受访者推动抽样：研究隐藏人口的方法与实践

“隐藏人口”的特点是规模较小且成员一般不愿暴露身份，因此很难使用常规抽样方法对其进行研究。近年来出现了一种新的研究隐藏人口的方法——受访者推动抽样（RDS)方法，该方法在传统“雪球抽样”方法的基础上，结合社会网络分析的理论和方法，使研究者有可能根据样本对总体特征做出合理的推论。本文对RDS方法的理论渊源、基本思路、主要操作步骤和原理进行了简要介绍，并探讨了在实际操作过程中应注意的问题。     

土地经营规模“适度”之研究

实行土地规模经营，之所以要强调“适度”，是由我国的基本国情和农业劳动生产力的特点决定的。衡量土地经营规模“适度”的主要标志应是土地的利用率和产出率，同时“适度”又是个动态的概念，条件发生了变化，合理的“度”也要随之作出相应的调整     

论人性假设对思想道德教育的意义

在以伦理为本位的中国传统文化中，曾出现过各种人性假设，如性善论、性恶论、性无善无恶论、性有善有恶论等，这些人性假设，曾为推动我国封建社会伦理道德问题的讨论提供过很大帮助。无独有偶，在现代管理学发展过程中，西方一些管理学家根据不同管理理论的立论，也提出了各种各样的人性假设，影响较大的主要有“经济人”、“社会人”、“决策人”、“自我实现的人”以及“Ｘ理论”、“Ｙ理论”等。“经济人”的假设认为人的根本目的是为了追求最大限度的收益，其相应理论就是提高单位产量和支付高工资；“社会人”的假设认为人除了追求获…     

QAP：测量“关系”之间关系的一种方法

常规统计方法要求变量之间独立，而关系数据恰恰违背这个假设。如何测量关系之间的关系？QAP是可用的一种方法。本文介绍了QAP的原理，并通过UCINET用实际例子展示QAP相关和QAP回归的应用。QAP不但可以测量两种关系数据之间的回归，还可以测量相关，测量“属性数据”和“关系数据”之间的关系，该方法因而独具特色。     

论法律行为生效的“适法规范”——公法对法律行为效力的影响及其限度

违反强行法的法律行为无效是各国的共同规则，可称为法律行为生效的“适法规范”。强行法应仅指公法上的强行法，私法上的强行法是自治规范，违反它的效力最严重的不过是“不生效”而不是“无效”。违反公法的法律行为是否无效，必须探究公法的目的，并运用比例原则来限制对公法目的的解释，以进一步区分公法责任与私法责任。民法也不能排除地方性法规和行政规章的适用。违法和违反公序良俗的功能截然不同，两者不能统一。     

西部计划让大学生志愿服务插上腾飞的翅膀

从2003年6月起，团中央、教育部、财政部、人事部联合组织实施大学生志愿服务西部计划（以下简称“西部计划”），按照公开招募、自愿报名、组织选拔、集中派遣的工作方式，每年招募一定数量的普通高校应届毕业生到西部地区贫困县的乡镇从事1-2年的志愿服务丁作。“西部计划”的组织实施是团组织按照胡锦涛总书记提出的“三个创新”要求，贯彻落实科学发展观的重要举措，是团组织做为先进性群众组织服务党政工作，在工作思路、     

“最适度货币区理论”的演变及问题

本文认为“最适度货币区理论”劳是从关于最适度汇率制度的长期争论中衍生的,并对该理论的演变过程进行了较为详细的分析。作者指出,该理论的演变特点是:从偏重理论研究到注意实证分析,从一国汇率制度选择到国际汇率制度改革,从终极、理想化目标到复合而现实的目标,从偏重概念与命题的推敲到探索货币一体化的途径。最后,作者还就该理论存在的一些问题,如“最适度货币区”与“货币同盟”的关系,“共同货币”与“不可改变的固定汇率制”,“最适度贷币区”的范围等问题,作了初步的探讨。     

评合同法关于违约责任的规定

一、合同法规定的违约责任的特点我国过去制定的涉及合同的几部法律 ,都有关于违反合同的责任的规定。 1 986年制定的《民法通则》在第六章“民事责任”中的第二节规定了“违反合同的民事责任”。其内容主要为 :违约责任的承担不以主观过错为必备条件 ,承担违约责任的方式有赔偿损失、支持违约金。 1 981年制定的《经济合同法》第四章规定了“违反经济合同的责任” ,其中对违约责任的规定是以过错为前提的 ,是过错责任 ,承担违约责任的形式是违约金和赔偿金。 1 985年制定的《涉外经济合同法》第三章规定了“合同的履行和违反合同的责任” ,…     

山东省微山县：“爱心妈妈”与孤困儿童帮扶结对

近日,微山县开展了“手牵手、心连心”爱心妈妈与孤困儿童帮扶结对活动。在全县各机关企事业单位招募了150名有爱心、责任心和奉献精神的“爱心妈妈”,采取“一对一”,“多对一”,“多对多”等方式与孤儿、事实上无人抚养儿童、留守儿童结成帮扶对子。     

商业贿赂犯罪疑难问题的司法适用

《关于办理商业贿赂刑事案件适用法律若干问题的意见》对“谋取不正当利益”作出明确规定，但由于实践中“谋取不正当利益”形式的多样性，该司法解释的规定仍然过于原则，导致在具体案例适用中理解的差异，本文针对“谋取不正当利益”的规定提出细化适用的思考，即受贿人在接受行贿人财物后提供了违反法律、法规、规章、政策、行业规范规定的帮助，但行贿人没有提出要求的，不能认定为“谋取不正当利益”。同时，司法解释对医生构成商业贿赂犯罪在“为销售方谋取利益”方面的规定，与现行立法存在矛盾，降低了该罪的构成门槛，扩大了适用范围，值得商榷。     

Allais for all: Revisiting the paradox in a large representative sample

We administer the Allais paradox questions to both a representative sample of the Dutch population and to student subjects. Three treatments are implemented: one with the original high hypothetical payoffs, one with low hypothetical payoffs and a third with low real payoffs. Our key findings are: (i) violations in the non-lab sample are systematic and a large bulk of violations is likely to stem from non-familiarity with large payoffs, (ii) we can identify groups of the general population that have much higher than average violation rates; this concerns mainly the lowly educated and unemployed, and (iii) the relative treatment differences in the population at large are accurately predicted by the lab sample, but violation rates in all lab treatments are about 15 percentage points lower than in the corresponding non-lab treatments.     

Testing the Intransitivity Explanation of the Allais Paradox

This paper uses a two-dimensional version of a standard common consequence experiment to test the intransitivity explanation of Allais-paradox-type violations of expected utility theory. We compare the common consequence effect of two choice problems differing only with respect to whether alternatives are statistically correlated or independent. We framed the experiment so that intransitive preferences could explain violating behavior when alternatives are independent, but not when they are correlated. We found the same pattern of violation in the two cases. This is evidence against intransitivity as an explanation of the Allais Paradox. The question whether violations of expected utility are mainly due to intransitivity or to violation of independence is important since it is exactly on this issue the main new decision theories differ.     

Experts in experiments

An ever increasing number of experiments attempts to elicit risk preferences of a population of interest with the aim of calibrating parameters used in economic models. We are concerned with two types of selection effects, which may affect the external validity of standard experiments: Sampling from a narrowly defined population of students (??experimenter-induced selection??) and self-selection due to non-response or incomplete response of participants in a random sample from a broad population. We find that both types of selection lead to a sample of experts: Participants perform significantly better than the general population, in the sense of fewer violations of revealed preference conditions. Self-selection within a broad population does not seem to matter for average preferences. In contrast, sampling from a student population leads to lower estimates of average risk aversion and loss aversion parameters. Furthermore, it dramatically reduces the amount of heterogeneity in all parameters.     

Ancestral ambivalence and racial self-classification change

In survey research, race is often treated as an exogenous control variable, which assumes that response instability in racial self-classification represents random response instability only (error). With census figures suggesting that only 3% of Americans change their racial self-classification in the short-term, potential violations of this assumption may seem harmless. Advances in genetic research together with other factors, however, may render racial self-classification increasingly flexible in the future, which in turn may increase the risk of observing systematic response instability.     

When punishment is emotion‐driven: Children's,adolescents', and adults' costly punishment of unfair allocations

When do children, adolescents, and adults decide to punish fairness violations? Two studies with 9‐year‐old children, 13‐year‐old adolescents, and adults investigated whether the link between unfairness and punishment was mediated by negative emotional reactions (measured through galvanic skin responses and emotion ratings). Study 1 (N = 117) examined this question in the context of second‐party punishment, where the punisher is a direct victim of the violation. Study 2 (N = 119) assessed third‐party punishment, where the punisher is an observer, unaffected by the violation. In each study, participants were presented with seven distributions of points, which differed in how fairly the points were allocated between a proposer and receiver, and had to decide whether to punish these distributions. Although the unfairness of the distribution strongly influenced second‐ and third‐party punishment in all age groups, the mediating role of emotional appraisals (i.e., galvanic skin responses vs. emotion ratings) depended on whether or not the punisher was personally affected by the violation and age. Thus, negative emotions primarily motivate costly punishment when the punisher is affected by the violation or when an unaffected third‐party punisher takes the perspective of the victim of a violation, an ability that develops between childhood and adolescence.     

Testing the ‘standard’ model of stochastic choice under risk

Models of stochastic choice are intended to capture the substantial amount of noise observed in decisions under risk. We present an experimental test of one model, which many regard as the default—the Basic Fechner model. We consider one of the model’s key assumptions—that the noise around the subjective value of a risky option is independent of other features of the decision problem. We find that this assumption is systematically violated. However the main patterns in our data can be accommodated by a more recent variant of the Fechner model, or within the random preference framework.     

Individual and group decision making under risk: An experimental study of Bayesian updating and violations of first-order stochastic dominance

This paper reports the results of experiments designed to test whether individuals and groups abide by monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance and Bayesian updating when making decisions under risk. The results indicate a significant number of violations of both principles. The violation rate when groups make decisions is substantially lower, and decreasing with group size, suggesting that social interaction improves the decision-making process. Greater transparency of the decision task reduces the violation rate, suggesting that these violations are due to judgment errors rather than the preference structure. In one treatment, however, less complex decisions result in a higher error rates.

Media coverage of corporate malfeasance in the oil industry

Due to space, time and resource constraints, all potential news events cannot be reported in the media. This article examines the “reasonableness” of media coverage of the violations of the 25 largest U.S. oil firms on network news, in newsmagazines and in The Wall Street Journal. The size of firm, violation record of firm, and perceiced seriousness of offense are empirically assessed as alternative explanations of media coverage. Findings suggest that the perceived seriousness of oil-firm violations most adequately accounts for coverage across all media sources. However, the media source was determined to have a definite impact on the nature of the media coverage of corporate illegality.