Global Warming Risk Perceptions in India

Few studies have focused on global warming risk perceptions among people in poor and developing countries, who are disproportionately impacted by climate change. This analysis conducts a comprehensive assessment of global warming risk perceptions in India using a national sample survey. Consistent with cultural theory, egalitarianism was positively associated with global warming risk perceptions. In addition, perceived vulnerability and resilience to extreme weather events were also two of the strongest factors associated with global warming risk perceptions. While worry was positively associated with risk perceptions, it accounted for only a small proportion of the variance, unlike studies in developed countries. Finally, the study also collected global warming affective images. The most common responses were “don't know” or “can't say” (25%), followed by “pollution” (21%), “heat” (20%), and “nature” (16%). The study finds that the predictors of global warming risk perceptions among the Indian public are both similar and different than those in developed countries, which has important implications for climate change communication in India.     

The Role of Emotion in Global Warming Policy Support and Opposition

Prior research has found that affect and affective imagery strongly influence public support for global warming. This article extends this literature by exploring the separate influence of discrete emotions. Utilizing a nationally representative survey in the United States, this study found that discrete emotions were stronger predictors of global warming policy support than cultural worldviews, negative affect, image associations, or sociodemographic variables. In particular, worry, interest, and hope were strongly associated with increased policy support. The results contribute to experiential theories of risk information processing and suggest that discrete emotions play a significant role in public support for climate change policy. Implications for climate change communication are also discussed.     

American Risk Perceptions: Is Climate Change Dangerous?

Public risk perceptions can fundamentally compel or constrain political, economic, and social action to address particular risks. Public support or opposition to climate policies (e.g., treaties, regulations, taxes, subsidies) will be greatly influenced by public perceptions of the risks and dangers posed by global climate change. This article describes results from a national study (2003) that examined the risk perceptions and connotative meanings of global warming in the American mind and found that Americans perceived climate change as a moderate risk that will predominantly impact geographically and temporally distant people and places. This research also identified several distinct interpretive communities, including naysayers and alarmists, with widely divergent perceptions of climate change risks. Thus, "dangerous" climate change is a concept contested not only among scientists and policymakers, but among the American public as well.     

The Interplay Between Knowledge,Perceived Efficacy,and Concern About Global Warming and Climate Change: A One‐Year Longitudinal Study

If the long‐term goal of limiting warming to less than 2°C is to be achieved, rapid and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions are required. These reductions will demand political leadership and widespread public support for action on global warming and climate change. Public knowledge, level of concern, and perceived personal efficacy, in positively affecting these issues are key variables in understanding public support for mitigation action. Previous research has documented some contradictory associations between knowledge, personal efficacy, and concern about global warming and climate change, but these cross‐sectional findings limit inferences about temporal stability and direction of influence. This study examines the relationships between these three variables over a one‐year period and three waves with national data from New Zealand. Results showed a positive association between the variables, and the pattern of findings was stable and consistent across the three data points. More importantly, results indicate that concern mediates the influence of knowledge on personal efficacy. Knowing more about global warming and climate change increases overall concern about the risks of these issues, and this increased concern leads to greater perceived efficacy and responsibility to help solving them. Implications for risk communication are discussed.     

Effects of the Chernobyl Accident on Public Perceptions of Nuclear Plant Accident Risks

Assessments of public perceptions of the characteristics of a nuclear power plant accident and affective responses to its likelihood were conducted 5 months before and 1 month after the Chernobyl accident. Analyses of data from 69 residents of southwestern Washington showed significant test-retest correlations for only 10 of 18 variables--accident likelihood, three measures of impact characteristics, three measures of affective reactions, and hazard knowledge by governmental sources. Of these variables, only two had significant changes in mean ratings; frequency of thought and frequency of discussion about a nearby nuclear power plant both increased. While there were significant changes only for two personal consequences (expectations of cancer and genetic effects), both of these decreased. The results of this study indicate that more attention should be given to assessing the stability of risk perceptions over time. Moreover, the data demonstrate that experience with a major accident can actually decrease rather than increase perceptions of threat.     

Emotions,Trust, and Perceived Risk: Affective and Cognitive Routes to Flood Preparedness Behavior

Despite the prognoses of the effects of global warming (e.g., rising sea levels, increasing river discharges), few international studies have addressed how flood preparedness should be stimulated among private citizens. This article aims to predict Dutch citizens’ flood preparedness intentions by testing a path model, including previous flood hazard experiences, trust in public flood protection, and flood risk perceptions (both affective and cognitive components). Data were collected through questionnaire surveys in two coastal communities (n= 169, n= 244) and in one river area community (n= 658). Causal relations were tested by means of structural equation modeling (SEM). Overall, the results indicate that both cognitive and affective mechanisms influence citizens’ preparedness intentions. First, a higher level of trust reduces citizens’ perceptions of flood likelihood, which in turn hampers their flood preparedness intentions (cognitive route). Second, trust also lessens the amount of dread evoked by flood risk, which in turn impedes flood preparedness intentions (affective route). Moreover, the affective route showed that levels of dread were especially influenced by citizens’ negative and positive emotions related to their previous flood hazard experiences. Negative emotions most often reflected fear and powerlessness, while positive emotions most frequently reflected feelings of solidarity. The results are consistent with the affect heuristic and the historical context of Dutch flood risk management. The great challenge for flood risk management is the accommodation of both cognitive and affective mechanisms in risk communications, especially when most people lack an emotional basis stemming from previous flood hazard events.     

Why Reduced-Form Regression Models of Health Effects Versus Exposures Should Not Replace QRA: Livestock Production and Infant Mortality as an Example

Do pollution emissions from livestock operations increase infant mortality rate (IMR)? A recent regression analysis of changes in IMR against changes in aggregate “animal units” (a weighted sum of cattle, pig, and poultry numbers) over time, for counties throughout the United States, suggested the provocative conclusion that they do: “[A] doubling of production leads to a 7.4% increase in infant mortality.” Yet, we find that regressing IMR changes against changes in specific components of “animal units” (cattle, pigs, and broilers) at the state level reveals statistically significant negative associations between changes in livestock production (especially, cattle production) and changes in IMR. We conclude that statistical associations between livestock variables and IMR variables are very sensitive to modeling choices (e.g., selection of explanatory variables, and use of specific animal types vs. aggregate “animal units). Such associations, whether positive or negative, do not warrant causal interpretation. We suggest that standard methods of quantitative risk assessment (QRA), including emissions release (source) models, fate and transport modeling, exposure assessment, and dose-response modeling, really are important—and indeed, perhaps, essential—for drawing valid causal inferences about health effects of exposures to guide sound, well-informed public health risk management policy. Reduced-form regression models, which skip most or all of these steps, can only quantify statistical associations (which may be due to model specification, variable selection, residual confounding, or other noncausal factors). Sound risk management requires the extra work needed to identify and model valid causal relations.     

Assessing the Effects of Information About Global Population Growth on Risk Perceptions and Support for Mitigation and Prevention Strategies

The human population is forecast to increase by 3–4 billion people during this century and many scientists have expressed concerns that this could increase the likelihood of certain adverse events (e.g., climate change and resource shortages). Recent research shows that these concerns are mirrored in public risk perceptions and that these perceptions correlate with a willingness to adopt mitigation behaviors (e.g., reduce resource consumption) and preventative actions (e.g., support actions to limit growth). However, little research has assessed the factors that influence risk perceptions of global population growth (GPG). To contribute to this important goal, this article presents three studies that examined how risk perceptions of GPG might be influenced by textual‐visual representations (like those in media and Internet articles) of the potential effects of GPG. Study 1 found that a textual narrative that highlighted the potential negative (cf. positive) consequences of GPG led to higher perceived risk and greater willingness to adopt mitigation behaviors, but not to support preventative actions. Notably, the influence of the narratives on perceived risk was largely moderated by the participant's prior knowledge and perceptions of GPG. Contrary to expectations, studies 2 and 3 revealed, respectively, that photographs depicting GPG‐related imagery and graphs depicting GPG rates had no significant effect on the perceived risk of GPG or the willingness to embrace mitigation or preventative actions. However, study 3 found that individuals with higher “graph literacy” perceived GPG as a higher risk and were more willing to adopt mitigation behaviors and support preventative actions.     

Personal Efficacy, the Information Environment, and Attitudes Toward Global Warming and Climate Change in the United States

Despite the growing scientific consensus about the risks of global warming and climate change, the mass media frequently portray the subject as one of great scientific controversy and debate. And yet previous studies of the mass public's subjective assessments of the risks of global warming and climate change have not sufficiently examined public informedness, public confidence in climate scientists, and the role of personal efficacy in affecting global warming outcomes. By examining the results of a survey on an original and representative sample of Americans, we find that these three forces—informedness, confidence in scientists, and personal efficacy—are related in interesting and unexpected ways, and exert significant influence on risk assessments of global warming and climate change. In particular, more informed respondents both feel less personally responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming. We also find that confidence in scientists has unexpected effects: respondents with high confidence in scientists feel less responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming. These results have substantial implications for the interaction between scientists and the public in general, and for the public discussion of global warming and climate change in particular.     

Precision of Information,Sensational Information,and Self‐Efficacy Information as Message‐Level Variables Affecting Risk Perceptions

Studies that investigate how the mass media cover risk issues often assume that certain characteristics of content are related to specific risk perceptions and behavioral intentions. However, these relationships have seldom been empirically assessed. This study tests the influence of three message‐level media variables—risk precision information, sensational information, and self‐efficacy information—on perceptions of risk, individual worry, and behavioral intentions toward a pervasive health risk. Results suggest that more precise risk information leads to increased risk perceptions and that the effect of sensational information is moderated by risk precision information. Greater self‐efficacy information is associated with greater intention to change behavior, but none of the variables influence individual worry. The results provide a quantitative understanding of how specific characteristics of informational media content can influence individuals’ responses to health threats of a global and uncertain nature.     

Public Perceptions of the Risks and Benefits of Technology1

This study attempted to verify and extend previous research on people's perceptions of the risks and benefits of technology and their judgments concerning the acceptability of technology safety regulations. The study addressed several limitations of prior work, in that: (1) it was the first “expressed-preference” study to collect data from large, representative samples of Americans; (2) the research design made “person,” rather than “technology,” the unit of statistical analysis; and (3) the study employed an expanded set of independent variables, including three qualitative benefit characteristics. The results confirmed several major conclusions of prior expressed-preference research, the most important being that members of the public tend to define “risks,”“benefits,” and “acceptability” in a complex, multidimensional manner; and that their definitions differ significantly from those used by professional risk-managers and other technical experts in quantitative assessments of risk and acceptability. The results also indicated that people's stances toward technology regulation tend to cut across traditional sociodemographic lines.     

Communicating with the Public About Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attacks: Results from a Survey Experiment on Factors Influencing Intention to “Run,Hide, Tell” in the United Kingdom and Denmark

Effective risk communication is an integral part of responding to terrorism, but until recently, there has been very little pre‐event communication in a European context to provide advice to the public on how to protect themselves during an attack. Following terrorist attacks involving mass shootings in Paris, France, in November 2015, the U.K. National Police Chiefs’ Council released a Stay Safe film and leaflet that advises the public to “run,” “hide,” and “tell” in the event of a firearms or weapons attack. However, other countries, including Denmark, do not provide preparedness information of this kind, in large part because of concern about scaring the public. In this survey experiment, 3,003 U.K. and Danish participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: no information, a leaflet intervention, and a film intervention to examine the impact of “Run, Hide, Tell” advice on perceptions about terrorism, the security services, and intended responses to a hypothetical terrorist firearms attack. Results demonstrate important benefits of pre‐event communication in relation to enhancing trust, encouraging protective health behaviors, and discouraging potentially dangerous actions. However, these findings also suggest that future communications should address perceived response costs and target specific problem behaviors. Cross‐national similarities in response suggest this advice is suitable for adaptation in other countries.     

Public Meetings and Risk Amplification: A Longitudinal Study

This article offers longitudinal data tracking people who did and did not attend a series of public meetings in an upstate New York rural community grappling with the expansion of an existing solid waste landfill and remediation of an adjacent inactive hazardous waste site. Before and after the public meetings, mailed questionnaires measured risk perceptions and perceived credibility of risk managers (here, the state government agencies and the responsible industry) conducting the meetings. Respondents at each measurement point included meeting attendees and nonattendees, with some fluctuation over time when attendees at one measurement point were nonattendees at the next and vice versa. The results from the first survey indicate that following the first two public meetings, attendees perceived greater risks from the waste sites than did nonattendees; attendees also perceived the risk managers as less credible. After the third public meeting, the results showed that attendees' risk perceptions remained steady; however, perceptions of government agency credibility significantly decreased. After the fourth public meeting, the survey found that attendees' risk perceptions were again not significantly different, whereas perceptions of government agency credibility increased significantly. The industry's credibility also increased, though only among attendees who had attended the most recent public meeting, not among attendees who had attended both the third and fourth public meetings. For nonattendees, risk perceptions and credibility ratings did not change. The discussion examines how distinctive characteristics of communication at each public meeting may have resulted in different effects and proposes hypotheses for future research.     

Climate Change Risk Perception and Communication: Addressing a Critical Moment?

Climate change is an increasingly salient issue for societies and policy‐makers worldwide. It now raises fundamental interdisciplinary issues of risk and uncertainty analysis and communication. The growing scientific consensus over the anthropogenic causes of climate change appears to sit at odds with the increasing use of risk discourses in policy: for example, to aid in climate adaptation decision making. All of this points to a need for a fundamental revision of our conceptualization of what it is to do climate risk communication. This Special Collection comprises seven papers stimulated by a workshop on “Climate Risk Perceptions and Communication” held at Cumberland Lodge Windsor in 2010. Topics addressed include climate uncertainties, images and the media, communication and public engagement, uncertainty transfer in climate communication, the role of emotions, localization of hazard impacts, and longitudinal analyses of climate perceptions. Climate change risk perceptions and communication work is critical for future climate policy and decisions.     

Weighing the Risks of Nuclear Energy and Climate Change: Trust in Different Information Sources,Perceived Risks,and Willingness to Pay for Alternatives to Nuclear Power

We examined how individuals perceive nuclear energy in the context of climate change mitigation and how their perceptions are associated with trust in different risk information sources. We analyzed the interrelationships between trust, perceived risk of nuclear power, climate change concern, perception of nuclear energy as an acceptable way to mitigate climate change, and willingness to pay (WTP) for alternatives to nuclear power. A nationwide survey (N = 967) collected in Finland was analyzed with structural equation modeling. The associations between trust and perceived risk of nuclear power, climate change concern, and perception of nuclear power as a way to mitigate climate change varied by the type of information source. Political party support and other background variables were associated with trust in different information sources. The effect of trust in information sources on WTP was mediated by perceived risks and benefits. The results will increase our understanding of how individuals perceive nuclear energy as a way to cut CO₂ emissions and the role of trust in different information sources in shaping nuclear risk perceptions and energy choices.     

Illustrating Risk: Anaphylaxis Through the Eyes of the Food‐Allergic Child

The risk perception research is widely focused on children as targets of risk. To date, very few studies have consulted with the impacted group to assess the perceptions of risk associated with the exposures of interest. Much less research has investigated the experiences of children at risk for anaphylaxis, their concerns, and the psychosocial stresses associated with risk. The present study explores the perceptions and experiences of Ontario students with anaphylaxis, and their parents regarding school as a safe place in order to inform school policy around risk management and coping. A “child‐centered” analytical framework incorporating illustrative techniques within interpretative analysis is outlined. Five prominent themes: (a) social and environmental barriers to safety, (b) coping strategies, (c) emotional burden of responsibility, (d) balance of responsibility (transitions), and (e) redefining “normal” are discussed. Results found that “child‐centered” techniques empowered children in a process that is meaningful and relevant to their lives. A preliminary framework for understanding what risk means to children highlighted the differences in how they cope in the public sphere of school.     

The Psychophysics of Terror Attack Casualty Counts

In communicating the risk that terror attacks pose to the public, government agencies and other organizations must understand which characteristics of an attack contribute to the public's perception of its severity. An attack's casualty count is one of the most commonly used metrics of a terror attack's severity, yet it is unclear whether the public responds to information about casualty count when forming affective and cognitive reactions to terror attacks. This study sought to characterize the “psychophysical function” relating terror attack casualty counts to the severity of the affective and cognitive reactions they elicit. We recruited n = 684 Mechanical Turk participants to read a realistic vignette depicting either a biological or radiological terror attack, whose death toll ranged from 20 to 50,000, and rated their levels of fear and anger along with the attack's severity. Even when controlling for the perceived plausibility of the scenarios, participants’ severity ratings of each attack were logarithmic with respect to casualty count, while ratings of fear and anger did not significantly depend on casualty count. These results were consistent across attack weapon (biological vs. radiological) and time horizon of the casualties (same-day or anticipated to occur over several years). These results complement past work on life loss valuation and highlight a potential bifurcation between the public's affective and cognitive evaluations of terror attacks.     

Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts about Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality

Modern theories in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicate that there are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The “analytic system” uses algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus, formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortful, and requires conscious control. The “experiential system” is intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness. The experiential system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad). This system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it is safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange‐smelling water. Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and the experiential systems operate in parallel and each seems to depend on the other for guidance. Studies have demonstrated that analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect. Rational decision making requires proper integration of both modes of thought. Both systems have their advantages, biases, and limitations. Now that we are beginning to understand the complex interplay between emotion and reason that is essential to rational behavior, the challenge before us is to think creatively about what this means for managing risk. On the one hand, how do we apply reason to temper the strong emotions engendered by some risk events? On the other hand, how do we infuse needed “doses of feeling” into circumstances where lack of experience may otherwise leave us too “coldly rational”? This article addresses these important questions.     

Now What Do People Know About Global Climate Change? Survey Studies of Educated Laypeople

In 1992, a mental‐models‐based survey in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, revealed that educated laypeople often conflated global climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion, and appeared relatively unaware of the role of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions in global warming. This study compares those survey results with 2009 data from a sample of similarly well‐educated laypeople responding to the same survey instrument. Not surprisingly, following a decade of explosive attention to climate change in politics and in the mainstream media, survey respondents in 2009 showed higher awareness and comprehension of some climate change causes. Most notably, unlike those in 1992, 2009 respondents rarely mentioned ozone depletion as a cause of global warming. They were also far more likely to correctly volunteer energy use as a major cause of climate change; many in 2009 also cited natural processes and historical climatic cycles as key causes. When asked how to address the problem of climate change, while respondents in 1992 were unable to differentiate between general “good environmental practices” and actions specific to addressing climate change, respondents in 2009 have begun to appreciate the differences. Despite this, many individuals in 2009 still had incorrect beliefs about climate change, and still did not appear to fully appreciate key facts such as that global warming is primarily due to increased concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and the single most important source of this carbon dioxide is the combustion of fossil fuels.