Policy options when population growth slows: The case of Thailand

Thailand reached replacement-level fertility almost a decade ago, although there has been a lag in measuring and recognising the implications of this benchmark event. Fertility could well sink still lower. The momentum of population growth will ensure substantial further increase before the population levels off, but this is not true in all regions. For example, earlier and faster fertility decline in the North, and net outmigration, have led to a situation where some geographical and age segments of the North's population are decreasing. Population policy in Thailand since 1970 has had two major planks: to reduce fertility through an active family planning program, and to distribute population away from the large primate city of Bangkok. The paper discusses whether these policies may need to be modified as a result of the major demographic and socio economic changes that have been taking place. It also discusses the limits to population policy in terms of the likely efficacy of various measures that could be adopted, based on both an assessment of the Thailand situation and the experience of other low-fertility countries.     

Population growth,economic development and family planning

This report discusses research conducted to determine whether reduction in population growth rates contributed to the rapid economic growth of Indonesia, South Korea, Japan and Thailand. The 5-year research projects, jointly sponsored by the UN Fund for Population Activities, the Nihon University Population Research Institute, and the East-West Population Institute, concluded that development and family planning programs contributed substantially to fertility decline in these countries. The project examined 3 factors that influence the long-term productive capacity and growth of the 4 Asian economies: savings, the size of the labor force, and the quality of labor (measured by educational attainment). Available evidence indicates a strong positive contribution of population decline toward growth of savings, a growth in labor force concurrent with a decline in fertility rates which enables per capita income to rise, and an increase in 2ndary education enrollment ratios as fertility is lowered. Development factors by themselves explain no more than 1/2 of the decline in fertility observed, suggesting that family planning programs particularly in Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia since 1976 have had an important impact on fertility and economic development.     

Religious fertility differentials in Thailand, 1960

Abstract Although the evidence supporting high fertility in Thailand is clear-cut, little is known about fertility differentials within the population. As part of a larger investigation, a special 1 % tabulation of the 1960 Thai census data on number of children ever-born to married women has been analysed to determine the extent of differentials by religion and urban-rural status. The findings point to considerable differentials among Buddhists, Moslems, and Confucianists. Standardizing for age, the number of children ever-born to 12/loslems averaged well below the number born to Buddhists. Confucian fertility was intermediate. Within specific age groups, the number of children ever-born to Moslem women was considerably below the Buddhist average and the differentials were sharper in the higher age groups. By contrast, Confucian fertility was highest of all in the age groups under 35, but lower than the Buddhist averages among older women. Significant urban-rural differentials also exist. For both the Buddhist and the Confucian women, fertility is markedly lower in urban than in rural categories. When controlling for both age and urban-rural status, Buddhist and Confucian differences tend to be minimal. By contrast, Moslem fertility was highest in the most urban category - Bangkok - but was considerably lower and substantially below the fertility levels of Buddhists and Confucianists in all other urban-rural categories. The census data in themselves do not permit adequate analysis of the reasons for the differentials. Later age at marriage in urban places may be a significant factor in accounting for the overall differentials in urban-rural fertility ; but this relation is much less clear for specific religious groups, particularly since Moslems marry at a considerably earlier age. More frequent divorce and remarriage may lower Moslem rates. Poorer health may also be a factor.     

Below-replacement fertility in Thailand and its policy implications

The fertility transition in Thailand has been one of the most rapid among Asian countries that are yet to attain newly industrialized country status. In the early 1960s, the total fertility rate exceeded six births per woman; currently, it stands at 1.9 or slightly below replacement level. At present, it is hard to predict the future trend in fertility as this involves several factors that need much closer study, in particular, fertility preferences, changes in marriage patterns and the wider effects of the current economic crisis in Thailand. Rapid declines in fertility and mortality have had a profound effect on the age structure of the population, notably the increasing elderly proportion. Thailand now faces new challenges and priorities for population policy. Policy responses to concerns arising from below-replacement fertility will be much more complex and involve greater government activism, improved institutional capacities and more resources than in the past. This paper reviews the fertility transition in Thailand and looks at some consequences and policy implications of low fertility, with special reference to the family and the elderly population. National Statistical Office     

After the demographic transition: policy responses to low fertility in four Asian countries

In the low fertility countries of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand, policy-makers are concerned about the consequences of low growth. In South Korea, a family planning (FP) program was instituted in the early 1960s, and fertility declined to 1.6 by 1987. Rural fertility is still higher at 1.96, and abortion rates are high. 32.2% of fertility reduction is accomplished through abortion. South Korean population will not stabilize until 2021, at 50.6 million people. The elderly are expected to increase and strain housing, energy, and land resources. Government support for FP is being reduced, while private sector services are being enhanced. Government sterilization programs have been reduced significantly, and revisions in the Medical Insurance Law will cover part of contraceptive cost. Integrated services are being established. Many argue for an emphasis on birth spacing, child and family development, sex education, and care of the elderly. In Taiwan, replacement level fertility was reached in 1983. Policy in 1992 recommended increasing fertility from 1.6 to 2.1. The aim was to stabilize population without pronatalist interventions. Regardless of policy decisions, population growth will continue over the next 40 years, and the extent of aging will increase. In Singapore since the 1960s, the national government focused on encouraging small families through fertility incentives, mass media campaigns, and easy access to FP services. Fertility declined to 1.4 in 1988. Since 1983, government has established a variety of pronatalist incentives. In 1989, fertility increased to 1.8. The pronatalist shift is viewed as not likely to succeed in dealing with the concern for an adequate work force to support the elderly and economic development. In Thailand, fertility declined the fastest to 2.4 in 1993. The key factors were rapid economic and social development, a supportive cultural setting, strong demand for fertility control, and a successful FP program. The goal is to reduce fertility to 1.2 by 1996. Replacement level may be reached in 2000 or 2005. Future trends are not clear.     

Population pressure and fertility in pre-transition Thailand

Before the demographic transition in Thailand, fertility was high, but not uniformly so. As in other pre-transition settings, Thai fertility responded to pressures and opportunities created by socioeconomic structure and land availability. Drawing upon provincial data from the 1947 and 1960 censuses of Thailand, we find a strong 'frontier effect' on Thai fertility in the 1950s. Fertility was higher in sparsely settled frontier provinces and lower in provinces with higher population density relative to cultivatable land. This finding is robust and holds up with controls for agricultural employment, land quality, and the sex ratio (an indicator of sex-selective migration). The effect of population pressure lowers the likelihood of marriage and of marital fertility. The findings from Thailand are consistent with the research of Easterlin on the nineteenth century United States and with other pre-transition societies. We suggest how demographic transition theory might be broadened to include fertility dynamics in pre-transition societies.     

The demographic transition in the Korean peninsula, 1910-1990: South and North Korea compared

North and South Korea have both experienced demographic transition and fertility and mortality declines. The fertility declines came later in North Korea. In 1990, the population was 43.4 million in South Korea and 21.4 million in North Korea and the age and sex compositions were similar. This evolution of population structure occurred despite differences in political systems and fertility determinants. Differences were in the fertility rate and the rate of natural increase. The total fertility rate was 2.5 children in North Korea and 1.6 in South Korea. The rate of natural increase was 18.5 per 1000 in North Korea and 9.8 in South Korea. Until 1910, the Korean peninsula was in the traditional stage characterized by high fertility and mortality. The early transitional stage came during 1910-45 under the Japanese annexation. Health and medical facilities improved and the crude birth rate rose and then declined. With the exception of the war years, population expanded as a function of births, deaths, and international migration. Poor economic conditions in rural areas acted as a push factor for south-directed migration, migration to Japan, and urban migration. Next came the chaotic stage, during 1945-60. South Korean population expanded during this period of political unrest. Repatriation and refugee migration constituted a large proportion of the population increase. Although the war brought high mortality, new medicine and disease treatment reduced the mortality rate after the war. By 1955-60, the crude death rate was 16.1 per 1000 in South Korea. The crude birth rate remained high at 42 per 1000 between 1950-55. The postwar period was characterized by the baby boom and higher fertility than the pre-war period of 1925-45. Total fertility was 6.3 by 1955-60. The late transitional stage occurred during 1960-85 with reduced fertility and continued mortality decline. By 1980-85, total fertility was 2.3 in the closed population. The restabilization stage occurred during 1985-90, and fertility declined to 1.6. In North Korea, strong population control policies precipitated fertility decline. In South Korea, the determinants were contraception, rising marriage age, and increased use of abortion concomitant with improved socioeconomic conditions.     

Differential fertility in Puerto Rico

In spite of high overall fertility Puerto Rico exhibits fertility differentials resembling those in areas where birth rates are low. The fertility of whites exceeds that of non-whites, educational standards influence child-bearing and there is a rural urban differential of long standing. These differences are documented in the paper and their implication for future population development in Puerto Rico is discussed     

Urbanization in Thailand, 1947–1967

Utilizing both census and population register data for the period 1947–1967, this analysis assesses changing levels and rates of urbanization in Thailand, compares regional variations in urbanization patterns, and relates such differences to selected indicators of economic and demographic development. Although the overall level of urbanization remains low, the rate of urbanization is high and the increase in the number of moderate sized urban places significant. Greater Bangkok, accounting for over half of Thailand’s urban population and almost two–thirds of all urban growth, has increased its primacy in Thailand’s urban structure. But urban development has also begun to permeate all regions of the country and to be an important factor in the complex process of national social and economic development.     

A look at Asia's changing youth population

This report summarizes findings from a recent East-West Center study on demographic and social changes among young people aged 15-24 years in 17 countries in East, Southeast, and South Asia. Nearly every country in Asia has experienced fertility decline. Decline began in Japan and Singapore during the 1950s, followed by declines in Hong Kong, South Korea, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, and China during the 1960s. Declines occurred during the 1970s in Indonesia, India, and Myanmar. A "youth bulge" occurred about 20 years later due to declines in infant and child mortality. This bulge varies by country with the timing and magnitude of population growth and subsequent fertility decline. The proportion of youth population rises from 16% to 18% about 20 years after the beginning of fertility decline and declines to a much lower stable level after several decades. The bulge is large in countries with rapid fertility decline, such as China. Governments can minimize the effects of bulge on population growth by raising the legal age at marriage, lengthening the interval between first marriage and first birth, and increasing birth intervals. School enrollments among adolescents are rising. In South Korea, the population aged 15-24 years increased from 3.8 to 8.8 million during 1950-90, a rise of 132% compared to a rise of 653% among school enrollments. It is expected that the number of out-of-school youths will decline from 5.1 to 3.6 million during 1990-2025. Youth employment varies by gender. Policies/programs in family planning and reproductive health will need to address the changing needs of youth population.     

Below-replacement fertility in east and southeast asia: Consequences and policy responses

Fourteen countries in Asia have total fertility rates at or below replacement level. This is more pronounced in China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand. The implications are far-reaching and profound as they affect the age structure of the population, giving rise to population ageing, labour force shortages, increased elderly dependency ratios and feminization of the aged population. Evidence from European countries suggests that although fertility may rebound, in most countries it is highly unlikely that fertility will recover sufficiently to reach replacement level in the near future. Mortality reduction will continue to be an overriding policy goal, which would further enhance the ageing process. Therefore, the greatest challenge will be to pension systems, old-age care systems, and health systems or health insurance. This paper first examines the fertility transition in five low-fertility countries. It then discusses the policy measures that these countries have adopted in response to low fertility and population ageing. The paper concludes with the policy implications for healthcare, social care, income security and caregiving facility, and the scope for further study.     

美国、日本、韩国应对人口老龄化的经验及其启示

世界人口规模不断扩大,年龄结构类型也趋于老年型。但是发达国家与发展中国家有明显差异。发达国家人口老龄化程度高于发展中国家。本文以美国、日本、韩国三国为例,在考察人口规模争人口老龄化状况的基础上,总结了这些国家应对人口老龄化的主要经验,即政府重视人口老龄化问题;制定相应法律法规、方针政策;积极引导社会共同参与;不断完善老年社会保障制度。结合国情提出了对我国应对人口老龄化问题有益的启示。     

A lost family-planning regime in eighteenth-century Ceylon

Based on Dutch colonial registers (thombos), this paper reconstructs fertility for two districts in Ceylon, 1756–68. It overcomes challenges in data quality by establishing the outer bounds of plausible estimates in a series of scenarios. Among these, total fertility rates (TFRs) averaged 5.5 in one district, but only 2.7 in the other. These figures exclude the victims of infanticide, a custom noted in European travelogues between about 1660 and 1820. Sex ratios among children differed depending on the number of older siblings, and overall, 27?per cent of girls are missing in one district and 57?per cent in the other. There was little significant variation either in the TFR or the sex ratio by socio-economic status, suggesting that poverty was not a key factor in motivating infanticides. Instead, we argue that at least parts of Ceylon had a forward-looking culture of family planning in the eighteenth century, which was lost in subsequent decades.     

Socio-economic status and fertility decline: Insights from historical transitions in Europe and North America

The timings of historical fertility transitions in different regions are well understood by demographers, but much less is known regarding their specific features and causes. In the study reported in this paper, we used longitudinal micro-level data for five local populations in Europe and North America to analyse the relationship between socio-economic status and fertility during the fertility transition. Using comparable analytical models and class schemes for each population, we examined the changing socio-economic differences in marital fertility and related these to common theories on fertility behaviour. Our results do not provide support for the hypothesis of universally high fertility among the upper classes in pre-transitional society, but do support the idea that the upper classes acted as forerunners by reducing their fertility before other groups. Farmers and unskilled workers were the latest to start limiting their fertility. Apart from these similarities, patterns of class differences in fertility varied significantly between populations.     

Fertility differentials as evidence of incipient fertility decline in a developing country

Abstract Age data from the 1960 and earlier censuses of Ghana allow the construction of child-woman ratios which appear to indicate the existence of a substantial urban-rural fertility differential. Plausible assumptions of urban-rural mortality differentials increase the apparent fertility differential. In this paper recently published data for Statistical Areas in the country's larger towns are used to demonstrate that one explanation for the fertility differential is almost certainly the enumeration of some females in the towns, while one or more of their surviving children were enumerated outside. Nevertheless, in 1960 the four largest towns exhibited birth levels which are likely to have been about 11% below those of the population in the surrounding regions. Roughly half the differential can be attributed to a general urban-rural differential and half to socio-economic differentials within the towns. It is shown that most fertility reduction within the towns may be explained by delayed female marriage, and that such delay is associated with extended education. It is also shown that amongst the higher socio-economic status groups a small part of the reduction can probably be attributed to the prevention of pregnancy within marriage, and that the making of such attempts is positively associated with extended education, urban birth, participation in first and monogamous marriages, Protestantism, and the holding of views about the harmful effect of high population growth rates on attempts to raise living standards. It is argued that these fertility differentials are evidence of some fertility decline among key groups in the population and that such declines are likely to become more widespread.     

U. S. population growth as an abstractly-perceived problem

Recent public opinion polls report that a majority of Americans consider the nation’s population growth rate to be a “serious” problem. Little systematic evidence exists on whether they view the problem as a factor that the individual married couple should consider in deciding on family size. A survey of 134 adult women living in a limited-income family housing project in a relatively small and isolated American community suggests: the view that continued population growth is a problem in the United States is endorsed more strongly than the view that the couple has a responsibility to limit its fertility because of overpopulation; and concern with population growth is only loosely associated with acceptance of the individual responsibility attitude. Among subgroups of respondents, Catholics were more likely to hold a negative attitude toward population growth than to possess the individual responsibility view and they exhibited a correlation between the two attitudes. Protestants were distinguished by no difference in or correlation between the acceptance of the two attitudes. A correlation between the attitudes was especially pronounced among Catholics with high achievement values. It is suggested that measures explicitly intended to control population growth probably cannot be adopted until there is a strong correlation between the two attitudes.     

The effects of income level,income distribution,education and urbanization on fertility rates among 28 administrative regions of China

Conflicting empirical evidence on the role of income distribution on fertility rates is the impetus for this 1982 study of providence-specific Chinese Census data, excluding Tibet. The findings support the prior thesis of Repetto but utilize the micromethods and per household income measures of the competing findings of Boulier. It is cautioned that in the Chinese analysis equal income distribution depresses fertility, but China may not reflect world wide patterns. China did not have until recently a market incentive system, and there are income measurement problems. The data are per capita economic output not per capita income, and those high output areas which did not produce low fertility may actually have had households with low incomes. The importance of this research is in establishing that cross-province data are a useful tool in understanding the influence of income distribution on fertility. As with most developing countries, women's education, for instance, at least junior high education explained the largest variation of fertility differences among the 28 provinces. The urbanization variable when controlling for income was positive, unlike the other developing countries. The 1949 Chinese government's spatial industrial policy encouraged urbanization and industrialization in rural areas and family planning programs such that highly urbanized provinces have low population density. A variety of variables on income level, income distribution, education, and urbanization are discussed. OLSQ regressions were generated utilizing such independent variables as output per capita in yuan (YOUTHPC80), the square of YOUTHPC80 (YOUTHPC802), YOUTHPC80 multiplied by the average family size in each province (YOUTHPH80), and the squared value of YOUTHPH80.     

Contraception,attitude-practice,and fertility differentials among US Hispanic,African–American and white women

Hispanic fertility (primarily among nationals from Mexico, Central and South America in the US) is higher today than it is in Mexico and the other nations of origin (Frank and Heuveline 2005). It persists into the second and third generations, with only moderate signs of declining to replacement. Meanwhile, the fertility rates of African–Americans, American Indians Cubans, and Puerto Ricans have all declined to replacement, only slightly above the non-Hispanic white population. This study attempts to clarify the question why African–American fertility has declined to replacement, but Hispanic fertility has not. The data used are from Cycle 6 of the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) of 2002. Differences in physiological or marital-status factors are found not to explain these fertility differences; however, there are significant differences in the practice of contraception during early childbearing years. Slightly less effective methods if contraception is used, and less recourse to abortion if a pregnancy is undesired, all imply higher fertility for Hispanic women. Underlying contraceptive behaviour are sets of attitudes and motives that favour, permit, or seek childbearing. A much higher percentage of Hispanic than African–American women report that they wanted their last birth and intend to have another in the future. Hispanic women of all socio-economic statuses are considerably more pronatal in their attitudes, particularly with respect to the births of first and second children.     

Adapting the Own Children Method to allow comparison of fertility between populations with different marriage regimes

The Own Children Method (OCM) is an indirect procedure for deriving age-specific fertility rates and total fertility from children living with their mothers at a census or survey. The method was designed primarily for the calculation of overall fertility, although there are variants that allow the calculation of marital fertility. In this paper we argue that the standard variants for calculating marital fertility can produce misleading results and require strong assumptions, particularly when applied to social or spatial subgroups. We present two new variants of the method for calculating marital fertility: the first of these allows for the presence of non-marital fertility and the second also permits the more robust calculation of rates for social subgroups of the population. We illustrate and test these using full-count census data for England and Wales in 1911.     

Below-replacement fertility: Determinants and prospects in South Asia

Although 10 countries and two of China’s special administrative areas, totalling 1,528 million people or 44 per cent of Asia’s total population, are now characterized by fertility rates below long-term replacement levels, no such countries are yet found in South Asia. This paper first examines the characteristics of 12 Asian administrations with very low fertility at various stages of their fertility declines and then compares the findings with the present situation in three South Asian countries, Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh. This allows a prediction of when the South Asian countries will reach replacement fertility in accord with the trends in two key criteria, the percentage of girls in secondary school and the infant mortality rate. These conclusions are then buttressed for each country by the findings of anthropological demographic research programs in which the authors were involved. The predictions are that all three countries will attain a total fertility rate of 2.1 within the next 30 years and that the UN2000 Revision of the medium population projection is plausible in that regard. However, the authors part company with the UN projection in their assessment that the nature of these societies means that they will all subsequently fall to still lower fertility levels.