Spatially Representing Vulnerability to Extreme Rain Events Using Midwestern Farmers’ Objective and Perceived Attributes of Adaptive Capacity

Potential climate‐change‐related impacts to agriculture in the upper Midwest pose serious economic and ecological risks to the U.S. and the global economy. On a local level, farmers are at the forefront of responding to the impacts of climate change. Hence, it is important to understand how farmers and their farm operations may be more or less vulnerable to changes in the climate. A vulnerability index is a tool commonly used by researchers and practitioners to represent the geographical distribution of vulnerability in response to global change. Most vulnerability assessments measure objective adaptive capacity using secondary data collected by governmental agencies. However, other scholarship on human behavior has noted that sociocultural and cognitive factors, such as risk perceptions and perceived capacity, are consequential for modulating people's actual vulnerability. Thus, traditional assessments can potentially overlook people's subjective perceptions of changes in climate and extreme weather events and the extent to which people feel prepared to take necessary steps to cope with and respond to the negative effects of climate change. This article addresses this knowledge gap by: (1) incorporating perceived adaptive capacity into a vulnerability assessment; (2) using spatial smoothing to aggregate individual‐level vulnerabilities to the county level; and (3) evaluating the relationships among different dimensions of adaptive capacity to examine whether perceived capacity should be integrated into vulnerability assessments. The result suggests that vulnerability assessments that rely only on objective measures might miss important sociocognitive dimensions of capacity. Vulnerability indices and maps presented in this article can inform engagement strategies for improving environmental sustainability in the region.     

Empirical Analysis of Farmers' Drought Risk Perception: Objective Factors,Personal Circumstances,and Social Influence

Drought‐induced water shortage and salinization are a global threat to agricultural production. With climate change, drought risk is expected to increase as drought events are assumed to occur more frequently and to become more severe. The agricultural sector's adaptive capacity largely depends on farmers’ drought risk perceptions. Understanding the formation of farmers’ drought risk perceptions is a prerequisite to designing effective and efficient public drought risk management strategies. Various strands of literature point at different factors shaping individual risk perceptions. Economic theory points at objective risk variables, whereas psychology and sociology identify subjective risk variables. This study investigates and compares the contribution of objective and subjective factors in explaining farmers’ drought risk perception by means of survey data analysis. Data on risk perceptions, farm characteristics, and various other personality traits were collected from farmers located in the southwest Netherlands. From comparing the explanatory power of objective and subjective risk factors in separate models and a full model of risk perception, it can be concluded that farmers’ risk perceptions are shaped by both rational and emotional factors. In a full risk perception model, being located in an area with external water supply, owning fields with salinization issues, cultivating drought‐/salt‐sensitive crops, farm revenue, drought risk experience, and perceived control are significant explanatory variables of farmers’ drought risk perceptions.     

Perception of Climate Risk among Rural Farmers in Vietnam: Consistency within Households and with the Empirical Record

Rural farmers in Vietnamese communes perceive climate risk and potential impacts on livelihood within a complex context that may influence individual and household decisions. In a primary survey of 1,145 residents of the Thach Ha district of Ha Tinh province, we gathered data regarding perception about stability in climate, potential risks to livelihood, demographic characteristics, orientation toward risk, and interest in expanding economic activity. Temporal analysis of meteorological and economic indicator data forms an empirical basis for comparison with human perception. We ask the basic question: Are rural farmers’ perceptions of climate consistent with the historical record and reproducible within households? We find that respondents do perceive climate anomalies, with some anchoring on recent extreme events as revealed by climate observational data, and further that spouses disproportionately share perceptions relative to randomly simulated pairings. To put climate‐related risk perception in a larger context, we examine patterns across a range of risks to livelihood faced by farmers (livestock disease, pests, markets, health), using dimension reduction techniques. We find that our respondents distinguish among potential causes of low economic productivity, with substantial emphasis on climate‐related impacts. They do not express uniform concern across risks, but rather average patterns reveal common modes and distinguish climate concern. Still, among those expressing concern about climate‐related risks to livelihood we do not find an association with expressed intention to pursue changes in economic activity as a risk management response.     

Efficacy,Action, and Support for Reducing Climate Change Risks

A growing body of research demonstrates that believing action to reduce the risks of climate change is both possible (self‐efficacy) and effective (response efficacy) is essential to motivate and sustain risk mitigation efforts. Despite this potentially critical role of efficacy beliefs, measures and their use vary wildly in climate change risk perception and communication research, making it hard to compare and learn from efficacy studies. To address this problem and advance our understanding of efficacy beliefs, this article makes three contributions. First, we present a theoretically motivated approach to measuring climate change mitigation efficacy, in light of diverse proposed, perceived, and previously researched strategies. Second, we test this in two national survey samples (Amazon's Mechanical Turk N = 405, GfK Knowledge Panel N = 1,820), demonstrating largely coherent beliefs by level of action and discrimination between types of efficacy. Four additive efficacy scales emerge: personal self‐efficacy, personal response efficacy, government and collective self‐efficacy, and government and collective response efficacy. Third, we employ the resulting efficacy scales in mediation models to test how well efficacy beliefs predict climate change policy support, controlling for specific knowledge, risk perceptions, and ideology, and allowing for mediation by concern. Concern fully mediates the relatively strong effects of perceived risk on policy support, but only partly mediates efficacy beliefs. Stronger government and collective response efficacy beliefs and personal self‐efficacy beliefs are both directly and indirectly associated with greater support for reducing the risks of climate change, even after controlling for ideology and causal beliefs about climate change.     

Risk and Climate Change: Perceptions of Key Policy Actors in Canada

This article examines factors that predict perceptions of risk associated with global climate change. The research focuses on the perceptions of those associated with climate change policy making in the prairie region of Canada. The data are from an online survey ( n = 851) of those policy actors. The analysis integrates several dominant approaches to the study of risk perception: psychometric approaches that examine the effects of cognitive structure; demographic assessments that examine, for example, differences in perception based on gender or family status; and political approaches that suggest that one's position in the policy process may affect his or her perceived risk. Attitudes toward climate change are to a degree predicted by all of these factors, but only when indirect effects are observed. Sociodemographic characteristics have little direct effect on perceived risk, but do affect general beliefs that affect risk perceptions. Perceived risk is related more strongly to these general beliefs or world views than to more specific beliefs about the effects of climate change on weather patterns. Position within the policy process also contributes to our understanding of perceptions, with industry and governmental actors demonstrating similar attitudes, which contrast with environmental groups and university researchers.     

Indiscriminate,Irrelevant, and Sometimes Wrong: Causal Misconceptions about Climate Change

Prior research demonstrates widespread persistence of beliefs about climate change causes and risks that are arguably misconceptions. They include believing pollution causes climate change, believing ozone depletion causes climate change, the combination of these two “green beliefs,” referred to as environmental problems, and believing natural climate variation significantly contributes to current climate trends. Each of these causal beliefs has the potential to weaken or divert support away from effective climate change risk mitigation policies. To assess this potential, we explore the nature and prevalence of these beliefs in the United States with a national sample of interviews (N = 77) and two national surveys (N = 1,013, N = 1,820), and apply regression and mediation analyses to explore whether they explain any of the variation in individuals’ concern or support for policy to mitigate climate change. Adherence to these beliefs—which reflect a variety of misconceptions illustrated in the interviews—differs by political ideology but is common, with over a third of interviewees mentioning one or more. Controlling for general knowledge, political ideology, and other factors, misconceptions about environmental problems are still associated directly with support for climate change policies. On average adherence to the belief that environmental problems cause climate change is associated with a 25% higher probability of policy support. In contrast, believing natural climate variability is a major recent cause of climate change is associated with a 7% lower probability of supporting climate policy, even after controlling for political ideology and other knowledge about climate change.     

Hazard Experience,Geophysical Vulnerability,and Flood Risk Perceptions in a Postdisaster City,the Case of New Orleans

This article investigates the determinants of flood risk perceptions in New Orleans, Louisiana (United States), a deltaic coastal city highly vulnerable to seasonal nuisance flooding and hurricane‐induced deluges and storm surges. Few studies have investigated the influence of hazard experience, geophysical vulnerability (hazard proximity), and risk perceptions in cities undergoing postdisaster recovery and rebuilding. We use ordinal logistic regression techniques to analyze experiential, geophysical, and sociodemographic variables derived from a survey of 384 residents in seven neighborhoods. We find that residents living in neighborhoods that flooded during Hurricane Katrina exhibit higher levels of perceived risk than those residents living in neighborhoods that did not flood. In addition, findings suggest that flood risk perception is positively associated with female gender, lower income, and direct flood experiences. In conclusion, we discuss the implications of these findings for theoretical and empirical research on environmental risk, flood risk communication strategies, and flood hazards planning.     

The Relative Weights of Direct and Indirect Experiences in the Formation of Environmental Risk Beliefs

Direct experiences, we find, influence environmental risk beliefs more than the indirect experiences derived from outcomes to others. This disparity could have a rational basis. Or it could be based on behavioral proclivities in accord with the well‐established availability heuristic or the vested‐interest heuristic, which we introduce in this article. Using original data from a large, nationally representative sample, this article examines the perception of, and responses to, morbidity risks from tap water. Direct experiences have a stronger and more consistent effect on different measures of risk belief. Direct experiences also boost the precautionary response of drinking bottled water and drinking filtered water, while indirect experiences do not. These results are consistent with the hypothesized neglect of indirect experiences in other risk contexts, such as climate change.     

Parenthood and Worrying About Climate Change: The Limitations of Previous Approaches

The present study considers the correlation between parenthood and worry about the consequences of climate change. Two approaches to gauging people's perceptions of the risks of climate change are compared: the classic approach, which measures risk perception, and the emotion‐based approach, which measures feelings toward a risk object. The empirical material is based on a questionnaire‐based survey of 3,529 people in Sweden, of whom 1,376 answered, giving a response rate of 39%. The results show that the correlation of parenthood and climate risk is significant when the emotional aspect is raised, but not when respondents were asked to do cognitive estimates of risk. Parenthood proves significant in all three questions that measure feelings, demonstrating that it is a determinant that serves to increase worry about climate change.     

Climate Change Beliefs and Perceptions of Weather‐Related Changes in the United Kingdom

Public perception research in different countries has suggested that real and perceived periods of high temperature strengthen people's climate change beliefs. Such findings raise questions about the climate change beliefs of people in regions with moderate climates. Relatively little is known about whether public concerns about climate change may also be associated with perceived changes in other weather‐related events, such as precipitation or flooding. We examine the relationship between perceived changes in weather‐related events and climate change beliefs among U.K. residents at a time of below‐average winter temperatures and recent flooding. National survey data (n = 1,848) revealed that heat waves and hot summers were perceived to have become less common during respondents’ lifetimes, while flooding, periods of heavy rainfall, coastal erosions, and mild winters were perceived to have increased in frequency and cold winters were perceived to be unchanged. Although perceived changes in hot‐weather‐related events were positively associated with climate change beliefs, perceived changes in wet‐weather‐related events were found to be an even stronger predictor. Self‐reported experience of “flooding in own area” and “heat‐wave discomfort” also significantly contributed to climate change beliefs. These findings highlight the importance of salient weather‐related events and experiences in the formation of beliefs about climate change. We link our findings to research in judgment and decision making, and propose that those wishing to engage with the public on the issue of climate change should not limit their focus to heat.     

Risk Communication,Public Engagement,and Climate Change: A Role for Emotions

This article discusses the potential role that emotions might play in enticing a lifestyle that diminishes climate change. Climate change is an important challenge for society. There is a growing consensus that climate change is due to our behavior, but few people are willing to significantly adapt their lifestyle. Empirical studies show that people lack a sense of urgency: they experience climate change as a problem that affects people in distant places and in a far future. Several scholars have claimed that emotions might be a necessary tool in communication about climate change. This article sketches a theoretical framework that supports this hypothesis, drawing on insights from the ethics of risk and the philosophy of emotions. It has been shown by various scholars that emotions are important determinants in risk perception. However, emotions are generally considered to be irrational states and are hence excluded from communication and political decision making about risky technologies and climate change, or they are used instrumentally to create support for a position. However, the literature on the ethics of risk shows that the dominant, technocratic approach to risk misses the normative‐ethical dimension that is inherent to decisions about acceptable risk. Emotion research shows that emotions are necessary for practical and moral decision making. These insights can be applied to communication about climate change. Emotions are necessary for understanding the moral impact of the risks of climate change, and they also paradigmatically provide for motivation. Emotions might be the missing link in effective communication about climate change.     

Socioeconomic Vulnerability and Adaptation to Environmental Risk: A Case Study of Climate Change and Flooding in Bangladesh

In this article we investigate the complex relationship between environmental risk, poverty, and vulnerability in a case study carried out in one of the poorest and most flood-prone countries in the world, focusing on household and community vulnerability and adaptive coping mechanisms. Based upon the steadily growing amount of literature in this field we develop and test our own analytical model. In a large-scale household survey carried out in southeast Bangladesh, we ask almost 700 floodplain residents living without any flood protection along the River Meghna about their flood risk exposure, flood problems, flood damage, and coping mechanisms. Novel in our study is the explicit testing of the effectiveness of adaptive coping strategies to reduce flood damage costs. We show that, households with lower income and less access to productive natural assets face higher exposure to risk of flooding. Disparity in income and asset distribution at community level furthermore tends to be higher at higher risk exposure levels, implying that individually vulnerable households are also collectively more vulnerable. Regarding the identification of coping mechanisms to deal with flood events, we look at both the ex ante household level preparedness for flood events and the ex post availability of community-level support and disaster relief. We find somewhat paradoxically that the people that face the highest risk of flooding are the least well prepared, both in terms of household-level ex ante preparedness and community-level ex post flood relief.     

Vulnerability,Risk Perception,and Health Profile of Marginalized People Exposed to Multiple Built‐Environment Stressors in Worcester,Massachusetts: A Pilot Project

Millions of low‐income people of diverse ethnicities inhabit stressful old urban industrial neighborhoods. Yet we know little about the health impacts of built‐environment stressors and risk perceptions in such settings; we lack even basic health profiles. Difficult access is one reason (it took us 30 months to survey 80 households); the lack of multifaceted survey tools is another. We designed and implemented a pilot vulnerability assessment tool in Worcester, Massachusetts. We answer: (1) How can we assess vulnerability to multiple stressors? (2) What is the nature of complex vulnerability—including risk perceptions and health profiles? (3) How can findings be used by our wider community, and what lessons did we learn? (4) What implications arise for science and policy? We sought a holistic picture of neighborhood life. A reasonably representative sample of 80 respondents captured data for 254 people about: demographics, community concerns and resources, time‐activity patterns, health information, risk/stress perceptions, and resources/capacities for coping. Our key findings derive partly from the survey data and partly from our experience in obtaining those data. Data strongly suggest complex vulnerability dominated by psychosocial stress. Unexpected significant gender and ethnic disease disparities emerged: notably, females have twice the disease burden of males, and white females twice the burden of females of color (p < 0.01). Self‐reported depression differentiated by gender and age is illustrative. Community based participatory research (CBPR) approaches require active engagement with marginalized populations, including representatives as funded partners. Complex vulnerability necessitates holistic, participatory approaches to improve scientific understanding and societal responses.     

Risk Perceptions,General Environmental Beliefs,and Willingness to Address Climate Change

The research reported here examines the relationship between risk perceptions and willingness to address climate change. The data are a national sample of 1225 mail surveys that include measures of risk perceptions and knowledge tied to climate change, support for voluntary and government actions to address the problem, general environmental beliefs, and demographic variables. Risk perceptions matter in predicting behavioral intentions. Risk perceptions are not a surrogate for general environmental beliefs, but have their own power to account for behavioral intentions. There are four secondary conclusions. First, behavioral intentions regarding climate change are complex and intriguing. People are neither nonbelievers who will take no initiatives themselves and oppose all government efforts, nor are they believers who promise both to make personal efforts and to vote for every government proposal that promises to address climate change. Second, there are separate demographic sources for voluntary actions compared with voting intentions. Third, recognizing the causes of global warming is a powerful predictor of behavioral intentions independent from believing that climate change will happen and have bad consequences. Finally, the success of the risk perception variables to account for behavioral intentions should encourage greater attention to risk perceptions as independent variables. Risk perceptions and knowledge, however, share the stage with general environmental beliefs and demographic characteristics. Although related, risk perceptions, knowledge, and general environmental beliefs are somewhat independent predictors of behavioral intentions.     

Personal Values, Beliefs, and Ecological Risk Perception

A mail survey on ecological risk perception was administered in the summer of 2002 to a randomized sample of the lay public and to selected risk professionals at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). The ranking of 24 ecological risk items, from global climate change to commercial fishing, reveals that the lay public is more concerned about low-probability, high-consequence risks whereas the risk professionals are more concerned about risks that pose long-term, ecosystem-level impacts. To test the explanatory power of the value-belief-norm (VBN) theory for risk perception, respondents were questioned about their personal values, spiritual beliefs, and worldviews. The most consistent predictors of the risk rankings are belief in the new ecological paradigm (NEP) and Schwartz's altruism. The NEP and Schwartz's altruism explain from 19% to 46% of the variance in the risk rankings. Religious beliefs account for less than 6% of the variance and do not show a consistent pattern in predicting risk perception although religious fundamentalists are generally less concerned about the risk items. While not exerting as strong an impact, social-structural variables do have some influence on risk perception. Ethnicities show no effect on the risk scales but the more educated and financially well-off are less concerned about the risk items. Political leanings have no direct influence on risk rankings, but indirectly affect rankings through the NEP. These results reveal that the VBN theory is a plausible explanation for the differences measured in the respondents' perception of ecological risk.     

Adaptive Governance,Uncertainty, and Risk: Policy Framing and Responses to Climate Change,Drought, and Flood

As climate change impacts result in more extreme events (such as droughts and floods), the need to understand which policies facilitate effective climate change adaptation becomes crucial. Hence, this article answers the question: How do governments and policymakers frame policy in relation to climate change, droughts, and floods and what governance structures facilitate adaptation? This research interrogates and analyzes through content analysis, supplemented by semi‐structured qualitative interviews, the policy response to climate change, drought, and flood in relation to agricultural producers in four case studies in river basins in Chile, Argentina, and Canada. First, an epistemological explanation of risk and uncertainty underscores a brief literature review of adaptive governance, followed by policy framing in relation to risk and uncertainty, and an analytical model is developed. Pertinent findings of the four cases are recounted, followed by a comparative analysis. In conclusion, recommendations are made to improve policies and expand adaptive governance to better account for uncertainty and risk. This article is innovative in that it proposes an expanded model of adaptive governance in relation to “risk” that can help bridge the barrier of uncertainty in science and policy.     

A Probabilistic Analysis of Surface Water Flood Risk in London

Flooding in urban areas during heavy rainfall, often characterized by short duration and high‐intensity events, is known as “surface water flooding.” Analyzing surface water flood risk is complex as it requires understanding of biophysical and human factors, such as the localized scale and nature of heavy precipitation events, characteristics of the urban area affected (including detailed topography and drainage networks), and the spatial distribution of economic and social vulnerability. Climate change is recognized as having the potential to enhance the intensity and frequency of heavy rainfall events. This study develops a methodology to link high spatial resolution probabilistic projections of hourly precipitation with detailed surface water flood depth maps and characterization of urban vulnerability to estimate surface water flood risk. It incorporates probabilistic information on the range of uncertainties in future precipitation in a changing climate. The method is applied to a case study of Greater London and highlights that both the frequency and spatial extent of surface water flood events are set to increase under future climate change. The expected annual damage from surface water flooding is estimated to be to be £171 million, £343 million, and £390 million/year under the baseline, 2030 high, and 2050 high climate change scenarios, respectively.     

Projections of Future Extreme Weather Losses Under Changes in Climate and Exposure

Many attempts are made to assess future changes in extreme weather events due to anthropogenic climate change, but few studies have estimated the potential change in economic losses from such events. Projecting losses is more complex as it requires insight into the change in the weather hazard but also into exposure and vulnerability of assets. This article discusses the issues involved as well as a framework for projecting future losses, and provides an overview of some state‐of‐the‐art projections. Estimates of changes in losses from cyclones and floods are given, and particular attention is paid to the different approaches and assumptions. All projections show increases in extreme weather losses due to climate change. Flood losses are generally projected to increase more rapidly than losses from tropical and extra‐tropical cyclones. However, for the period until the year 2040, the contribution from increasing exposure and value of capital at risk to future losses is likely to be equal or larger than the contribution from anthropogenic climate change. Given the fact that the occurrence of loss events also varies over time due to natural climate variability, the signal from anthropogenic climate change is likely to be lost among the other causes for changes in risk, at least during the period until 2040. More efforts are needed to arrive at a comprehensive approach that includes quantification of changes in hazard, exposure, and vulnerability, as well as adaptation effects.     

Rethinking Vulnerability Analysis and Governance with Emphasis on a Participatory Approach

This article draws on vulnerability analysis as it emerged as a complement to classical risk analysis, and it aims at exploring its ability for nurturing risk and vulnerability governance actions. An analysis of the literature on vulnerability analysis allows us to formulate a three‐fold critique: first, vulnerability analysis has been treated separately in the natural and the technological hazards fields. This separation prevents vulnerability from unleashing the full range of its potential, as it constrains appraisals into artificial categories and thus already closes down the outcomes of the analysis. Second, vulnerability analysis focused on assessment tools that are mainly quantitative, whereas qualitative appraisal is a key to assessing vulnerability in a comprehensive way and to informing policy making. Third, a systematic literature review of case studies reporting on participatory approaches to vulnerability analysis allows us to argue that participation has been important to address the above, but it remains too closed down in its approach and would benefit from embracing a more open, encompassing perspective. Therefore, we suggest rethinking vulnerability analysis as one part of a dynamic process between opening‐up and closing‐down strategies, in order to support a vulnerability governance framework.     

GIS‐Based Integration of Social Vulnerability and Level 3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment to Advance Emergency Preparedness,Planning, and Response for Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents

In the nuclear power industry, Level 3 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is used to estimate damage to public health and the environment if a severe accident leads to large radiological release. Current Level 3 PRA does not have an explicit inclusion of social factors and, therefore, it is not possible to perform importance ranking of social factors for risk‐informing emergency preparedness, planning, and response (EPPR). This article offers a methodology for adapting the concept of social vulnerability, commonly used in natural hazard research, in the context of a severe nuclear power plant accident. The methodology has four steps: (1) calculating a hazard‐independent social vulnerability index for the local population; (2) developing a location‐specific representation of the maximum radiological hazard estimated from current Level 3 PRA, in a geographic information system (GIS) environment; (3) developing a GIS‐based socio‐technical risk map by combining the social vulnerability index and the location‐specific radiological hazard; and (4) conducting a risk importance measure analysis to rank the criticality of social factors based on their contribution to the socio‐technical risk. The methodology is applied using results from the 2012 Surry Power Station state‐of‐the‐art reactor consequence analysis. A radiological hazard model is generated from MELCOR accident consequence code system, translated into a GIS environment, and combined with the Center for Disease Control social vulnerability index (SVI). This research creates an opportunity to explicitly consider and rank the criticality of location‐specific SVI themes based on their influence on risk, providing input for EPPR.