Fertility of the jews

The objectives of this paper were to review and summarize the existing literature on Jewish fertility and to discuss the highlights of data on fertility trends and differentials based on survey data obtained on the Jewish population of the metropolitan area of Providence, Rhode Island. The literature consistently confirmed the finding of lower fertility among Jews since the 1880's in the United States and for the last seventy-five years in a variety of European countries.A review of available data on fertility trends and differentials within the Jewish population indicated contradictory and inconsistent findings. The Providence survey data pointed to changing patterns of fertility among Jews and clarified a number of seeming inconsistencies. These data suggested (1) the pre-World War II decline and postwar recovery of Jewish fertility; (2) the change from an inverse relationship of social class and Jewish fertility among first-generation Jews to a direct relationship among second- and third-generation Jews; (3) the changing relationship of religiosity and Jewish fertility, which reflects social class changes.Finally, an attempt is made to clarify the interpretation of these and related findings by placing the analysis of Jewish fertility in the context of assimilation and acculturation.     

Trends in the age at reproductive transitions in the developing world: The role of education

Girls’ school participation has expanded considerably in the developing world over the last few decades, a phenomenon expected to have substantial consequences for reproductive behaviour. Using Demographic and Health Survey data from 43 countries, this paper examines trends and differentials in the mean ages at three critical life-cycle events for young women: first sexual intercourse, first marriage, and first birth. We measure the extent to which trends in the timing of these events are driven either by the changing educational composition of populations or by changes in behaviour within education groups. Mean ages have risen over time in all regions for all three events, except age at first sex in Latin America and the Caribbean. Results from a decomposition exercise indicate that increases in educational attainment, rather than trends within education groups, are primarily responsible for the overall trends. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed.     

Increasingly heterogeneous ages at first birth by education in Southern European and Anglo-American family-policy regimes: A seven-country comparison by birth cohort

According to the 'reproductive polarization' hypothesis, family-policy regimes unfavourable to the combination of employment with motherhood generate greater socio-economic differentials in fertility than other regimes. This hypothesis has been tested mainly for 'liberal' Anglo-American regimes. To investigate the effects elsewhere, we compared education differentials in age at first birth among native-born women of 1950s and 1960s birth cohorts in seven countries representing three regime types. Women with low educational attainment have continued to have first births early, not only in Britain and the USA but also in Greece, Italy, and Spain. Women at all other levels of education have experienced a shift towards later first births, a shift that has been largest in Southern Europe. Unlike the educationally heterogeneous changes in age pattern at first birth seen under the Southern European and Anglo-American family-policy regimes, the changes across birth cohorts in the study's two 'universalistic' countries, Norway and France, have been educationally homogeneous.     

Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of educational differences and fertility preferences

This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition. The data are from Demographic and Health Surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in developed and less developed countries with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This conclusion implies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be a cause of stalling fertility.     

Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of educational differences and fertility preferences

This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition. The data are from Demographic and Health Surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in developed and less developed countries with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This conclusion implies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be a cause of stalling fertility.     

The economic explanation of fertility changes in the United States

Abstract It is widely assumed that fertility varies positively with economic conditions. Actually this assumption receives little support from the historical record. For a century before 1930 fertility declined while the economy expanded and real incomes rose. Then for nearly three decades fertility and incomes fell and rose together. Since 1960 they have again moved in opposite directions. Clearly, no simple generalization about their relation will hold water. More sophisticated explanations are based on relative rather than absolute incomes. Banks suggested that the downturn in English fertility in the 1870's might have occurred because standards of middle-class consumption rose faster than middle-class incomes, but he found the evidence inconclusive. To reconcile the post-war baby boom in the United States with earlier experience, Easterlin has argued that fertility is determined by the relationship between the income of couples in their twenties and the income of their parents ten to fifteen years earlier. Among the weaknesses of this theory as applied to U.S. experience are its failure to explain the sharp drop in fertility, including that of native white urban women, in the 1920's; the fact that fertility rose most in the baby boom at the higher socio-economic levels where incomes rose least; and the sharp decline of fertility after 1962 in spite of the favourable trend of incomes, including those of younger people. The broad conclusion is that while couples no doubt do consider income, employment opportunities, etc. in deciding how many children to have, such considerations have had a relatively minor influence on changes in fertility, which for the most part have been the result of changes in attitudes. Even the post-war baby boom was a result not only of higher incomes and full employment but also of a shift in attitudes toward family size, particularly among the better-educated, economically better-off sections of society.     

White-nonwhite differentials: Overview and implications

This paper reviews the arguments for maintaining a separate series of statistics for the white and nonwhite populations of the United States; only by maintaining factual data will it be possible to document inequality and discrimination. It then summarizes some white-nonwhite differentials: fertility, life expectancy, health, school attendance, educational attainment, and income. The human, social, and political implications are then reviewed.     

Is the Demographic Dividend an Education Dividend?

The effect of changes in age structure on economic growth has been widely studied in the demography and population economics literature. The beneficial effect of changes in age structure after a decrease in fertility has become known as the “demographic dividend.” In this article, we reassess the empirical evidence on the associations among economic growth, changes in age structure, labor force participation, and educational attainment. Using a global panel of countries, we find that after the effect of human capital dynamics is controlled for, no evidence exists that changes in age structure affect labor productivity. Our results imply that improvements in educational attainment are the key to explaining productivity and income growth and that a substantial portion of the demographic dividend is an education dividend.     

The Decomposition of Economic Outcomes as a Result of Changes in Brazil’s Male Age–Education Structure

In Brazil, the age and education compositions of the male labor force is changing with great regional variation. Based on Demographic Census microdata, results indicate that cohort size has a negative impact on earnings, but this effect is decreasing over time. In this study we consider the impact on earnings by age and education, as well as estimated income inequality reduction and racial differentials. Fertility decline and improve regarding educational attainment had a significant influence on the decline of income inequality in the country. Moreover, the non-white population has been experiencing less success in relation to educational achievement, compared to the white population.     

Population growth,economic development and family planning

This report discusses research conducted to determine whether reduction in population growth rates contributed to the rapid economic growth of Indonesia, South Korea, Japan and Thailand. The 5-year research projects, jointly sponsored by the UN Fund for Population Activities, the Nihon University Population Research Institute, and the East-West Population Institute, concluded that development and family planning programs contributed substantially to fertility decline in these countries. The project examined 3 factors that influence the long-term productive capacity and growth of the 4 Asian economies: savings, the size of the labor force, and the quality of labor (measured by educational attainment). Available evidence indicates a strong positive contribution of population decline toward growth of savings, a growth in labor force concurrent with a decline in fertility rates which enables per capita income to rise, and an increase in 2ndary education enrollment ratios as fertility is lowered. Development factors by themselves explain no more than 1/2 of the decline in fertility observed, suggesting that family planning programs particularly in Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia since 1976 have had an important impact on fertility and economic development.     

Modernization and Tradition in the Recent History of Italian Fertility

The secular decline of Italian fertility, started in the last decade of the nineteenth century, came to an end in the early 1950'sand has recovered slightly in the last fifteen years. Italian experience seems to follow, with a twenty-year lag, the experience of the more advanced western European populations. At present, with an average of 2.5 children per marriage, Italian fertility is very close to the French and to the average European level.At the regional level, two contrasting patterns can be detected. On one side stands the very low fertility of the North and of the Center, mostly below replacement in the last thirty years;on the other, the still high fertility of the South.In the North and in the Center, where the decline started earlier, fertility has fallen well below replacement level in the last thirty years. In the South, where the decline started in the late 1920's and early 1930's, a large family system still prevails, and the spreading of voluntary control faces barriers setup by a long historyof cultural isolation,attachment to tradition and religion. In the last 15 years, however, the gap has narrowed slowly, more because of an upturn of fertility in the North and in the Center than because of the decline in the South.Another interesting feature of Italian fertility is low class differentials: the fertility of the most prolific segment (farmers, farm laborers) is only 20 percent higher than the fertility of the less prolific professional groups. Finally, Italian experience provides an interesting example of the changing relationship linking the economic level of the population and fertility changes; in 1931-51 a negative correlation linked the changes in fertility to the economic level of the region, while in 1951-61 and 1961-66 a very high and positive correlation can be observed.As for the future trends in fertility, two factors may have an important role. In the first place, on the one hand, the economic policy of the government, aiming at reducing the economic gap between the South and the rest of the country, may accelerate the leveling of regional fertility differentials. The same effect, on the other hand, may be reached by more liberal legislation, now under way, for birth control and family planning propaganda.     

Growing Wealth Gaps in Education

Prior research on trends in educational inequality has focused chiefly on changing gaps in educational attainment by family income or parental occupation. In contrast, this contribution provides the first assessment of trends in educational attainment by family wealth and suggests that we should be at least as concerned about growing wealth gaps in education. Despite overall growth in educational attainment and some signs of decreasing wealth gaps in high school attainment and college access, I find a large and rapidly increasing wealth gap in college attainment between cohorts born in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively. This growing wealth gap in higher educational attainment co-occurred with a rise in inequality in children’s wealth backgrounds, although the analyses also suggest that the latter does not fully account for the former. Nevertheless, the results reported here raise concerns about the distribution of educational opportunity among today’s children who grow up in a context of particularly extreme wealth inequality.     

Effects of education on reproductive behavior: lessons from Pakistan

Evidence from the Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 1990/91 (PDHS) and a 1987 study by Zeba A. Sathar and Karen Oppenheim on women's fertility in Karachi and the impact of educational status, corroborates the correlation between improved education for women and fertility decline. PDHS revealed that current fertility is 5.4 children/ever married woman by the end of the reproductive period. 12% currently use a contraceptive method compared to 49% in India, 40% in Bangladesh, and 62% in Sri Lanka. The social environment of high illiteracy, low educational attainment, poverty, high infant and child and maternal mortality, son preference, and low status of women leads to high fertility. Fertility rates vary by educational status; i.e., women with no formal education have 2 more children than women with at least some secondary education. Education also affects infant and child mortality and morbidity. Literacy is 31% for women and 43% for men. 30% of all males and 20% of all females have attended primary school. Although most women know at least 1 contraceptive method, it is the urban educated woman who is twice as likely to know a source of supply and 5 times more likely to be a user. The Karachi study found that lower fertility among better educated urban women is an unintended consequence of women's schooling and deliberate effort to limit the number of children they have. Education-related fertility differentials could not be explained by the length of time women are at risk of becoming pregnant (late marriage age). Fertility limitation may be motivated by the predominant involvement in the formal work force and higher income. The policy implications are the increasing female schooling is a good investment in lowering fertility; broader improvements also need to be made in economic opportunities for women, particularly in the formal sector. Other needs are for increasing availability and accessibility of contraceptive and family planning services and increasing availability and accessibility of contraceptive and family planning services and increasing knowledge of contraception. The investment will impact development and demography and is an adjunct to child health an survival.     

Population Aging and the Rising Cost of Public Pensions

Rapid population aging is raising concerns about the sustainability of public pension systems in high‐income countries. The first part of this study identifies the four factors that determine trends in public pension expenditures: population aging, pension benefit levels, the mean age at retirement, and the labor force participation rate. The second part presents projections to 2050 of the impact of demographic trends on public pension expenditures in the absence of changes in pension benefits, labor force participation, and age at retirement. These projections demonstrate that current trends are unsustainable, because without reforms population aging will produce an unprecedented and harmful accumulation of public debt. A number of projection variants assess the potential impact of policy options aimed at improving the sustainability of public pension systems. Although the conventional responses are considered, particular attention is given to the demographic options of encouraging higher fertility and permitting more immigration. This analysis is illustrated with data from the seven largest OECD countries.     

Multistate projections by level of education for Portugal, 2011–2031

Educational attainment is an attribute that leads to a great distinction between the members of a population, including when considering their health and well-being, which are features to pursue within an aging society. The aim of this work was to produce demographic projections for the Portuguese population by sex, age group and level of educational attainment, for the period 2011–2031. Considering fertility, mortality and migration differentials by level of education, the population was projected using the multistate cohort-component method with a block Leslie matrix. Two scenarios were considered, one where educational attainment before 2011 remains constant and another in which educational attainment will follow the trend observed over the last decade, being the trend in the state proportion modelled using continuation ratio models. The results show an increase in the proportion of individuals who complete higher educational levels in almost all age groups of both sexes. Among women, only 13.6 % had completed some level of higher education in 2011, a figure that will rise to approximately 23.4 % in 2031, whereas among men this value was only 9.7 % and will also rise by 2031, reaching 15.5 %. We can expect the proportion of people with higher educational levels to continue to rise as the education of younger cohorts seems to evolve positively. This work will be particularly useful to study how the aging population and the rising levels of education can contribute to the planning and monitoring of public policies, although these findings can also be used in other research contexts.     

Gendering fertility: Second births in Sweden and Hungary

With the growing prevalence of the dual-earner family model in industrialized countries the gendered nature of the relationship between employment and parenting has become a key issue for childbearing decisions and behavior. In such a context taking into account the societal gender structure (public policies, family-level gender relations) explicitly can enhance our understanding of contemporary fertility trends. In this paper we study the second birth, given its increasing importance in the developed world as large proportions of women remain childless or bear only one child. We focus on Sweden where gender equality is pronounced at both the societal and the family level and on Hungary where the dual-earner model has been accompanied by traditional gender relations in the home sphere. Our analysis is based on data extracted from the Swedish and Hungarian Fertility and Family Surveys of 1992/93. We use the method of hazard regression. The results suggest that the second-birth intensity increases as the combination of parenthood and labor-force attachment of either parent is facilitated. We see this in the effect of family policies in Sweden and in the higher second-birth intensity of couples who share family responsibilities as compared to those with traditional gender-role behavior in both countries. Also, the lack of any visible impact of men's educational attainment in both Sweden and Hungary is probably linked to public policies as state support for families with children has reduced the importance of income for second childbearing. A positive educational gradient for Swedish women and an essentially zero gradient in Hungary reflects the success of policy measures in reducing fertility cost for more educated women in both countries.     

Residence background and fertility in Greater Bombay

Abstract The residence background of wives who migrate to metropolitan areas plays an important role in determining their fertility. From the data collected during 1966, relating to 7,872 currently married women of Greater Bombay, an attempt was made to establish differentials in marital fertility by residence background of the wives. This was categorized into three groups - non-migrants, urban migrants and rural migrants. It was observed that rural migrant wives exhibited significantly higher fertility compared with the other two groups, and this was explained by their lower educational attainment. Between the non-migrant and the urban migrant wives the latter consistently showed lower fertility for all age groups up to 40, while there was a reversal in the age group 40 and above, where non-migrants exhibited lower fertility. The urban migrant wives showed a somewhat higher level of education, most likely on account of selectivity, compared to the non-migrants. However, presence of a sizeable number of Parsee wives, characterized by a distinct urban culture and considerably lower fertility, was largely responsible for the low fertility of the non-migrant wives in the age group 40 and above. The variable that has emerged as the most influential in creating fertility differentials is education of the wife, which is shown to be negatively associated with the level of fertility. Wife's education explains to a large extent the observed fertility differentials by residence background.     

A new look at schooling inequalities in Italy and their trends over time

This article examines whether the influence of family background on educational attainment has changed in Italy in the course of the 20th century. For several European countries, recent studies have come to question the widely agreed thesis of persistent schooling inequalities. This work discusses extensively factors that may produce variations of class differentials in academic achievement and in participation rates in the Italian case. The empirical analyses are based on a new dataset and on new modelling techniques that ensure high statistical power to detect trends over time. Yet, the substantive conclusions point to a prevailing stability of class differentials, with a limited equalisation restricted to the agricultural classes in the oldest cohorts.     

Causes of fertility decline in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

Abstract This is the first part of a wider study which attempts to throw iight on the demographic, economic and social factors that have led to dramatic declines in fertility levels in most socialist countries of Eastern Europe during the last fifteen years or so. The present part is concerned with the purely demographic influences, that is mainly with the impact of changes in the age and sex structure of the populations under study, and in nuptiality. The statistical evidence adduced indicates that the observed downward trends in the annual number of births and in crude birth rates are a reflection of genuine changes in attitudes towards family size.     

Do children from small families do better?

The education, income, wealth and satisfaction with life of australians aged 25–54 are examined in relation to the circumstances of their childhood, paying particular attention to variation by number of siblings when growing up. The data are from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survery. Educational attainment, income earned and household wealth tend to be greater for people who grew up in relatively small families. The effect of the number of siblings on educational attainment is greater for females than for males. However the advantages of growing up in a smaller family do not translate into higher levels of satisfaction with life. The implications of the findings for the public debate on fertility and child-related benefits in Australia are discussed, as are the implications of a child-quality-child-quantity trade-off for the explanation of fertility levels in more developed countries.