An analysis of safety culture attitudes in a highly regulated environment

Culture is a complex construct in organizations, consisting of attitudes, perceptions, values and beliefs, which must necessarily be set in context. Many authors imply that culture is organization-wide and common to all employees. In terms of safety culture, the organizational context may determine its salience and likelihood of affecting behaviour, especially in a highly regulated environment such as the nuclear industry. This study investigates the components of safety culture and how it varies in a highly-regulated nuclear power plant. A 60-item questionnaire measuring safety attitudes and values was administered anonymously to 1550 employees at two plants in the UK nuclear industry, with a 64.7% mean response rate. Principal components analyses revealed six factors conceptually common to shop floor and management (supervisor/manager/professional) groups for both plants, relating to: management style and communication; responsibility and commitment; risk-taking; job satisfaction; complacency; and risk awareness. A canonical discriminant analysis of the items suggested that the data could distinguish three employee groups. The implications of these findings and the proposal that there are two or more safety cultures in the organization is discussed.     

Modelling safety climate in the prediction of levels of safety activity

This study examined the architecture of the relationships between components of organizational safety climate, including employee attitudes to safety issues and perceptions of the work environment, and related this to self-reported levels of safety activity. Data were collected from a large multinational manufacturing organization by questionnaire. A total of 915 valid questionnaires were returned and formed the basis for structural equation modelling and subsequent analyses. These data showed that a common structure, or architecture, of attitudes to safety issues and perceptions of the work environment could be constructed that explained levels of safety activity. The strength of employees' attitudes with regard to safety management played a pivotal role in this model through both direct and indirect paths. This is consistent with earlier findings on the importance of management commitment in organizations with well developed safety cultures. An examination of the differences between plants/sites showed that employees differed in their attitudes to safety issues, such as the management of safety and communication, and in their perceptions of workplace hazards. It is intended that this model be further utilized within the organization under study as a basis for monitoring safety performance and planned improvements in safety.     

Measuring safety climate on offshore installations

The human and organizational factors affecting safety were examined on 10 offshore installations using the Offshore Safety Questionnaire. The questionnaire contained scales measuring work pressure and work clarity, job communication, safety behaviour, risk perception, satisfaction with safety measures and safety attitudes. A total of 722 UK offshore workers (33% response rate) from a range of occupations completed and returned the questionnaire. The 'safety climates' on the various installations were characterized by most respondents feeling 'safe' with respect to a range of offshore hazards and expressing 'satisfaction' with safety measures. Respondents reported little risk-taking behaviour and felt positive about levels of work clarity and job communication. There was a wider diversity of opinions on the safety attitudes scale, indicating a lack of a positive, concerted 'safety culture' and more evidence for a range offragmented 'safety subcultures', which varied mainly as a function of seniority, occupation, age, shift worked and prior accident involvement. It is suggested that the interaction between these differing subcultures partly determines the prevailing 'safety climate' on any given installation. The UK oil and gas industry is now trying to improve its safety culture through the 'Stepchange' initiative, which hias set itself three main targets for the year 2000 : a 50 YO improvement in the industry's safety performance; safety performance contracts demonstrating leadership's personal concern for safety as an equal to business performance and encouraging industry members to work together to improve sharing of safety information and good practice. It is suggested that the existence of a strong, cohesive culture with respect to safety is not necessarily beneficial, possibly leading to 'dry rot' and complacency. A healthy culture may be represented by a range of assumptions, values, norms and expectations as reflected in employees' differing experiences of safety climate.     

Risk, Trust, and Safety Culture in U.K. Train Operating Companies

Organizational safety culture reflects the attitudes and behaviors that individuals share in considering and reacting to hazards and risks. We first argue that trust is an underdeveloped and important concept in relation to theories of safety culture and high-reliability organizations. The article then reports findings from a two-year qualitative study of train operating companies (TOCs) in the United Kingdom, which sought to explore in detail the linkages between safety culture and the postprivatized railway industry. In-depth interviews and focus groups were carried out with a sample of over 500 employees, from four organizations, and representing all key functional levels. Our analysis suggests that the 1993 privatization, and subsequent organizational restructuring of the U.K. railway industry, has had important repercussions for both safety culture and trust relationships. We explore our findings in relation to three key constructs within "safe organizations" theories (namely, flexibility, commitment, and learning), and discuss how the safe organization model might be usefully supplemented by a consideration of trust issues.     

Safety culture as an ongoing process: Culture surveys as opportunities for enquiry and change

In their efforts to enhance performance and use resources efficiently the nuclear power industry, along with many other industries, has turned to the improvement of 'culture'. This paper presents an example of one department at a nuclear power plant that faced an apparent problem with its safety culture. This department responded in a creative way that opened up possibilities for self-assessment and learning. In particular, although members of the department used a safety culture survey as a key part of self-assessment, the survey was understood to be an entry point into group interviews and collective discussions with change implications. The safety culture project revealed some surprises about the safety culture and work culture of the plant. In an atmosphere of mostly positive improvements following an earlier crisis, there were some issues that needed management attention. The safety culture survey and group interviews found that safety was not understood consistently and comprehensively, communications up and down the hierarchy were not always effective, and supervisors were being placed in weak positions without the resources to carry out their expanding roles. Management took steps to address these issues and continues to rely on a variety of feedback and communication mechanisms. It tends to hold these survey and enquiry techniques in reserve, as a reactive response when issues arise, although they could also be used as a periodic opportunity for dialogue.     

The structure of employee attitudes to safety: A European example

This paper concerns organizational safety culture and the structure or architecture of employee attitudes to safety as part of that culture. It begins by reviewing the somewhat scant literature relevant to this area, and then reports a study, conducted in a European company, which collected and factor analysed data on employee attitudes to safety. The framework provided for the study was that offered by Purdham (1984), and the results suggested that employees' attitudes to safety, within this company (across occupation/occupational level and country), could be mapped By five orthogonal factors: personal scepticism, individual responsibility, the safeness of the work environment, the effectiveness of arrangements for safety, and personal immunity. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed, and attention is drawn to their subsequent use in an intervention to enhance safety culture within the organization by attacking supervisors' attitudes to safety.     

Risk Perception Among Nuclear Power Plant Personnel: A Survey

This study investigated risk perception, well-being, and organizational commitment among nuclear power plant personnel. The study group, 428 employees from a nuclear power plant, completed a questionnaire which included the same questions as those in previous surveys on risk perception of lay persons and industrial workers. Hazards at work were not seen as a sizable problem by nuclear power plant personnel. The study group estimated the safety of nuclear power plants better and the possibility of a serious nuclear accident as more unlikely than the general public. Compared to employees in other industrial companies, the overall perceived risks at work among plant personnel did not exceed the respective perceptions of the reference groups. Risk-related attitudes did not explain well-being among plant personnel, but the relationship between the perceived probability of a serious nuclear accident at work and organizational commitment yielded to a significant correlation: Those plant workers who estimated the likelihood of an accident higher were less committed to the organization.     

Safety culture on the UK railway network

Safety culture is an important concept in understanding the involvement of organizations in accidents and as a tool in safety management. British Rail, the public sector company which ran the UK railway network until its privatization in April 1994, was criticized for its 'poor safety culture' following a major accident at Clapham Junction, London, in 1988, in which 35 lives were lost. Studies conducted after the accident have demonstrated that deficiencies in the organization's safety culture may be related to workers' negative perceptions of managers' commitment to safety. These perceptions underlie a lack of mutual trust between staff and managers, which has implications for the fostering of open and honest communications within the network, and for the development of a positive safety culture. Communication problems are likely to be compounded by the privatization of British Rail, which has involved the fragmentation of the network, with different bodies responsible for infrastructure maintenance and train operation. The repercussions of privatizing the railway network are discussed in the context of safety culture research.     

Knowledge and Risk Perception Among Nuclear Power Plant Employees

This is a study of knowledge, risk perception, and attitudes among nuclear power plant employees. A total of 236 persons participated, belonging to 10 different professional groups and working at two Swedish power plants. Job-related radiation risks were judged about average as compared to a number of other risks. On the whole, the participants in the study were satisfied with the measures of safety at work, but there were some exceptions to this rule, especially among those hired for temporary jobs through external contractors. The experience of job-related radiation risks was related to the level of knowledge about radiation and its risks: those who knew less experienced larger risks. General level of anxiety did not correlate with risk perception. The latter was accounted for mainly by perceived radiation risks. Job satisfaction was more strongly related to perceived conventional job risks than to nuclear risks. Risk ratings were related to how subjects defined the concept of risk. Those who stressed consequences as part of their risk definition gave higher risk ratings.     

Relationships between work-family culture and work attitudes at both the individual and the departmental level

There is a need to better understand the nature of work-family culture and its relationships with job-related outcomes. The main objective of this study was to investigate the associations between a supportive work-family culture and work attitudes (i.e., job satisfaction, work engagement, turnover intentions) at both the individual and work departmental level. Survey-based data were gathered from 52 Finnish work departments (1219 individuals) in the domains of health care, ICT, and the paper industry. Data were analysed via multilevel structural equation modelling. Work-family culture was assessed via managers’ supportiveness, organizational time demands, and the expected career consequences of taking up work-family-related benefits. The results showed, first, that employees in the same work department shared similar perceptions of the department's work-family culture and work attitudes; second, the perceptions of the work-family culture shared within the work department as well as employees’ individual perceptions of it were associated with work attitudes. Thus, the positive effects of a supportive work-family culture on work attitudes were established at both the individual and work departmental levels.     

Strengthening Safety Compliance in Nuclear Power Operations: A Role‐Based Approach

Safety compliance is of paramount importance in guaranteeing the safe running of nuclear power plants. However, it depends mostly on procedures that do not always involve the safest outcomes. This article introduces an empirical model based on the organizational role theory to analyze the influence of legitimate sources of expectations (procedures formalization and leadership) on workers’ compliance behaviors. The sample was composed of 495 employees from two Spanish nuclear power plants. Structural equation analysis showed that, in spite of some problematic effects of proceduralization (such as role conflict and role ambiguity), procedure formalization along with an empowering leadership style lead to safety compliance by clarifying a worker's role in safety. Implications of these findings for safety research are outlined, as well as their practical implications.     

Safety sans Frontières: An International Safety Culture Model

The management of safety culture in international and culturally diverse organizations is a concern for many high‐risk industries. Yet, research has primarily developed models of safety culture within Western countries, and there is a need to extend investigations of safety culture to global environments. We examined (i) whether safety culture can be reliably measured within a single industry operating across different cultural environments, and (ii) if there is an association between safety culture and national culture. The psychometric properties of a safety culture model developed for the air traffic management (ATM) industry were examined in 17 European countries from four culturally distinct regions of Europe (North, East, South, West). Participants were ATM operational staff (n = 5,176) and management staff (n = 1,230). Through employing multigroup confirmatory factor analysis, good psychometric properties of the model were established. This demonstrates, for the first time, that when safety culture models are tailored to a specific industry, they can operate consistently across national boundaries and occupational groups. Additionally, safety culture scores at both regional and national levels were associated with country‐level data on Hofstede's five national culture dimensions (collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and long‐term orientation). MANOVAs indicated safety culture to be most positive in Northern Europe, less so in Western and Eastern Europe, and least positive in Southern Europe. This indicates that national cultural traits may influence the development of organizational safety culture, with significant implications for safety culture theory and practice.     

Competitive Goals and Plant Investment in Environment and Safety Practices: Moderating Effect of National Culture

Operations managers clearly play a critical role in targeting plant‐level investments toward environment and safety practices. In principle, a “rational” response would be to align this investment with senior management's competitive goals for operational performance. However, operations managers also are influenced by contingent factors, such as their national culture, thus creating potential tension that might bias investment away from a simple rational response. Using data from 1,453 plants in 24 countries, we test the moderating influence of seven of the national cultural characteristics on investment at the plant level in environment and safety practices. Four of the seven national cultural characteristics from GLOBE (i.e., uncertainty avoidance, in‐group collectivism, future orientation and performance orientation) shifted investment away from an expected “rational” response. Positive bias was evident when the national culture favored consistency and formalized procedures and rewarded performance improvement. In contrast, managers exhibited negative bias when familial groups and local coalitions were powerful, or future outcomes—rather than current actions—were more important. Overall, this study highlights the critical importance of moving beyond a naïve expectation that plant‐level investment will naturally align with corporate competitive goals for environment and safety. Instead, the national culture where the plant is located will influence these investments, and must be taken into account by senior management.     

The Role of Distrust in Offshore Safety Performance

Trust is recognized as a potentially important factor in safety within high-risk industries. However, little detailed empirical research has explored how trust operates in these contexts to influence worker safety performance. The present study addresses this by (i) identifying the target (occupational group) in which trust is most important for good safety, and (ii) establishing the "type" of trust (trust or distrust) with the greatest impact on safety performance. A questionnaire survey of 203 UK offshore gas workers' attitudes of trust and distrust toward four occupational groups (workmates, supervisors, offshore managers, and contractors) and an operating company was conducted. Logistic regression analysis identified attitudes toward offshore management as the strongest predictor of safety performance at an industry level. At an installation level, safety performance was best predicted by attitudes toward contractors and workmates. Further analysis revealed attitudes of distrust as better predictors of safety performance compared to attitudes of trust. These findings suggest that safety professionals should pay more attention to the role of distrust in safety performance. They also suggest that safety initiatives should target attitudes toward specific groups for optimal effectiveness.     

Perceived Nuclear Risk, Organizational Commitment, and Appraisals of Management: A Study of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel

This study examined to what extent nuclear risk perceptions, organizational commitment (OC), and appraisals of management are associated with each other among nuclear power plant personnel. The sample consisted of 428 nuclear power plant workers who completed a questionnaire at their workplace. Perceived nuclear risk and OC were most closely related to the appraisals of the top management of the organization. As the trust in and satisfaction with the top management increased, perceived nuclear safety and acceptance of the organizational goals and values heightened. This result is discussed in the context of industrial safety management.     

Managing Employee Compliance with Information Security Policies: The Critical Role of Top Management and Organizational Culture*

We develop an individual behavioral model that integrates the role of top management and organizational culture into the theory of planned behavior in an attempt to better understand how top management can influence security compliance behavior of employees. Using survey data and structural equation modeling, we test hypotheses on the relationships among top management participation, organizational culture, and key determinants of employee compliance with information security policies. We find that top management participation in information security initiatives has significant direct and indirect influences on employees’ attitudes towards, subjective norm of, and perceived behavioral control over compliance with information security policies. We also find that the top management participation strongly influences organizational culture which in turn impacts employees’ attitudes towards and perceived behavioral control over compliance with information security policies. Furthermore, we find that the effects of top management participation and organizational culture on employee behavioral intentions are fully mediated by employee cognitive beliefs about compliance with information security policies. Our findings extend information security research literature by showing how top management can play a proactive role in shaping employee compliance behavior in addition to the deterrence oriented remedies advocated in the extant literature. Our findings also refine the theories about the role of organizational culture in shaping employee compliance behavior. Significant theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Crossvergence and cultural tendencies: A longitudinal test of the Hong Kong,Taiwan and United States banking sectors

Cultural attitudes in two, sometimes assumed similar, regions of Greater China (Hong Kong and Taiwan) were compared and examined within the context of an often assumed, dissimilar region (the United States) for the banking industry during 1985 and 2000. The potentially dynamic nature of national culture, as opposed to a more static approach that is often assumed in management research using a Hofstede framework, is examined. The evidence of relative sample convergence, particularly in relation to collectivism and uncertainty avoidance, along with select, individual region static positions for cultural dimensions provide support for the crossvergence theory [Ralston, D., Holt, D, Terpstra, R., Kai-Cheng, Y., 1997. The impact of national culture and economic ideology on managerial work values: a study of the U.S., Russia, Japan and China. Journal of International Business Studies 28, 177–207]. Pragmatically the research suggests organizational policies and practices should be updated for maximum effectiveness in relation to crossverging realities and that culture is not static. Academically the research cautions use of approaches that rely on dated rankings for cultural indicators as a basis for current examination since relative cultural positions among regions and nations are also not static.     

The relationship between safety–production conflict and employee safety outcomes: Testing the impact of multiple organizational climates

Safety research is understandably dominated by studies examining the impact of organizational safety climate. Yet, other climates (e.g. service climate; productivity climate) that may also influence safety-related outcomes are rarely concurrently studied. Consequently, questions regarding how different organizational climates simultaneously affect employee safety attitudes and behaviours largely remain unanswered. Multilevel data collected from public transit employees indicated that safety–production conflict (SPC) was negatively related to accident-reporting attitudes and behavioural safety compliance. As expected, among employees in workgroups exhibiting a positive safety climate, the negative effect of SPC on behavioural safety compliance was attenuated. Moreover, a positive customer service climate reduced the negative effects of SPC on reporting attitudes; on the other hand, this relationship was exacerbated among workgroups with a high-productivity climate (i.e. those emphasizing on-time performance). The need for considering multiple aspects of an organizational climate is discussed in light of these results.