The Bangladesh fertility decline: an interpretation

The claim has been made, notably in a 1994 World Bank report, that the Bangladesh fertility decline shows that efficient national family planning programs can achieve major fertility declines even in countries that are very poor, and even if females have a low status and significant socioeconomic change has not occurred. This article challenges this claim on the grounds that Bangladesh did experience major social and economic change, real and perceived, over the last two decades. This proposition is supported by official data and by findings of the authors' 1997 field study in rural southeast Bangladesh. That study demonstrates that most Bangladeshis believe that conditions are very different from the situation a generation ago and that on balance there has been improvement. Most also believe that more decisions must now be made by individuals, and these include decisions to have fewer children. In helping to achieve these new fertility aims, however, the services provided by the family planning program constituted an important input.     

Emigration and fertility decline: The case of Barbados

This paper examines the role of emigration in the recent fertility declines which have occurred on the island of Barbados. Barbados with a history of over two centuries of out-migration has experienced in the period 1951–1970 very significant migration loss. In the period 1960–1970 and up to the present fertility has been declining. An important question is what part has this net migration loss of 32,600 had on the reduction of the crude birth rate from 33.6 in 1960 or from 31.5 in 1956 to 20.5 in 1970? Using officially published net migration loss figures and supplementing them with data on Barbadians living overseas, we calculated the crude birth rates which would have occurred had there been no migration loss. We also calculated the numbers of births to be expected if certain age-specific fertility rates were maintained and compared these with the births to residents plus the calculated births to Barbadians overseas. We conclude that in both cases emigration is a very significant contributor to the fertility declines which have occurred and are still underway.     

The western fertility decline: Reflections from a chronological perspective

The study of recent fertility trends in the West has been dominated by examinations of Europe. A better perspective on twentieth-century fertility movements can be gained by giving an equal emphasis to trends in the ‘Offshoots’ (USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). This paper focuses on the periods of rapid fertility decline and to a greater extent on the intervening periods of near-equilibrium. It is suggested that the ‘late twentieth century compromise’ is more stable than is suggested by reports on its internal strains, and that only massive government intervention could raise fertility.     

Case study: fertility decline in Iran

Iran has experienced one of the most successful family planning programs in the developing world, with 64 percent decline in total fertility rate (TFR) between 1986 and 2000. This paper focuses on Iranians’ unique experience with implementation of a national family planning program. Recognition of sensitive moral and ethical aspects of population issues resulted in successful collaboration of technical experts and religious leaders. Involvement of local health workers, women health volunteers and rural midwives led to great community participation. Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data in 2000 indicated a TFR of 2.0 births per women and 74 percent contraceptive use among married women. This case study will help policy makers and researchers in Moslem countries and other developing countries with high fertility rate to consider a successful family program as a realistic concept with positive impacts on nation’s health and human development.     

The determinants of early fertility decline in Texas

This study examines the determinants of fertility control in a frontier population made up largely of German-Americans during the years from 1850 to 1910. The analysis employs a complex register of population constructed from census enumerations, civil and ecclesiastical vital registration, and tax assessment rolls. The article begins with a series of bivariate analyses with cohort of mother’s birth, religion, ethnicity, and husband’s occupation determining marital fertility. The second half of the paper presents a multivariate model of the determinants of fertility using these and other demographic characteristics as independent variables. The conclusions emphasize the importance of the overall trend toward fertility decline in the United States, as well as the role of religion and of occupational differences, in determining changes in fertility behavior in the population of Gillespie County, Texas.     

The delayed western fertility decline: an examination of English-speaking countries

Fertility decline began in English-speaking countries 80 years later than in France even though per capita incomes in the former were higher and children were probably a net economic burden, at least for the middle classes. Explanations have included ignorance of contraception and the desire to keep women out of the workforce. This essay suggests that the reasons are to be found in the works of the moral reformers rather than in those of the neo-Malthusians. The Victorian family was a construct made to meet the needs of industrializing countries. The marital relationship was believed to be in danger—and probably was in danger—from discussion of genital-related contraception. The low demand for contraception meant that contraceptives remained crude and could not be discussed in most marriages. The problem would ultimately be overcome through further economic development together with educational and other social change. Nevertheless, the legitimation of marital discussion of birth control was not achieved until the subject was written about in the press and subsequently in birth control manuals sold on a much larger scale than before. This, in turn, changed the packaging and accessibility of contraceptives, making their discussion, acquisition, and use easier and a fertility decline possible.     

Recent fertility decline in Ceylon

Abstract The crude birth rate for Ceylon has been falling steadily between 1960 and 1970, except for a slight interruption in 1968. The fall between 1953 and 1963 has been documented elsewhere and this paper will therefore deal with the period 1963-69.     

Family planning and fertility decline: a global overview

Family planning and development policy concerns are not incompatible. The emphasis on development policies at the 1974 World Population Conference at Bucharest did not mean that world governments had lost interest in the population and family planning issue. Although worldwide attitudes toward family planning have become more and more favorable, this has not yet meant great impact on world demographic trends. The "inertia factor," i.e., the effects of high birthrates in the previous generation, will camouflage declining birthrates for some time to come. The trend of fertility reduction which was perceptible only among small populations a few years ago is also becoming manifest in larger Third World countries. Mortality rate declines have slowed down but there is no rising mortality due to starvation in any country. At present, food demand exceeds availability for 80% of the Third World population. It is predicted that the food deficit will increase 70% by the year 2000.     

The decline of non-marital fertility in Europe, 1880-1940

Abstract Between 1880 and 1940, to take approximate dates, illegitimate fertility rates in Europe dropped precipitously, falling in most countries by 50% or more. The rates used throughout this paper relate extra-marital births to the number of unmarried (i.e. single, widowed and divorced) women; we use a standardized index, I ({ih}) to be discussed later. In Fig. 1 we present most of the European series of I ( h )'s that can be computed from existing census and vital registration data. Although there are interesting exceptions the general picture is clear: a decline in illegitimate fertility commenced in most countries in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and was arrested in the 1920's and 1930's. Once it had begun in a country, the downward course was swift and uninterrupted, until non-marital fertility had been cut in half.     

Is aboriginal fertility on the decline?

This paper examines if there has been sustained Aboriginal fertility decline since the mid-1980s, as expected in previous studies (Gray 1983, 1990; Jain 1989), by analysing fertility information obtained from the 1994 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey, birth registrations and midwives’ collections data by states. Although two studies (Gray and Tesfaghiorghis 1993:87–90; Dugbaza 1994) refuted this expectation, the results are questionable because of the unreliability of the data on which the estimates were based and the lack of fertility information. This study has produced more reliable age patterns of fertility at the national and state levels. The paper also examines the definition of Aboriginality and associated measurement problems, which are central to an understanding of Aboriginal demography.     

New survey finds fertility decline in India

A brief indication was provided of demography, fertility, and contraceptive usage and knowledge based on the recent 1992/93 Indian National Family Health Survey. The sample included 88,562 households and 89,777 ever married women aged 13-49 years in 24 states and the National Capital Territory of Delhi. About 38% of household members were aged under 15 years. The sex ratio was 944 females to 100 males. 54% aged over 5 years were currently married; 10% were widowed, divorced, or separated. 43% were literate and 9% had secondary or higher education: 67% for females in cities and 34% in rural areas. Female literacy was 82% in Kerala but under 30% in Rajasthan, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh. During 1990-92, the crude birth rate was 28.9 per 1000 population. Total fertility was 3.4 for women aged 15-49 years: 3.7 in rural and 2.7 in urban areas. 31% of parents had been sterilized. 26% desired no more children. Only 6% of women with four or more children desired another child. 99% of urban and 95% of rural respondents had knowledge of at least one modern or traditional method. Female and male sterilization were the most well-known modern methods. 47% of women had ever used contraception: 42% with a modern method and 12% with a traditional method. 41% were current users of family planning: 36% with a modern and 4% with a traditional method (45% in urban and 33% in rural areas with a modern method). The highest contraceptive use was in Kerala, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Punjab states and Delhi (over 50%). The two most populous states, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, had the lowest rates, which were under 25%; other low usage was in Assam and several small northeastern states. 75% of all female modern contraceptive use was female sterilization. 12% in urban and 3% in rural areas used a modern spacing method. Use increased with increased educational level. Rural sources of supply emphasized public facilities: sterilization and IUDs.     

Theoretical explanation of rapid decline in China's fertility]

China's fertility decline is widely acknowledged. The 1982 census and a random survey of 1/1,000th of the nation's population set the total fertility rate at 2.6%. Bureau of statistics data collected in 1984 showed the nation's birth rate as 1.7% and total fertility rate 1.94%. Friendly observers call this a miracle; others blame the decline on forced government family planning policy. Scientific pursuit of the causes for the decline is an issue of practical and realistic value. First, favorable conditions for fertility decline have been fostered by the socialist system and are deeply rooted in the country's economic development. China's industrialization and urbanization have brought new lifestyles and liberated individuals and families from the constraints of traditional family life. Couples have chosen to limit the number of children, to enhance the quality of life and education potential of their children, thus altering the traditional high fertility in China. Education of women has played a role in raising women's consciousness; a 1982 census placed the fertility rate of women with high-school level education or above, lower than that for less or uneducated women. Neonatal mortality rate decline is also related to the spontaneous decline in fertility rate, as high fertility has historically been intended to compensate for high child mortality rates. Welfare and social security systems for the elderly have also helped change the traditional mentality of having many children as assurance of life support in old age. Social organizations have accelerated knowledge and methods of planned fertility. Later marriages are also a factor: in 1970 the average marriage age was 19 - 20 and had increased by 1976 to 22 - 23. Other favorable social factors include free birth control and the view of population planning as an essential part of national welfare.     

Temporal and spatial analysis of fertility decline in Taiwan

Abstract The conventional mode of evaluating the success of family planning programmes has frequently emphasized the activities of the programmes, rather than their ultimate effects. This paper examines the role of family planning programmes in inducing fertility decline in Taiwan. First it presents the secular trends of Taiwanese fertility changes, pointing out that family planning programmes began only after the birth rate had already shown a substantial decline. Secondly, it specifically evaluates the impact of family planning programmes in the Taichung areas, since its success has been widely proclaimed. Finally, it is stipulated that the dynamics of Taiwanese fertility changes may be related to declining infant mortality and accelerating educational development, and that these institutional effects, rather than the family planning programmes, should be credited with changes in fertility.     

Economic development and fertility decline: lessons from Asia's newly industrialized countries

The general thesis that economic development and fertility decline are interrelated is substantiated in literature that discusses the successes of the newly industrialized countries of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. When countries are developing rapidly, family planning accelerates the rate of fertility change, particularly among the poor uneducated rural population. Relying on economic and social development is not enough. National policy in Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan recognized that population growth drains resources and the family planning programs operating since the 1960s contributed to a drop from 5 children/woman to 2 by 1988, and 70% of married couples used contraception. Coupled with this, age at marriage rose, contraception became more available, and educational and employment opportunities increased. Economically, the growth rate in the 1980's was 6-10% annually, with growth in the manufacturing and service sectors and export trade. Close economic ties evolved between governments and private sectors. Social development programs had been fully funded and gains evident in education, living standards, health care and nutrition, and life expectancy. The success of family planning is attributed to encouraging contraceptive awareness and use. Fertility reduction may occur with social and economic development, but no developing countries have reduced fertility without family planning. The relative importance of family planning may change over time, and reducing the cost through government sponsored family planning programs and encouraging the acceptability of contraceptive usage.     

The South African fertility decline: Evidence from two censuses and a Demographic and Health Survey

Inadequate data and apartheid policies have meant that, until recently, most demographers have not had the opportunity to investigate the level of, and trend in, the fertility of South African women. The 1996 South Africa Census and the 1998 Demographic and Health Survey provide the first widely available and nationally representative demographic data on South Africa since 1970. Using these data, this paper describes the South African fertility decline from 1955 to 1996. Having identified and adjusted for several errors in the 1996 Census data, the paper argues that total fertility at that time was 3.2 children per woman nationally, and 3.5 children per woman for African South Africans. These levels are lower than in any other sub-Saharan African country. We show also that fertility in South Africa has been falling since the 1960s. Thus, fertility transition predates the establishment of a family planning programme in the country in 1974.