高管激励、制度环境与高技术企业探索式创新

高管股权激励对高技术企业的探索式创新起正向促进作用,而高管薪酬激励与探索式创新之间存在倒“U”型关系;政府干预在高管股权激励和探索式创新之间起负向调节作用,并且政府干预和法制水平能够对高管薪酬激励与探索式创新的曲线关系产生显著的调节效应;进一步根据产权对样本进行分组划分,检验了组间主效应影响系数之间差异的显著性,结果表明,仅在国有高技术企业中,高管股权激励负向阻碍企业的探索式创新,而在非国有高技术企业中起正向促进作用。     

高管激励风险研究

本文探讨了实施高管薪酬激励时可能遇到的潜在风险,并对这些风险提出了规避的方法。     

高管报酬激励、战略并购重组与公司绩效——来自中国A股上市公司的实证

本文运用结构方程模型探究了高管报酬激励、战略并购重组与公司绩效间的作用关系路径。研究发现,高管年薪报酬对公司绩效的直接正向作用显著,高管持股报酬对公司绩效的直接正向作用不显著;在激励契约完备与不完备的前提下,不同高管报酬激励、战略并购重组、公司绩效之间作用路径及其显著水平不同,战略并购重组的中介作用及公司规模与公司性质调节作用也不相同。研究结果为为中国企业选择高管报酬激励方式、进一步完善公司治理结构提供实证支持。     

董事激励与公司业绩--实验的证据

我们在实验框架下检验了董事会成员的激励对股东财富和CEO报酬的影响,以及该报酬与公司业绩之间的敏感度.文中提出了两种任命董事的方法,一种由CEO任命,另一种由最大的股东自动担任董事.由董事会决定CEO的报酬,而CEO负责企业的生产、投资和分红决策.投资者根据接收到的每个公司的分红、资本收益这些信息,通过买卖这些企业的股票来调整他们的资产组合. 我们发现,薪酬与业绩之间的敏感度随董事持股比例的增加而上升.此外,当大股东作为董事会成员时,经济体所产生的财富(股东财富是其中的一部分)更大;而当CEO选择董事时,结果是缺乏效率的.本文讨论了关于董事职能和相关代理成本这一研究结果,以及标准会计框架下,限制执行人员报酬和报表标准化要求.     

高管薪酬差距、治理模式和企业创新

考虑《报废机动车回收拆解管理条例》中涉及再制造的相关建议,研究了汽车生产商和汽车拆解商之间的报废汽车回收拆解合作决策问题.依据新车和再制造车的需求替代关系,构建四种合作模式下的汽车生产商和拆解商的博弈模型,比较分析了各模式下报废汽车回收拆解的再制造效果、环境影响以及双方利润.结果表明:双方完全深度合作时不能保证再制造汽车产量和再制造率的提高;制造商不提供技术支持时,拆解商按再制造要求实施拆解可降低两类汽车产品对环境的影响,且可提高回收拆解活动的环境效果;《报废机动车回收拆解管理条例》的实施会降低拆解商的利润,但可采用补偿策略促进两方的深度合作.     

高管薪酬的治理作用研究

高级管理人员的薪酬制度是解决基于代理行为而产生的问题,是使经营者行为符合所有人期望的有效制度。本文研究了高管薪酬对公司治理发挥作用的理论基础和作用机制,旨在于解释高管薪酬的治理作用,如何借助合理的薪酬制定,使高管的行为与所有者的期望趋于一致,以确保公司的可持续发展。     

高管激励与公司税负关系的实证分析

随着高管激励的增强,高管甘愿冒更大风险以达到避税动机,直接表现是企业实际税负水平降低,本文的实证检验验证了这一理论判断。因此,公司应当加强内部监管,抑制高管过度操纵税负的行为,政府监管部门要强化会计信息披露的深度和广度,税收部门则应进一步提高治理机制。     

高管与员工:激励有效性之比较与互动

高管和职工皆为企业价值创造者,皆是重要的须激励的人力资源。已有研究更多地集中于高管激励的研究,研究职工激励的少,更加缺乏将两者加以结合进行研究的。对于激励高管还是激励职工哪个更有效,以及两者之间的互动关系,既有研究没有给予足够的关注。本文以我国上市公司为样本,分析了企业对两类人力资源的激励效果比较及其互动关系。研究发现,高管和职工薪酬均对企业业绩反应敏感,并且高管的薪酬业绩敏感性显著高于职工,说明两类激励对未来业绩增长都具有积极作用。并且,职工对企业未来业绩的积极作用高于高管;高管与职工薪酬变化同步性越强,对未来业绩的积极作用越明显。本文首次研究了高管与职工激励效果的比较及其互动关系,拓展了激励领域的研究。     

高管权力、审计委员会专业性与内部控制缺陷

本文以2009-2012年沪市A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了高管权力是否会干预审计委员会专业性对内部控制的监控效力。研究发现,专业的审计委员会有助于提高上市公司内部控制质量;进一步研究发现,高管权力会干预审计委员会专业性作用的发挥,随着高管权力的增加,审计委员会专业性对内部控制的监控作用将被削弱。     

熊彼特竞争,交叉效应与创新激励

论文引入行业熊彼特竞争,基于技术原创性与市场原创性,纳入技术与市场专业人员努力的交叉效应,研究创新激励合约的时间长度、激励实现的组织形式与创新团队剩余索取权分成系数的选择.研究显示:1)当不存在委托代理问题时,技术与市场专业人员的整合总是创新团队组织的优化选择;2)创新团队的组织形式对企业创新对象的复杂性选择与剩余索取权分配不产生影响;3)行业熊彼特竞争强度、创新原创性与创新激励合约时间长度负相关;4)交叉效应与技术和市场原创性3者的关系决定了最优创新激励的组织形式.研究提高了创新团队管理的可操作性,强化了创新激励对行业竞争的响应性.     

The influence of executive age,career horizon and incentives on pre-turnover earnings management

In this paper we hypothesize that CEOs will be motivated to manage earnings prior to a turnover decision. This motivation comes from the horizon problem for CEOs nearing retirement age and for CEOs whose profit-based bonus is a large portion of their total compensation. We find that firms in which CEOs are nearing retirement age have large discretionary accruals in the year prior to turnover. Although we find firms with a larger proportion of profit-based bonus pay have larger discretionary accruals, this result is not robust with the inclusion of control variables in the regressions.

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Risk incentives of executive stock options for undiversified managers

The starting point of this paper is twofold. First, managers are often undiversified. Second, an increase in systematic risk could increase the market’s discount rate and consequently effect a contemporaneous change in the underlying stock’s market price. The paper makes comparative static analyses of these circumstances by using Meulbroek’s (Financ Manag 30:5–44, 2001) executive stock option model together with the dividend discount model, and shows that options do not provide incentive to increase the proportion of systematic risk to firm-specific risk, as commonly argued. The paper also demonstrates that the option’s value to the manager can be monotone decreasing, but may also show an inverted U-shape with respect to firm-specific risk. The option’s value exhibits a similar pattern against the total risk. In addition, the study finds that total risk incentives may under some conditions lower the shareholder value; executive options may thus encourage managers to act against principals’ interests.     

Hospital medical directors, quality of care, and financial returns

You are a physician executive working very hard within a hospital on all sorts of medical staff issues and quality of care. You answer to the board. The latter, through its administrators, may still have difficulty documenting the precise value of a full-time physician executive. Your hospital is losing money or not making enough profit for capital expenditures and salary raises. It is considering or will have to consider staff cuts. What can you do that will influence the bottom line, produce a quality image, and quantify your value?     

The compensation of non-executive directors: rationale,form, and findings

Corporate governance guidelines in many countries do not specify the determinants of non-executive director compensation and the empirical evidence has only briefly and indirectly addressed this issue. We show that this question is fundamentally complex because (a) whilst the roles of non-executive directors are relatively well stated, their actual contributions remain unclear, (b) governance codes have not discussed the ways in which non-executive directors should undertake their roles and (c) non-executive director contribution may be unobservable. As a result, their efforts, contribution and/or performance are difficult to measure. Nevertheless, we find the literature related to non-executive directors strongly supportive of some sort of remuneration that is a function of performance and effort to align non-executive directors with their duties and make boards more efficient in undertaking their duties.     

Team incentives,task assignment,and performance: A field experiment

The performance of a work team commonly depends on the effort exerted by the team members as well as on the division of tasks among them. However, when leaders assign tasks to team members, performance is usually not the only consideration. Favouritism, employees' seniority, employees' preferences over tasks, and fairness considerations often play a role as well. Team incentives have the potential to curtail the role of these factors in favor of performance — in particular when the incentive plan includes both the leader and the team members. This paper presents the results of a field experiment designed to study the effects of such team incentives on task assignment and performance. We introduce team incentives in a random subsets of 108 stores of a Dutch retail chain. We find no effect of the incentive, neither on task assignment nor on performance.     

市场非有效与公司投机及过度融资

构建了一个模型,讨论非有效的股票市场对上市公司控股股东或管理层过度融资与短期实业投机行为的影响.并针对具体因素采用比较静态的方法,分析非有效市场对管理层投机程度的影响及其经济意义.发现:公司管理层会在真实内在价值的实业投资和短期投机之间权衡.1)当实业投资回报比较高时,即使市场非有效程度比较高,公司管理层也不会采取投机活动;当实业竞争激烈,收益相对于投机过低时,会选择短期投机.2)当多余的融资大到某种程度时,会影响公司管理者投资行为,他们会花一部分功夫去迎合外部投资者,而且在迎合上所下的功夫随着多余的融资的增大而增大.     

Knowledge, innovation and share value

Knowledge–based enterprises (KBEs) are difficult to value owing to the relatively greater importance of their intangible assets, such as human capital and investment in innovation. Traditional valuation models rely on variables such as earnings, dividends and assets, which, for many KBEs, are either non–existent or are distorted by differing accounting practices. This paper reviews the various attempts by practitioners and academics to overcome these difficulties by such devices as different proxies for the valuation variables or different forms of the valuation equations. We then examine some theoretical approaches that provide novel approaches to valuation. Finally, we discuss the notion of the 'fuzzy firm', where traditional corporate boundaries have become amorphous, with the result that the firms require new valuation methodologies.     

CEO proactiveness,innovation, and firm performance

Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are essential in driving firm innovation. However, despite existing research on CEO personality characteristics and firm innovation and performance, we know relatively little about how personality characteristics reflecting anticipatory action and strong outcome-oriented components, such as proactiveness, shape firm innovation and performance. We explore the relationship between CEO proactiveness and three facets of organizational innovation, as well as its impact on firm performance. We suggest that CEO proactiveness is manifested in different network-building, problem-solving, and feedback-seeking behaviors with different implications for exploratory innovation, exploitative innovation, and organizational ambidexterity, and that its effect on firm performance is partially mediated by organizational ambidexterity. By examining the influence of this important CEO personality characteristic on key firm strategic choices and performance, we extend research on strategic leadership and firm innovation and performance.     

Spirituality and the physician executive

The "s" word can now be spoken without flinching in health care organizations. Spirituality is becoming a common topic in management conferences around the world. Many U.S. corporations are recognizing the role of spirituality in creating a new humanistic capitalism that manages beyond the bottom line. Spirituality refers to a broad set of principles that transcend all religions. It is the relationship between yourself and something larger, such as the good of your patient or the welfare of the community. Spirituality means being in right relationship to all that is and understanding the mutual interdependence of all living beings. Physician executives should be primary proponents of spirituality in their organizations by: Modeling the power of spirituality in their own lives; integrating spiritual methodologies into clinical practice; fostering an integrative approach to patient care; encouraging the organization to tithe its profits for unmet community health needs; supporting collaborative efforts to improve the health of the community; and creating healing environments.