The power of directional predictions in psychology

The vast majority of empirical hypotheses in psychology, or in the social sciences more generally, are directional whereas in other sciences, such as the physical sciences, there are more point or narrow-interval empirical hypotheses. Characteristics of theories and auxiliary assumptions play a role in the difference. Given that psychology research strongly features directional predictions, it is important to question the extent to which these provide convincing tests of theories that they are designed to test. The present work aims to provide a nuanced view that considers the complex interaction between the obviousness of directional predictions, the obviousness of the theory from which they derive, and the quality of the auxiliary assumptions that push towards directional predictions. Then, too, there is the related issue of vulnerability of directional predictions to alternative explanations and how to address them.     

Abstracts

The concept of ‘tacit knowledge’ as the means by which individuals interpret the ‘rules’ of social interaction occupies a central role in all the major contemporary theories of action and social structure. The major reference point for social theorists is Wittgenstein's celebrated discussion of rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations. Focusing on Giddens' incorporation of tacit knowledge and rules into his ‘theory of structuration’, I argue that Wittgenstein's later work is steadfastly set against the ‘latent cognitivism’ inherent in the idea of tacit knowledge and tacit rules. I also argue that the idea of tacit knowledge and tacit rules is either incoherent or explanatorily vacuous. Scholars of the emotions maintain that all anger requires an object of blame. In order to be angry, many writers argue, one must believe than an actor has done serious damage to something that one values. Yet an individual may be angered without blaming another. This kind of emotion, called situational anger, does not entail a corresponding object of blame. Situational anger can be a useful force in public life, enabling citizens to draw attention to the seriousness of social or political problems, without necessarily vilifying political officials. In the first half of this paper I show how H. L. A. Hart's theory of rules can resolve, or at least clarify, a central methodological problem in legal anthropology that was first posed in Llewellyn and Egebel's The Cheyenñe Way In the second half I explore and develop Hart's theory (a) of rules, and apply it to problems of agency and behaviourism in legal anthropology, and (b) of legal development, and apply it to the problem of rule-scepticism in legal anthropology as it is posed in Roberts and Comaroffs Rules and Processes and elsewhere. As human beings, we share many historically developed, language-game interwoven, public forms of life. Due to the joint, dialogically responsive nature of all social life within such forms, we cannot as individuals just act as we please; our forms of life exert a normative influence on what we can say and do. They act as a backdrop against which all our claims to knowledge are judged as acceptable or not. As a result, it is not easy to articulate their inadequacies in a clear and forceful manner. However, within most of our forms of life, we have a first-person right to express how our individual circumstances seem to us. And by the use of special forms of poetic, gestural talk—talk that can originate new language-games—we can offer to make our own ‘inner lives’ public. In this paper, I want to claim that this is just what Wittgenstein is attempting to do in his later philosophy: by use of the self-same methods that anyone might use to express aspects of their own world picture, he is offering us his attempts to make the background ‘landscape’ of our lives more visible to us. These methods are explored below. Proponents of the view that social structures are ontologically distinct from the people in whose actions they are immanent have assumed that structures can stand in causal relations to individual practices. Were causality to be no more than Humean concomitance correlations between structure and practices would be unproblematic. But two prominent advocates of the ontological account of structures, Bhaskar and Giddens, have also espoused a powers theory of causality. According to that theory causation is brought about by the activity of particulars, in the social psychological case, individuals of some sort. Consistence would demand that structure be those individuals. But neither Giddens nor Bhaskar wish to reify structure to the extent that would fit it for a role as a powerful particular. If only human beings can be powerful particulars in these contexts, the only way that structures can be real must be as properties of conversational (symbolic) interactions. Human action is social just in so far as people direct themselves to engage well in joint activities with others.     

A choice for ‘me’ or for ‘us’? Using we-reasoning to predict cooperation and coordination in games

Cooperation is the foundation of human social life, but it sometimes requires individuals to choose against their individual self-interest. How then is cooperation sustained? How do we decide when instead to follow our own goals? I develop a model that builds on Bacharach (in: Gold, Sugden (eds) Beyond individual choice: teams and frames in game theory, 2006) ??circumspect we-reasoning?? to address these questions. The model produces a threshold cost/benefit ratio to describe when we-reasoning players should choose cooperatively. After assumptions regarding player types and beliefs, we predict how the extent of cooperation varies across games. Results from two experiments offer strong support to the models and predictions herein.     

The Roles of Evolution in the Social Sciences: Is Biology Ballistic?

This paper discusses some widespread but often not fully articulated views concerning the possible roles of biology and evolution in the social sciences. Such views cluster around a set of intuitions that suggest that evolution's role is “ballistic”: it constitutes a starting point for mind that has been, and is, superseded by the role of culture and social construction. An implication is that evolved and the socially constructed aspects of mind are separable and independent, with the latter being the primary driver of mind. I outline four variants of the ballistic view. I then show how current findings and arguments in evolutionary thinking as related to mind contradict those ballistic views. The contrary view—that evolutionary and social factors are interdependent in the generation of social psychological capacities—is proposed as a consequence. This view is able to respect some insights of theories that make ballistic assumptions, whilst avoiding those assumptions.     

On the Nature and Role of Peer Review in Mathematics

For the past three decades, peer review practices have received much attention in the literature. But although this literature covers many research fields, only one previous systematic study has been devoted to the practice of peer review in mathematics, namely a study by Geist, Löwe, and Van Kerkhove from 2010. This lack of attention may be due to a view that peer review in mathematics is more reliable, and therefore less interesting as an object of study, than peer review in other fields. In fact, Geist, Löwe, and Van Kerkhove argue that peer review in mathematics is relatively reliable. At the same time, peer review in mathematics differs from peer review in most, if not all, other fields in that papers submitted to mathematical journals are usually only reviewed by a single referee. Furthermore, recent empirical studies indicate that the referees do not check the papers line by line. I argue that, in spite of this, mathematical practice in general and refereeing practices in particular are such that the common practice of mathematical journals of using just one referee is justified from the point of view of proof validity assessment. The argument is based on interviews I conducted with seven mathematicians.     

The ranking assumption

This paper is an attempt to raise some general objections to the whole concept of making decisions on teleological principles. Its scope is finally the whole concept of how we rationally decide, on a teleological basis, to do any act at all. However the arguments developed here arise from the recent discussions about one particular species of teleological decision-making - utilitarianism. Therefore, while I hope that the paper has consequences that are important far beyond this one ethical theory, my objections are phrased in terms of direct arguments about utilitarianism. The recent lively debates on this topic make it easy to ask some interesting questions about this sort of goal-oriented theory. However, if my objections are correct, the scope of these questions is much wider than any one utilitarian theory (or cluster of theories) because my objections are about an assumption that is common to all teleological theories and not just to classical utilitarianism.     

Optimal insurance without expected utility: The dual theory and the linearity of insurance contracts

Models of the insurance markets and institutions are routinely based on expected utility. Since EU is being challenged by an increasing number of decision models, we examine whether EU-based models are robust in their predictions. To do so, we rework some basic models of optimal insurance contracts and equilibrium using the “dual” theory to EU of Yaari. When there is a single, insurable source of risk, dual theory permits only corner solutions if the contract itself is linear. This contrasts sharply with EU. Nonlinearity, and thereby the possibility of interior solutions, is introduced in two ways. First, the contract itself is nonlinear, i.e., a deductible insurance policy. Or second, the decision maker is subject to some background risk such as uninsurable risky assets or default of the insurer. When decision problems are subject to nonlinearity, the predictions on optimal insurance are more similar to, though not identical with, those generated with EU.     

The Not Altogether Social Construction of Emotions: A Critique of Harré and Gillett

Are emotions like sneezes, unwilled, mechanical, or are they like judgments; are they entirely social constructions? Harré and Gillett believe that emotions are exclusively judgments. We argue that their view misses something important. Imagine a person quaking in anger. Both we and Harré and Gillett believe that he is angry only if he has made an implicit judgment, such as I have been transgressed against. But it is the quaking, not the judgment, that gives authenticity and force to the expression of anger. The quaking does not clarify what the actor means but rather it clarifies the relation of the actor to the meaning of his display. What makes it a genuine expression of anger and not a joke or performance is that the quaking is beyond the will. Bodily displays are not necessary to make expressions authentic; anything that shows that the expression is beyond the will will do, for instance, obsessive thoughts, intrusions, or an inability to concentrate. For Harré and Gillett emotions both as displays and feelings do not merely embody judgments but are also speech acts. We argue that an expression, a feeling or flitting through the mind, cannot be a speech act since only the overt can fit into the convention, the strictures of a community. Nor is the display merely a speech act. Since for an emotional display to be genuine it must slip from the lips unbidden. Further, a speech act account makes the emotions arbitrary; they imply that the set of possible emotions is open. We think, on the other hand, that only some sorts of judgments can become part of an emotion; judgments that relate to things that are important enough in a particular culture that judgment display and feeling are linked together involuntarily.     

Policy modeling of foreign exchange rates

This paper is neither a complete survey of empirical work on exchange rate determination, nor a review of the ballooning volume of theoretical models. It is instead an attempt to classify the main alternative approaches to modeling exchange rates. I shall concentrate on approaches that can be used to assess the effects of alternative policies. There will be four further sections in the paper. The first three sections will each deal withthe structure, empirical support, and policy consequences of three main types of model: purchasing power parity models emphasizing the close and immediate relation of goods markets; interest rate parity models emphasizing the close and immediate international linkage of markets for financial assets; and structural balance-of-payments models that do not assume either of the above linkages to be so strong and immediate as to eliminate the other, and that hence require separate (but interdependent) modeling of trade and capital linkages in the determination of exchange rates. Each of these main categories has many rather distinct models within it, and some models are not easily classified into one of the three categories; I hope that the three-way split will nevertheless serve to make some distinctions that are important for policy modeling.In the final section I shall try to summarize the available model results that pertain to national and international policy choices under a system of more flexible exchange rates, and then to suggest where more or better model building might usefully increase the amount of information available to guide policy decisions.     

Clinical trials litigation: practical realities as seen from the trenches

Litigation involving human clinical research trials has escalated rapidly in the past few years. Whereas these suits raise many important theoretical questions, they also have important practical and human dimensions of which many people are unlikely to be aware until, by some unfortunate turn, they must live the reality. From the vantage of a fairly close view on one recent lawsuit, this article offers some ground-level observations and reflections that, it is hoped, may be of use to people in clinical research who might one day find themselves in a similar position.     

A note on the prisoner's dilemma

This paper clarifies some basic concepts or assumptions of the prisoner's dilemma, asserts the independence between the two agentsA andB, and advocates the application of the dominance principle of decision theory to the prisoner's dilemma. It discusses several versions of the prisoner's dilemma, including the one-shot and repeated cases of a noncooperative game from a purely egoistic point of view. The main part of this paper, however, is a study of the problem from a moral point of view through a special decision-theoretic approach. Morality is taken into account by incorporating the utility of the feeling of moral satisfaction for the agent, as a part of the total utility for the agent, into the decision-theoretic model. In this way the problem will appear as a purely technical decision problem, and the conflicts between various assumptions, or the dilemma caused by the problem, will no longer exist. It is also pointed out that in a more general case, for some values of the coefficient of moralityk, dominance will not exist so that the dominance principle will not be applicable.     

Psychoanalytic Sociology and the Interpretation of Emotion

Simon Clarke, Psychoanalytic Sociology and the Interpretation of Emotion, pp. 145–163.
In this paper I explore the sociological study of emotion, contrasting constructionist and psychoanalytic accounts of envy as an emotion. I seek not to contra each vis-à-vis the other but to establish some kind of synthesis in a psychoanalytic sociology of emotion. I argue that although the constructionist approach to emotion gives us valuable insights into the social and moral dimensions of human encounters, it is unable to address the level of emotional intensity found for example in murderous rage against ethnic groups, or the emotional and often self destructive elements of terrorism. Psychoanalytic ideas do engage with these dynamics, and as such, a theory that synthesises both the social construction of reality and the psychodynamics of social life is necessary if we are to engage with these destructive emotions.     

Trust, Staking, and Expectations

Trust is a kind of risky reliance on another person. Social scientists have offered two basic accounts of trust: predictive expectation accounts and staking (betting) accounts. Predictive expectation accounts identify trust with a judgment that performance is likely. Staking accounts identify trust with a judgment that reliance on the person's performance is worthwhile. I argue (1) that these two views of trust are different, (2) that the staking account is preferable to the predictive expectation account on grounds of intuitive adequacy and coherence with plausible explanations of action; and (3) that there are counterexamples to both accounts. I then set forward an additional necessary condition on trust (added to the staking view), according to which trust implies a moral expectation. When A trusts B to do x , A ascribes to B an obligation to do x , and holds B to this obligation. This Moral Expectation view throws new light on some of the consequences of misplaced trust. I use the example of physicians' defensive behavior/defensive medicine to illustrate this final point.     

For an integrative theory of social behaviour: Theorising with and beyond rational choice theory

Most sociologists are not content with merely relating macrosocial phenomena to preceding macrosocial causes in their causal explanations of social phenomena. Instead they are seeking to provide (non‐reductive) microfoundations with which they can corroborate and make understandable the connection between macrosocial phenomena. In order to do so a theory (or theories) of human action is required. One such theory, rational choice theory (RCT), has long been viewed with strong suspicion in sociology. I show such suspicion to be partially justified. RCT cannot be a general theory of social behaviour. Nonetheless, there are important insights in various versions of RCT that should not be discarded. In order to improve upon RCT and move toward a more unified or integrative theory of action social‐psychological research has to be taken note of. I demonstrate how dual‐process theories and the research on heuristics can help sociologists move beyond RCT without contradicting some of its more basic insights.     

Points of View, Social Positioning and Intercultural Relations

The challenge of intercultural relations has become an important issue in many societies. In spite of the claimed value of intercultural diversity, successful outcomes as predicted by the contact hypothesis are but one possibility; on occasions intercultural contact leads to intolerance and hostility. Research has documented that one key mediator of contact is perspective taking. Differences in perspective are significant in shaping perceptions of contact and reactions to it. The ability to take the perspective of the other and to understand it in its own terms is a necessary condition for successful intergroup outcomes. This paper sheds light on the processes involved in intercultural perspective taking by elaborating the notion of the point of view based on social representations theory. The point of view provides a theory of social positioning that can analyse cultural encounters between social actors, and identify the conditions for positive relations. Insights are drawn from a study of public views on the relative merits of science and religion, following a documentary by Richard Dawkins in which it was suggested that religion is a source of evil. The findings demonstrate that the point of view may be categorised according to a three-way taxonomy according to the extent to which it is open to another perspective. A point of view may be monological—closed to another's perspective entirely, dialogical—open to the possibility of another perspective while maintaining some percepts as unchallengeable, or metalogical—open to another's perspective based on the other's frame of reference.     

On the structuralist constraints in social scientific theorizing

Several case studies and theoretical reports indicate that the structuralist concept of a constraint has a central role in the reconstruction of physical theories. It is surprising that there is only little theoretical discussion on the relevance of constraints for the reconstruction of social scientific theories in the literature. Almost all structuralist reconstructions of social theorizing are vacuously constrained. Consequently, constraints are methodologically irrelevant.In this paper I reconstruct three cases selected from social scientific theorizing. The first case is a generalization of Gross, Mason and McEachern's (1958) role expectation conflict theory, which is a qualitative theory. The second case is Cohen and Lee's (1975) quantitative theory of social conformity, which essentially utilizes the theor of Markov chains. The third case is the explanation schema of folk psychology which is one of the most important methodological frameworks in the social sciences.In all the three cases important constraints emerge. From an epistemological point of view it seems that the related constraints work as higher-order laws. In any case, purely conceptual arguments are insufficient to justify them.The three cases,mutatis mutandis, cover nearly all types of social scientific theorizing, so that in my view constraints play a crucial methodological role in the social sciences precisely as they have in the natural sciences.