Risk,Ambiguity, and Decision Choice: Some Additional Evidence*

This paper extends prior research by jointly assessing the roles of risk attitude and tolerance for ambiguity in predicting choice. An experiment examined the effects of these variables on decisions made in four different scenarios. The four scenarios (treatment combinations) were generated by manipulating risk and ambiguity into two levels (high and low). The context was defined in terms of a sample size selection problem. The second issue explored was the effect of attitudes toward risk and ambiguity on decision confidence. The results indicate that (1) both risk attitude and ambiguity intolerance determined choice behavior, (2) the roles of these individual attitudes depend on the levels of the two treatment variables of risk and ambiguity, (3) the presence of ambiguity accentuates the perception of risk in individual subjects, and (4) decision makers who are less risk averse, and have more tolerance for ambiguity, display greater confidence in their choice. The paper discusses some of the managerial implications of the results.     

Risk Perceptions and Food Choice: An Exploratory Analysis of Organic- Versus Conventional-Produce Buyers

Consumer choice between organically (without pesticides) and conventionally grown produce is examined. Exploratory focus-group discussions and questionnaires (N = 43) suggest that individuals who purchase organically grown produce believe it is substantially less hazardous than the conventional alternative and are willing to pay significant premiums to obtain it (a median 50% above the cost of conventional produce). The value of risk reduction implied by this incremental willingness to pay is not high relative to estimates for other risks, since the perceived risk reduction is relatively large. Organic-produce consumers also appear more likely than conventional-produce consumers to mitigate other ingestion-related risks (e.g., contaminated drinking water) but less likely to use automobile seatbelts.     

How to Perform an Ethical Risk Analysis (eRA)

Ethical analysis is often needed in the preparation of policy decisions on risk. A three‐step method is proposed for performing an ethical risk analysis (eRA). In the first step, the people concerned are identified and categorized in terms of the distinct but compatible roles of being risk‐exposed, a beneficiary, or a decisionmaker. In the second step, a more detailed classification of roles and role combinations is performed, and ethically problematic role combinations are identified. In the third step, further ethical deliberation takes place, with an emphasis on individual risk‐benefit weighing, distributional analysis, rights analysis, and power analysis. Ethical issues pertaining to subsidiary risk roles, such as those of experts and journalists, are also treated in this phase. An eRA should supplement, not replace, a traditional risk analysis that puts emphasis on the probabilities and severities of undesirable events but does not cover ethical issues such as agency, interpersonal relationships, and justice.     

Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts about Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality

Modern theories in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicate that there are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The “analytic system” uses algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus, formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortful, and requires conscious control. The “experiential system” is intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness. The experiential system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad). This system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it is safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange‐smelling water. Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and the experiential systems operate in parallel and each seems to depend on the other for guidance. Studies have demonstrated that analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect. Rational decision making requires proper integration of both modes of thought. Both systems have their advantages, biases, and limitations. Now that we are beginning to understand the complex interplay between emotion and reason that is essential to rational behavior, the challenge before us is to think creatively about what this means for managing risk. On the one hand, how do we apply reason to temper the strong emotions engendered by some risk events? On the other hand, how do we infuse needed “doses of feeling” into circumstances where lack of experience may otherwise leave us too “coldly rational”? This article addresses these important questions.     

Does Communicating (Flood) Risk Affect (Flood) Risk Perceptions? Results of a Quasi‐Experimental Study

People's risk perceptions are generally regarded as an important determinant of their decisions to adjust to natural hazards. However, few studies have evaluated how risk communication programs affect these risk perceptions. This study evaluates the effects of a small-scale flood risk communication program in the Netherlands, consisting of workshops and focus group discussions. The effects on the workshop participants' ( n  = 24) and focus group participants' ( n  = 16) flood risk perceptions were evaluated in a pretest-posttest control group ( n  = 40) design that focused on two mechanisms of attitude change—direct personal experience and attitude polarization. We expected that (H1) workshop participants would show greater shifts in their flood risk perceptions compared with control group participants and that (H2) focus groups would rather produce the conditions for attitude polarization (shifts toward more extreme attitudinal positions after group discussion). However, the results provide only modest support for these hypotheses, perhaps because of a mismatch between the sessions' contents and the risk perception measures. An important contribution of this study is that it examined risk perception data by both conventional tests of the mean differences and tests for attitude polarization. Moreover, the possibility that attitude polarization could cause people to confirm their preexisting (hazard) beliefs could have important implications for risk communication.     

Expert Judgment-Based Risk Assessment Using Statistical Scenario Analysis: A Case Study—Running the Bulls in Pamplona (Spain)

In this article, we present a methodology to assess the risk incurred by a participant in an activity involving danger of injury. The lack of high-quality historical data for the case considered prevented us from constructing a sufficiently detailed statistical model. It was therefore decided to generate a risk assessment model based on expert judgment. The methodology is illustrated in a real case context: the assessment of risk to participants in a San Fermin bull-run in Pamplona (Spain). The members of the panel of "experts on the bull-run" represented very different perspectives on the phenomenon: runners, surgeons and other health care personnel, journalists, civil defense workers, security staff, organizers, herdsmen, authors of books on the bull-run, etc. We consulted 55 experts. Our methodology includes the design of a survey instrument to elicit the experts' views and the statistical and mathematical procedures used to aggregate their subjective opinions.