The changing American family

This Bulletin documents recent changes in American family patterns resulting both from longterm trends in urbanization, industrialization, and economic growth and the disruption of the Great Depression and World War 2, as well as changed attitudes toward marriage, parenthood, divorce, and the roles of women. Following a postwar boom in the 1950s and 1960s, marriage rates have now fallen to levels observed in the early 20th century. Since 1970, the number of unmarried couples living together has more than tripled to 1.9 million in 1983. The divorce rate has now stabilized after more than doubling since 1960, but at the current level, 1/2 of all recent marriages will end in divorce. Most divorced persons remarry fairly quickly, often creating complex families of "step-relatives." With 19% of households with minor children now headed by a women with no husband present, up to 1/2 of all children will live for sometime in a fatherless family before age 18. Over 1/2 of all married women, including 49% of married mothers of preschool children, now hold a paid job outside the home. Working wives boost a family's income by an average 40% but still are expected to shoulder most responsiblility for home and childcare. White women now in their 20s say they expect to have an average of 2 children, but are delaying childbearing to such an extent that 29% could end up childless. Most of the elderly live on their own but usually near children whom they see frequently. Despite changes in traditional family patterns, Americans consistently report that a happy marriage and good family are the most important aspects of life. And though most Americans now live with few or no family members, they maintain active contact with a large network of family.     

The relationship of family planning to savings and consumption in Taiwan

This study relates fertility behavior to modern economic behavior, namely, saving and consumption of modern durables, for a sample of couples in Taiwan. It uses only couples who say they want no more children, and these couples are further classified by current use of contraception and by whether or not they already had excess fertility. Couples who are successful fertility planners, i.e., those who have no unwanted children and are current users of contraception, are distinctive with regard to modern economic behavior as compared to couples who do not use contraception or have excess fertility. Successful planners are more likely to save and to have more modern durables; these differentials remain when adjustments are made for the effects of family income, wife’s age, wife’s education, and duration of marriage. It seems that the kind of planning behavior which enables a couple to successfully plan their family size also enables them to manage their economic affairs so that they can save and enjoy more modern consumption goods.     

Intensive Parenting: Fertility and Breastfeeding Duration in the United States

Using 30 years of longitudinal data from a nationally representative cohort of women, we study the association between breastfeeding duration and completed fertility, fertility expectations, and birth spacing. We find that women who breastfeed their first child for five months or longer are a distinct group. They have more children overall and higher odds of having three or more children rather than two, compared with women who breastfeed for shorter durations or not at all. Expected fertility is associated with initiating breastfeeding but not with how long mothers breastfeed. Thus, women who breastfeed longer do not differ significantly from other breastfeeding women in their early fertility expectations. Rather, across the life course, these women achieve and even exceed their earlier fertility expectations. Women who breastfeed for shorter durations (1–21 weeks) are more likely to fall short of their expected fertility than to achieve or exceed their expectations, and they are significantly less likely than women who breastfeed for longer durations (≥22 weeks) to exceed their expected fertility. In contrast, women who breastfeed longer are as likely to exceed as to achieve their earlier expectations, and the difference between their probability of falling short versus exceeding their fertility expectations is relatively small and at the boundary of statistical significance (p = .096). These differences in fertility are not explained by differences in personal and family resources, including family income or labor market attachment. Our findings suggest that breastfeeding duration may serve as a proxy for identifying a distinct approach to parenting. Women who breastfeed longer have reproductive patterns quite different than their socioeconomic position would predict. They both have more children and invest more time in those children.     

Demographic aspects of fertility in Thailand

Abstract Data from a national rural and urban sample survey are analysed in order to examine various demographic aspects of fertility in Thailand. Marital fertility rates found for Thailand are among the highest in Asia. Particularly noteworthy is the persistence of high fertility at older ages of childbearing for rural women. Cumulative fertility shows a pronounced relationship with age at marriage and current marital status. Women who marry at an older age or who experience disruption of their marriages are clearly more likely to have fewer children ever born. Differences in both current and cumulative fertility are strongly associated with residence. Rural women who constitute the vast majority of Thai women, experience the highest fertility, Bangkok-Thonburi women experience the lowest fertility and provincial urban women are characterized by an intermediate fertility level which is closer, however, to the experience of their counterparts in the capital than in the countryside. Rural-urban fertility differences are mitigated but by no means eliminated by differences in infant mortality. In both rural and urban areas a positive association between cumulative fertility and infant morality is evident. Breast-feeding, commonly practised for extended periods-among both rural and urban Thai women, undoubtedly serves to some extent as an intervening variable in this relationship. A comparison of current fertility with cumulative fertility strongly suggests that a decline in marital fertility has been under way recently among urban women, especially those residing in the capital, but not at all among rural women. Although it seems safe to assume that the urban fertility decline results in large part from an increasing use of contraception among urban women, those still in the reproductive ages who were using or had previously used birth control were characterized by higher cumulative fertility than women who had never practised contraception. Evidently couples resort to family planning only late in the family building process after they have already achieved or exceeded the number of children they wish to have.     

Comparison and fairness in family planning]

There are two kinds of comparison in family planning (FP) practice. First, people compare the number of children they have with their desired family size. Second, people compare their number of children with other's. The extent of their satisfaction from the comparison often depends on their expectation. And people's expectation about their family size may have an impact on the level of fertility. One task in a FP program is to regulate people's objects for comparison and to reduce the number of children they expect to have. But, changes in people's desired number of children are largely dependent upon the socio economic charges which can not be achieved in short time. Therefore, it would be more advisable to direct people to compare their fertility behavior with those of couples who have only one child, rather than those who have 3 or 4. Satisfaction with family size also comes from a feeling of fairness. People not only look at what they get, but also at what others get. Fairness and justice in FP program implementation is important. If those who violate local birth control policies and regulations are not properly punished, other people would feel that the situation is unfair and they would regret that they did not do the same. The pressure brought by over-population to socio-economic development has been gradually felt by most people. But, it is still difficult to have them strictly observe the present fertility regulation policy. If restrictions of various kinds are enforced and education and publicity are used, people will feel that they are being treated fairly. This will facilitate the promotion of the FP program.     

Female sterilization in Aberdeen: Preliminary findings

2,500 women whose first marriage was continuing and who were living with their husbands at the time of hospital admission were sterilized in Aberdeen between 1963 and 1971. The social and demographic characteristics of these women are analysed, and a preliminary analysis by marriage cohort is presented. Those marriage cohorts in which sterilization was being performed for the first time mainly on young women with small families are identified. The family size of sterilized women was found to be substantially higher than that of women from the same marriage cohort who had not undergone the procedure. The contribution to total fertility made by the various forms of foetal wastage is assessed. Women whose sterilization was performed in association with a termination of pregnancy were found to have patterns of foetal loss which differed markedly from those of women who were not pregnant at the time of the operation.     

How female education affects reproductive behavior in urban Pakistan

Although Pakistan remains in a pretransitional stage (contraceptive prevalence of only 11.9% among married women in 1992), urban women with post-primary levels of education are spearheading the gradual move toward fertility transition. Data collected in the city of Karachi in 1987 were used to determine whether the inverse association between fertility and female education is attributable to child supply variables, demand factors, or fertility regulation costs. Karachi, with its high concentration of women with secondary educations employed in professional occupations, has a contraceptive prevalence rate of 31%. Among women married for less than 20 years, a 10-year increment in education predicts that a woman will average two-fifths of a child less than other women in the previous 5 years. Regression analysis identified 4 significant intervening variables in the education-fertility relationship: marriage duration, net family income, formal sector employment, and age at first marriage. Education appears to affect fertility because it promotes a later age at marriage and thus reduces life-time exposure to the risk of childbearing, induces women to marry men with higher incomes (a phenomenon that either reduces the cost of fertility regulation or the demand for children), leads women to become employed in the formal sector (leading to a reduction in the demand for children), and has other unspecified effects on women's values or opportunities that are captured by their birth cohort. When these intervening variables are held constant, women's attitude toward family planning loses its impact on fertility, as do women's domestic autonomy and their expectations of self-support in old age. These findings lend support to increased investments in female education in urban Pakistan as a means of limiting the childbearing of married women. Although it is not clear if investment in female education would have the same effect in rural Pakistan, such action is important from a human and economic development perspective.     

The conflicting effects of delayed marriage and declining divorce rates on cumulative fertility in Indonesia

The impact of nuptiality patterns on fertility in Indonesia is examined with multivariate analysis controlling for 8 socioeconomic variables. Data were obtained from the 1987 Indonesian Contraceptive Prevalence Survey. Marriage is usually universal by age 35, and in this study all women 30 years had been married at least once. 20% were married at 15 years and 45% married at 18 years. For those married more than once, prevalence of 1st marriage was 7% for women 15-24 years, 15% for 25-34 years, and 29% for 35-49 years. In 1976 and 1987, the age at 1st marriage and number of times married were both strongly and negatively correlated. The % never marrying between 15-49 years rose from 21.5% to 26.4% between 1980-87. Cumulative fertility w as related to both age at 1st marriage and number of times married. Muslim women, women in Java and Bali, and rural women all marry at younger ages. 27% of the variance in age at 1st marriage is explained by women aged 25-34, current residence, region, religion, language, education, and work or not before marriage. The number of times married is also associated with socioeconomic characteristics without control, i.e., Muslim women 25-34 years were 3 times more likely to have been married more than once than in other faiths. With controls for socioeconomic factors, only 13% of the variance is explained and being Muslim has no statistically significant effect. The important net effects were being interviewed in Balinese, age, and age at 1st marriage. In the analysis of cumulative fertility, age at 1st marriage consistently is related to cumulative fertility in almost every socioeconomic group when age and number of times married is controlled for. Women married more than once have lower fertility. 36% of the variance is explained by all the variables. Being married more than once leads to having 2.1 fewer children. A 5-year delay in marriage leads to .75-1.1 fewer children. When other variables are controlled for, neither educational level nor prior work experience has a statistically significant effect on cumulative fertility. In the contraception analysis, women married more than once used contraception less. Among women 35-49, those marrying later had higher contraceptive use, but in general contraceptive use declined with age. More information is needed on why marriage patterns are changing.     

Consanguinity and child mortality: The risk faced by families

Previous research reveals that the characteristics and practices of a child's family are important determinants of its chances of surviving beyond childhood. This study investigates the effects of consanguinity on a family's odds of experiencing the death of a child in Pakistan, a society in which marriage among close relatives is common. Analysis of data from the 1991 Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey reveals that first cousin marriages increase a couple's risk of enduring the death of one or more of their children. These couples are 1.18 times as likely to have a child die by its fifth birthday than couples not related by blood net of other factors associated with child mortality. Elimination of first cousin marriages would contribute to a modest decrease in the proportion of Pakistani families suffering the death of a child.     

Determinants of fertility and the unmet need for family planning in Indonesia

Indonesia's fertility has declined to an average of slightly more than 3 children/woman. The islands of Java and Bali have the lowest birth rates. Indonesia's family planning program has been a model of innovation, flexibility, and community involvement, and has been effective in reducing fertility, changing family preferences, and increasing contraceptive use. Fertility decline is also determined by factors other than contraceptive use, as provinces in Jakarta and East Java has low fertility and low contraceptive use. Recent research by Suyono and Palmore found that among cohorts of women in Jakarta lowest fertility rates were explained by greater nonexposure to pregnancy in an unmarried state or by a divorced or widowed status, and by infecundity. In East Java, fertility determinants were the same with the possible addition of lower coital frequency. The study estimated nonexposure due to marriage, infecundity, and contraceptive use. Policy considerations, however, are concerned with the exposed state of the percentage of time women are currently married, fecund, not using contraceptive, and sexually active. Suyono and Palmore also calculated the percentage of time spent in the exposed state by province. The estimates ranged from 12% in Yogyakarta to 25% in West Java and the Outer Islands. Exposed was further divided into groups with a manifest, latent, and no current need. Women with a manifest need for family planning are those who are aware of their contraceptive needs to stop or postpone childbearing and not using. Manifest need was highest in high fertility areas: 12% in Central Java, 13% in West Java, and 12% in the Outer Islands. Programs targeting these women should focus on wider availability of information and services. Women with latent needs are unaware of their need for family planning and are not using contraception. These women were also concentrated in high fertility areas. The percentage of years spent in the latent unmet need state was estimated at 23-24% in West Java and the Outer Islands. Program emphasis should be on education and motivation to show how family size can be controlled. Women with current need can be educated toward future acceptance.     

Which couples at given parities expect to have additional births? An exercise in discriminant analysis

Do couples at given parities who expect to have additional births differ on selected characteristics from their counterparts who do not expect to have any more children? This question is examined herein focusing attention on the wife’s age, age at marriage, religion, and education and the husband’s education and income. The method used is the discriminant-function analysis. The data are from the 1965 U. S. National Fertility Study. The combined discriminatory power of the social and economic background characteristics examined herein has been found to be greater at higher parities than at lower ones, while the opposite is true of demographic characteristics.     

Changes in union status during the transition to parenthood in eleven European countries, 1970s to early 2000s

Couples who have children are increasingly likely to have lived together without being married at some point in their relationship. Some couples begin their unions with cohabitation and marry before first conception, some marry during pregnancy or directly after the first birth, while others remain unmarried 3 years after the first birth. Using union and fertility histories since the 1970s for eleven countries, we examine whether women who have children in unions marry, and if so, at what stage in family formation. We also examine whether women who conceive when cohabiting are more likely to marry or separate. We find that patterns of union formation and childbearing develop along different trajectories across countries. In all countries, however, less than 40 per cent of women remained in cohabitation up to 3 years after the first birth, suggesting that marriage remains the predominant institution for raising children.     

Marital moratorium and fertility control in China

Abstract Since 1949, the issue of marital postponement has been extensively discussed in China. Unlike some other means of fertility control (e.g. abortion and oral contraception), marital postponement has been welcomed with the fewest misgivings. Lately, marital postponement has also been given renewed emphasis by those outside China who see a weak link between various current national family planning programmes based on improved technology and the goal of fertility reduction. One aim of this paper is to render a comprehensive account of the marital postponement programme in China in the course of the birth control campaign during the last two decades. The second objective is to discuss the lessons that may be learned from it, and its implications for the current fertility controversy in the United States. Four general conclusions emerge from a careful analysis of the available documents: (1) in China, proponents of delayed marriage were divided on the question of how to secure its general acceptance. One issue dividing them was whether or not China's Marriage Law of 1950 should be amended in order to achieve it. Those who favoured raising the minimum legal age disagreed on the details of the presumably needed change. There is enough evidence to suggest that medical personnel were the chief advocates of compulsory postponement of marriage. The government rejected this legalistic approach and, in so doing, agreed with Chen Ta (a noted demographer) and others who sought to achieve postponement of marriage through appropriate social and economic measures. (2) Decisions to delay matrimony in different socio-cultural settings are not necessarily identical sociological phenomena. In some societies, (e.g. the United States), they may amount to no more than a course of action that enables individuals involved to realize or develop alternate goals in life. In others (e.g. China), they are literally acts of rebellion. (3) The fertility policy dispute has been carried on in a context of revolutionary change, and involved persons who have committed themselves to transforming the Chinese family. This prior commitment was mainly responsible for the relative lack of controversy about marital postponement as a means of fertility control. (4) Use of contraception is private, hidden from open view. But postponement of marriage is public and may be a source of inter-generational and interpersonal conflict. In China and other parallel situations, a decision to delay marriage is in itself against tradition. In this sense, a full-scale marital moratorium cannot but be more than a partial assault on the hold that the family has over its offspring. This must be unequivocally reflected in discussions of fertility control policy everywhere.     

Another Child? Fertility Ideals,Resources and Opportunities

Low fertility in most developed countries has prompted policy concern in relation to labour market supply, pensions, and expenditure on health and welfare services as well as policy debate about both the cost of children and the opportunity costs of parenthood. The extent to which family policy interventions can be effective in slowing or reversing fertility decline is much debated. This paper, based on a fertility module of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2005, examines the current fertility, and ideal and expected fertility of a nationally representative sample of 455 parents of reproductive age and focuses on whether they plan to have another child. It compares the characteristics of those who intend to have another child with those who do not, and how parents with one child differ from those with more children. It addresses three questions about family size: (1) fertility ideals, (2) resources and the economic implications of childbearing, and (3) opportunities for childbearing and the effects of a late start on fertility expectations. It concludes that, despite a sustained period of low fertility in Scotland, childbearing ideals are robust and explanations of low fertility must derive from difficulties in realising those ideals. Difficulties in realising fertility aspirations are associated less with resources than with opportunities for childbearing, especially the timing of first birth. Those who delay their first birth are less likely to realise their ideal family size, and their lower fertility is associated with the opportunity costs of childbearing in terms of foregone qualifications, careers and earnings.     

Poverty in the Philippines: the impact of family size

The people of Asia are beginning to realize that lower fertility translates into increased family wealth and educational attainment. This is the message that population and development efforts have been focusing on. In the Philippines, the goal is to lower fertility with a strategy based on the assumption that increased capacity of the economy will support a growing population at a higher standard of living. In the Philippines, over 33% of the households have 7 or more family members, while 20% of urban and 27% of rural households have 4 or more. The risk of poverty associated with increased number of children are 44-50% for 1 child and 60-78% for those with 5. Households spend up to 10% of their total income to raise 1 child, 18% for 2, and 26% for 4 children. Because many families lack the resources to raise children the per child share drops dramatically with each child, a household with 4 children spends 25% less per child than does 1 with 2 children. Occupation also affects income as the highest poverty rates are among heads of household who are: laborers (60%) and agricultural workers (73%). The best solution is an integrated approach with increases in family planning, education, and agricultural reform.     

Migration and fertility in the Philippines: Hendershot's selectivity model revisited

A demographer compared 1983 data on 5092 currently married migrant and nonmigrant women living in the Philippines to determine whether migration was still selective in terms of fertility behavior or not. Fertility was basically the same between migrant and nonmigrant women in their early reproductive years, but clear differences existed between older migrants and nonmigrants as indicated by children ever born (CEB). In fact, migration did not significantly affect cumulative fertility at all (correlation ratio=.03). Moreover its effect was further reduced when the researchers controlled for age and duration of marriage. Besides level of education and contraceptive use status contributed more to explanations of fertility differentials (correlation ratio=.09 for both) than did migration. The mean number of CEB adjusted for all variables fell with level of education from 4.18 for those with primary education to 3.63 to those with college education. This result identified education as a means to reduce high fertility in the Philippines. On the other hand, the mean was higher among women who ever used contraception than it was for those who never used it (4.21 vs. 3.72). Apparently considerable family size motivated mothers to use contraception. Since women who migrated to cities tended to be in the beginning of their reproductive period, considerable natural increase could occur in urban areas. Therefore the Philippines needed to devise a strategy for reducing fertility among migrant women as well as strategies for other groups such as professional/career oriented women and women who remained at home to tend to children and/or the home.