Causes of fertility decline in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union II

Abstract The first part of this study (which appeared in the preceding issue of Population Studies) assessed the extent of the decline in fertility in the countries of the area during the last 10-15 years, and analyzed the purely demographic aspects ofthis phenomenon. Part II examines the socio-economic differentials in fertility, with regard to such variables as urban-rural residence, socio-occupational and employment status of women, educational attainment, income and housing conditions, and the consequent impact of structural changes in these characteristics of the population on observed fertility trends. The broad conclusion is that the fertility differentials usually found in western societies are also relevant to the socialist countries of eastern Europe, and that the dramatic falls in fertility in the 1950's and the 1960's have largely been the outcome ofthe deep and rapid structural changes, particularly those associated with urbanization, educational attainment and the incidence of female employment. The last part of the study is concerned with the impact on post-war fertility trends of social legislation and of general economic policies, particularly in the fields of employment and income. An appraisal of the extent of family planning is followed by a discussion of the recent pro-natalist measures introduced in most countries of the area and of their effectiveness.     

The two generation urbanite hypothesis revisited

It is generally accepted that socioeconomic differentials in fertility are minimal among urban couples with nonfarm origins -- two generation urbanites. In this paper, we replicate Duncan's (1965) analysis to see if the two generation urbanite hypothesis holds for more recent cohorts of American women. In four cohorts of women, drawn from three recent fertility surveys, we find no support for the two generation urbanite hypothesis. It appears that the links between farm background, socioeconomic status and fertility were different for the low fertility cohorts of women born in the early 1900's and the more recent cohorts of women who experienced the baby boom.     

Delayed childbearing in the U.S.: facts and fictions

Between 1970-82, the proportion of 1st births in the US to women 25 and older rose from 19-36% and the proportion of women still childless at ages 25-34 increased by 56% at about the same time. Although a sharp contrast with the baby boom era of the 1950s and 1960s, todays's epidemic of delayed childbearing is similar to patterns earlier in the 20th century. As then, much is due to delayed age at marriage, but baby boomers now in the their late 20s and early 30s are also delaying childbirth after marriage. The trend stems in part from their economic difficulties as they compete in a tight job market caused both by their large numbers and a turbulent economy. But it is also related to women's increasing education and, in turn, increasing opportunities in and commitment to the labor force, which can be expected to encourage a delayed childbearing even after prospects brighten for young people. Although a diverse group, most of today's delayed childbearers are white, highly educated, 2-career couples. Adequate daytime care for preschool children is a prime concern. Although more employers now offer childcare assistance and flexible work schedules to working parents, the juggle between jobs and childraising can be a strain. On the plus side are delayed childbearers' greater maturity and generally higher incomes, which can ease potential problems created by parent-child age differences as their children grow up. Businesses have been quick to respond to the new market of older, affluent, 1st-time mothers. New methods of treating of circumventing infertility and prenatal detection of chromosomal birth defects can now help overcome potential biological problems that may concern women who choose to delay childbearing past age 30.     

America's baby boom generation: the fateful bulge

From 1955-64 nearly 42 million births occurred in the U.S., an unprecedented expansion. The roots of the baby boom lie in the universal rush to early marriage and favorable economic climate for the relatively scarce young men born of the Depression cohort. The impact of the boom interrupted a century-long fertility decline. Pro-marriage, pronatalist norms were revived by the Depression cohort who formed families of at least 2 children or more. During the 1960-70's schools, colleges, and universities were built to accomodate the boom and are now excessive for the baby bust cohort. Unemployment and crime rates rose and fell with the passing of the boom babies through late adolescence and early adulthood. In the 1980's, boom babies will be aged 20-30. Demands for housing will be high. Annual birth numbers will increase even if the rate of childbearing hovers below replacement level at about 1.8 per woman. Per capita earnings and overall labor productivity should improve as the boom baby cohort reaches middle age in the 1990s. However, chances for advancement will be fewer. As the cohort reaches retirement age, the over 65 population will double from 31 million in 2000 to almost 60 million in 2030. Although the burden will be somewhat offset by reduced proportions of under 18-year-olds, the ratio of active workers paying Social Security will fall drastically.     

Cuba: the demography of revolution

Cuba's post-revolution demographic trends, especially in regard to fertility and emigration, and the causes and consequences of these trends, were examined using available statistical data. The authors maintain that both fertility and emigration trends were highly infuenced by economic factors. The trends are described in the context of the social and economic changes instituted by the revolutionary government. Government policies were aimed at 1) eradicating inequalities in housing, income, education, and health; 2) improving the status of women; and 3) upgrading the living standards of the rural population. Government policies did alleviate many social problems and greatly improved the health and educational status of the population; however, these policies had a marked adverse effect on economic performance. The demographic transition began in Cuba earlier than in most other developing countries and it began long before the 1959 revolution. These earlier changes must be taken into account when assessing the impact of post-revolution policies on demographic trends. Cuba's birthrate declined from 26-14.8/1000 population between 1959-1979 and the total fertility rate declined from 3.7-1.9 between 1970-1978; however, during the 1960s there was a baby boom and the birth rate for 1963 exceeded 35/1000 population. The baby boom was largely a response to the temporary improvement in economic conditions which occurred shortly after the revolution. The decline in fertility during the 1970s was due in part to the increased availability of abortion and contraceptive services and to a decline in the marriage rate; however, Cuba's deteriorating economy was also a major contributing factor. The baby boom of the 1960s is negativley affecting the current economy of the country. Individuals born during the baby boom are entering adulthood and are contributing toward Cuba's current unemployment problems. Prior to the revolution, Cuba experienced a high rate of in-migration. Immediately after the revolution this pattern was reversed and between 1959-1980 more than 800,000 Cubans emigrated. Most of these emigrants went to the U.S. A large proportion of the earlier emigrants were members of the upper and middle socioeconomic classes. Recent emigrants were more evenly representative of all segments of Cuba's population. The socioeconomic characteristics of the emigrants are described and their adjustment in the U.S. is discussed. Tables provide statistical data on Cuba's demographic trends.     

Relative Income,Race, and Fertility

If a white husband's income is higher than expected for men of his age, race, education, job characteristics, and region, economic theory predicts higher complete fertility for his wife. In the present study one per cent public use samples from the 1970 Census for California and Hawaii were used to examine the effect of relative income on Japanese, Chinese, and black fertility. Relative income was defined in two ways: (1) with regard to earnings of husbands of the same race, education, employment, and state; (2) with regard to earnings of white husbands of the same education, employment, and state. High relative incomes defined in each way were associated with increased completed fertility of Japanese and Chinese in Hawaii, where Orientals form a majority. Neither definition of high relative income was associated with the completed fertility of Japanese, Chinese, or blacks in California, where non-whites form a minority. The results suggest that the effect of relative income on fertility for a racial group will be positive only where there are few racial barriers to their attainment of high incomes.     

Baby booms,busts, and population ageing in the developed world

The key challenge facing contemporary society is a process of population ageing rooted mainly in past fertility cycles. The goals of the study reported in this paper were (i) to analyse jointly the post-1930s baby boom and the baby bust that followed, (ii) to consider the specific ways this particular combination influenced the process of ageing in different societies, and (iii) to evaluate some possible implications for policy of different historical experiences. Demographic time series for 27 nations in the developed world were used. The main results confirm the importance of the boom and bust fertility cycle of the second half of the twentieth century for population ageing. Some countries will experience ageing processes driven mainly by the growth of elderly populations while others will age largely as a result of declines in working-age populations. These differences underscore the need to tailor policy priorities for specific patterns of ageing.     

New zodiacal influences on chinese family formation: Taiwan, 1976

Although Chinese folklore holds that the Dragon Year is an auspicious time to have a birth, notable increases in Chinese fertility in Dragon Years did not occur before 1976. Demographic explanations for the belated occurrence of this phenomenon rely on the notion of natural fertility: that is, couples’ lack of modem contraception had kept such decisions outside the realm of choice. The decomposition performed in this article, however, shows that the bulk of the 1976 Dragon Year baby boom on Taiwan was due to strategies that had always been available: marriage timing, abortion, and coital behavior. The natural fertility paradigm thus is insufficient in explaining the motivation for this behavior and should be complemented by institutional approaches.     

Family sizes of children and family sizes of women

This paper demonstrates the relation that obtains between the average family size of women and the average family size of offspring of those women. It estimates the value of these two measures for cohorts of American women aged 45–49 in various years from 1890 to 1970. It shows that children born during the post-war baby boom actually derived from smaller families than those born during the low-fertility 1930’s; that under current patterns a woman would have to bear an average of almost two children fewer than were borne by her mother merely to keep population fertility rates constant from generation to generation; and that average family size for nonwhite children exceeds that for white by 50 percent, although the racial difference in family sizes of women is only 19 percent.     

The Demographic Foundations of Rising Employment and Earnings among Single Mothers in Canada and the United States, 1980–2000

Despite comparatively modest welfare reforms in Canada relative to those of the United States, employment rates and earnings among single mothers have risen by virtually identical magnitudes in the two countries since 1980. We show that most of the gains in Canada and a substantial share of the change in the US were the result of the dynamics of cohort replacement and population aging as the large and better educated baby boom generation replaced earlier cohorts and began entering their forties. In both countries, demographic effects were the main factor accounting for higher employment and earnings among older (40+) single mothers. Changes among younger single mothers, in contrast, were mainly the result of changes in labor market behavior and other unmeasured variables. Overall, demographic changes dominated in Canada but not in the US for two reasons: (a) Canadian single mothers are significantly older than their US counterparts; and (b) consistent with the welfare reform thesis, the magnitude of behavioral change among younger single mothers was much larger in the US.     

Fertility in England and Wales: a fifty-year perspective

This paper provides a detailed account of fertility levels and trends in England and Wales since 1938, with a briefer coverage of a much longer time-span. The paper is concerned both with the measurement of fertility and with understanding the observed fertility behaviour. We lament and correct the failure of demographers to apply measurement tools available since the 1950s to the analysis of fertility in England and Wales, with a particular emphasis on adjustment of period measures and period parity progression ratios and show how some of the grosser errors of analysis and interpretation might have been avoided by earlier use of these approaches. We also relate these estimates to more recent ones. Once a clearer account of trends has been established, the paper goes on to reinterpret and explain the baby boom and baby bust. The conclusion looks at future prospects for fertility.     

Fertility in England and Wales: A Fifty-Year Perspective

This paper provides a detailed account of fertility levels and trends in England and Wales since 1938, with a briefer coverage of a much longer time-span. The paper is concerned both with the measurement of fertility and with understanding the observed fertility behaviour. We lament and correct the failure of demographers to apply measurement tools available since the 1950s to the analysis of fertility in England and Wales, with a particular emphasis on adjustment of period measures and period parity progression ratios and show how some of the grosser errors of analysis and interpretation might have been avoided by earlier use of these approaches. We also relate these estimates to more recent ones. Once a clearer account of trends has been established, the paper goes on to reinterpret and explain the baby boom and baby bust. The conclusion looks at future prospects for fertility.     

The Baby Boom and Its Causes: What We Know and What We Need to Know

This study analyzes the timing, magnitude, and volume of the mid‐twentieth century baby boom in European and non‐European Western countries. The baby boom is found to have been especially strong in the non‐European countries, fairly strong in some European countries, and quite weak in others. While the boom has often been linked with postwar economic growth and the recuperation of births postponed during the Depression era, we argue that this is only a limited part of the story. In most cases the recovery of the birth rate started well before the end of World War II, a fact not accounted for by existing theories. We investigate the roles played by the recovery of period as well as cohort fertility, the underlying marriage boom, and the recovery of marital fertility. We identify major puzzles for future research, including the reasons for strongly declining ages at marriage and the role played by contraceptive failure in the rise of high‐parity births.     

Bargaining over family size: The determinants of fertility in Brazil

Understanding how households make fertility decisions is important to implementing effective policy to slow population growth. Most empirical studies of this decision are based on household models in which men and women are assumed to act as if they have the same preferences for the number of children. However, if men and women have different preferences regarding fertility and are more likely to assert their own preferences as their bargaining power in the household increases, policies to lower fertility rates may be more effectively targeted toward one spouse or the other. In this paper, we test the relevance of the single preferences model by investigating whether men and women's nonwage incomes have the same effects on the number of children in the household. We find that while increases in both the man and woman's nonwage income lower the number of children in the household, an equivalent increase in the woman's income has a significantly stronger effect than the man's. In addition, we find that increases in women's nonwage transfer income have the strongest effects on the fertility decisions of women with low levels of education. The most important policy implication of our results is that policies aimed at increasing the incomes of the least-educated women will be the most effective in lowering fertility rates.     

从生育高峰出生同期群看我国农村养老模式的选择

第一次生育高峰期出生的人口,受到国家计划生育政策的影响,生育的孩子数目减少,是未来农村老年贫困的高发群体。国家应该对他们的老年生活给予资助。最后,对建立普享型老年津贴的可行性进行了分析。     

Studying the fertility peak in Beijing]

Beijing, China, is experiencing a baby boom in response to 2 periods of large population increase in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. The average number of annual births was 220,000 in the first period and 269,000 in the second period. The causes of the large increase in the population in the first period were an improvement of health conditions which led to a reduction in mortality, immigration flow, and an erroneous population policy. The causes in the second period were recuperative fertility after three years of natural calamity and increased fertility among immigrants. Net migration had an important role in population growth these two periods; it also will have an important impact in future population changes. According to population projections, another baby boom is expected to occur before the end of the end of the century. During the up-coming baby boom period, 1.54 million births are expected, 190,000 per annum. The average increase in population size is expected to 127,000 per year. In the peak year, it may be around 200,000. Thanks to the family planning (FP) program the occurrence of the third baby boom in Beijing has been postponed and the duration will be shortened. From 1972 to 1982, 2.57 million births was averted due to FP, which drastically reduced pressure on the demand for resources and on the momentum of the next baby boom. Another baby booms is not expected during the early half of the 21st century, although an elevated birth rate within the range of normal fluctuation is predicted. The projection was based on the assumption of restricted migration and the enforcement of the FP program. The realization of the projected population will depend on deferred marriage, deferred child-bearing, prolonged birth spacing, the prevention of high parity fertility, the maintenance of the current population policy, and control over the reproductive behavior of the new migrant population.     

An analysis of baby boom characteristics in China

This article analyzed the 3rd Chinese baby boom and its causes by focusing on the fertility intensity of women and the number of births per year. The 3rd baby boom is expected to end in 2002 and to peak in 1995. The baby boom in urban areas will last a much shorter time than in rural areas. Particular differences are manifested between provinces: 1) The baby boom will last 3-4 years in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, and will last 10 years in Liaoning, Jilin, and Jiangsu. In other provinces, the boom will last 15-23 years; 2) The peak years are different between provinces; 3) The base number of births curves are province-specific; 4) The absolute base birth numbers are different between provinces (Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, and Sichuan 700,000; Beijing, Tianjin, Qinghai, and Ningzia 100,000); and 5) The shapes of progressive increases for base number of births are province specific. The increase in the number of childbearing-age women, the unplanned higher parity births, and early marriage and childbearing have all contributed to the current baby boom. Recommendations to control the problem include controlling higher parity births, observing birth spacing, and controlling the age of marriage and childbearing.     

Republic of Korea. Country feature

The Government of Korea's 5th 5-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1982-86) seeks to reduce the population growth rate from its 1982 level of 1.58% to 1.49% by 1986; it is assumed that the population replacement level of fertility (total fertility rate, 2.1) will be attained in 1988. The task of achieving these demographic targets is expected to be made more difficult by factors such as the impact of the 1950s baby boom and widespread son preference. New population control policy measures announced in 1981 call for improvements in the current family planning program management system; a new social and institutional support system to inculcate the small family size norm; strengthened information, education, and communication activities for family planning; and establishment of coordination among the government organizations involved in population-related activities. Numerous social support measures have already been put into effect, including income tax exemptions for up to 2 children, inclusion of population education in the school curriculum, priority in alloting public housing to sterilization acceptors with 2 or fewer children, and provision of IUD services through the medical insurance system. The number of contraceptive acceptors in the government program increased 78.3% from 1981-83, from 614,000 to 1,094,600. Sterilization and menstrual regulation services have shown particularly sharp increases. Program achievement for 1983 was equivalent to 19% of eligible women ages 15-44 years. The total fertility rate stood at 2.7 in 1982. Major efforts now must be directed toward eradicating the strong parental son preference and ensuring better family planning program efficiency and effectiveness.     

More than an urban legend: the short- and long-run effects of unplanned fertility shocks

This paper examines the short- and long-run effects of a quasi-exogenous variation in fertility behavior due to a yearlong period of power rationing in Colombia in 1992. We show that power shortages caused a mini baby boom and that the increase in fertility was unplanned and persistent: the time in between births was reduced and overall lifetime fertility increased. We also present evidence suggesting that women who had a baby due to the outage found themselves in worse socioeconomic conditions 12 years later.