新鲜产品跨季销售中的动态库存管理策略研究

新鲜产品在跨季销售过程中不可避免地发生变质，给分销商带来较大的风险。本文基于一个两阶段决策模型来帮助分销商动态管理库存，在考虑产品质量随机变化的情形下更好地匹配供给与需求。具体来说，在采摘季节确定采购的总数量；在销售季节结合产品新鲜度的演变以及剩余库存水平的变化动态地决策每周期的销售量，以实现期望利润的最大化。我们采用动态规划模型分析销售期的库存管理决策，刻画了利润函数和最优决策的结构性质，并考察了库存量、新鲜度水平和价格等参数对最优库存决策的影响。数值实验结果表明，当产品变质风险大、需求不确定性低时，动态库存管理策略相比静态策略的利润改进效果更为显著。     

基于消费者选择行为的生鲜农产品保鲜和定价策略研究

针对生鲜农产品易变质的特性以及消费者偏好的多样性,构建了价格和新鲜度影响下的消费者时变选择模型,基于零售商所面临的初始订货数量变化或潜在市场容量变化,分析了零售商对于生鲜农产品的最优定价及最优保鲜投入。结果表明,当潜在市场容量较小时,零售商通过保鲜所获得的利润增加值、最优定价及最优保鲜投入均随着初始订货量的增加而减小;当潜在市场容量较大时,零售商的保鲜利润增加值和最优定价仍然随着初始订货量的增加而减小,但最优保鲜投入却随着初始订货量的增加而增大。     

考虑消费者效用与保鲜的生鲜农产品EOQ模型

针对生鲜农产品新鲜度随时间减小的特点,构造受生鲜农产品新鲜度和零售价格影响的消费者时变效用函数,分析了消费者在不同时刻够买生鲜农产品的效用和数量的变化,并基于此建立了消费者偏好影响需求的生鲜农产品EOQ模型;以提高消费者效用为目的,分析了两种不同保鲜情形下零售商的最优订货决策和最优保鲜投入。研究发现,零售商的最优保鲜投入并不能使消费者效用最大化,满足消费者对生鲜农产品新鲜度的要求必须依靠政府的宏观调控。     

不同贸易模式下生鲜农产品供应链冷链物流服务与定价决策

针对生鲜农产品跨境贸易模式选择以及保鲜问题，本文在考虑冷链物流服务的基础上，基于FOB、CIF和DAP三种贸易模式分别构建了生鲜农产品供应链Stackelberg博弈模型。研究表明：不管冷链物流服务价格为外生参数还是内生变量，供应商、分销商以及第三方物流商在FOB、CIF以及DAP贸易模式下都存在唯一最优的均衡策略；当冷链物流服务价格为外生参数时，不存在严格占优的贸易模式使供应商、分销商和第三方物流商的利润同时达到最大；但当冷链服务价格为内生变量时，存在帕累托改善区间，使得DAP贸易模式严格优于FOB和CIF贸易模式，且此时DAP贸易模式下的冷链物流服务水平也高于FOB和CIF贸易模式下的冷链物流服务水平。数值分析不仅验证了理论模型性质，而且还进一步显示，随着冷链物流生产力水平的提升，冷链物流服务水平随之提高，同时给供应链各方带来了更多的利润。本文的研究能够为生鲜农产品供应链跨境贸易模式的选择以及冷链物流服务水平决策提供理论依据。     

随机需求下生鲜电商供应链物流合作与运营决策

物流服务合作对生鲜电商供应链订货定价决策与产品保鲜水平具有重要影响。基于物流服务商独立运营、与供应商合作、与电商平台合作三种物流合作模式分析,分别构建考虑市场随机需求与保鲜努力的生鲜电商供应链运营决策模型,对比探讨不同模式下的产品定价、产品保鲜努力与市场需求,并结合数值算例分析生鲜电商市场需求预测与供应链成员合作模式偏好。研究结果表明：物流合作能有效分担物流保鲜成本与市场预测风险,降低产品零售价格,提高物流保鲜努力水平;独立运营模式下生鲜电商应采取较保守的产品订货策略,而合作运营模式下可适当提高产品订货量;两种合作经营模式可提高合作企业利润与供应链整体利润,利润合理分配是成员企业合作经营的关键。     

基于新鲜度的冷链一体化库存与定价联合决策

为了揭示生鲜农产品在流通中质量与数量损耗的变化规律,分析"双重损耗"对冷链库存的影响,针对配送中心与零售商组成的两级冷链系统,引入保鲜努力与时间因素对生鲜农产品的数量与质量损耗进行刻画,尤其突显了二者间的关联性及其合理性,需求上综合考虑了价格与新鲜度的影响,以供应链总平均利润最大化为目标函数,建立了二级冷链一体化库存模型,并对系统最佳的保鲜投入、库存及定价进行了规划求解。随后,以某连锁超市销售的鲜切果蔬为例进行仿真,验证了模型的有效性。最后,灵敏度分析发现,一方面,系统利润会随着新鲜度时间敏感性的降低与保鲜努力敏感性的增加而增加,且时间敏感因子更容易左右系统利润的变化。另一方面,并非所有的生鲜农产品都适用打折促销。考虑商品"双重损耗"所做的库存与定价的优化分析不仅为生鲜农产品冷链的理论研究提供了新思路,也为冷链运作实践提供了更为可靠、更为有效的决策参考。     

考虑期权合同供应链的零售商订货研究

文章讨论了面向随机需求的两个独立的零售商.由于生产提前期长而销售期短,零售商通过期权合同从供应商订货.在销售期初,零售商可根据市场需求通过与另外一个零售商进行期权交易来调整自己的库存.讨论了期权交易对零售商最优订货和最大利润的影响,得到考虑期权合同的零售商的最优订货存在唯一的纳什均衡解,零售商的最优订货是期权交易价格的增函数.有期权交易的零售商的最大期望利润高于不进行期权交易的零售商的最大期望利润.当零售商面临相同的市场结构时,存在唯一的最优期权交易价格,并且有期权交易的零售商的最优订货高于没有期权交易的零售商的最优订货.当零售商面临相同的正态需求分布时,零售商的最优订货和最大期望利润是需求相关系数的减函数.     

两种订货模式下订购和促销联合优化策略

本文基于CVaR决策准则,通过构建需求依赖于促销的一般需求模型,其中包括加法和乘法需求模型作为特例,考察了一次订货和允许紧急订货两种模式下风险厌恶零售商关于促销和库存的联合优化问题。讨论了紧急订购成本、风险厌恶以及市场需求变动对最优策略的影响,并对两种模式下零售商的最优策略和收益进行了比较分析,结果表明:在两种订货模式下,零售商的最优订购量和促销努力均随风险厌恶程度的增大而降低;紧急订货模式下的促销努力和实现的收益大于一次订货模式,且在加法需求模型下,紧急订货模式下的初次订购量小于一次订货模式的最优订购量。运用随机变量一阶和二阶交替随机占优的概念刻画了市场需求变动下零售商如何调整最优策略的充分条件。最后实施数值实验验证了理论分析结果。     

产品召回供应链中线性保险合约与订货决策

考虑一个由单供应商和单制造商组成的二级供应链,在不确定市场需求情形下考虑产品召回,站在制造商角度研究供应链线性保险合约下的最优订货决策以及最优线性保险合约决策。研究表明,最优的订货决策与产品召回概率以及线性保险系数相关,存在唯一的最优订货量来最大化制造商的利润。对于密度函数倒数的导数较大的一般需求分布函数,最优的线性保险系数与线性保险合约的固定费用以及产品召回概率有关。当产品召回概率和线性保险合约的固定费用均较小时或者产品召回概率较大但线性保险合约的固定费用适中时,制造商通过选择线性保险合约可以改善自己的利润。     

基于信息更新与服务水平约束的供应链订货及协调决策

研究由一个供应商和一个零售商及一组顾客组成的单周期供应链系统。供应商向零售商提供两次订 货机会,零售商根据第一阶段的订货情况及市场信号,对需求信息进行更新预测,确定第二阶段是否需要补货。首先,通过分析顾客购买与退货决策,确定产品的最优零售价格与退货价格。其次,对零售商的订 货策略进行研究,以两阶段利润之和最大化为目标函数,引入服务水平约束,确定了零售商第一阶段和第 二阶段的最优订货量,并探讨了市场信号和服务水平约束对零售商最优订货策略及期望利润的影响。结果表明,当目标服务水平设定较低时,零售商的订货策略与不设定服务水平约束时的情形相同;但是无论是高目标服务水平还是低目标服务水平,若二次订货时点上的市场信号为低值时,零售商无需二次订货,而若此时点的市场信号为高值时,零售商需要进行二次订货,目标服务水平的高低将对第二次的订货量产生影响。最后,证明了基于差别定价的回购契约能够实现上述供应链系统的协调。     

考虑保鲜努力与数量/质量弹性的农产品三级供应链协调优化

以供应具有季节性的农产品为研究对象,研究了由农户-第三方物流供应商（TPLP）-零售商组成的三级供应链协调问题。将农产品的数量和质量损耗均视为TPLP保鲜努力的内生变量,分别建立了分散与集中决策模式下的动态博弈模型。分析表明分散决策模式下供应链各成员的决策会导致产品销售量和销售价格扭曲,严重影响供应链绩效。针对三级供应链中的两个交易过程,并基于对系统中相关决策变量的变化及影响因素分析,分别设计了成本分担和收益共享协调契约,并论证了在一定条件下该组合协调机制可以显著扩大农产品的销售量,实现供应链各成员收益的帕累托改进。最后,通过算例验证了文章结论,并分析了努力水平对不同农产品质量和数量损耗的改善程度（数量/质量弹性）对农产品三级供应链决策及协调效果的影响。     

考虑保鲜努力与增值服务的生鲜电商供应链最优决策与协调

针对一个生鲜电商与一个生鲜供应商组成的供应链，其中生鲜电商负责销售农产品并提供增值服务，而生鲜供应商负责农产品的保鲜配送。考虑保鲜努力与服务水平均会影响生鲜农产品的市场需求，通过构建集中式与分散式下的生鲜电商供应链决策模型，分析了新鲜度需求弹性、服务需求弹性等因素对最优决策的影响，并对比分析了分散式与集中式决策下的最优决策。在此基础上，设计了"收益共享-双向成本分担"契约，通过合理设计契约参数实现了生鲜电商供应链的完美协调与帕累托改进。最后，进一步深入分析了供应链在协调前后的最优决策变化，并用数值算例进行了考察与验证。研究发现：供应链在协调后必然会提高产品新鲜度与服务水平，但可能会导致更低或更高的生鲜农产品销售价格。当新鲜度需求弹性与服务需求弹性较低时，生鲜电商在协调后会制定相对更低的产品价格，实施"优质低价"策略；而在新鲜度需求弹性或服务需求弹性高于某一水平时，生鲜电商在协调后会制定相对更高的产品价格，实施"优质优价"策略。     

Supply Chain Management of Fresh Products with Producer Transportation*

This article considers a class of fresh‐product supply chains in which products need to be transported by the upstream producer from a production base to a distant retail market. Due to high perishablility a portion of the products being shipped may decay during transportation, and therefore, become unsaleable. We consider a supply chain consisting of a single producer and a single distributor, and investigate two commonly adopted business models: (i) In the “pull” model, the distributor places an order, then the producer determines the shipping quantity, taking into account potential product decay during transportation, and transports the products to the destination market of the distributor; (ii) In the “push” model, the producer ships a batch of products to a distant wholesale market, and then the distributor purchases and resells to end customers. By considering a price‐sensitive end‐customer demand, we investigate the optimal decisions for supply chain members, including order quantity, shipping quantity, and retail price. Our research shows that both the producer and distributor (and thus the supply chain) will perform better if the pull model is adopted. To improve the supply chain performance, we propose a fixed inventory‐plus factor (FIPF) strategy, in which the producer announces a pre‐determined inventory‐plus factor and the distributor compensates the producer for any surplus inventory that would otherwise be wasted. We show that this strategy is a Pareto improvement over the pull and push models for both parties. Finally, numerical experiments are conducted, which reveal some interesting managerial insights on the comparison between different business models.     

Optimization and Coordination of Fresh Product Supply Chains with Freshness‐Keeping Effort

We consider a supply chain in which a distributor procures from a producer a quantity of a fresh product, which has to undergo a long‐distance transportation to reach the target market. During the transportation process, the distributor has to make an appropriate effort to preserve the freshness of the product, and his success in this respect impacts on both the quality and quantity of the product delivered to the market. The distributor has to determine his order quantity, level of freshness‐keeping effort, and selling price, by taking into account the wholesale price of the producer, the cost of the freshness‐keeping effort, the likely spoilage of the product during transportation, and the possible demand for the product in the market. The producer, on the other hand, has to determine the wholesale price based on its effect on the order quantity of the distributor. We develop a model to study this problem, and characterize each party's optimal decisions in both decentralized and centralized systems. We further develop an incentive scheme to facilitate coordination between the two parties. Computational results are reported to show the effects of freshness‐keeping efforts.     

Fresh-product supply chain management with logistics outsourcing

We consider a supply chain in which a producer supplies a fresh product, through a third-party logistics (3PL) provider, to a distant market where a distributor purchases and sells it to end customers. The product is perishable, both the quantity and quality of which may deteriorate during the process of transportation. The market demand is random, sensitive to the selling price as well as the freshness of the product. We derive the optimal decisions for the three supply chain members, including the 3PL provider's transportation fee, the producer's shipping quantity and wholesale price, and the distributor's purchasing quantity and retail price. We find that the presence of the 3PL provider in the supply chain has a significant impact on its performance. We propose an incentive scheme to coordinate the supply chain. The scheme consists of two contracts, including a wholesale-market clearance (WMC) contract between the producer and the distributor, and a wholesale-price-discount sharing (WDS) contract between the producer and the 3PL provider. We show that the proposed contracts can eliminate the two sources of “double marginalization” that exist in the three-tier supply chain, and induce the three parties to act in a coordinated way.     

促进低碳产品需求的供应链减排成本分担模型

减排成本的存在,导致低碳产品的零售价格偏高,市场需求偏低,从而制约低碳产品的推广。以此为背景,针对单一制造商和单一零售商构成的双边垄断供应链,建立了基于减排成本分担契约的Stackelberg模型,分析比较了有、无减排成本分担契约两种情况下订货量、供应链各成员利润及供应链整体利润变化。研究发现,引入减排成本分担契约后,低碳产品最优订货量增加,零售价格降低,且在一定条件下制造商和零售商的利润得到帕累托改进,并推导出了制造商和零售商的参与约束和最优分担率。在此基础上,进一步分析了消费者对低碳产品的认知与零售商的产品订货量、供应链整体利润呈正相关关系,与制造商承担的减排成本分担率呈负相关关系。最后结合数值分析验证了成本分担契约的有效性。     

Impacts of demand uncertainty on retailer's dominance and manufacturer-retailer supply chain cooperation

Recent studies in marketing and distribution channels have shown that the balance of power between manufacturers and retailers is shifting. Based on this observation, we investigate a two-echelon supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer in this paper. We first develop retailer-dominant non-cooperative game models by introducing a sensitivity of retailer's order quantity to manufacturer's wholesale price; then we analyze two cooperative scenarios, in which the Nash bargaining model is utilized to implement profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Under the assumption that the manufacturer and the retailer are risk-neutral, we find that the manufacturer and the retailer can bargain to cooperate at any level of retail-market demand uncertainty with exogenous retail price. However, the cooperation is conditional on retail-market demand uncertainty with endogenous retail price: it can be implemented if the fluctuation of retail-market demand is relatively small, and the measure of retail-market demand uncertainty does not exceed an upper bound. Theoretical and numerical analyses show that the retailer's dominance over the manufacturer increases with the increase in the sensitivity of retailer's order quantity to manufacturer's wholesale price under a limitation of retail-market demand uncertainty. Numerical analyses also show that the retailer's dominance decreases with the increase in retail-market demand uncertainty.     

Demand uncertainty and manufacturer returns policies for style-good retailing competition

This paper investigates the role of the returns policy in the co-ordination of supply chain: A manufacturer provides a return policy for unsold goods to two competing retailers who face uncertain demand. The problem is described with a game theory structure: The manufacturer, as the Stackelberg leader, first commits a returns price to the retailers under a given wholesale price. Upon receiving this information, two competing retailers, as followers, make decisions for their retail price and order size, in which the process of pricing and ordering is played as Nash equilibrium. Anticipated the retailers’ responses, the manufacturer designs his returns policy. Adopting the classic newsboy problem model framework and using numerical study methods, the study finds that the provision of a returns policy is dependent on the market conditions faced by the retailers. The paper also analyses the impact of demand variability on the decisions of optimal retail price and order quantity and profit reallocation between the manufacturer and the retailers. Finally, it investigates how the competing factor influences the decision-making of supply chain members in response to uncertain demand and profit variability.     

混合需求下考虑专利保护因素的闭环供应链定价与协调

在新产品需求为随机需求,再制造产品需求受销售价格影响的混合需求条件下,以博弈论为主要工具,研究了受专利保护的再制造闭环供应链的定价与协调问题,分析了集中决策和分散决策两种情形下的新产品最优订购量、废旧产品最优回收价格、最优专利许可费用、再制造品最优零售价格以及供应链的最优利润,并通过收益分享一费用分担契约对闭环供应链系统进行了协调,并通过数值算例验证了集中决策和分散决策情形下再制造成本节约对供应链成员的最优决策和利润的影响,以及收益分享.费用分担契约对闭环供应链的协调效果。研究表明再制造受专利保护的情况下,原制造商能通过专利许可费来影响第三方再制造商回收的废旧产品的回收价格和回收量,进而去影响原制造商和第三方再制造商的收益。     

Contracting and Coordination under Asymmetric Production Cost Information

We analyze a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier's unit production cost, which characterizes his type, is only privately known to him. When trading with the retailer, the supplier demands a reservation profit that depends on his unit production cost. We model this problem as a game of adverse selection. In this model, the retailer offers a menu of contracts, each of which consists of two parameters: the ordering quantity and the supplier's share of the channel profit. We show that the optimal contract depends critically on a surrogate measure—the ratio of the types’ reservation profit differential to their production cost differential. An important implication from our analysis is that information asymmetry alone does not necessarily induce loss in channel efficiency. The optimal contract can coordinate the supply chain as long as the low‐cost supplier's cost efficiency is neither much overvalued nor much undervalued in the outside market. We further discuss the retailer's preference of the supplier's type under different market conditions, as well as evaluate the effects of the supplier's reservation profit, the retail price, and the demand uncertainty on the optimal contract.