Social Contagion of Risk Perceptions in Environmental Management Networks

An important requisite for improving risk communication practice related to contentious environmental issues is having a better theoretical understanding of how risk perceptions function in real‐world social systems. Our study applied Scherer and Cho's social network contagion theory of risk perception (SNCTRP) to cormorant management (a contentious environmental management issue) in the Great Lakes Basin to: (1) assess contagion effects on cormorant‐related risk perceptions and individual factors believed to influence those perceptions and (2) explore the extent of social contagion in a full network (consisting of interactions between and among experts and laypeople) and three “isolated” models separating different types of interactions from the full network (i.e., expert‐to‐expert, layperson‐to‐layperson, and expert‐to‐layperson). We conducted interviews and administered questionnaires with experts (e.g., natural resource professionals) and laypeople (e.g., recreational and commercial anglers, business owners, bird enthusiasts) engaged in cormorant management in northern Lake Huron (n = 115). Our findings generally support the SNCTRP; however, the scope and scale of social contagion varied considerably based on the variables (e.g., individual risk perception factors), actors (i.e., experts or laypeople), and interactions of interest. Contagion effects were identified more frequently, and were stronger, in the models containing interactions between experts and laypeople than in those models containing only interactions among experts or laypeople.     

Engaging with Comparative Risk Appraisals: Public Views on Policy Priorities for Environmental Risk Governance

Communicating the rationale for allocating resources to manage policy priorities and their risks is challenging. Here, we demonstrate that environmental risks have diverse attributes and locales in their effects that may drive disproportionate responses among citizens. When 2,065 survey participants deployed summary information and their own understanding to assess 12 policy‐level environmental risks singularly, their assessment differed from a prior expert assessment. However, participants provided rankings similar to those of experts when these same 12 risks were considered as a group, allowing comparison between the different risks. Following this, when individuals were shown the prior expert assessment of this portfolio, they expressed a moderate level of confidence with the combined expert analysis. These are important findings for the comprehension of policy risks that may be subject to augmentation by climate change, their representation alongside other threats within national risk assessments, and interpretations of agency for public risk management by citizens and others.     

Managing Risk: A Joint U.S.-German Perspective

Ideas from a USA-FRG conference on risk management are presented. In general, the difficulties confronted by risk management authorities in the two countries are similar, from discovering important risks at an early stage to setting acceptable goals. Government regulation is overburdened and somewhat inefficient in both countries, leading to greater search for alternatives. The many differences in approach between the two countries can inform both. German risk management is done largely through negotiations among the affected parties; when this does not resolve a dispute, a specialized administrative court takes charge. In both countries nonregulatory methods of managing risk should be enhanced and given a larger role. A matrix of risk management method versus criteria proved stimulating in comparing and ranking approaches. The conceptual differences between managing discrete events (auto crashes, boiler explosions, etc.) and chronic exposures have not been appreciated. Although uncertainty and probability are involved in both, there are qualitative differences in both analysis and management. Public perceptions of risk and the role these should play have been characterized by "objectivist" and "subjectivist" positions. In the former view, risks are subject to analysis, are calculable, and the public must be educated to accept the conclusions of experts. In the latter view what people perceive is what is most important, both psychologically and politically, and the risk experts must understand public fears and desires. These are important opportunities for cross cultural studies.     

Communicating Low‐Probability High‐Consequence Risk,Uncertainty and Expert Confidence: Induced Seismicity of Deep Geothermal Energy and Shale Gas

Subsurface energy activities entail the risk of induced seismicity including low‐probability high‐consequence (LPHC) events. For designing respective risk communication, the scientific literature lacks empirical evidence of how the public reacts to different written risk communication formats about such LPHC events and to related uncertainty or expert confidence. This study presents findings from an online experiment (N = 590) that empirically tested the public's responses to risk communication about induced seismicity and to different technology frames, namely deep geothermal energy (DGE) and shale gas (between‐subject design). Three incrementally different formats of written risk communication were tested: (i) qualitative, (ii) qualitative and quantitative, and (iii) qualitative and quantitative with risk comparison. Respondents found the latter two the easiest to understand, the most exact, and liked them the most. Adding uncertainty and expert confidence statements made the risk communication less clear, less easy to understand and increased concern. Above all, the technology for which risks are communicated and its acceptance mattered strongly: respondents in the shale gas condition found the identical risk communication less trustworthy and more concerning than in the DGE conditions. They also liked the risk communication overall less. For practitioners in DGE or shale gas projects, the study shows that the public would appreciate efforts in describing LPHC risks with numbers and optionally risk comparisons. However, there seems to be a trade‐off between aiming for transparency by disclosing uncertainty and limited expert confidence, and thereby decreasing clarity and increasing concern in the view of the public.     

Quantifying the Effects of Expert Selection and Elicitation Design on Experts’ Confidence in Their Judgments About Future Energy Technologies

Expert elicitations are now frequently used to characterize uncertain future technology outcomes. However, their usefulness is limited, in part because: estimates across studies are not easily comparable; choices in survey design and expert selection may bias results; and overconfidence is a persistent problem. We provide quantitative evidence of how these choices affect experts’ estimates. We standardize data from 16 elicitations, involving 169 experts, on the 2030 costs of five energy technologies: nuclear, biofuels, bioelectricity, solar, and carbon capture. We estimate determinants of experts’ confidence using survey design, expert characteristics, and public R&D investment levels on which the elicited values are conditional. Our central finding is that when experts respond to elicitations in person (vs. online or mail) they ascribe lower confidence (larger uncertainty) to their estimates, but more optimistic assessments of best‐case (10th percentile) outcomes. The effects of expert affiliation and country of residence vary by technology, but in general: academics and public‐sector experts express lower confidence than private‐sector experts; and E.U. experts are more confident than U.S. experts. Finally, extending previous technology‐specific work, higher R&D spending increases experts’ uncertainty rather than resolves it. We discuss ways in which these findings should be seriously considered in interpreting the results of existing elicitations and in designing new ones.     

Explosion Probability of Unexploded Ordnance: Expert Beliefs

This article reports on a study to quantify expert beliefs about the explosion probability of unexploded ordnance (UXO). Some 1,976 sites at closed military bases in the United States are contaminated with UXO and are slated for cleanup, at an estimated cost of $15–140 billion. Because no available technology can guarantee 100% removal of UXO, information about explosion probability is needed to assess the residual risks of civilian reuse of closed military bases and to make decisions about how much to invest in cleanup. This study elicited probability distributions for the chance of UXO explosion from 25 experts in explosive ordnance disposal, all of whom have had field experience in UXO identification and deactivation. The study considered six different scenarios: three different types of UXO handled in two different ways (one involving children and the other involving construction workers). We also asked the experts to rank by sensitivity to explosion 20 different kinds of UXO found at a case study site at Fort Ord, California. We found that the experts do not agree about the probability of UXO explosion, with significant differences among experts in their mean estimates of explosion probabilities and in the amount of uncertainty that they express in their estimates. In three of the six scenarios, the divergence was so great that the average of all the expert probability distributions was statistically indistinguishable from a uniform (0, 1) distribution—suggesting that the sum of expert opinion provides no information at all about the explosion risk. The experts' opinions on the relative sensitivity to explosion of the 20 UXO items also diverged. The average correlation between rankings of any pair of experts was 0.41, which, statistically, is barely significant (p= 0.049) at the 95% confidence level. Thus, one expert's rankings provide little predictive information about another's rankings. The lack of consensus among experts suggests that empirical studies are needed to better understand the explosion risks of UXO.     

Hot Potato: Expert-Consumer Differences in the Perception of a Second-Generation Novel Food

Novel foods have been the object of intense public debate in recent years. Despite widespread efforts to communicate the outcomes of risk assessments to consumers, public confidence in risk management has been low. Social scientists have identified various reasons for this, including a disagreement between technical experts and consumers over the nature of the hazards on which risk assessments should focus. The aim of this study was to identify and compare the ways in which experts and consumers understand the benefits and risks associated with a genetically modified example crop. Two qualitative studies were conducted. In Study 1, mental models were elicited from 24 experts by means of a three-wave Delphi procedure. In Study 2, mental models were elicited from 25 consumers by means of in-depth interviews. As expected, the expert mental models were focused on the types of hazards that can realistically be addressed under current regulatory frameworks, whereas the consumers were often more concerned about issues outside the scope of current legislation. Moreover, the experts tended to define risk and benefit in terms of detailed chains of cause-effect relationships between variables for which clear definitions and measurement rules exist. The concepts the consumers used when reasoning about biological processes were very abstract, suggesting that the participants had, at most, a holistic understanding. In line with this, issues of uncertainty played a prominent role for the consumers.     

Does Concern‐Driven Risk Management Provide a Viable Alternative to QRA?

This article discusses a concept of concern-driven risk management, in which qualitative expert judgments about whether concerns warrant specified risk management interventions are used in preference to quantitative risk assessment (QRA) to guide risk management decisions. Where QRA emphasizes formal quantitative assessment of the probable consequences caused by the recommended actions, and comparison to the probable consequences of alternatives, including the status quo, concern-driven risk management instead emphasizes perceived urgency or severity of the situation motivating recommended interventions. In many instances, especially those involving applications of the precautionary principle, no formal quantification or comparison of probable consequences for alternative decisions is seen as being necessary (or, perhaps, possible or desirable) prior to implementation of risk management measures. Such concern-driven risk management has been recommended by critics of QRA in several areas of applied risk management. Based on case studies and psychological literature on the empirical performance of judgment-based approaches to decision making under risk and uncertainty, we conclude that, although concern-driven risk management has several important potential political and psychological advantages over QRA, it is not clear that it performs better than (or as well as) QRA in identifying risk management interventions that successfully protect human health or achieve other desired consequences. Therefore, those who advocate replacing QRA with concern-driven alternatives, such as expert judgment and consensus decision processes, should assess whether their recommended alternatives truly outperform QRA, by the criterion of producing preferred consequences, before rejecting the QRA paradigm for practical applications.     

Different Roles and Viewpoints of Scientific Experts in Advising on Environmental Health Risks

Environmental health risks are often complex, largescale, and uncertain. The uncertainties inherent in these problems permit differences among experts in the appraisal of risks. This raises the question of whether different expert roles exist and, if so, how this affects the policy advice that is given. Here, we present a pilot study of the different roles and viewpoints that can be discerned among scientific experts in the Netherlands. Q methodology was used to empirically explore existing theoretical treatises on different expert roles. In total, 26 electromag­netic field (EMF) experts and 21 particulate matter (PM) experts participated. The responses were analyzed separately for EMF and PM respondents using Q factor analysis. In both the EMF and PM domain, three different expert roles were identified. This suggests that particular expert roles depend on the specific environmental health risk. The results indicate that different expert roles exist among scientists who provide policy advice on environmental health risks. This empirical study adds new data and insights to the literature on expert roles. The results of this study are relevant for the selection and composition of expert committees and the interpretation of expert advice.     

Risk Perception in the U.K. Oil and Gas Production Industry: Are Expert Loss‐Prevention Managers' Perceptions Different From Those of Members of the Public?

This article investigates potential differences in risk perception between experts (loss-prevention managers in the U.K. oil and gas production industry) and nonexperts (managers and students). Extant research on expert versus nonexpert perceptions of risk is reviewed, followed by the present study concerning risk perceptions of seven pen-picture scenarios involving the occurrence of hazardous events in the U.K. oil and gas production industry. In contrast to many of the earlier studies of expert versus nonexpert perceptions of risk, the present analysis concludes that experts did not judge the overall riskiness of the portrayed hazardous events as less risky than the nonexperts. Nevertheless, the experts believe more strongly than our nonexperts that the risks portrayed in the scenarios pose little threat to future generations, are more precisely known, and are relatively controllable. Use of multiple regression analysis to help uncover the basis of overall riskiness assessments for expert and lay respondents was inconclusive, however. Finally, little evidence was found that nonexperts were any more heterogeneous in their risk perceptions than experts. It may be that the nature of the risks assessed in the present study may account for the general lack of clear expert versus nonexpert differences in overall perceptions of the riskiness of hazardous events in the North Sea. Earlier findings of strong expert versus nonexpert differences in risk perception assessed hazards of major public concern. It is inferred that using such extreme hazards may have resulted in an exaggerated view of differences in expert versus public (nonexpert) perception of risk.     

Structured expert elicitation about Listeria monocytogenes cross-contamination in the environment of retail deli operations in the United States

Listeria monocytogenes is among the foodborne pathogens with the highest death toll in the United States. Ready‐to‐eat foods contaminated at retail are an important source of infection. Environmental sites in retail deli operations can be contaminated. However, commonly contaminated sites are unlikely to come into direct contact with food and the public health relevance of environmental contamination has remained unclear. To identify environmental sites that may pose a considerable cross‐contamination risk, to elucidate potential transmission pathways, and to identify knowledge gaps, we performed a structured expert elicitation of 41 experts from state regulatory agencies and the food retail industry with practical experience in retail deli operations. Following the “Delphi” method, the elicitation was performed in three consecutive steps: questionnaire, review and discussion of results, second questionnaire. Hands and gloves were identified as important potential contamination sources. However, bacterial transfers to and from hands or gloves represented a major data gap. Experts agreed about transfer probabilities from cutting boards, scales, deli cases, and deli preparation sinks to product, and about transfer probabilities from floor drains, walk‐in cooler floors, and knife racks to food contact surfaces. Comparison of experts' opinions to observational data revealed a tendency among experts with certain demographic characteristics and professional opinions to overestimate prevalence. Experts’ votes clearly clustered into separate groups not defined by place of employment, even though industry experts may have been somewhat overrepresented in one cluster. Overall, our study demonstrates the value and caveats of expert elicitation to identify data gaps and prioritize research efforts.     

Improving fire risk communication between authorities and micro-entrepreneurs: A mental models study of Ghanaian central market fires

This study conceptualizes how fire management authorities can empower nonexpert public to participate in fire risk communication processes and increase their own responsibilities for managing fire preventive, protective and recovery processes effectively. Drawing narratives from 10 disaster management experts working at government institutions and nine micro-entrepreneurs operating self-sustaining businesses in different merchandized lines in Ghana, we analyzed the data thematically and explored new insights on mental models to generate a two-way fire risk communication model. The findings suggest that fire management authorities planned fire disasters at the strategic level, collaborated with multiple stakeholders, disseminated information through many risk communication methods, and utilized their capabilities to manage fire at the various stages of fire risk communication, but the outcomes were poor. The micro-entrepreneurs sought to improve fire management outcomes through attitude change, law enforcement actions, strengthened security and better public trust building. The study has implications for policymakers, governments, and risk communication authorities of developing countries to strengthen their fire disaster policies to minimize commercial fire incidents and address the damaging effects of fire on people's livelihoods, businesses, properties, and environments. Our proposed two-way fire risk communication model is a new theoretical lens for experts and the nonexpert public to assess each other's beliefs about risk information and manage fire risk communication effectively at all stages.     

The Contrast Between Risk Assessment and Rules of Evidence in the Context of International Trade Disputes: Can the U.S. Experience Inform the Process?

Risk assessment provides a formalized process to evaluate human, animal, and ecological responses associated with exposure to environmental agents. The purpose of risk assessment is to answer two related questions.

• ? How likely is an (adverse) event to occur?
• ? If it does, how severe will the impact be?

In the United States, the science of risk assessment has evolved out of the necessity to make public health decisions in the face of scientific uncertainty. Its basic propositions have been established over the past three decades and its applications have impacted virtually every aspect of public health and environmental protection in many countries, including the United States. More recently, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute‐settlement process has provided additional incentive for the reliance on risk assessments internationally through the requirement that member countries be able to provide scientific justification, based on a risk assessment, for public health and environmental regulatory measures that are challenged. The purpose of this article is to review the history of risk assessment in the United States, emphasizing the development of both its scientific and policy aspects, as one example of the development of institutional capacity for risk assessment. This article discusses the importance of the social, political, and economic contexts of risk assessment and risk management in shaping the approaches taken while highlighting the reality that the analytic or risk assessment part of the decision‐making process, in the absence of scientific data, can be completed only by inserting inferences, or policy judgments, which may differ among countries. This article recognizes these differences, and the consequent difference between risk assessment that incorporates public health protective assumptions and the rules of evidence that seek to answer questions of causality, and discusses implications for the WTO dispute‐settlement process. It further explores the value of country‐specific risk assessment guidelines to facilitate consistency within a country along with the appropriateness and feasibility of international risk assessment guidelines.     

Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of Chemical Risks

Human beings have always been intuitive toxicologists, relying on their senses of sight, taste, and smell to detect harmful or unsafe food, water, and air. As we have come to recognize that our senses are not adequate to assess the dangers inherent in exposure to a chemical substance, we have created the sciences of toxicology and risk assessment to perform this function. Yet despite this great effort to overcome the limitations of intuitive toxicology, it has become evident that even our best scientific methods still depend heavily on extrapolations and judgments in order to infer human health risks from animal data. Many observers have acknowledged the inherent subjectivity in the assessment of chemical risks and have indicated a need to examine the subjective or intuitive elements of expert and lay risk judgments. We have begun such an examination by surveying members of the Society of Toxicology and the lay public about basic toxicological concepts, assumptions, and interpretations. Our results demonstrate large differences between toxicologists and laypeople, as well as differences between toxicologists working in industry, academia, and government. In addition, we find that toxicologists are sharply divided in their opinions about the ability to predict a chemical's effect on human health on the basis of animal studies. We argue that these results place the problems of risk communication in a new light. Although the survey identifies misconceptions that experts should clarify for the public, it also suggests that controversies over chemical risks may be fueled as much by limitations of the science of risk assessment and disagreements among experts as by public misconceptions.     

Confluence and Contours: Reflexive Management of Environmental Risk

Government institutions have responsibilities to distribute risk management funds meaningfully and to be accountable for their choices. We took a macro‐level sociological approach to understanding the role of government in managing environmental risks, and insights from micro‐level psychology to examine individual‐level risk‐related perceptions and beliefs. Survey data from 2,068 U.K. citizens showed that lay people's funding preferences were associated positively with beliefs about responsibility and trust, yet associations with perception varied depending on risk type. Moreover, there were risk‐specific differences in the funding preferences of the lay sample and 29 policymakers. A laboratory‐based study of 109 participants examined funding allocation in more detail through iterative presentation of expert information. Quantitative and qualitative data revealed a meso‐level framework comprising three types of decisionmakers who varied in their willingness to change funding allocation preferences following expert information: adaptors, responders, and resistors. This research highlights the relevance of integrated theoretical approaches to understanding the policy process, and the benefits of reflexive dialogue to managing environmental risks.     

Combining Experts’ Judgments: Comparison of Algorithmic Methods Using Synthetic Data

Expert judgment (or expert elicitation) is a formal process for eliciting judgments from subject‐matter experts about the value of a decision‐relevant quantity. Judgments in the form of subjective probability distributions are obtained from several experts, raising the question how best to combine information from multiple experts. A number of algorithmic approaches have been proposed, of which the most commonly employed is the equal‐weight combination (the average of the experts’ distributions). We evaluate the properties of five combination methods (equal‐weight, best‐expert, performance, frequentist, and copula) using simulated expert‐judgment data for which we know the process generating the experts’ distributions. We examine cases in which two well‐calibrated experts are of equal or unequal quality and their judgments are independent, positively or negatively dependent. In this setting, the copula, frequentist, and best‐expert approaches perform better and the equal‐weight combination method performs worse than the alternative approaches.     

The Distinction Between Risk and Hazard: Understanding and Use in Stakeholder Communication

A major issue in all risk communication efforts is the distinction between the terms “risk” and “hazard.” The potential to harm a target such as human health or the environment is normally defined as a hazard, whereas risk also encompasses the probability of exposure and the extent of damage. What can be observed again and again in risk communication processes are misunderstandings and communication gaps related to these crucial terms. We asked a sample of 53 experts from public authorities, business and industry, and environmental and consumer organizations in Germany to outline their understanding and use of these terms using both the methods of expert interviews and focus groups. The empirical study made clear that the terms risk and hazard are perceived and used very differently in risk communication depending on the perspective of the stakeholders. Several factors can be identified, such as responsibility for hazard avoidance, economic interest, or a watchdog role. Thus, communication gaps can be reduced to a four‐fold problem matrix comprising a semantic, conceptual, strategic, and control problem. The empirical study made clear that risks and hazards are perceived very differently depending on the stakeholders’ perspective. Their own worldviews played a major role in their specific use of the two terms hazards and risks in communication.     

Effects of Acknowledging Uncertainty about Earthquake Risk Estimates on San Francisco Bay Area Residents’ Beliefs,Attitudes, and Intentions

We test here the risk communication proposition that explicit expert acknowledgment of uncertainty in risk estimates can enhance trust and other reactions. We manipulated such a scientific uncertainty message, accompanied by probabilities (20%, 70%, implicit [“will occur”] 100%) and time periods (10 or 30 years) in major (≥magnitude 8) earthquake risk estimates to test potential effects on residents potentially affected by seismic activity on the San Andreas fault in the San Francisco Bay Area (n = 750). The uncertainty acknowledgment increased belief that these specific experts were more honest and open, and led to statistically (but not substantively) significant increases in trust in seismic experts generally only for the 20% probability (vs. certainty) and shorter versus longer time period. The acknowledgment did not change judged risk, preparedness intentions, or mitigation policy support. Probability effects independent of the explicit admission of expert uncertainty were also insignificant except for judged risk, which rose or fell slightly depending upon the measure of judged risk used. Overall, both qualitative expressions of uncertainty and quantitative probabilities had limited effects on public reaction. These results imply that both theoretical arguments for positive effects, and practitioners’ potential concerns for negative effects, of uncertainty expression may have been overblown. There may be good reasons to still acknowledge experts’ uncertainties, but those merit separate justification and their own empirical tests.