者福利,因而需要政府规制。本文在考虑网络外部性、运营商的市场份额、市场容量和用户的转换成本等因素影响的基础上,通过构建一个包含"防降价均衡"机制的三阶段博弈模型来分析运营商的服务定价、互通决策、政府的接入费规制决策以及社会福利变化,发现存在合理的接入费区间使得运营商有动力互通且社会福利得到改善。     

政府补贴下制造/再制造竞争机理研究

以政府“以旧换再”补贴政策为背景,建立了原始制造商、再制造商与零售商两阶段博弈模型.基于此博弈模型,考虑政府不采取补贴政策、政府补贴给再制造商及政府通过零售商补贴购买再制造产品消费者3种情况,对比分析了政府不同补贴策略对两种产品单位批发价格、零售价格、销售量、利润、消费者剩余及环境的影响.结果表明:当再制造产品的需求不受废旧产品回收量限制,政府补贴可以降低两种产品单位零售价格,增加再制造商和零售商的利润,提高消费者的剩余;当再制造产品的需求受到废旧产品回收量限制时,政府补贴可以增加两种产品的单位批发价格和两种产品制造商的利润,但是会降低零售商的销售利润.     

Supply chain coordination through cooperative advertising with reference price effect

Cooperative advertising, which usually occurs in a vertical supply chain, is typically a cost sharing and promotion mechanism for the manufacturer to affect retail performance. Research in the literature, however, rarely considers the important phenomenon that advertising has a positive effect on the consumer's reference price. In fact, when a consumer makes a decision to buy a product or not, a reference price is usually in his mind and plays a determinant role. Taking into account the impact of advertising on the reference price, this paper proposes a dynamic cooperative advertising model for a manufacturer–retailer supply chain and analyzes how the reference price effect would influence the decisions of all the channel members. In our model, both the consumer's goodwill and reference price for the product are assumed to be influenced by the advertising and are modeled in differential dynamic equations. In addition, the advertising level, the consumer's goodwill and the reference price are all assumed to have positive effect on sales. Utilizing differential game theory, this paper formulates the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer in two different game scenarios: Stackelberg game and cooperative game. Also, this paper proposes a new mechanism to coordinate the supply chain in which both the manufacturer and the retailer share each other's advertising costs.     

The Value of Free Water: Analyzing South Africa's Free Basic Water Policy

This paper analyzes South Africa's Free Basic Water Policy, under which households receive a free water allowance equal to the World Health Organization's recommended minimum. I estimate residential water demand, evaluate the welfare effects of free water, and provide optimal price schedules derived from a social planner's problem. I use a data set of monthly metered billing data for 60,000 households for 2002–2009 from a particularly disadvantaged suburb of Pretoria, with rich price variation across 20 different nonlinear tariff schedules. I find that the free allowance acts as a lump‐sum subsidy, without large effects on water consumption. However, it is possible to reallocate the current subsidy to form an optimal tariff without a free allowance, which would increase welfare while leaving the water provider's profit unchanged. This optimal tariff would also reduce the number of households consuming low quantities of water, a desirable policy goal according to the WHO.